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“Toute la politique part d’un grain de blé” 
 
Honoré-Gabriel Mirabeau (1789) 
 
 
 
᾿Αλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν χρειῶν ἡ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευὴ τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ 
ζῆν ἕνεκα / But the first and most important of all needs is food, upon which our very 
existence and life depends. 
 
[Plato, Republic, 369 d] 
 
 
 
 
 
Κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισιν·  
ῥηιδίως γάρ κεν καὶ ἐπ' ἤματι ἐργάσσαιο,  
ὥστε σε κεἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἔχειν καὶ ἀεργὸν ἐόντα·  
 αἶψά κε πηδάλιον μὲν ὑπὲρ καπνοῦ καταθεῖο,  
ἔργα βοῶν δ' ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἡμιόνων ταλαεργῶν.  
ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς ἔκρυψε χολωσάμενος φρεσὶν ᾗσιν.  
 
For the Gods keep men’s livelihood hidden 
indeed, you could easily have worked even for a day, 
to keep yourself for a year, though remaining idle. 
Immediately you could hang your steering oar over the fireplace 
and the toils of oxen and hardworking mules would cease. 
But Zeus, because of the anger in his heart, hi dit. 
 
[Hesiod, Works and Days, 42-47, translated by A. T. Edwards (2014), pp. 44-45] 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Surplus, subsistence and shortage 
 
The grain supply of the Graeco-Roman 
Mediterranean, between agrarian economy, 
markets and civic institutions (1st -3rd c. AD) 
 
 
 
 
Nicolas SOLONAKIS 
 
 
 
 
Proefschrift voorgelegd tot het behalen van de graad van Doctor in de Geschiedenis 
 
2017 
 
 
 
 
 
  vii 
Acknowledgements 
Before opening the discussion, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the 
persons without whom I could never have achieved this PhD thesis. First of all, I would 
like to thank warmly Pr. Arjan Zuiderhoek, for the confidence he put in me for 
undertaking this research, for his sound advices, revisions, and for the countless 
stimulating discussions that we had during the past four years.  
I am also very grateful to the other members of the Doctoral Guidance Committee, 
Pr. Paul Erdkamp, Pr. Koen Verboven and Pr. François De Callataÿ, for taking the time 
to revise some parts of this research and for providing me with helpful comments. 
Their kindness, enthusiasm and understanding have been a crucial support for me. I 
also wish to thank the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research (FWO) which funded the 
project ‘Elites and the urban food supply in Roman Asia Minor’, allowing me to 
undertake this research in excellent conditions. Finally, my gratitude also goes to Pr. 
Jeroen Poblome for welcoming me at the Sagalassos excavation and allowing me to 
spend a few wonderful days on the site. 
Several other people deserve specific acknowledgements, for their active and 
invaluable contribution to this thesis: Anicet Touré and Mohamed Elhouderi, for 
spending countless hours programming my Monte-Carlo simulation and fixing my 
issues; Gerben Verbrugge, who designed the maps presented in Chap. III; Maarten Van 
Loo (KUL) and Brian J. Dermody who kindly accepted to share with me entire parts of 
their research and allowed me to reproduce them in my thesis; Pr. Jean-Louis 
Deneubourg (ULB), who spent hours helping me formalizing the mathematics of Chap. 
II; Pr. Alain Martin and Alain Delattre (ULB), my former epigraphy and ancient greek 
professors, who often helped me with the interpretation of difficult inscriptions; Sarah 
De Laet, for her advices regarding the geographical analysis.  
I would also like to thank my closest friends: Ludovic Suttor-Sorel, for designing the 
wonderful cover; Thibault Scohier and Galaad Wilgos, for bringing to my knowledge 
the works of Cornelius Castoriadis; Sophie Del Ducca and Ludovic once again, who 
helped me at a critical moment with my bibliography.  
 viii 
I express further gratitude to my colleagues Lindsey Vandevoorde and Kasey Reed, 
for the translation of abstracts and summaries, and for the proofreading of parts of this 
thesis. 
To my close family, I address another kind of gratitude. To my parents, who instilled 
in me the thirst of learning; to my mother, for her constant support and invaluable 
presence; to my father, who did me a big favor by teaching me modern Greek since my 
early age; to Naomi, finally, for her love and encouragements.  
 
Finally, I could not end these acknowledgements without paying respect to three 
people in particular: my former high school history teacher, Mrs Anne De Broeder, 
who revealed my passion for History, and my University professors, Pr. François De 
Callataÿ and Jean-Pierre Devroey, to whom I owe my particular interest for social and 
economic history.  
 
  ix 
Table of Contents 
General introduction ......................................................................................... 1 
Prolegomena ............................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 3 
From grain to fuel: object and purpose of the research .................................. 3 
Structure of the argument.................................................................................6 
Sources and methodology .......................................................................................... 7 
Data and documentary sources ........................................................................ 7 
Methods (1) – Interdisciplinary approach: the contribution of 
philology, economics, environmental sciences, and social 
sciences ................................................................................................... 7 
Methods (2) –  Models and formalization ...................................................... 10 
Field trip ........................................................................................................... 14 
Historiographical debates and theoretical framework ........................................... 15 
Food: production, distribution and intervention ........................................... 15 
Munificence versus civic finances .................................................................. 16 
Chapter 1 Subsistence, populations and environments ............................ 19 
1.1 Subsistence needs and socio-demographic constraints ................................ 19 
1.1.1 Nutritional requirements and food consumption .............................. 19 
1.1.2 Population and urbanization in Roman Asia Minor .......................... 20 
1.2 Environmental constraints: landscapes and climate of the Eastern 
Mediterranean (100 AD – 400 AD) ..................................................................21 
1.3 Limits and potential of Graeco-Roman agriculture ....................................... 26 
1.3.1 The Graeco-Roman ‘agrarian system’ and the Ancient 
agricultural revolution ......................................................................... 26 
1.3.2 Crop varieties and the ancient diet ..................................................... 30 
1.3.3 Seed yields, soil productivity and carrying capacity ........................... 32 
Chapter 2 Land exploitation and extraction of surplus ............................. 43 
2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 43 
2.2 Forms of land ownership and management ................................................. 46 
2.3 Economic modelling of ancient agricultural production .............................. 50 
 x 
2.3.1 The neoclassical model and its shortcomings .................................... 52 
2.3.2 Non-decreasing marginal returns : insights from H. C. Carey 
and P. Sraffa .......................................................................................... 54 
2.3.3 Cooperativity and the non-linear dynamic of labor-dependent 
yield ....................................................................................................... 60 
2.3.4 Non-linear labor productivity: addressing neoclassical 
inconsistencies ...................................................................................... 63 
2.3.5 An alternative production function .................................................... 65 
2.3.6 Town and countryside: modelling interactions .................................. 67 
2.3.6.1 The spatial division of labor ................................................... 67 
2.3.6.2 The Neo-classical model ......................................................... 68 
2.3.6.3 The Sraffa-Hill model .............................................................. 70 
2.3.6.4 Urban-driven growth or diminishing returns…but not 
both .......................................................................................... 72 
2.3.6.5 Urbanization and agricultural production: a generalized 
model ....................................................................................... 75 
2.4 Rents, land values and grain production ....................................................... 83 
2.4.1 The economics of land resources ........................................................ 83 
2.4.2 Rents and land returns in historical perspective : a case study 
from western Asia  Minor .................................................................... 88 
2.4.3 The share of rents in total produce as a proxy for the degree of 
surplus extraction ................................................................................. 97 
2.5 Direct taxation and tribute ........................................................................... 100 
Chapter 3 The grain supply systems and their functions ........................ 105 
3.1 Famines, grain prices and grain-related interventions ................................ 105 
3.1.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 105 
3.1.2 A chronological overview ................................................................... 106 
3.1.3 Grain prices in Asia Minor: variations, evolutions and ideas ............ 115 
3.1.4 Levels of grain-related interventions ................................................. 120 
3.2 Institutions ..................................................................................................... 126 
3.2.1 The lexical diversity of food-related offices ....................................... 126 
3.2.1.1 Preliminary remarks ............................................................... 126 
3.2.1.2 The data : grain-related terminology in the inscriptions 
and literature .......................................................................... 127 
3.2.1.3 Agoranomoi, sitophylakes and sitopolai ............................... 128 
3.2.1.4 Sitonai and sitonia .................................................................. 130 
3.2.1.5 Sitometria ............................................................................... 132 
  ................................................................................... 136 
3.2.1.7 Sitobolarioi and sitologoi ....................................................... 138 
3.2.1.8 Generic terms .........................................................................140 
3.2.1.9 Regional variations .................................................................140 
3.2.1.10 Artificial diversity ? ................................................................ 141 
3.2.1.11 Conclusion .............................................................................. 145 
3.2.2 Grain funds and grain doles : a case study ........................................ 146 
  xi 
3.2.2.1 The working of grain funds ....................................................147 
3.2.2.2 Anatolian grain-doles and the supply of Rome .................... 152 
3.2.2.3 Geographical synthesis : storage, distribution and 
supply schemes ....................................................................... 154 
3.2.3 Modelling the financial sustainability of grain funds ....................... 162 
3.2.3.1 The solvability condition ...................................................... 164 
3.2.3.2 The efficiency condition ........................................................ 189 
3.2.4 The decline of grain-related institutions in the 3rd c. AD : an 
attempt of explanation ....................................................................... 192 
3.2.4.1 The demographic and economic impact of the Antonine 
Plague ..................................................................................... 192 
3.2.4.2 The disappearance of the sitonìa .......................................... 201 
3.3 Benefactors and officials: two sides of the same coin? ................................ 205 
3.3.1 Patterns of civic grain-related munificence ...................................... 205 
3.3.2 Liturgies, magistracies, and euergetism : beyond the 
public/private opposition ................................................................... 208 
3.3.3 Social profile, status and institutional role of benefactors ................ 211 
3.3.4 The determinants of munificence and civic intervention: 
interpretative frameworks ................................................................... 217 
3.3.4.1 Euergetism as a social behavior : development, 
functions and ethics .............................................................. 218 
3.3.4.2 The rationale of grain-related interventions ........................ 222 
3.4 Markets, traders and money ......................................................................... 227 
3.4.1 Grain merchants and their strategies: ............................................... 227 
3.4.2 Cities: money and the commercialization of grain ............................ 231 
General conclusion ........................................................................................ 237 
Research perspectives ............................................................................................ 237 
Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 238 
Bibliography 245 
Appendix 1: grain-related benefactions ........................................................ 267 
Appendix 2 : mathematical appendix ............................................................ 271 
 
 
  1 
General introduction 
Prolegomena 
The Ancient Graeco-Roman world is marked by a stubborn paradox. Greek and Roman 
societies had attained levels of urbanization nearly unknown before the eighteenth 
century, with several megalopoleis, like Rome and its 1 million residents in the 1st c. AD, 
Athens, Alexandria, Carthage, Ephesos, or Antioch…; despite obvious variations over 
time and space, it periodically raised large parts of the population to unexpected levels 
of material well-being in the landscape of pre-industrial societies; it established 
innovative political institutions, developed sophisticated amenities, and yielded 
ground-breaking scientific and philosophical works that still constitute a fundamental 
part of European heritage. And yet it collapsed. Apart from the idea once expressed by 
Oswald Spengler that cultures and political constructs follow a life cycle inexorably 
leading to their decay, the reasons of the decline of ancient Graeco-Roman civilization 
and its economy has given rise to an ever-lasting debate. Some approaches have 
emphasized climatic changes and demographic causes (migrations, epidemics, etc.) – 
i.e. external causes – while others have underlined internal causes, such as the rise of 
Christianity (this was the famous thesis of Gibbon in 1776) or monetary policy. In fact, 
there is now an increasing consensus among ancient historians that the crisis of the 
Roman Empire and of ancient city-state culture involved numerous factors together in 
complex relationships, and it is their interplay and mutual reinforcement, rather than a 
single deus ex machina, which should be viewed as the crucial explanatory factor.  
 I must confess, however, that I have always been skeptical about considering that 
the political or institutional collapse of ancient Greek and Roman societies would 
equate the decline of ancient culture, economy and way of life. In many cities, and 
even more in rural areas, what Fernand Braudel has labeled the ‘the structures of daily 
life’ must have long remained unaffected by the political dismembering of the Empire. 
The idea of a continuity between before and after the fall of the Roman Empire is not 
new: it was already the grand theory of Henri Pirenne that the actual ‘end’ of Antiquity 
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resulted from the rupture of the of the economic and cultural unity of the 
Mediterranean basin in the 7th c. AD due to the rise and expansion of Islam. Fernand 
Braudel has shown, however, that the decrease in economic activity in the 
Mediterranean Sea had already begun long before the birth of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Yet, I think that the intuition of Pirenne, reworked later by Braudel, bears 
a fundamental truth: Graeco-Roman civilization was largely characterized by the 
intrinsic consistency of the Mediterranean Basin – beyond its ecological or cultural 
fragmentation – to which I would add civic political culture. It is for this reason that I 
have widened the geographical focus of this study, which was initially centered on Asia 
Minor, to the whole Eastern Mediterranean.  
 In the last fifty years, the focus of ancient scholarship has progressively 
abandoned investigating the issue of the ‘collapse’ of ancient Greek and Roman 
civilization and turned towards examining its socio-economic success instead. Much of 
this debate has been – and still is – dominated by the question of economic growth. I 
cannot provide a detailed explanation of why I think this approach can be no more 
than an intellectual tool to renew our methodological approaches to the ancient 
economy; yet, two remarks need to be stressed : first, although the concept of growth 
is theoretically no less applicable to the ancient economy than to ours, we lack – and 
will always lack – the required data to accurately measure ancient economic growth in 
a way that would allow comparison with other societies; second, the focus on 
economic growth – even in modern economics – too often overlooks the impact of the 
distribution of wealth between regions and social categories. Per capita output, it 
should be remembered, is no more than an intellectual construct to take account of 
population variations. It tells us nothing per se of how this production was 
appropriated, distributed, or consumed.  
 A more fruitful framework is perhaps to approach ancient economies in terms of 
living standards (or, as Braudel would say, of ‘material life’1), and to examine them in 
terms of achievements and limits rather than of success and failure. In this framework, 
notably represented by the network Structural Determinants of Economic Performance 
in the Roman World (SDEP), questions of natural resources, environments, social 
groups and political institutions, are among the major factors shaping the economy. 
Access to food – and, above all, grain – is evidently one of the most important aspects 
of the material life of ancient populations, which lies at the crossroads of those 
determining factors. 
 
 
                                               
1 Braudel (1979), p. 10 
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Introduction 
From grain to fuel: object and purpose of the research 
In his famous Prière sur l’Acropole, French writer Ernest Renan described with lyricism 
how much he had been impressed by his visit of the Acropolis, which, he says, was the 
testimony of a true ‘Greek miracle’. Nothing, however, of what Renan could admire of 
the Parthenon, or the Coliseum or any famous ancient building would have ever 
existed if the workers and slaves who built them had been starving. The same applies 
to the famous battles we love hearing about, and to the games and festivals which are 
so commonly used as typical embodiments of Antiquity: in an economy where labor is 
the principal production factor of both agricultural and non-agricultural commodities, 
an adequate supply of grain to the population was truly the economic pillar of the 
cultural, political and institutional superstructure. Since it provided the main source of 
calories at a relatively low cost, grain was by far the most important economic organic 
item of ancient Greek and Roman societies. In a sense, grain was as important to 
Greeks and Romans as fuel is to us: it was, by and large, their principal source of 
energy, since human labor was the major production factor. Moreover, the issues faced 
by ancient Greeks and Romans are still issues that people face nowadays in some 
regions of the globe: speculative hoarding, market failures, food riots…It is no surprise 
that such events occur today in Mozambique or India, that is, in economies which still 
exhibit some common features with pre-industrial societies. In a period where the 
world population exceeds seven billion people, the question of the relationship 
between Humans and their resources is more accurate than ever.  
  
 In order to shed some new light on the achievements and limitations of ancient 
economies, the purpose of this investigation will be to examine the determinants of the 
grain supply of ancient Greek and Roman populations, the most important of which 
can be listed straightaway:  
 
▪ The environmental conditions (soil, climate) and the efficiency of agriculture 
under specific farming practices 
▪ The exploitation of resources and the management of the produced surpluses 
▪ The efficiency of the different supply channels and the extent of civic grain-
related interventions  
  
The subject however requires some geographical and chronological narrowing. Hence, 
this project will focus on the Eastern Mediterranean, and more particularly on Asia 
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Minor understood in the broad sense of the whole Anatolian peninsula (the Roman 
province of Asia, Bithynia and Pontus, Cilicia, Phrygia and the central plateau of 
Galatia; cf map on next page2). Anatolia is an interesting case study because it offers 
abundant epigraphic evidence of grain supply intervention by civic magistrates, which 
will form the core chapter of this research. It has also received comparatively less 
discussion with regard to regions like Attica of the Latium. 
 
The three determinants listed above form the basis of the research questions which 
will guide this research. These questions are the following:  
 
(1) How conducive were environmental conditions of Roman Anatolia to 
agricultural production? 
(2) Beyond the environmental setting, what were the factors determining the 
size of available surpluses and how were these surpluses managed? 
(3) What were the precise channels through which cities gained access to grain 
supply and which forms did élite involvement in these channels take ? 
(4) How did grain -related intervention vary over time and across space ? 
 
There is an obvious connection between those issues: environmental conditions set the 
limits of the possible and the impossible, which human activities can only offset with 
considerable difficulty, all the more in a preindustrial society. On this layer of 
ecological constraints, socio-economic factors influenced the distribution of the 
surplus between regions and social groups. Finally, various mechanisms – mostly 
markets, élite munificence and civic institutions – intervene to overcome the effects of 
both environmental and socio-economic forces. Michael Rostovtzeff had well 
understood the relevance of this interaction of factors. So much, actually, that it led 
him to claim that the prevalence of civic grain funds in the East compared to the 
moderate frequency of grain specific magistrates in the West was due to the fact that 
cities of the Eastern Mediterranean had outstripped the carrying capacity of their 
hinterland3. In this investigation, I will try, among other things, to disprove this claim 
of him.  
 
 
                                               
2 The reader may refer to this map for several regions and cities referred to in this thesis.   
3 Rostovtzeff (1927), p. 139 
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Structure of the argument 
After briefly presenting the material on which my research has been based, I will 
explain in some detail the specific and quite uncommon methodologies which have 
been implemented in some parts of this thesis. Then, I shall concisely sum up previous 
views regarding ancient food supply and élite intervention before entering the subject 
per se. 
 
I will open the discussion on the major constraints which shaped food production in 
Roman Anatolia: the climate and environment of the region, its population level and 
urbanization, and most importantly the farming practices in operation. I will argue 
that the productivity of Anatolian agriculture in the Graeco-Roman context has been 
underestimated due to misconceptions regarding the extent of intensive farming. 
 The second chapter will deal with the conditions of surplus production and 
surplus appropriation in the form of rents and taxes. In this part, I will come up with 
an alternative economic model of agricultural production, which will reassess the 
dependency of total agricultural output to the ratio of labor to land, and I will argue 
that, most of the time, agrarian production in the Graeco-Roman context is not 
governed by any insuperable principle of diminishing returns. Then, I will account for 
the patterns of surplus extraction by landowners and Roman taxation, through the 
analysis of regional and epigraphic sources. 
 Finally, in chapter III, I will detail the major mechanisms involved in the cities’ 
grain supply, namely: élite munificence, civic institutions, and markets. As ancient 
grain markets have already been extensively discussed by previous scholarship, my 
contribution to this debate will be only marginal, and I will mostly focus on patterns of 
grain—related intervention by civic élites and civic supply systems. In this part, I will 
argue, inter alia, that (1) the lexical diversity of grain-supply intervention reflects an 
intense specification of tasks among city officials; (2) cities (and, less frequently, other 
levels of power) intervened regularly in the grain supply; (3) that civic grain funds were 
overall a far more sustainable system than scholars had previously thought; and that 
(4) there is a rationale of grain-supply interventions which accounts for both élite 
munificence regarding grain (or food) gifts and civic institutional frameworks. 
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Sources and methodology 
Data and documentary sources 
This research is essentially based on five types of sources. The fundamental material 
analyzed here consists of inscriptions. The collected corpus totalizes some 240 
inscriptions, 205 of which are specifically dealing with the food supply, while the 
others concern connected subject such as prices, rents, landed wealth,…etc. These 
inscriptions are naturally crossed with literary sources, which mostly consist of annals, 
biographies, or political writings sensu lato. Juridical sources, namely the Digest, also 
bring important complementary information. Finally, archaeological material is used 
incidentally in some specific cases.  
Methods (1) – Interdisciplinary approach: the contribution of 
philology, economics, environmental sciences, and social sciences 
As far as disciplines and data analysis are concerned, the principal methodological 
characteristic of this investigation is its interdisciplinary character. The 
interdisciplinary approach is not a mere fashion. Nor is it the panacea for improving 
historical research. But it is of particular interest in the framework of social and 
economic history, a fortiori when dealing with the food supply and the agrarian 
economy. Indeed, environmental conditions, agricultural practices, political 
institutions, social structures, customs and social norms, economic mechanisms of 
resource management and demographic trends are all intertwined and thus require a 
comprehensive and wide-ranging approach, impossible without methodological 
flexibility.  
 
It is trivial – and almost useless – to say that the starting point for historians – 
especially of Antiquity – is the reading of ancient sources. Philology and documentary 
analysis (papyri or inscriptions) are the conditio sine qua non for extracting 
information – whether qualitative or quantitative – from ancient texts4, and constitute 
the inevitable first step towards other more refined treatments of the data. From there, 
we will use our primary sources – mainly inscriptions – and literary texts from a 
qualitative perspective in order to discuss the ancient ‘agrarian system’ (cf. below), 
 
                                               
4 All translation presented in this dissertation are my own, unless specified otherwise. 
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land management and exploitation, and above all the forms of intervention in the 
grain supply and the role of institutions in this matter. But we will also use both 
literary sources and inscriptions in a quantitative perspective, the former for 
undertaking a statistical analysis of grain-related offices, and the latter for 
reconstructing the chronological and geographical spread of grain-related 
interventions. 
 Grain supply is intrinsically connected to various crucial issues: productive 
capacities and consumption patterns, distribution, management of land and labor, 
fluctuations of prices…etc. But the changes in grain accessibility – a probably more 
relevant concept than grain supply as will be advocated in chap. III – have very diverse 
effects according to the location and social position of individuals: town residents and 
country dwellers, middling citizen groups and wealthy councilors never endure 
identically the effects of a similar cause, and do not play the same role in the channels 
of food supply. For all these reasons, this investigation will be conducted in a resolutely 
socio-economic perspective and will thus regularly leave space for the application of 
concepts and theories borrowed from economics, as is the case in Erdkamp’s and 
Temin’s book, although P. Temin in fact reduces ‘economics’ to essentially ‘neo-
classical economics’.  
 Environmental sciences – and agronomy in particular– provide a further crucial 
methodological tool in order to undertake an integrated approach of the subject. Of 
course, environmental history – for all periods – is now on a roll, due to the current 
issues being at stake in our societies; yet, adding this perspective to an already diverse 
methodological toolbox is not a fancy attitude. Accounting for the ratio of available 
grain to the number of mouths to feed is directly influenced by the underlying 
assumptions we make regarding cereal yields, which in return are heavily dependent 
upon the local geomorphologic and climatic conditions as well as on farming practices. 
The fruitfulness of the contribution of earth sciences to history and archaeology need 
not be demonstrated anymore, as outstanding studies have now dramatically advanced 
our knowledge of the past. Perhaps the better examples of such ecological-
environmental history are R. Sallares The Ecology of the Ancient Greek world (1991), 
Horden & Purcell’s The corrupting sea (2000), and more recently the book by J. D. 
Hughes (2014) Environmental problems of the Greeks and the Romans  
 Finally, as history is first and foremost a matter of human behavior and collective 
dynamics, this research will also occasionally make use of theories and concepts 
borrowed from anthropology and sociology, and thereby frame some of our findings in 
a diachronic perspective in order to understand Graeco-Roman society in its relative 
continuity with other civilizations. This approach follows a scholarly tradition of 
ancient historians who have shed some new light on Antiquity by using concepts and 
theories developed by modern philosophers or social scientists : G. De Ste Croix (1981) 
  9 
and E. Meiksins Woods (1988), who applied a neo-marxist analytical grid to ancient 
Greek history; the ‘Weberian’ approach among ancient historians, whose most 
renowned representative is probably Moses Finley. This approach was further 
elaborated by by J. Love (1991) in his book Antiquity and Capitalism. Finally, more 
recently scholars reassessed the role and nature of gifts in ancient societies on the basis 
of the theories developed by Marcel Mauss and, some decades later, by Pierre 
Bourdieu. The use of such concepts and theories is obviously not neglecting the crucial 
importance of historical context; rather, it comes down to acknowledging that, ‘if 
history never repeats itself, it often rhymes’, as Mark Twain once wrote.  
 J. Poblome has recently advocated that future research should seek to better 
integrate a wide range of proxies together with theoretical frameworks opened by the 
increasing contribution of economic archaeology and natural science5s. This 
contribution to the ongoing debate on the food supply in preindustrial societies 
constitutes an attempt at addressing this salutary recommendation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                               
5 Poblome (2015), p. 140 
Economy Agriculture 
Environment 
Institutions Social structure 
System component interactions and interdisciplinary approach 
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Methods (2) –  Models and formalization  
Beside the interdisciplinary character regarding the disciplines involved, this research 
will also attempt at combining a variety of methods concerning the way of analyzing 
and interpreting the data. Direct exposition of – and inference from – the sources will 
take place in some parts of the analysis, in an attempt to decode the precise meaning 
and functions of the various grain-related offices. Here, nothing works best than the 
systematic interpretation of literary or epigraphic mentions taken individually, in order 
to allow the potential patterns to emerge from the addition of separate examples. For 
the main part of the investigation, however, important place will be left to the 
development of interpretative models.  
 The concept of ‘model’ is somehow ambiguous: on the one hand, it may refer to a 
theoretical scheme in which various variables or events are linked with one another in 
causal relationships. This is, for instance, the case of the ‘taxes and trade’ model 
developed by Keith Hopkins. On the other hand, the notion of ‘model’ designates a 
quantitative simulation, relying on definite algorithms, which computes a series of 
numerical variables. These quantitative models themselves can be divided into two 
families: the random (or stochastic) models, and the deterministic models. 
Deterministic models are those in which a set of equations predicts the behavior of one 
(or more) dependent variable. A very famous example is the well-known model 
developed by John Maynard Keynes which desribes how Gross National Income reacts 
to changes in tax rate, government expenditure, investment, consumption, or 
commercial balance6. In historical scholarship, deterministic models have been 
applied, among others, by P. Bang in trying to estimate the subsistence consumption in 
the Roman Empire as a function of the share of surplus taken by the imperial élite, and 
by. A. Zuiderhoek when he calculated the proportion of élite income spent on 
munificence as well as its relative weight compared to the civic expenditures7. 
Stochastic models, on the other hand, are those in which the behavior of the 
dependent variable is not pre-defined by a stable relationship, but rather displays a 
probabilistic behavior. Birth and death, for instance, are typical random events. The 
use of such simulation models is not new in the field of ancient history: Richard Saller 
used a stochastic model to analyze how the distribution of patrimony would evolve 
among a given population of Romans according to the randomness of births, deaths 
and marriages8. Lately, M. Lavan has developed a Monte-Carlo simulation model (cf. 
 
                                               
6 Keynes (1936) 
7 Zuiderhoek (2009), pp. 24-27 ; 37-51. 
8 Saller (1987), pp. 21-34 & Saller (1994) 
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Chap. III) to quantify the evolution of the number of roman citizens before the Edict of 
Caracalla9. Both random and deterministic models share a common feature: they need 
the independent and dependent variables to be connected; in other words, they need 
equations. In the models I built, whether ‘deterministic’ or random, the reader might 
consider them overly mathematic. Yet, I do not use mathematics rhetorically to 
impress the reader or to overemphasize the importance of rigor. In a recent essay, 
American economist Dani Rodrik has very clearly explained the usefulness of 
mathematics in quantitative models. Allow me to quote him in full : 
 
 ‘It has little to do with sophistication, complexity or claim of a higher truth. 
Math essentially plays two roles [in economics], neither of which is for glory: 
clarity and consistency. First, math ensures that the elements of a model – the 
assumptions, behavioral mechanisms, and main results – are stated clearly and 
are transparent. Once a model is stated in mathematical form, what is says or 
does is obvious to all who can read it. (…) The second virtue of mathematics is 
that it ensures the internal consistency of a model – simply put, that the 
conclusions follow from the assumptions.’10 
 
 I must confess that some of the most famous deterministic models in ancient 
economy, those of K. Hopkins and W. Jongman, have often puzzled me because the 
actual connections between independent and dependent variables, as well as their 
relations of proportionality were not expressed in a mathematical form. Let me give an 
abstract example of what is problematic in keeping the mathematics implicit. Stating 
that ‘the soil productivity increases as the number of laborers per unit of land 
increases’ is one thing, but it does not say if this increase is linear, exponential or 
follows a power-law. This might seem like a detail, but as I will show in Chap. II, the 
actual mathematical relationship between two variables can have a dramatic impact on 
the conclusions of the model. It is mostly for this reason that I chose to be transparent 
and express my assumptions in mathematical form, even if at the cost of an apparently 
increased complexity or abstraction.   
 Whatever the way they are expressed, models respond to a legitimate question 
among scholars: how can we increase and refine our knowledge and understanding of 
past societies? There are, usually, three ways : (1) a new reading or interpretation of 
existing documents; (2) the discovery of new material (literary or archaeological) 
 
                                               
9 Lavan (2016), pp. 3-46 
10 Rodrik (2015), pp. 31-32 
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which contradicts existing theories; and (3) the analysis of historical data with new 
methods, sometimes borrowed to other disciplines (economics, social sciences, earth 
sciences,...etc). The process of archaeological and historical discoveries can obviously 
not be planed; it is partly tributary to the survey policies and accessibility to unused 
material, and partly random. Hence, in the absence of a continuous inflow of new 
documents, the historian is confronted to the Iron law of the fragmentary nature of its 
data. In this situation, once all the information that could be extracted from a body of 
documents has been analyzed, discussed, and confronted to opposing views, and that 
ongoing issues cannot be solved, there are two possible attitudes: the first, and logical 
attitude, is to keep the questions open and apply the famous assertion of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: ‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’. The other 
possible attitude, in the absence of data that could bridge the gaps in our knowledge, is 
to ‘simulate the ancient past’, to borrow W. Jongman’s phrase11. In other words, the 
idea is to reconstruct, through logical relationships, the way variables are likely to have 
influenced one another in a specific context. This of course, requires simplifying 
complex realities. For us historians and archaeologists who are trained to pay attention 
to the details of various historical and cultural contexts, and who are precisely 
accustomed to emphasizing the complexities of the situation we are studying, these 
necessary simplifying hypothesis may often seem fanciful. However, simplification in 
itself is no evil. Dani Rodrik, once again, has clearly discussed the conditions of validity 
of (economic) models. Let me quote his argument, which I follow in this study: 
 
‘For a model to be useful in the sense of tracking reality, its critical assumptions 
also have to track reality sufficiently closely. What exactly is a critical 
assumption? We can say an assumption is critical if its modification in an 
arguably more realistic direction would produce a substantive difference in the 
conclusion produced by the model. Many, if not most, assumptions are not 
critical in this sense.’12 
  
In other words, some unrealistic assumptions can be fine as long as they do not have a 
crucial effect on the outcome of the model. 
 This is an important step, but it still leaves one aspect of models undiscussed: 
their inputs. Contemporary economists have the advantage that they can test their 
models by confronting them with a huge quantity of data; ancient economic historians 
 
                                               
11 Jongman (1988), p.19 
12 Rodrik (2015), p. 27 
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do not have this luxury. This means that several parameters of the model are not 
accessible from the documents. To overcome this problem, I will follow a widely used 
method among historians (notably by K. Hopkins and P. Bang13), which M. Hansen has 
labeled ‘the shotgun method’, and which consists of filling the gaps of our model with 
a set of reasonable guesstimates. Hence, the models can be run by combining the few 
quantitative data at our disposal in the sources – once given a critical discussion – and 
some reasonable quantitative speculations What we should remind here is that, unlike 
economists, accuracy of the result is not our main goal; what we are looking for is 
merely to obtain an order of magnitude. Compared to our near ignorance of the 
answers to some questions to which our documents alone cannot provide a solution, 
having at least a notion of the orders of magnitude and the rough distinctions between 
what is likely and what is unlikely is still better than nothing. 
 The methodological position I would like to defend here is that of the variety of 
methods. Innovation is not an end in itself. My claim is that different problems are 
often best addressed using different methods, or by a combination of many. In some 
parts of this study I will rely on the inference from the sources, while in some others I 
develop both deterministic and random models. To quote W. Jongman once again, 
‘Pure induction is an illusion, as is pure deduction’14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13 For instance : Bang (2008), pp. 85-88 & 117-118 
14 Jongman (1988), p. 187 
Guesstimates
ModelsSources
Protocol for interpreting the data and constructing 
information 
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Field trip 
A final methodological aspect of this investigation was gaining some field experience. 
Unlike archaeology, most of historical research on various subjects can yield excellent 
results without having ever seen the region we are studying. This is also true of 
economic history. However, for such a tangible matter as the agrarian economy and 
the consumption of food, it seemed important to go on the field and visit some of the 
sites discussed in the thesis. To do this, I undertook two trips in Turkey: one near 
Izmir in September 2014 and one field trip in South-West Turkey (the ancient regions 
of Lycia and Pisidia) in summer 2016. Overall, I was able to visit ten ancient cities (cf. 
map below), which I chose so as to a roughly equal proportion of mountain, plain and 
coastal sites. I do not claim that this revealed any new truth, or that it was 
indispensable to the project. However, this influenced the way the research questions 
have been structured, and definitely convinced me of the importance of integrating the 
study of environment and local topography in research on food supply and agrarian 
history. 
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Historiographical debates and theoretical framework 
Food: production, distribution and intervention 
The study of the food supply is not a new topic of ancient social and economic history, 
though it probably received less attention than coins or craftsmanship, either because 
of the (obvious) absence of material remains, or because it belonged to a cohort of 
topics which were not perceived as ‘noble’ before the methodological revolution 
brought by the Annales. The first complete study of ancient food supply dates back to 
A. Jardé (1925) who undertook a systematic study of cereal production in Hellenistic 
and Classical Greece by successively examining agricultural conditions (crop varieties, 
yields, areas under cultivation, farming practices,…), the modes of land exploitation 
and consumption requirements for men and animals. His study constitutes a rich and 
erudite survey which should still be a starting point of any investigation on the subject. 
However, as far as agricultural conditions are concerned, it relies on the assumption of 
a straightforward comparability of ancient Greek agriculture with its early 20th century 
counterpart, which, as we will see, is questionable, to say the least.  
 The most wide-ranging and pioneering work on the subject is doubtless the 
major work by P. Garnsey (1988). By the two case studies on which he focuses – Athens 
in Classical and Hellenistic times, and Rome in the Republican and Imperial period – 
Garnsey encompasses nearly the whole Mediterranean along some eight centuries. 
Monumental by its scope, Garnsey’s work also impresses by its comprehensiveness and 
consistency: it is the first study on the subject which considers at once the conditions 
of agricultural production and subsistence strategies of peasants, the supply channels 
of cities and the influence of war and politics. As far as our research is concerned, the 
findings of Garnsey can be summarized as follows : (1) one should carefully distinguish 
shortage from famine : food crisis were frequent, but actual starvation were quite rare 
15Shortages were not solely dependent upon variability in environmental conditions 
but were largely determined by the mechanisms of grain distribution; (2) peasant 
strategies to ensure their subsistence relied mostly on a combination of risk-avoiding 
practices, involvement in non-market networks (family, patronage, and other 
relationships of reciprocity), and adaptation of their demographic behavior; (3) 
political responses to alleviate food shortages were of moderate scope and mostly 
inefficient. Euergetism played the major role in addressing food shortages but was 
 
                                               
15 Garnsey (1988), pp. 3-17 
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doomed to be ineffective because speculators and benefactors belonged to the same 
social strata; (4) the impact of the Roman Empire on the provinces was overall neutral : 
increased exploitation and increased stability counterbalanced each other, while most 
of the time imperial governments did not intervene to undermine the effect of 
shortages outside Italy.  
 
 Catherine Virlouvet (1995, 2009) has undertaken the most detailed study of the 
legal, social and logistic aspects of grain distributions in Rome – and sketched the 
comparison with the provinces. – by combining literary evidence, inscriptions and 
archaeological material (tessera). She has revealed the frequent deviations from the 
rule defining the accessibility conditions to the plebs frumentaria – the recipients of 
the grain distributions, and shown that poverty was far from the principal criterion.  
 P. Erdkamp (2005) has provided the most recent and complete reassessment of 
the question since the book of P. Garnsey. He focuses on the grain market(s) 
throughout the Roman Empire, understood in the broader sense of supply mechanisms 
and networks. His main conclusion is that a structural responses in the form of civic 
infrastructures aimed at ensuring a more or less regular grain supply because markets 
were most of the time unsuccessful in coping efficiently with shortages. 
 A. Moreno (2007) constitutes to some extent an update of Jardé’s pionneering 
study, but focused on the case of Attica. Moreno argued at once that Athens was a 
structural importer of cereals in the major part of its history and that the policies set 
up by the Athenian polis managed to overcome its demographic overload compared to 
the carrying capacity of its hinterland. Whether Athens was closer to the exception or 
the rule among ancient Greek cities is however another matter   
Munificence versus civic finances 
In parallel to the different approaches of provincial food supply in the Graeco-Roman 
world, the dialectical relationship between euergetism and civic funds will be a regular 
question during this investigation. Views on civic finances have long been pessimistic. 
Even the modernist Rostovtzeff argued that revenues of cities were barely sufficient to 
pay for their expenses, and that benefactions therefore played a major role in their 
food supply16. Similarly, for Saller & Garnsey, the weakness of civic finances rendered 
 
                                               
16 Rostovtzeff (1927), p. 141 sqq 
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private largesse necessary17. M. Sartre even considered that the cities’ expenses far 
exceeded their income18.  
 Other scholars have however countered this view of insufficient and fragile civic 
finances, which they present as more stable and resilient. The most representative 
scholar of this stream of thought is probably Léopold Migeotte. In his various works 
regarding the finances of ancient Greek city-states, Migeotte essentially argued that we 
should acknowledge the important diversity of the sources of civic funds: ‘public and 
sacred funds, surplus management, subscriptions, loans (…) and improvising, if 
needed, by asking for the financial support of some notables’19.  
 Following Migeotte, P. Fröhlich claimed that ‘we should not envisage everything 
through the angle of the financial distress of cities’20. The most recent comprehensive 
revision of the relative importance of euergetism is owed to Arjan Zuiderhoek. In his 
book The politics of munificence in the Roman Empire, Zuiderhoek calculated the 
average élite expenditure on benefactions. Basing himself on a quantitative model of 
an ideal-type city’s GDP which he confronts to a sample of sums relating to 
benefactions, he showed that the financial importance of euergetism should be revised 
downwards21. On the other hand, Hertha Schwartz presented a detailed study of civic 
revenues in Asia Minor during the Principate. Her investigation revealed that we can 
find little indices of chronic financial difficulties of the cities of the regions she 
analyzed, and that liturgies or summae honorariae did not count much in the civic 
budget22.As will be seen in this research, these challenging results agree well with our 
reassessment of the role of civic funds and infrastructures in urban grain supply. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
17 Garnsey & Saller (1987), p. 58 
18 Sartre (1991), pp. 135sqq 
19 Migeotte (1995), p. 86 
20 Fröhlich (2005), p. 251. 
21 Zuiderhoek (2009), pp. 24-36 
22 Schwartz (2001), pp. 313-325 
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Chapter 1  
Subsistence, populations and environments 
This introductory chapter aims at sketching the broader context into which the 
specific issues of grain production and distribution must be set in Roman Anatolia. In 
it, I will discuss the main variables affecting grain needs and grain production:  
 
(1) The population of Asia Minor, its rate of urbanization and its aggregate 
nutritional requirements ; 
(2) The environmental conditions, namely the geomorphology of Anatolia and the 
climate of the eastern Mediterranean;  
(3) Finally the general characteristics of the Graeco-Roman agrarian system (with 
the specificities regarding Asia Minor), focusing on crop varieties and the level 
of cereal yields; 
1.1 Subsistence needs and socio-demographic constraints 
1.1.1 Nutritional requirements and food consumption 
 
The starting point of subsistence needs is naturally the physical requirements of men. 
A sufficient staple food intake is indeed the conditio sine qua non of the reproduction 
not only of the labor force which constitutes the foundation of the economic structure 
of society, but also of the perpetuation of the political and cultural activities. The 
matter is not as simple as it may seem at first glance, for daily subsistence 
requirements vary greatly between men and women, between adults, the elderly and 
children, well-to-do and poor people, as well as relative to an individual’s degree of 
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physical activity. Based on FAO estimates, Foxhall & Forbes – whose study is still the 
most comprehensive on this subject – conclude that a very active male (agricultural 
laborer or unskilled worker) in his 20’s or 30’s requires some 3,340 cal/day.23 Braudel 
reckons with a somewhat higher figure of between 3,500 and 4,000 cal/day24. Overall, 
food consumption made up some 60-80% of a household’s budget. 
1.1.2 Population and urbanization in Roman Asia Minor 
From the household or individual level, we must know move to the aggregate level of 
grain requirement, which depends upon the size of the population to be fed. Several 
attempts at calculating the population of Anatolia in Graeco-Roman times have been 
made. There are, as usual, low counters and high counters: in his pioneering study on 
the size of ancient populations, K. J. Beloch suggested a total population of Asia Minor 
of 13 million people25, hence definitely paving the way for the high counters, since the 
census in Turkey in 1927 yielded a population size of some 14 million inhabitants. A few 
decades after Beloch, in what is undoubtedly the richest and widest survey of Asia 
Minor, T. R. S. Broughton initiated the low count view with an estimate of 7.3 million 
inhabitants26. Some decades later, McEvedy & Jones reckoned with an even more 
pessimistic figure of 6 million inhabitants27. The first study to go beyond these mere 
guesstimates is that by Stephen Mitchell. By combining data on settlement patterns, 
land use and management, and agricultural techniques, by reconstructing the 
circulation of grain from production to consumption whilst taking into account the 
interplay of rents and taxes and the disparities between town and countryside, he 
suggested a total Anatolian population of 8.19 million residents, which he considers to 
be an underestimate28. An almost identical estimate has been made by Frier who posits 
an Anatolian population of 8.2 million residents under Augustus, but argues that the 
region experienced non-negligible demographic growth and reached 9.2 million people 
by AD 16429. In his massive investigation of world economic history, Maddison arrives 
at a total of 8 million people30. Finally, Scheidel suggests a somewhat intermediate 
 
                                               
23 Foxhall & Forbes (1982), p. 49 
24 Braudel (1979) 
25 Beloch (1886), p. 507 
26 Broughton (1938), p. 619 
27 McEvedy & Jones (1978), p. 115, 135 & 139 
28 Mitchell (1993), p. 244 
29 Frier (2000), p. 812 & 814. 
30 Maddison (2007), p. 25 
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figure between high counters and low counters with an estimate of 9-10 million 
residents31. 
 How was this population distributed between town and countryside? Here 
estimates seem to find agreement easier. Goldsmith once suggested that the average 
urbanization rate in the provinces would be around 11.5%32. However, the East was 
notably far more densely settled than the West33. Scheidel thus suggests that the 
urbanization rate in the East would not have exceeded 20%34. 
1.2 Environmental constraints: landscapes and climate of 
the Eastern Mediterranean (100 AD – 400 AD) 
The geomorphology of Asia Minor is largely shaped by tectonic forces, which gave rise 
to the two major mountain chains of the region: the Pontic chain to the North, on the 
southern coast of the Black Sea, and the Taurus chain to the South, on the northern 
façade of the Mediterranean Sea. Similarly, the Sea of Marmara (the Propontis 
depression) and the fertile valley of the Meander which irrigates the Western coast are 
the result of fault lines35. The complex geological configuration of the Anatolian 
Peninsula generated four main biogeographical units: the Tauric region (Pisidia, Lycia, 
and Cilicia), the Pontic regions (Bithynia-Pontus and Paphlagonia), the Aegean 
Coastland and the Central plateau (mainly corresponding to the ancient regions of 
Galatia and Phrygia)36. These geomorphological processes are not without influence on 
the local weather conditions, since mountains play a crucial role in blocking and 
cooling water laden clouds. Hence, it is no surprise if the northern and southern 
mountain regions are also those where the highest levels of average annual rainfall37. 
 From a climatological point of view, the Mediterranean basin is a semi-arid, 
subtropical climate mainly characterized by a marked contrast between a hot a dry 
summer and a colder and wet winter – with only very short and discrete autumn and 
 
                                               
31 Scheidel (2007), p. 48 
32 Goldsmith (1982), p. 272 n.49 
33 Frier (2000), p. 812 
34 Scheidel (2007), pp_48-49 
35 Bresson (2016), p. 32 
36 Bridges (1991), pp. 151-152 ; Arena (2005), pp. 47-48 
37 Arena (2005), pp. 51-52 
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spring seasons – and subject to a strong inter-annual variability in both rainfall and 
temperature. In terms of regional spread, Braudel used to locate the Mediterranean 
climate between the northern limit of the olive tree and the southern limit of 
continuous palm groves38. Yet, these general characteristics, which are valid for most of 
the basin, should not conceal the instability of the Mediterranean climate, whose 
dynamic is extremely complex. The summer-winter alternation throughout the 
Mediterranean mostly obeys atmospheric features, in particular the changes in the 
North-Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), which has indeed widely been identified as the 
dominant factor affecting wind regimes and rainfall in the Mediterranean by 
commanding the intensity and trajectory of Atlantic depressions over the 
Mediterranean Sea39. The NAO also plays an important role with regard to the specific 
weather conditions in the central and Eastern Mediterranean : Atantic depressions lose 
energy along their eastward path, but keep carrying masses of cold air which, once 
they enter into contact with moister and warmer air of the oriental basin, result in 
atmospheric instabilities, precipitations, and cyclones. However, it is now increasingly 
argued by climate scientists that the NAO does not have as strong an effect on the 
eastern basin as it does on the western basin. As far as the eastern Mediterranean is 
concerned, other atmospheric features also play a very important role, such as the 
Persian trough (PT) the Red Sea trough (RST), the monsoon of the Indian 
subcontinent40, or the North-Sea Caspian Pattern index (NCPI), which has been shown 
to have a better correlation with the climate of the Eastern Mediterranean than the 
NAO. The consequence of the combination of these patterns is that the same stimulus 
such as a stronger NAO could well trigger opposite responses in the western and 
eastern basin.  
 
 In addition to these ‘external’ influences, the thermic and barometric structure of 
the Mediterranean basin itself plays an important climatic role: the pressure gradient 
between western and eastern regions might ‘influence climate variability and inter-
annual scales’41. Moreover, in addition to the Atlantic depressions, local zones of 
cyclogenesis play also an important role, especially in the Aegean and around Genoa 
and Cyprus42. As far as Asia Minor is concerned, an important feature affecting the 
wind regime of the region is the difference between Balkanic and Levantine 
 
                                               
38 Braudel (1990 a), p. 284 
39 Harding, Palutikoff & Holt (2009), p. 73 
40 Ibidem ; Ulbrich et al. (2012), pp.317-319  
41 Harding, Palutikoff & Holt (2009), p. 74 
42 Ibidem, pp. 74-75 ; Ulbrich et al. (2012), pp. 312-313 
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atmospheric pressures, which determine the well-known Etesian winds blowing over 
the Aegean43.  
 But the most important structural feature is probably the clearly warmer sea 
surface temperature of the Eastern Mediterranean44, combined to its higher thermal 
amplitude45. These particular features – variation in atmospheric circulation, higher 
sea surface temperature – combined with the regional geomorphology, may explain to 
a certain extent a very peculiar characteristic of the eastern basin, in complete 
opposition to the dominant pattern over the largest part of the Mediterranean sea: the 
observed positive correlation between precipitation and temperatures46 – while the 
inverse is true for the central and western basin. Hence, although general features 
undoubtedly allow us to characterize the Mediterranean region as belonging to a 
specific climate zone – given that deviations due to geomorphologic influences are 
characteristic of every region of the globe and not specifically the Mediterranean – it 
remains nonetheless true that the climate dynamic may exhibit considerable variations 
between the eastern and western basins.  
 What should mostly be reminded from this discussion is that, the Eastern 
Mediterranean basin follows a specific pattern which is only partly similar to that of 
the Western basin. Regarding the Anatolian peninsula more specifically, the 
combination of the geomorphological and climatic characteristics results is an 
ecologically fragmented environment47 in terms of altitude, bedrock, rainfall or 
temperature. Although the hottest and driest months are July and August almost 
everywhere, the intra-annual distribution of rainfall and temperature may vary 
considerably, as can be noticed on the climatograms of Fig. 2. As we will see later on, 
these two aspects are of great importance for the production and circulation of 
agricultural commodities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
43 Bresson (2016), pp. 37-38 
44 Bozec (2006), p. 6 ; Shaltout & Omstedt (2014), pp. 417-418 
45 Harding , Palutikof & Holt (2009), p. 70 
46 Dermody et al.(2014), suppl. (fig. S6) 
47 On ecological fragmentation : Horden & Purcell (2000), pp. 78-81 & 175-176 
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 Beside these regional variations, the Mediterranean climate also experienced 
significant changes over time. It is therefore important to describe the global climatic 
conditions in Graeco-Roman times, as well as to account for the shorter climatic 
variations noticeable for the Eastern Mediterranean during this period. An increasingly 
large set of proxies from various regions indicate that the Graeco-Roman world 
experienced both warm, wet and stable climatic conditions compared to previous and 
later centuries48 : pollen analysis, oxygen isotopes from Greenland ice cores, and tree 
rings (a less robust proxy, to be sure49) agree in identifying what has been labelled as 
 
                                               
48 Sallares (2007), p. 19 ; Ljungqvist (2010), pp. 344-345 ; Chen et al. (2011), p. 3888 ; Rossignol (2012), p. 
98 ; McCormck et al. (2012), pp. 174-180. Although Bresson rejects, quite unconvincingly, that the Roman 
Optimum could have been warmer than present-day conditions : cf. Bresson (2014), pp. 56-57.  
49 Swedish dendro-climatologist Hakan Grudd has indeed demonstrated that tree rings carry an 
intrinsic bias as temperature indicators : younger trees tend to build thicker rings than older trees, and 
thus respond differently to an identical thermal or hydric stimulus.. Grudd showed than climatic 
reconstruction based on tree-ring thickness should be calibrated by using (taking into account ?) wood 
density : Grudd (2008), pp. 843-857. 
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Fig.2. Present-day climatograms of four Anatolian cities (Source : Royal Meteorological Institute) 
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the ‘Roman Optimum.’ The reason for this period of overall climatic stability and 
warmth are probably to be sought in the intensity and stability of solar irradiance – 
known to have been one of the principal factors in influencing the climate for the 
major part of Earth’s history – combined with a period of exceptionally low levels of 
volcanic activity50. The precise extent and degree of this stable warm period is still 
debated, but growing evidence tends to point towards a climatic degradation during 
the 3rd c. AD, followed by a restoration of warm conditions in the 4th c. AD.  
 The question is, however, how this European-wide scheme is reflected in the 
regional climatic records of Anatolia. A full regional palaeoclimatic study involving a 
combination and comparison of proxies has yet to be carried out but Turkey presents 
very interesting material: plant residues, glaciers, lake sediments and, above all, 
speleothems (i.e. stalagmites and stalactites), by far the best preserved material. 
Carbon and oxygen isotopes of such speleothems in four Turkish caverns provide high 
resolution signals for effective moisture (δ13C) and temperature (δ18O) : the Sofular 
cave record broadly confirms the general evolution of the Mediterranean climate 
outlined above, clearly pointing towards a cooler and dryer 3rd c. AD51, although the 
Kocain cave record seem to indicate that the cooling period concerned the 4th rather 
than the 3rd. c.AD52. Such discrepancies might result from the strong influence of local 
geomorphology on water composition and, hence, on the isotopic composition of the 
calcium carbonate deposits. Furthermore, these regional speleothem records exhibit 
significant discrepancies with other data from the Mediterranean region as to the 
intensity and time span of the Roman Optimum53. These discrepancies should thus 
remind us of the fragility of the notion of ‘global climate’, even when applied to a 
relatively restricted region such as the Mediterranean. If any large scale climate change 
has a global origin, as underlined by M. Sanchez-Goni, and W. Burroughs after her54, 
‘the real question is how more rapid changes affected different parts of the world’55. If 
global dynamic commands the major trends, the intensity and shorter term 
fluctuations are significantly dependent upon regional or local environmental 
conditions.  
 
                                               
50 McCormick et al. (2012), pp. 175-180. 
51 Luterbacher et al. (2012), p.105 
52 Gökturk (2011), p. 54 
53 Gökturk (2011), pp. 57-58 
54 Sanchez-Goni (1996), pp. 7-8 ; Burroughs (2005), pp. 31-32. 
55 Burroughs (2005), pp. 31-32. 
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1.3 Limits and potential of Graeco-Roman agriculture  
1.3.1 The Graeco-Roman ‘agrarian system’ and the Ancient 
agricultural revolution  
The concept of ‘agrarian system’ originates in the work of geographers and 
agronomists of the mid-20th century and describes an integrated approach to 
agriculture in its agronomical, environmental, social and economic context. Here we 
mostly follow the comprehensive definition provided my Mazoyer & Roudart. They 
define the ‘système agraire’ as :  
 (…) l’expression théorique d’un type d’agriculture historiquement constitué et 
géographiquement localisé, composé d’un écosystème cultivé caractéristique et 
d’un système social productif défini, celui-ci permettant d’exploiter durablement 
la fertilité de l’écosystème cultivé correspondant56. 
The theory of agrarian systems is thus very useful from the historian’s perspective 
because it analyzes agriculture in terms of its geographical differentiation and its 
evolution over time. As stated by Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, this 
integrative approach considers agriculture as consisting of a combination of a 
cultivated ecosystem and a productive social system.  
 
(a) The cultivated ecosystem consists of portions of the natural setting which are 
modified by human agency in accordance with various factors (technology, available 
resources, relationship between husbandry and vegetable cultivation…etc). It is 
composed of arable land (ager), meadows (saltus), pastures, forests (silva) and gardens 
(hortus), and characterized by the varieties of cultivated crops. 
 
(b) The productive social system relates to the institutions and socio-economic 
structures (land ownership, type of labor, infrastructures…etc) with which the rural 
population interacts in order to produce the means of subsistence and surpluses. 
 
Graeco-Roman agriculture was basically polyculture57 : cereals, legumes, olives and 
sometimes vines were planted alongside each other in the same field. The obvious 
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reason for this prevalence of polyculture, both in small-scale farms and latifundia is the 
attempt to minimize risk in a context of unstable environmental conditions. Similarly, 
as we will see in the next section, an important diversity of cereals cultivated, 
especially in Italy, Asia Minor and the East.  
 From a technological point of view, ancient agriculture was essentially rain fed 
(most ancient farming was dry farming). Irrigation was limited to Egypt and some 
areas of the Near-East. Even if recent research increasingly challenges the once widely 
held view that ancient technology was of limited development – for example, Hero’s 
engine or the Anticythera mechanism– it remains that, as far as agriculture was 
concerned, technical means were quite rudimentary. Ancient Greek and Roman 
farmers used three major tools in particular in agricultural production: the spade and 
the hoe, handled by workers themselves, and the swing plough, which necessitated 
light animal traction58. The extent and impact of agricultural innovations by Greeks 
and Romans is still intensely debated, as is visible in a recent opus on the subject: some 
scholars argue for the presence of substantial technological innovations59, while others 
claim that the diffusion of such innovations – and hence their economic impact – 
remained within very tight limits.60 Alan Bowman and Andrew Wilson nevertheless 
reveal a clear peak in the use of water-mills throughout the Mediterranean in the 2nd 
and 3rd c. AD61. In terms of factors of production, the most important were land, 
human labor, and animal traction. 
  
 Perhaps the most crucial debate regarding the Graeco-Roman agrarian system 
concerns the relationship between livestock and arable farming. It has traditionally 
been quite widely argued that ancient Greek and Roman agriculture was characterized 
by a rather strict division between husbandry and farming, and by a biennial fallow on 
arable land. According to this scheme, ancient arable farming was characterized by an 
alternation of cereal cultivation and bare fallow. On the other hand, transhumance is 
seen as inevitable due to the variation in environmental conditions between highlands 
and lowlands along the year, while also fostered by the insufficiency of fodder 
production due to bare fallowing. As it is, the complementarity of transhumance and 
bare fallowing relies on what looks like a circular argument: transhumance partly 
results from bare fallow, but bare fallow is also a consequence of the limited resources 
of soils due to the scarcity of manure because transhumance removes livestock from 
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59 Forni (2006), pp. 145-180 : the discussion is however resticted to Italy. 
60 Brun (2006), pp. 101-130 
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the fields... As Paul Halstead noted, the assumed prevalence of bare fallow – and, 
hence, the rarity of crop rotation and soil fertility improvement by manuring – in 
Graeco-Roman farming derives from the idea that water is the limiting factor in 
ancient agriculture, rather than nutrients. This idea may well be true for very arid 
regions of the Mediterranean, but it is based on a misunderstanding of fallow’s 
function as allowing the storage of water in the soil. In fact, a considerable part of rain 
water would flow, evaporate or percolate62 through the karstic networks of calcareous 
regions, while a significant part of the water stored in the soil will be lost due to 
evapotranspiration of the spontaneous vegetation63.  
  As Halstead states on the basis of an experimental survey conducted in Cyprus in 
the mid-20th century, cereal/pulse crop rotation and manured cropping are both far 
more productive than bare fallowing. The extrapolation of the widespread presence of 
bare fallowing into the ancient past was based on modern observations of Greek 
agriculture in the 19th and 20th century. Yet, the prominence of bare fallowing in Greece 
in the modern period resulted from specific settlement patterns and from conditions of 
relative scarcity of manpower. Indeed, despite smaller yields per unit of land, bare 
fallowing is more productive per unit of labor64. Therefore, the specific historical 
conditions in which bare fallowing became prominent in Greece in the 19th and 20th 
centuries cannot simply be transposed to the ancient world. .  
 On the basis of Halstead’s criticism of the traditional view of ancient farming as 
overwhelmingly dominated by extensive dry farming coupling transhumance with bare 
fallow, a new model of ancient agriculture has been proposed by S. Hodkinson, 
followed by P. Garnsey65 and more recently relayed by Kron66, which advocates for the 
prevalence of intensive mixed farming where livestock and arable farming are more 
integrated, and where fertility improvement strategies by manuring and crop rotation 
frequently take place. It is not the purpose of this discussion to arbitrate between the 
traditional model and the “new” model, but some specific points require discussion.  
 The advantages of manuring, which reconstituted the nitrogen and phosphorus 
content of the soil, were far from underestimated in ancient farming67. Ancient authors 
make clear recommendation of the use of animal manure68, compost69 and mineral 
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fertilizers70 such as limestone or chalk, wood ashes, bone residue, burnt marble or 
potash71. Archaeological surveys have also identified the presence of crushed pottery 
sherds dispersed on fields as evidence for another source of mineral fertilizers72. In the 
context of crop rotation, the cultivation of pulses (peas, lentils, and more particularly 
lupines) had been noticed by ancient farmers to improve soil fertility, although they 
did not understand the process of nitrogen fixation in the soil through the action of 
these vegetables73. 
 The crucial role played by legumes, both as providers of crucial nutrients absent 
from cereals and as agents of soil fertility enhancement, raises the question of the 
extent to which ancient farmers replaced the two-field system of bare fallowing by crop 
rotation involving legumes and cereals. Some sources support the suggestion that they 
might sometimes have done so. An Attic inscription from the early 4th c. BC 
unambiguously mentions a three year rotational cycle involving the cultivation of 
pulses74; moreover, the well-known reference of Varro advising biennial fallowing does 
not actually refer to bare fallow, but instead recommends ‘sowing the field more 
lightly’ (agrum alternis annis relinqui opportet aut paulo leuioribus sationibus)75. While 
G. Kron argues that crop rotation came to replace bare fallowing almost completely, 
Isager & Skydgsaard are skeptical regarding the possibility of widespread development 
of intensive farming involving crop rotation, and stress that the model of intensive 
mixed farming has only a slender source-base compared with the amount of evidence 
that is available for the traditional model. This is indisputably right, but this argument 
neglects the bias of ancient agronomical sources, which overwhelmingly concern large-
scale commercial farming and hardly ever mention peasant farming. The relative share 
of intensive mixed farming and extensive ‘segregated’ farming thus depends on the 
relative share of peasant farming and smaller scale exploitations which were far more 
inclined to develop intensification strategies. Such intensive practices are even more 
justified in a context where extensive agricultural growth is intrinsically limited by the 
competition between fodder crops and staple foods for agricultural land. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
69 Theophr., HP, II, 7, 4 ; VII, 5, 1 ; Theophr., CP, III, 9, 2 ; Colum., R. r., II, 14, 5-6. 
70 Plin., NH, XVII, 50 ; Pallad., X, 3, 2 
71 Hughes (2014), p. 121 ; Kron (2015), p. 162. 
72 Sallares (2013), p. 268 
73 Michell (1957), p.54 ; Isager & Skydsgaard (1992), pp. 42-43 ; Erdkamp (2005), p. 41 ; Kehoe (2007), p. 
551 
74 IG II2, 2493 
75 Varro, De Re rust., I, 44, 3 
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 In fact, although Graeco-Roman agriculture was probably more productive and 
sophisticated than often argued, substantial increases in per capita output might 
sometimes be trapped in vicious cycles. Two important cases should be considered : (1) 
extensive growth of agricultural surfaces, and (2) the increase of livestock. Increasing 
agricultural surfaces often requires clearing forests; but deforestation may in turn  
generate erosion (this process is attested around Sagalassos76) which often depletes the 
mineral content of soils and hence leads to lower soil productivity unless ad hoc 
conservation measures are taken77. In this case, the impact on total output is uncertain 
since total agricultural land has been increased while average soil productivity has 
dropped. On the other hand, intensive growth through manuring requires an increase 
of available livestock. Yet, feeding this increased animal population puts the 
production of cereals devoted to human consumption under stress, since they compete 
with fodder crops for land78. In this case, thus, we end up with higher levels of soil 
productivity due to higher levels of manuring, but with smaller available surfaces, that 
is, the opposite situation of the one caused by extensive growth.  
1.3.2 Crop varieties and the ancient diet 
The Graeco-Roman agrarian system was mostly geared towards the production of what 
has been labelled the ‘Mediterranean triad’, the three basic components of ancient 
people’s diet : grain, wine and oil. These three elements correspond to some extent to 
the nutritional requirements of man based on a balance between proteins (provided by 
cereals for those who can only rarely afford meat or fish), carbohydrates (found in 
wine) and lipids (mostly provided by oil), although slow-burning carbohydrates are 
also found in significant proportions among cereals.  
 This investigation, though, mostly focuses on cereals, which formed the most 
important staple food for a majority of people, a fact that rendered its unhindered 
supply, especially to cities, a crucially important food-related socio-economic issue. As 
far as Asia Minor is concerned (even though this is also true for many other areas of 
the Mediterranean basin) it should be emphasized first that a wide diversity of cereals 
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was cultivated, as is made clear by both literary and epigraphic sources79: emmer wheat 
(– triticum diccocum)is attested in numerous places such as Magnesia on the 
Maeander80, in Dorylaeum of Phrygia81, in Assos82 (Troad) and in Cilicia83; barley 
(– hordeum vulgare) is also produced in Magnesia on the Maeander84, in Cilicia85 
and Cappadocia86. Spelt (triticum spelta), finally, was also present, of which two 
specific types, zeia and olyra (probably einkorn) – considered to be specific to the 
East87 –, are grown around Pergamon88. A particular spelt-wheat called zeopyron is also 
cultivated in Bithynia89. Palaeobotanical studies also confirm the presence of wheat 
and barley, as in Sagalassos90 and its territory (Beyşehir Gölu91). 
 Beside these common cereals, some more specific crop varieties are also known 
to have been grown in Asia Minor. Millet is attested on the Pontic coast92, in 
Bithynia93, in Cilicia94 and Lycia (Telmessos)95. Sesame was cultivated in Bithynia, 
Lycia96, Cilicia and Pamphylia97. Finally, sorghum is known to have been grown on the 
Pontic coast98 and near Telmessos99. Oats were cultivated almost everywhere, but this 
crop was only used as fodder.  
 It should thus be stressed that Graeco-Roman Asia Minor did not rank below 
later societies in terms of the variety of cultivated cereals. This feature was not just 
 
                                               
79 On the various types of cereals grown in the Ancient Greek world, see : Amouretti (1986), pp. 33-41 ; 
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important in terms of the variety of people’s diet; it was also a crucial economic 
advantage because these different crops had different agro-ecological and nutritional 
characteristics: wheat has the highest nutritional value, but has also high hydric 
requirements. Barley on the other hand has a lower nutritional value but allows higher 
yields and tolerates lower temperatures and lower precipitations. Millet has a high 
nutritional value too, but grows only in very specific environments. Spelt, finally, has a 
medium nutritional value and fairly low yields, but provides the advantage of growing 
on very poor soils. Whatever the variety, most of these cereals were consumed either in 
the form of bread – for the better off citizens –, porridges (puls, pulmentum), or flat 
cakes. From a more general point of view, G. Kron recently argued, optimistically, that 
the ancient Greek and Roman diet was very varied, and that ‘middle class’ citizens 
consumed meat, eggs, fish and fruits far more often than was previously 
acknowledged.  
1.3.3 Seed yields, soil productivity and carrying capacity 
The assumptions we make regarding the nature of Graeco-Roman agrarian system, in 
particular the extent to which intensive mixed farming took place, the species of 
cereals that were cultivated, as well as the region we consider, all these factors have a 
dramatic impact on the level of cereal yields that we can assume to have been the 
norm. After the pioneering work by Jardé, who suggested a range of 600-900 kg/ha for 
wheat and 1020-1270 for barley100 as average yield values, a number of influential 
scholars have provided quite restricted estimates for average crop yields per hectare in 
Greek and Roman agriculture. Sallares claimed that 650 kg/ha (averaging various 
cereals) was an upper limit which could only be exceeded in only very fertile places of 
the Mediterranean101. Garnsey reckoned with a ‘likely’ value of 770 kg/ha for barley and 
600 kg/ha for wheat102. Agronomy specialists Mazoyer & Roudart considered both 
Jardé and Garnsey’s assessments exaggerated and reckon with as little as 500 kg/ha for 
an average cereal yield. Moreno broadly followed Sallares’ estimate and considered 600 
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kg/ha as optimistic103. More recently, Bresson reckoned with a somewhat less 
pessimistic, but still moderate value of about 800-940 kg/ha104.  
 These estimates are however problematic in various ways, both for our current 
project specifically as well as in a more general sense :  
 
(1) We cannot simply extrapolate to Asia Minor data deriving from Italy or the 
Greek peninsula; 
(2) The existing estimates are often based on an extrapolation of yield figures from 
modern extensive Greek agriculture to antiquity; 
(3) The estimates mostly consist of indirect calculations of ancient yields on the 
basis of the probable area under grain cultivation and population figures, with 
no, or only superficial, discussion of soil properties, environmental conditions 
and the nature of ancient agrarian systems; 
(4)  The difference between gross yields and net yields is mostly ignored; 
 
 
 Let us develop these points in order:  
 
(1) Most of the abovementioned estimates concern Greece – or even more specifically 
Attica (Garnsey, Moreno). Since, as we have seen above, environmental conditions 
differed greatly between Greece and Asia Minor, assessments regarding soil 
productivity in Greece, and a fortiori in such a dry region as Attica, cannot be simply 
extrapolated to Asia Minor. Secondly, some of these estimates rely on data from 
modern Greece (late 19th – early 20th century) to derive an upper limit that ancient 
yields could not have exceeded105. While it is true that the Medieval agricultural 
revolution significantly improved yields in north-western Europe, its impact on the 
Eastern Mediterranean was actually quite limited, and modern yields from the Aegean 
could thus not be claimed to be necessarily higher than ancient ones.  
 (2) This deterministic reasoning relies on extensive farming practices observed in 
modern Greece, where mineral or even organic fertilizers were not widely used (mostly 
due to extensive pastoralism), and extrapolates this agrarian system backwards into 
Antiquity. As we have argued supra, however, intensive practices such as manuring, 
crop rotation, and integration of livestock and arable farming are likely to have been 
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substantially more frequent in Graeco-Roman agriculture than in modern Greece. 
Moreover, even if such extrapolation of farming practices were justified, even if local 
environmental conditions could be approximated by conditions prevailing in early 20th 
c. Greece, agricultural productivity is not solely a function of soil properties or 
agricultural techniques. As Osborne correctly pointed out, yields also depend upon 
labor inputs106, or more accurately, on the relative use of labor and land, which cannot 
be taken as identical between Antiquity and the modern era. Hence, yield figures from 
the 19th or 20th c. can by no means be taken as a maximum limit for ancient yield 
values. 
(3) The ‘pessimistic’ models of ancient cereal yields are almost entirely based on 
calculations of the proportion of agricultural land and population figures. The 
argument is dangerously circular: once a population figure has been assumed, 
temptation is strong to try to confirm it through estimates of land under grain 
cultivation and yield figures. The same is true, of course, if the starting point is an 
estimate of the extent of arable land. This is not to say that these variables are 
irrelevant to a proper calculation of ancient yields. Historical data providing the range 
of likely population figures and agricultural land surface are crucial for the calculation 
of yields, but should be combined with the variables which directly affected ancient 
soil productivity, such as the agrarian system in operation (intensive versus extensive 
farming, labor inputs, scale…) and environmental conditions (geomorphology, 
temperature, precipitation, which altogether determine soil properties).  
(4) Finally, most of these estimates, whether of the ‘pessimistic’ or ‘optimistic’ variety 
(except Garnsey and Mazoyer & Roudart) never specify whether their assessed value 
for cereal yields concern gross or net yields. This is a crucial aspect: gross yield, in 
agricultural terms, refers to the productive potential of the soil – the total amount of 
crops that can be produced per unit of cultivated land on the considered territory. This 
potential, however, is not the actual disposable quantity of grain, because a non-
negligible part of the cereals (or other crops) produced will be lost, either during or 
after the harvesting process. Discussion of the loss rate of agricultural production (pre- 
or post-harvest) is probably one of the biggest blind spots of historical debates 
regarding ancient food sustainability.  
  
 Other scholars have in fact advocated for a more optimistic view of cereal yields 
in ancient agriculture. Spurr rightly underlines the misleading view introduced by the 
concept of ‘average yield’ which, by merging very unproductive and highly productive 
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sub-regions, gives a distorted impression of historical reality107. Erdkamp provides a 
crucial contribution to the debate: based on a meticulous discussion of ancient 
evidence regarding crop yields, he claims that Columella’s figure of a 4: 1 yield/seed 
ratio is untrustworthy and describes, at best, conditions on very poor soils108. 
Columella’s agenda in this passage is to encourage viticulture, and hence he 
deliberately underestimated cereal yields. Using comparative data, Erdkamp, following 
Spurr, demonstates that Varro’s and Cicero’s figures of yield-seed ratios amounting to 
8 : 1 or 10 : 1 were not unrealistic at all and ‘provide reliable estimates of yields on fertile 
soils and on lands highly suitable to the cultivation of cereals’109. On the basis of these 
yield-seed ratios, Erdkamp thus widens the scale of possible soil productivity to values 
of 880-1100 kg/ha (if the yield-seed ratios concern barley) and 1035-1290 kg/ha (if 
wheat)110. This reassessment however mostly concerns Italy, and Erdkamp 
acknowledges that yields in Greece are far more difficult to estimate due to the paucity 
of testimonies. Yet, on the basis of a sound use of comparative data, more particularly 
of yields from the Ottoman period in which farming practices were most likely closer 
to the ones prevalent during the Classical and post-Classical eras, Osborne 
convincingly argues that some areas of Greece in Classical times could have 
experienced wheat yields in the range of 1,000-1,500 kg/ha, and that values of 900 
kg/ha should be viewed as the lower end of the scale rather that as its maximum 
limit111. On the basis of comparative data from Medieval Italy and Early Modern 
Europe, it thus appears perfectly probable that ancient farming often equaled or 
surpassed cereal yields of later societies112. Regarding the 16th, 17th and 18th c., this 
appears even less surprising if we remind ourselves that, from the 15th c. onwards, 
Europe entered a cooler climatic period known as the Little Ice Age, which only ended 
in the late 18th century, when the modern agricultural revolution was taking place113. 
 There are good reasons to believe that these optimistic views of ancient cereal 
yields certainly applied (at least) to the western part of Asia Minor. First, unlike the 
case of Greece, ancient sources explicitly mention the fertility of the region: Tacitus 
 
                                               
107 Spurr (1986), p. 84 
108 Erdkamp (2005), p. 38 
109 Spurr (1986), pp. 84-85 ; Erkamp (2005), p. 43 
110 Erdkamp (2005), p. 43. Expressing the yields of 8 :1 and 10 :1 in modii, Erdkamp provides the range of 
40-50 modii per iugerum, which, in terms of volume, gives 1,380-1720 hl/ha. The values provided here are 
arrived at by multiplying this range respectively by the volumetric mass of weat (about 0.75) and barley 
(0.64). 
111 Osborne (1987), p. 45 
112 Braudel (1979), pp.131-132 ; Erdkamp (2005), pp. 39-40. 
113 Le Roy Ladurie (1967) 
 36 
counted Asia Minor among the wealthiest provinces (opulentissimarum 
provinciarum)114, and Cicero explicitly praised the province of Asia for being among the 
most fertile regions :  
Asia is in fact so wealthy and fertile that, with regard to the abundancy of its 
fields, the variety of its produces, the large surfaces of its pastures (…), it easily 
surpasses all other regions115. 
Such statements on Asia Minor as a whole are corroborated by the description of 
specific areas. Xenophon claimed that Calpe of Bithynia was ‘productive in wheat and 
barley’116. Cilicia is said to experience wonderful harvests –but while Virgil places them 
in Gargara, Livy and Strabo rather refer to Cilician Thebe117. Writing about the more 
westward region of Pisidia, Livy qualified the territory of Sagalassos as ‘abundant and 
fertile in all kind of cereals’ (uber fertilisque omni genere frugum)118. Even the more arid 
region of Galatia is said to be abundant in grain by the Historia Augusta119, and is 
referred to as a provincia optima sibi sufficiens 120. Finally, Aelius Aristides wrote that, 
in the region of Cyzicus, ‘the mountains are more cultivated than the plains of others, 
and the plains are sufficient, not only for a city, but for entire peoples’121. In another 
discourse, he claimed that ‘the Aegean alone cannot be called “unharvested” (…) It is 
productive in wheat and all which the seasons engender’122. The literature of the 
Second Sophistic, and in particular the works of Aristides, has often been discarded for 
their heavy rhetorical accents and lyricism. But Doukellis holds an interesting position 
in arguing that their literary characteristics cannot per se shed doubt on their historical 
validity123 and that they most probably reflect to a certain extent the economic 
flourishing of the Greek cities in the second century AD, in addition to which we 
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should remind ourselves that Aristides was native of Smyrna and hence probably an 
eye witness of most of what he describes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most groundbreaking developments on the subject undoubtedly come from the 
contribution of earth sciences. In recent years, scholars have tried to model ancient 
crop yields primarily on the basis of environmental data and Geographical Information 
Systems (hereafter GIS). On the basis of terrain variables such as slope or solar 
exposure, H. Goodchild constructed an index of agricultural suitability for catchments 
of the Tiber valley124. On a much wider scale, an interdisciplinary study on Virtual 
Water redistribution in the Roman world, led by B. Dermody and involving a team of 
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Fig.3. GIS modelling of grain yields in rainfed (B) and irrigated (C) 
agriculture ( A = B + C) on the basis of land cover, climate forcing 
and water balance. [Reproduced with permission from Dermody 
et al. (2012)]. 
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scholars from earth sciences and classics, attempted to model ancient grain yields on 
the basis of land cover, weather parameters and water balance. As far as Asia Minor is 
concerned, their study reveals that a considerable part of western Asia Minor must 
have experienced gross wheat yields in the range of 1,000-1,250 kg/ha (see Fig. 3 supra), 
with several pockets above 1,500 kg/ha125. Moreover, despite the intense inter-annual 
climatic variability affecting the Mediterranean basin, they show that the Eastern 
empire, in particular Asia Minor and Egypt, had much more stable yields than the 
western part. Their threshold of 10% margin around the average yield can of course be 
criticized since, due to the strong inelasticity of grain demand, even very small 
variations of aggregate supply could have dramatic effects on prices and hence on grain 
accessibility, but in relative terms it nevertheless remain that the East seems to have 
been ‘less unstable’ than the West126. As a parallel to this empire-wide reconstruction, 
the still ongoing research by M. Van Loo et al. focuses instead on a much smaller zone 
– the Gravgaz marsh, in South-West Turkey, a focus which makes this study of 
particular interest for our investigation – through a very complete protocol: on the 
basis of sediment archives extracted on the site combined with a model of water 
balance127 (depending on local weather conditions and topography), they reconstruct 
sediment flows and hence soil thickness which has a key impact on crop yields (the 
study focuses on barley), as is illustrated in figure 5 128.  
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Fig.4. Relationship between crop yields and soil thickness in 
sediments from the Gravgaz Marsh in South-West Turkey 
(ancient Pisidia) [Reproduced with permission from M. Van 
Loo ( Sagalassos project, KUL)]. 
 
 
While Dermody’s study suffers from a lack of field data regarding local soil conditions 
due to the breadth of its scale, the limited area studied by Van Loo allows him to use a 
very complete set of data. The only aspect that might still be insufficiently examined – 
according to the latest update, at least – is the influence of climatic conditions on the 
initial production of soil (and not only on its agricultural properties)129. The results, of 
local significance of course due to the absence of similar studies for other regions of 
Turkey, are shown in figure 6 which displays the reconstructed barley yield from 
Roman times (1st & 5th c. AD), and reveal that an important part of the Gravgaz 
catchment could have experienced gross yields above 2,480 kg/ha (for summer barley) 
or even 2,640 kg/ha (for winter barley).  
 
                                               
129 It is widely acknowledged that pedogenesis – the production of regolith, the fundamental soil 
material – results from the physical and chemical alteration of bedrock, which depends upon its 
composition, on temperature, and on rainfall. 
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 These challenging figures allow us to introduce a fundamental remark regarding 
ancient productivities: Dermody’s and Van Loo’s reconstructions, unlike the 
assessments realized by Jardé and Moreno which are based on quantities likely to have 
been consumed, concern gross yields rather than net yields. Indeed, indications 
provided by ancient authors, or calculations made on the basis of a yield-seed ratio do 
not make clear whether the yield concerns the potential produce of the plant or the 
quantity that can actually be harvested. The difference between produced, harvested or 
supplied/consumed quantities is explained by the loss rate, i.e. the share of the crops 
Fig.5. Reconstruction of gross barley yields from sediment archives and water balance modelling 
in Graeco-Roman times in the Gravgaz catchment (SW Turkey) [Source : Van Loo et al., 
forthcoming]. 
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that is destroyed, wasted or altered during or after the harvest. This loss results from 
several factors: grain falling from the ears, moisture, bacteria, fungi, damages by 
insects, birds, or rodents, and transport130. Calculations have been made by the FAO, 
showing that such losses vary significantly depending on the cultivated crop (higher 
for rice than wheat), and the type of agriculture (higher losses for industrialized than 
traditional agriculture). In Africa, grain harvest losses prior to processing are in the 
range of 10-20% of primary production.131 Since Graeco-Roman farming is undoubtedly 
closer to modern traditional agriculture than to industrialized agriculture, it is 
reasonable to assume an average loss rate of 20%. Hence, Dermody’s wheat figure and 
Van Loo’s high barley figures would respectively correspond to a net yield of 800-1,000 
kg/ha and 1,984-2,112 kg/ha. Overall, besides local extremes, it seems that gross yields 
ranging from 1,000-1,200 kg/ha, close to the average net yield of 1,050-1,070 kg/ha 
reported by X. De Planhol for increasingly modernized Tukish agriculture of the period 
1934-1954, must have been quite common in Roman Asia Minor132.  
 
 If we now bring together the population data and the reassessment of Graeco-
Roman agriculture in the specific context of Anatolia, it might be worth doing a quick 
macroeconomic calculation to see whether the region was approaching its carrying 
capacity. Total area of Anatolia is roughly 520,000 km2. If only 15% of land was under 
grain cultivation133, and if, on the basis of our re-evaluation of grain yields in Asia 
Minor, we assume an average gross soil productivity for cereal cultivation of 1 ton/ha 
(150 modii/ha), reckoning with a high loss rate of 30% and a seed requirement of 1/5134, 
then total grain production would equal some 655 million modii. On the other hand, if 
we reckon with a population figure somewhat in between high-counters and low 
counters, say 10 million people, then, with an average grain subsistence requirement 
set at 35 modii per person, subsistence needs would be 437.5 million modii. In this 
arguably rather pessimistic scenario, Anatolia as a whole would still produce a 50% 
surplus of grain. 
 
 
 
                                               
130 Griffon (2006), pp. 167-169 
131 http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/79444/icode/  
132de Planhol (1960), p. 100 
133 For Attica, which is the typical region where population growth and urbanization had outsripped the 
agricultural carrying capacity, Garnsey reckons with a ‘likely’ figure  of 17.5% , while for Lemnos, he 
arrived at the figure of 25% : Garnsey (1988), pp. 101-102. 
134 This is again a pessimistic figure : with a soil productivity of 150 modii per ha, this would imply a 
rather high sowing rate of 30 modii per hectare. 
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135 
 
 
 
                                               
135 Colluvial plain near the city of Cadyanda (Lycia). 
 
Subsistence requirements  
 
Production 
Population 10000000 Total area (ha) 52000000 
Av. subs. Cons. per capita (mod) 35 Share of area under grain 15% 
Seed 0,2 Gross soil productivity (mod/ha)  150 
  
Loss rate 0,3 
  
Seed 0,2 
Total 437,500,000 mod.  655,200,000 mod. 
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Chapter 2  
Land exploitation and extraction of surplus 
2.1 Introduction 
“And first of all”, said Socrates to Critoboulos, foodstuffs that allow us to live come out 
of land when we cultivate it; and all the sweets of life, it is also land that provides 
them”136. Any discussion on the factors affecting the supply of grain could not afford 
leaving out a discussion of the exploitation of the basic mean of grain production : 
land. Land is crucial to our understanding of the capacity of ancient cities to get access 
to an adequate provision of grain. It should be noted in this respect that gifts of land to 
cities – and purchase of land by cities – sometimes took place137, and offered them a 
complementary source of grain, in addition to the commercial circuits connecting 
them with the farmers of their hinterland. Far beyond the technical or environmental 
constraints and agronomic techniques, which we have discussed in the previous 
chapter, land plays a crucial role in three fundamental aspect :  
 
(1) First, as a production factor, in determining the size of primary production, 
depending on its use in relationship to labor; 
(2) Secondly, because social élites derive their ability to influence the urban grain 
supply – either by distributions of grain or by practicing speculative hoarding – 
from the products of their landed property  
 
                                               
136 Xenophon, Economics, 5, 2 
137 See for instance : IGR III, 422 ; IGR IV, 915b ; BCH 45 (1921), pp. 157-158 
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(3) Thirdly, because the social and economic structure of land ownership and 
management influences the size of disposable quantities of grain both in towns 
and countryside depending on the perception and level of rents and taxes.  
 
The crucial importance of land as the main factor of ancient agrarian economies can be 
understood from the Economics. The author – most likely a disciple of Aristotle – 
writes that, in the ‘satrapian’ economy – the ‘regional’ level – ‘the revenues of highest 
importance and concern are those derived from land, which is sometimes called 
‘ground tax’, sometimes ‘tithe’’138. The text however distinguishes unambiguously 
between revenues ‘from agriculture’ (ἀπὸ γῆς) and revenues ‘produced in the 
countryside (ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἰδίων γινομένων). When discussing the ‘civic 
economy’, in the next paragraph, it is the latter category which is said to be ‘of the first 
importance’ (κρατίστη μὲν πρόσοδος ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γινομένη)139, while 
regarding the ‘private economy’ – the estate level –, it is the former which constitutes 
the main source of income (κρατίστη μὲν πρόσοδος ἡ ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένη)140. The 
difference might have been made by the non-agricultural production taking place in 
the city’s countryside but also, to a significant extent, to the mode of surplus 
appropriation, namely the relative share of rents and taxes.  This clear distinction 
between ‘revenues ‘from agriculture’ and revenues ‘from the countryside’ reveals how 
land actually lies at the crossroads of the agro-ecological setting and exploitation 
channels through the social structure of land ownership and through political 
subjection. Agro-environmental conditions (that is, the conjunction of the 
environmental setting and of a given agrarian system) merely defined the borders of 
‘the possible and the impossible’, to borrow Fernand Braudel’s expression, but how 
actual situations were shaped within these borders has everything to do with how the 
primary production took place through to the use of production factors, and how the 
produced surpluses were appropriated and distributed. Ellen Meiksins Woods has 
outstandingly summarized this point : 
 
It has been a general characteristic of peasants that a large proportion of their 
surplus production has been accounted for by rents and/or taxes. (…) Patterns of 
 
                                               
138 Ps.-Arist., Econ., II, 1, 4 : 
Δεύτερον δὲ τὴν σατραπικήν. Ἔστι δὲ ταύτης εἴδη ἓξ τῶν προσόδων (ἀπὸ γῆς, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἰδίων 
γινομένων, ἀπὸ ἐμπόρων, ἀπὸ τελῶν, ἀπὸ 
βοσκημάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων). Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πρώτη μὲν καὶ 
κρατίστη ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς· αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἣν οἱ μὲν ἐκφόριον, οἱ δὲ δεκάτην προσαγορεύουσιν. 
139 Ibid., II, 1, 5 
140 Ibid., II, 1, 6 
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surplus production, therefore, have varied in response to the demands of surplus 
appropriation. Clearly, the need to intensify production has varied in large part 
according to the extent of such obligations. These patterns have been determined 
not only by ‘objective’ factors of population, ecology and technology, cultural 
factors and the standard of expectations, but in particular by social and political 
relations and the balance of power between producing and appropriating classes. 
In fact, demographic pressures themselves cannot be considered in abstraction 
from these relations. The level at which population growth begins to strain 
available resources and productive capacities varies inter alia according to how 
much production is syphoned off by leisured appropriators141. 
 
 In this chapter, the notion of surplus will be essential, and therefore requires 
being given a clear definition. In his innovative and thought-provoking book The Class 
Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, G. E. M. de Sainte-Croix has opposed an internal 
definition of the surplus (“that part of an individual man’s labor of which he does not 
directly enjoy the fruits himself”142) to an external definition (“something set aside by 
the society as a whole (…) as surplus to its needs, and made available for some specific 
purpose”143). This surplus, he writes, can be extracted in three ways: by exploiting wage 
labor, by exploiting unfree labor, and by leasing land to tenant in return for the 
payment of a rent144 (to which we might add taxation). My definition somehow 
navigates between the internal and external definition: at the individual level, surplus 
will be defined as the proportion of total produce which is used for the payment of rents 
and taxes, and – if possible – for increasing self-consumption. The overall rate of surplus 
is the aggregation of all individual (positive, null or even negative) surpluses as a fraction 
of total regional produce.  
  
 In chapter I, the structure of Graeco-Roman agriculture has been outlined, 
together with its geographical variability. The analysis mostly focused on 
environmental conditions, technical innovations, crop diversity and yields, that is, on 
the agronomical side of the ancient agrarian system. In this chapter, we shall turn to 
the second half of the agrarian system : the exploitation of resources. The emphasis of 
this chapter will not be put on the various strategies and procedures of marketing of 
 
                                               
141 Meiksins Wood (1988), p. 55 
142 de Sainte-Croix (1981), p. 37 
143 Ibidem 
144 de Sainte-Croix (1981), p. 53 
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the agricultural surplus145; rather, it will aim at understanding which factors determine 
the primary production of this surplus and the mechanisms through which it was 
appropriated. The discussion will be guided by the following set of questions : 
 
▪ What were the different modes of land exploitation, and to what extent do they 
differ regarding their farming strategies and the use of production factors?  
▪ How reliable is the dominant (neo-classical) economic theory for the modelling 
and assessment of agricultural production in the Graeco-Roman context? 
▪ Which variables determined the value of landed wealth and its return, and are 
they marked by any noticeable changes over the considered period ? 
▪ How do rents and taxes influence agricultural production and available 
surpluses ?  
2.2 Forms of land ownership and management 
In the Greek part of the Roman Empire, land could fall in either of the following six 
categories146 :  
 
(1) the ager imperialis, belonging to the imperial domain. Rather reduced in the first 
century in Asia Minor, it only attained significant extent in the Severan period147. 
(2) the ager publicus, belonging to the populus romanus – the Roman institutional 
apparatus – and most often leased to private tenants148. According to Cicero, the 
ager publicus had acquired an important amount of land in Asia Minor by the 1st c. 
BC149;  
(3) the ager assignatus, consisting of extensions of the ager publicus due to conquests 
that were redistributed to roman colonists150; 
(4)  the ager privatus, possessed in full by landowners, either local citizens or 
Romans151;  
 
                                               
145 On which see Erdkamp (2005) 
146 Duncan-Jones (1990), pp. 121-126 
147 Sartre (1991), pp. 280-281 
148 Bowman & Wilson (2013), p. 5 
149 Cic., De leg. Agr., I, 5 & II, 50; Sartre (1991), p. 281 
150 Sartre (1991), p. 281; Mattingly (2011), p. 141 
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(5) civic land belonging to municipalities152;  
(6) sacred land (more frequent in the Greek part of the empire) owned by temples, 
which sometimes possessed considerable domains153;  
 
In the provincial context we are dealing with, we will mostly focus on privately owned 
land, ager assignatus, civic land and sacred land. Discussions on land transactions 
regarding civic and sacred land are left to section 2, and we will thus start with land 
owned by individuals.  
 In her study of agriculture in classical Greece, based mostly on literary sources, A. 
Burford identifies three variants of private land exploitation154 : (1) landlord leasing his 
land to a tenant (/colonus); (2) landowners employing a bailiff 
(/villicus) ; (3) small owners working their land themselves () 
with their household. Implicitly, Burford’s typology relies on a fundamental distinction 
in Roman law : the difference between property and possession, which finds a parallel 
in Greek law in the concepts of and . Property over a commodity is 
divided into three separate aspects: the right to use it (usus), the right to profit from its 
produces (fructus), and the right to alienate it (abusus). Possession (lat. : possessio) 
designates a situation where the enjoyment (usus) of the commodity has been 
transferred to another person, together with the right to claim a share of the produces 
(fructus), but without the right to alienate it. Applied to the context of land ownership, 
the small owner-cultivator holds both property and possession, while tenants and 
bailiffs hold possession but not property, and hence have to pay a share of the produce 
(or a fixed contribution) to the estate owner. 
 A different, yet complementary typology has been developed by P. Erdkamp 
which, instead of being based on the formal mode of exploitation, rather relies on the 
criteria of size and connection to the market (of both commodities and labor). Edkamp 
distinguishes between : (1) large-scale commercial estates, whose activity was mainly 
directed to the market (2) middling exploitations he calls ‘market-orientated’ farms, 
combining self-consumption with a substantial degree of commercialization, and (3) 
peasant farming, where production and consumption almost entirely took place within 
the household. His typology is quite similar to that proposed by agronomist J. D. Van 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
151 Land ownership by Romans in Asia Minor is quite well documented in the sources : Broughton (1937), 
pp. 549-553. See for instance : Cic. Ep. 234 & Cic.,Pro Flacco, 51. 
152 Macro (1980), p. 684; see also : Liebenam (1900), pp. 312-318. Explicit example for such city-owned 
land can be found in IK-Laodikeia Am Lykos, 47, mentioning a ‘supervisor of civic land’. 
153 Strab., XII, 3, 32-36 (Comana of Pontus) & XII, 8,14 (Pisidian Antioch). Cf. Sartre (1991), p. 278-279. 
154 Burford (1993), pp. 167-181 
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der Ploeg who distinguishes ‘capitalistic’ farming, ‘entrepreneurial farming’ and 
‘peasant farming’155. 
 To these categories, he adds the ‘rural proletariat’, the agricultural workers who 
were too poor to own land156. The first and last categories are rather self-evident, but 
the intermediate category of ‘market-orientated’ farming might seem more obscure. By 
this term, Erdkamp intended to designate the (wide) range of farm exploitations filling 
the gap between the extreme cases of small-scale owner-occupiers on the one hand, 
and large-scale commercial exploitations on the other.  
 As Erdkamp writes it, ‘the basic economic difference between farming on peasant 
farms, wealthier market-orientated farms and large estates consists of the variation in 
the input of productions factors’157. Even if this is true, the three ideal-types also differ 
regarding the size of available surplus, which depends both upon primary production 
and the extent of surplus extraction in the form of rent payment158. This dimension is 
quite absent from Erdkamp’s typology and directly relates to the form of ownership, 
while it also influences the relative share of self-consumption and seed in the total 
produce (cf. infra). We might therefore try to provide a synthetic typology, combining 
the criteria of size and market connectivity with the mode of ownership/exploitation. 
We could do this by constructing a two-dimensional diagram on which size and 
market connectivity form the Y and X axis. The surface of the diagram can then be 
divided into separate domains, each characterized by a specific form of ownership, 
consistent with a particular combination of size and connection to the market. Since 
small-scale farmers with high market connectivity and large estates with weak 
connection to the market are both highly unlikely and find no support in the evidence, 
we can exclude them from the beginning. The resulting diagram (Fig. 6) thus allows us 
proposing the three following categories :  
 
1°) Small-scale owner-occupiers, probably best described by the Greek term autourgos 
than by the label ‘peasant farming’, which would require a discussion on the definition 
of the peasantry; 
 
2°) Large-scale commercial estates functioning almost entirely for the market, owned 
by a landlord, managed by a conductor or villicus and leased to a tenant (colonus).  
 
 
                                               
155 Van der Ploeg (2011) 
156 Erdkamp (2005), p. 14 & p. 58 
157 Erdkamp (2005), p. 14 
158 See below (section 2) for detailed discussion. 
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3°) Intermediate exploitations, which we label as ‘market-connected’ farms. This is not 
to say, of course, that small owner-occupiers are not connected at all to the market, 
but the vast majority of their production factors – above all labor – as well as the 
consumption of their surplus originates in the household, even more so since they do 
not have to pay a rent. Erdkamp’s label of ‘market-orientated’ farms, while accurately 
describing the characteristics of intermediate exploitations, might be somehow 
confusing insofar as it would imply that these middling farms organized the majority 
of their production primarily for the market. A significant proportion of them, closer to 
the large commercial estates, must undoubtedly have done so, but countless others 
might be smaller farms, worked by peasant households, epitropoi or tenants who 
occasionally used some extra wage labor from time to time and commercialized a 
proportion of their surplus – relatively modest compared to self-consumption – mostly 
to pay their rent. The criteria of land ownership and mode of exploitation can be 
introduced with a third, implicit axis, ranging from the south-west to the north-east 
corner of the graph: indeed, beside the payment of the rent, the variable that 
distinguishes small freeholdings, leases to bailiffs, and tenancy, is the cost of logistics 
and management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An important question, which I unfortunately have not enough data to discuss, is that 
of the relative proportions of each of these three forms of land ownership in Roman 
Size 
Market  
connectivity Weak or non-
existent 
Medium Strong 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Fig. 6. Typology of farming exploitations 
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Owner-occupiers 
Rent/leaseholding 
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Autourgoi 
Management and 
logistical costs 
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Asia Minor, since it is likely to be a crucal parameter of both overall production and 
distribution of available surpluses159.  
2.3 Economic modelling of ancient agricultural 
production 
The total produce (Y) of a leased agricultural exploitation is distributed between self-
consumption for basic needs (N), seed-corn (S), rents (R), taxes (T) and a potential 
benefit (B) : 
  
𝑌 = 𝑁 + 𝑆 + 𝑅 + 𝑇 (+𝐵) 
 
The productive basis consists of the share of the produce which is necessary to further 
production, namely self-consumption (the ‘reproductive cost’ of labor) and seed; the 
remaining quantity defines the surplus, for which rents, taxes, and benefits have to 
compete. The share of each component in the total output may vary significantly 
according to the yield (cf. chap. I), the level of rents, and the tax rate. If we leave out 
the tenant’s benefit out of the problem as a first approximation, the ‘canonical’ share of 
each component that we may expect on average in Roman Asia Minor is displayed in 
the following figure160.  
 
                                               
159 For a general discussion on tenancy, see : Kehoe (1997), esp. chap. 2-4. 
160 Mitchell (1993), p. 251-253 
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Each of these values is of course only illustrative and experienced significant variations 
through time and across space. The 20% ascribed to the seed requirements implies a 
rather pessimistic yield-to-seed ratio of 5:1, while we have seen in chap. I that ratios of 
8:1 or 10:1 were probably more common that usually admitted, particularly in western 
Asia Minor, which was more fertile than continental Greece. What matters mostly for 
this chapter are rents and taxes. The bulk of rents paid up by tenants to landlords 
(discussed in section 3) defines the quantity of grain that will eventually supply the 
urban market. Of course, some small-scale independent peasants also commercialized 
a share of their surplus, but it is unlikely that this may have represented an important 
part of overall urban grain supply. Yet, not all the grain paid in the form of rents end 
up on the market, since a small share of these must have been hoarded for (mostly) 
speculative purposes. Finally, the 10% taxes in kind consist of the decuma required for 
Rome, whose impact and levying .are discussed in section 4  
 However, before discussing the distribution and allocation of total production, 
we need to examine the conditions of its ‘primary’ production as resulting from the use 
of land and labor. In chapter I, we merely reassessed the productivity of Graeco-Roman 
agriculture (in the Anatolian context) through the perspective of farming practices and 
agro-climatic conditions. But, within a given environmental setting, the productive 
potential varies dramatically depending on how the available resources (labor and 
land) are used. The agronomic approach to the productive capacities should thus be 
followed by an economic discussion of the use of resources, which will be the concern 
of the first section of this chapter. 
Rural Consumption
50
Seed
20
Rents
(Urban Cons.)
20
Taxes 
10
Productive basis Surplus
Fig. 7. Structure of grain output (in % of produce)
(Source : S. Mitchell, 1993)
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2.3.1 The neoclassical model and its shortcomings 
Neo-classical economic theory has brought an important innovation with regard to 
classical theory by relating production factors and output by what economists call a 
‘production function’. The most widely used production function among neo-classical 
models is the Cobb-Douglas function161, of the form :  
 
𝑄 = ℎ ∙ 𝐿𝜂 ∙ 𝐴𝑎
𝛽
   (1) 
 
where Q represent the total output, h is a constant capturing the technological 
development, L is agricultural labor and Aa is the cultivated surface. The exponents η 
and β are the partial elasticities of production regarding, respectively, labor and land. 
The sum of η and β define the returns to scale : 
 
η + β > 1 : growing returns to scale 
η + β = 1 : constant returns to scale 
η + β < 1 : decreasing returns to scale 
 
The fundamental and almost pervasive assumption of the neo-classical models is that 
the returns to scale are constant, while marginal returns are decreasing. The returns to 
scale define the change in total output if both production factors increase in the same 
proportion. Constant returns to scale thus mean that doubling labor inputs and 
doubling cultivated area together will imply a doubling of total output. However, as 
one input (say, labor) is more intensively employed, the contribution of each 
additional unit of this factor to total output decreases, while the productivity of the 
other factor increases. 
 Despite its welcome mathematical simplicity and its intrinsic consistency , the 
neo-classical model contains substantial problems regarding ‘critical assumptions’162 : 
(1) decreasing marginal returns on labor (labor productivity), which implies that 
average labor productivity decreases linearly as labor-intensification (the increase of 
the use of labor relative to land) increases163; (2) decreasing marginal returns on land 
 
                                               
161 Among an enormous literature : Fruit (1962), pp. 186-236 ; Debertin (2012), pp. 171-187. 
162 Rodrik (2015) 
163 Here, some clarification is needed regarding the vocabulary used in this chapter : from an economic 
point of view, increasing the number of laborers per unit of land is of course an extensive process. 
Intensification concerns changes in the production techniques, such as changing the rhythm of crop 
rotation, manuring, or new agricultural technology. In this chapter, I use the term ‘intensification’ as 
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(soil productivity), implying that intensification always plays against average 
productivity and, hence, against per capita output. It is not to say that those 
statements should be dismissed a priori, but they deserve at least to be questioned.  
 One further observation regarding the Neo-classical model should be 
emphasized: since, as explained above, it relies on a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, the model only allows for linear (in the present case, hyperbolic) 
relationships. This feature alone, it should be noted, puts such a model somehow in 
contradiction with the canonical Neo-classical theory itself. Indeed, in Neo-classical 
economics, the law of diminishing marginal returns belongs to a more general law, 
known as ‘the law of variable proportions’, or ‘law of non-proportional returns’. As 
illustrated by the graph below, the law of variable proportions states that, when the use 
of a production factor increases, total output begins by growing more than the increase 
of inputs, then increases linearly with inputs (the relative increase of output equals the 
relative increase of inputs), and only in a later phase starts increasing less than 
proportionally to the input increments164. As the input increase continues, the increase 
in total output will approach zero and might even ultimately decrease. Of course, it is 
perfectly possible that one or more of these phases would not be present in a given 
production process, but the generic case contains them all.  
 The obvious problem is that the function describing the law of variable 
proportions displays at least one inflexion point (the point where the convexity of the 
curve changes). Yet, the mathematical formulation of the Cobb-Douglas function does 
not allow for any inflexion point whatsoever165 : in the case of decreasing marginal 
returns and constant returns to scale – the traditional assumptions of most neo-
classical models –, the convexity of the curve is always turned downwards166. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
defining the increase in the use of labor inputs per units of land as opposed to an extention of the 
agricultural cultivated surface. 
164 Jurion (2006), pp. 105-106 
165 In mathematical terms, the inflexion point is given by the one where the second derivative of the 
function is equal to zero. But in a Cobb-Douglas function, the second derivative of the curve is always 
negative, except in the trivial point (0,0). 
166 Simon & Blume (2014), pp. 47-48 
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On the basis of the problems exhibited by the Cobb-Douglas production function, it 
might seem sounder to choose a more appropriate production function. Other 
functions indeed exist in the economic literature, but they do not especially solve our 
problems without creating new ones : some of them contain many different 
parameters that it would be impossible to assess in a context which does not provide 
statistical data, while others considers the production factors as being independent 
from one another, an assumption obviously untenable since both labor and land are 
required for any agricultural production to take place. The indirect goal of the current 
section will be to construct an alternative production function more suitable to the 
modeling of agricultural production, and more specifically to ancient agricultural 
production. We shall thus start by discussing the flaws of the Neo-classical model, the 
first of which lies in concept of ‘diminishing marginal returns’. 
2.3.2 Non-decreasing marginal returns : insights from H. C. Carey 
and P. Sraffa 
How likely is it that constantly diminishing marginal returns would occur in 
agriculture, and more precisely in ancient agriculture ? With respect to the puzzles 
arising from the Cobb-Douglas production function, this is the question to be asked 
here. Yet, when speaking of agricultural returns, one fundamental distinction should 
be made ab initio in order to avoid any confusion : (1) the evolution of soil productivity 
resulting from an increase of the cultivated area, and (2) the evolution of soil 
productivity resulting from an increase in the use of labor per unit of land.  
 (1) It has often been argued by classical economists like Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo that, when a process of extensive cultivation occurred (notably as a 
Output 
Prod. 
factor 
Increasing 
returns 
Diminishing 
returns 
negative 
returns 
Linear returns Null returns 
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consequence of population growth), the best soils were cultivated first, resulting in 
decreasing marginal productivity of land. Yet, this hypothesis has been strongly 
criticized : already in the early 19th century, economist Henry Charles Carey argued 
that the order of cultivation did not always or even generally go from fertile to poor 
soils. In his book The past, the present and the future, he examines Ricardo’s 
proposition of decreasing marginal land returns and argues :  
‘If man begins always with the best soils, then is this proposition true, and with 
every step in the process of population, he loses more and more control over his 
own actions, becoming the victim of an overruling necessity. If, on the contrary, 
he begins with the poor soils, and passes gradually towards the bests, every step 
should be accompanied by increasing power to select such soils as are best suited 
to his purpose, taking sometimes the light sands and at others the heavy marls; at 
one time the clay, at another the lime (…); the hilltop or the river bottom; the 
near or the distant; the superficial or the profound.’167 
In his other opus (Principles of Political Economy), he writes : ‘the soils first cultivated 
are very frequently not those of highest fertility; (…) the settler prefers that which is 
somewhat inferior, but which is clear and ready for cultivation’168. Order of cultivation 
he claims, does not usually follow a decreasing gradient of fertility. Other factors must 
be taken into account such as the suitability of the soil to the specific type of 
cultivation, and the amount of labor required for rendering the land ready for 
agricultural operations169. For Carey, soil fertility is therefore not only a ‘natural’ given, 
but also depended upon the effects of human labor. Of course, Carey’s case study is the 
English territory from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the 19th century, but his 
reasoning may well apply to any pre-industrial context. In accordance with those 
criticisms of mechanically decreasing marginal returns on cultivable land extension, 
Ph. Wicksteed himself, one of the leading figures of economic Marginalism, stated that 
the very label of ‘marginal product’ was far less applicable to land than to any other 
mean of production170.  
 (2) Yet, doesn’t marginal soil productivity decrease with the intensification of the 
use of labor ? In a paper that has largely been ignored by later scholarship, P. Sraffa 
examined the conditions of validity of the law of diminishing marginal returns.  
According to neo-classical theory, decreasing marginal returns in an industry broadly 
 
                                               
167 Carey (1848), p. 50 
168 Carey (1837), p. 38 
169 Ibid., n.2 On the effects of labor and management as determining factors of soil productivity, see : 
Vidonne (1977). 
170 Wicksteed (1914), pp. 18-20; Sraffa (1960), p. 2. 
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defined – say, ‘agriculture’– will only occur if some means of production – land, for 
example – are considered as ‘fixed’. In this case, considering the agricultural sector as a 
whole, without further precisions, the total quantity of cultivable land cannot be 
increased as fast as population – and, hence, demand for food products – grows, 
resulting in diminishing returns. Yet, this requires a very wide and vague definition of 
an ‘industry’. So wide, actually, that the fundamental hypothesis of independence 
between demand and supply will no longer be valid : indeed, any attempt to generate 
an overall increase in agricultural production would change the relative prices of land 
and labor, since it would to a certain extent redirect labor from other industries into 
agriculture171. A S. Keen explains in his recent book Debunking economics, in which he 
reassessed the validity of Sraffa’s works, this change in the relative prices of inputs will 
also, mechanically, change the distribution of income and, hence, modify the aggregate 
demand curve172. The logical conclusion to be drawn is that, as changes in aggregate 
supply of agricultural products would affect aggregate demand for such products, the 
induced changes in income distribution and demand might, to a certain extent, 
compensate for the diminishing returns, and will eventually result in a situation of 
multiple equilibrium points.  
 If, on the other hand, we reckon with a more realistic conception of an industry 
– say, grain production – then the hypothesis of independence between demand and 
supply becomes valid, but that of fixed inputs is no longer tenable :  
If we next take an industry which employs only a small part of the "constant 
factor" (which appears more appropriate for the study of the particular 
equilibrium of a single industry), we find that a (small) increase in its production 
is generally met much more by drawing "marginal doses " of the constant factor 
from other industries than by intensifying its own utilization of it ; thus the 
increase in cost [i.e. the decrease in returns] will be practically negligible, and 
anyhow it will still operate in a like degree upon all the industries of the group. 
Excluding these cases, and excluding – if we take a point of view embracing long 
periods – the numerous cases in which the quantity of a means of production 
may be regarded as being only temporarily fixed in respect to an unexpected 
demand, very little remains: the imposing structure of diminishing returns is 
available only for the study of that minute class of commodities in the production 
of which the whole of a factor of production is employed173. 
 
                                               
171 Sraffa (1926), p. 539 
172 Keen (2011), pp. 146-147 
173 Sraffa (1926), p. 539 
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Under these conditions, some flexibility in the use of production factors is likely to 
take place : an increased demand for grain could be met by converting into grain-land 
agricultural surfaces devoted to other purposes, or by a reduction of fallow, or by a 
shift operated by other producers (wine, cattle,…etc) towards the production of grain, 
and only in some residual circumstances would an actual extension of cultivated land 
by purchases (or other procedures) occur; more likely, of course, is a combination of all 
processes.  
 Going back to the case where production would be constrained by a fixed 
resource, Sraffa, followed by Keen, acknowledges that diminishing returns are likely to 
occur, but only from a certain level of production and beyond, reconnecting thereby to 
the actual generic law of non-proportional returns174. Yet, he contests the idea that 
diminishing returns would mechanically occur anyway. As Sraffa, and Keen after him, 
explain, the idea that diminishing returns are inevitable supposes a complete 
utilization of the fixed resource. But this is not always the case. As Keen explains :  
Imagine that you have a franchise to supply ice creams to a football stadium, and 
that the franchise lets you determine where patrons are seated. If you have a 
small crowd one night – say, one quarter of capacity – would you spread the 
patrons evenly over the whole stadium, so that each patron was surrounded by 
several empty seats? Of course not! This arrangement would simply force your 
staff to walk farther to make a sale. Instead, you’d leave much of the ground 
empty, thus minimizing the work your staff has to do to sell the ice creams. 
There’s no sense in using every last inch of your ‘fixed resource’ (the stadium) if 
demand is less than capacity175. 
The same is true, he says, of a farm or factory: ‘If a variable input displays increasing 
marginal returns at some scale of output’ – as is precisely claimed by Sraffa – ‘then the 
sensible thing for the farmer or factory owner to do is leave some of the fixed resource 
idle, and work the variable input to maximum efficiency on part only of the fixed 
resource’176. A numerical example might usefully illustrate this point. Let us consider a 
farmer having 25 cultivable hectares177 and 50 workers at his disposal, with the 
following levels of output per hectare for different numbers of workers per ha :  
 
 
                                               
174 Keen (2011), p. 148 
175 Ibid., pp. 148-149 
176 Ibid., p. 149 
177 In the case where fallow accounts for 50% of total surface, this implies a total agricultural surface of 
50 ha. 
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Workers per hectare Output per hectare (bushels) 
0 0 
1 0.2 
2 0.75 
3 1.5 
4 2.5 
5 3.75 
6 5 
7 6.25 
8 7 
9 7.5 
10 7.75 
11 7.8 
 
According to the neo-classical model, the farmer would use his 50 workers and 25 
hectares, resulting in a labor/land ratio of 2 workers per ha (50/25). As illustrated by 
the table above, at this level of labor intensity, average output per hectare is 0.75 
bushels. Hence, total output would be equal to 25 x 0.75, or 18.75 bushels (total 
cultivated surface x average productivity per hectare). On the other hand, a ‘Sraffaian’ 
farmer would rather concentrate his workers on a portion only of his cultivable surface 
so as to obtain a higher level of productivity. He would for instance dispose his 50 
workers on 12.5 hectares in order to obtain a labor-land-ratio of 4 workers per ha, 
resulting in a total output of 31.25 bushels, hence realizing a 12.5 bushels surplus over 
the neoclassical farmer. 
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Thus, the important and somehow counterintuitive conclusion to be derived from 
Sraffa’s analysis – in particular the non-linear response of soil yields to intensification – 
is that cultivating a smaller surface might be synonym of a more efficient use of 
resource and, hence, of a larger output. We should thus be careful in interpreting small 
cultivated surfaces as leading to small surpluses and precariousness of peasant living 
condition. This conclusion makes particular sense in a context where a substantial 
proportion of farming exploitations – not only small autourgoi but also intermediate 
farm tenants – do not maximize profit, as is continuously assumed by neo-classical 
models, but rather maximize total output178. As P. Garnsey states it: 
‘Production totals mattered. Every year farmers measured their harvest. Every 
year they decided how much to put aside as seed (…). But just as regularly they 
decided how much land to put under cultivation, how much to assign to each 
crop, and how much seed to sow for a given area.179 
 
                                               
178 This idea is also expressed by Pliny the Elder, NH, XVIII, 38; on output maximization by peasants, 
see : Fenoaltea (1976), p. 130 sqq (for preindustrial farming); Erdkamp (2005), p. 62 & p. 99 (for Roman 
farming) ; Van Der Ploeg (2008), p. 42 : ‘the peasant way of farming is geared to the production of as 
much value added as possible’. 
179 Garnsey (2000), p. 708 
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We might thus wholeheartedly agree with J. D. Van der Ploeg when he writes : 
‘peasants did not maximize profit, but were not bond to subsistence’180.  
2.3.3  Cooperativity and the non-linear dynamic of labor-dependent 
yield  
As displayed in the figure below, the hypothesis of Sraffa is that average productivity 
responds non-linearly to changes in the labor/land ratio :  
 
This is, however, a discrete example, and the formalization of hypothesis in order to 
build a mathematical model was not as common a practice in Sraffa’s times as it is 
today. In order to suggest an alternative production function, we thus need to find a 
continuous function depicting such a relationship between intensification (the 
labor/land ratio) and average soil productivity. The shape of the curve proposed by 
Sraffa is close to what mathematicians call a sigmoidal curve. Several types of sigmoidal 
functions exist in mathematics, but with very different levels of complexity and 
conditions of applicability181. In order to avoid manipulating exponential functions, we 
propose to model the soil yield-labor/land ratio relationship by using a slightly 
modified Hill sigmoidal curve. 
 
                                               
180 Van der Ploeg (2011), p. 46 
181 We might think, for example, of the logistical curves such as the so-called Verhulst equation or the 
Gomperz equation, often used to describe processes such as population or cell growth. Cf. Simon & 
Blume (2014), pp. 491-500. 
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 The choice of Hill equations is not only governed by (relative) algebraic 
simplicity – though more complex than Cobb-Douglas functions. It is also relevant 
from an explanatory point of view, in so far as it helps providing an actual economic 
explanation to the possibility of increasing returns in agriculture which is intrinsic to 
the agricultural process. The Hill functions find their origin in the works of biochemist 
Archibald Hill who, back in 1910, formulated such equations to describe a process 
called ‘cooperative binding’, referring to the process of linkage between a ligand and a 
macromolecule182. As stated by subsequent research in biochemistry and physiology, 
the Hill equation expresses the level of cooperativity between enzymes183. What the 
notion of cooperativity expresses is that the effect of two or more ligands on the 
affinity of further ligands is superior to the simple sum of the effect of each individual 
ligand. Stated differently, the whole is more than the sum of its parts.  
 The concept of cooperativity, initially developed in biochemistry, has since been 
widely used in natural sciences and particularly in entomology for modeling the 
behavior of social insects in their food supply strategies. In this respect, it can find 
useful application to the economics of agriculture. Cultivation is, indeed, a cooperative 
process in which peasants not only distribute tasks between each other but also 
develop empirical strategies and methods to cope with their difficulties, constraints or 
goals. It seems thus perfectly sound to consider that the effect of intensification – the 
increase in the number of workers per unit of land – fosters cooperation: the impact of 
the addition of 5 workers per ha on average soil productivity would then be greater 
than the simple sum of the individual effect of each of the 5 workers. This cumulated 
effect on output per hectare would start decreasing from the moment when the 
increase in the number of workers would become an impediment to an efficient use of 
the resources, and as intensification would start facing the natural limit in the produce 
that the soil can yield (needless to say, given the level of technological development)184. 
For this reason, the function of average soil productivity (𝜋𝐴) must be both 
proportional and conversely proportional to the labor-land ratio (γ). To depict such a 
relationship, we propose the following ‘Hill-type’ equation : 
 
 
                                               
182 Hill’s paper focused on the particular case of fixation of oxygen (O2) on hemoglobin; see : Hill (1910), 
pp. iv-vii. 
183 Monod, Wyman & Changeux (1965), pp. 88-118 ; Weiss (1997), p. 835 sqq. 
184 Mathematically speaking, it would perhaps have been more accurate to describe such a phenomenon 
by using autocatalytic functions (such as those of Gompertz or Verhulst), but this resulted in problems 
that we could not overcome regarding the match between the average labor productivity function and 
the average soil productivity function.  
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𝜋𝐴̅̅ ̅ = ℎ
∗ ∙
𝛾𝑛
𝜃 ∙ ?̅? + 𝛾𝑛
           (2) 
 
where h* is a coefficient capturing technological development and intrinsic soil 
fertility, which together define the maximal attainable output per hectare185, ?̅? is a 
function of total farm size, θ is a positive parameter defining the value of the inflexion 
point (the point where diminishing returns appear), and n is the cooperativity 
coefficient expressing the effect of intensification on productivity (with n ≥ 1). The 
higher the value of n, the stronger the impact of intensification on soil productivity. 
The graphical representation of the average soil-productivity as a function of 
intensification resulting from this equation is displayed in the figure below and 
confronted with the Neo-classical curve. 
 
  
 Cooperativity is of course not limited to labor, and might theoretically apply to 
other production factors. One might thus want to consider the extent to which 
additional cultivated hectares could have an increasing effect on output. The only 
parameter which could increase the effect of extending cultivation on output is the 
specific conditions of land : in the case of scattered cultivation, additional hectares 
 
                                               
185 Here, h* is equal to a ratio h/μ in which h is the same technological parameter as the one present in 
the Neo-classical model, and μ relates to the intrinsic properties of the soil. 
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would be cultivated in different climatic and soil conditions, which would reduce the 
overall risk of harvest failure186. Yet, substantial land extensions might be contiguous to 
the already existing ones, in which case there would be no specific advantage from 
land extension alone. Overall thus, and taking into account the thorough critique of 
the concept of marginal returns – not only as resulting from labor-intensification but 
also from extended cultivable surface (cf. supra) – we should consider that there is no 
cooperativity on the increase of cultivated land, and no anti-cooperativity either. 
2.3.4 Non-linear labor productivity: addressing neoclassical 
inconsistencies 
As already explained above in the beginning of this section, the Cobb-Douglas model 
assumes continuously decreasing marginal productivity of labor; that is, from the first 
unit of labor. But it also assumes continuously decreasing average labor productivity 
(𝜋𝐿) : as the labor/land ratio increases, average labor productivity drops. This can be 
noticed from the Cobb-Douglas function itself. Since average productivity is equal to 
total output divided by total labor (Q/L), expressing Q by the Cobb-Douglas equation 
and labelling the labor/land ratio (L/A) by γ yields : 
 
𝜋𝐿 =
𝑄
𝐿
=
ℎ ∙ 𝐿𝜂 ∙ 𝐴𝑎
1−𝜂
𝐿
= ℎ ∙ 𝛾𝜂−1         (3) 
 
This feature of the Cobb-Douglas function results in the situation in which, when the 
units of labor per hectare equal zero, average labor productivity is infinite. Although 
mathematically correct, this conclusion is obviously absurd from an economic or 
agronomical point of view. While it is perfectly valid to consider that, after a certain 
level of intensification, any increase in labor inputs relative to land would result in a 
decrease of average productivity, we should stick to the (trivial) constraint that average 
labor productivity is zero when there is no labor per unit land. Thus, the relationship 
between labor productivity and the labor/land ratio starts at 0, decreases beyond a 
certain threshold, and, by definition, can never be negative. Combining these three 
constraints forces us to acknowledge that the function describing this relationship 
must experience an increasing phase and a maximum. This consequence is derived 
 
                                               
186 Erdkamp (2005), p. 73 
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from a mathematical principle dating back to the 17th c. and known as Rolle’s 
Theorem187.   
 If we now turn to the modeling of the curve, we have to integrate the further 
constraint that our function must be in accordance with our modelling of the 
relationship between soil productivity and the labor/land ratio. In other words, since 
we ultimately seek to propose an alternative production function, we must ensure that 
the same output equation will arise from both productivity functions (land and labor). 
We should therefore try to model labor productivity with the same type of function as 
the one used to model soil productivity : a Hill equation, modified in order to fit the 
specific constraints of labor productivity. We thus propose the function, with the same 
parameters as those defined for land productivity : 
𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ = ℎ
∗ ∙
𝛾𝑛−1
𝜃 ∙ ?̅? + 𝛾𝑛
           (4) 
The following graph compares this non-linear, Hill-type equation with the Neo-
classical model : 
 
 
 
 
                                               
187 Rolle (1690); We can think of this conclusion by imagining that we have to draw the relationship with 
a pen : given that we start from the point (0;0), since the line we are about to draw cannot go beyond the 
horizontal axis (average productivity is never negative), and since after a certain point, the curve will 
have to go down (in order to express diminishing marginal returns), how is it possible to draw such a 
curve without starting by drawing an increasing segment ? The reader will easily notice that it is not 
possible to do differently. 
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2.3.5 An alternative production function 
From these two productivity equations, we may now infer a single production function 
which is thus of the generic form : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
h* is the maximum output per ha; θ is a constant coefficient defining the skewedness 
of the curve; n is the coefficient of labor cooperativity; the difference m-n defines the 
surface maximizing total output for a given level of labor input, and ε captures the 
elasticity of output with regard to land. Since we argued above that total output should 
be considered a linear function of land, ε should be set at 1.  
 
 
 
As displayed by Fig.11, this new production function leads us to draw the somewhat 
counterintuitive conclusion that, for a given level of labor input, increasing the 
cultivated area does not always increase total output. Yet, this is perfectly consistent 
with the hypothesis of Sraffa stating that soil-productivity responds non-linearly to 
n = 2.75
n = 3
n = 3.25
n = 3.5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
0 20 40 60 80 100
To
ta
l a
n
n
u
al
 o
u
tp
u
t 
(t
o
n
s)
Total cultivated surface ; L = 50
Fig.11. The Sraffa-Hill production function displaying total output
as a function of cultivated surface with diffent levels of
cooperativity for a farm employing 50 workers | m = 2 ; ε = 1
𝑄 = ℎ∗ ∙
𝐴𝑎
𝜖 ∙ 𝐿𝑛
𝜃 ∙ 𝐴𝑎
𝑚 + 𝐿𝑛
               (5) 
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intensification: since there is an optimal labor/land ratio, extending the cultivated 
surface beyond this optimal threshold will result in a less efficient use of the resources 
and, hence, in a lower output.  
 In the light of this alternative model of primary production, an important 
discovery of nowadays’ agro-economic research is worth emphasizing : the inverse 
relationship (hereafter IR) between farm size and yield. While our Sraffa-Hill 
production function implies that increasing farm size (and cultivated surface) might 
play against total output, an ever-growing literature in the field of agro-economics has 
now revealed that in developing countries larger farm size is very frequently correlated 
with lower yields per hectare (i.e. lower soil productivity) 188. The actual explanation of 
this phenomenon is far beyond the scope of this discussion, and is still disputed among 
experts; but this recurring observation in more traditional farming strongly suggests 
that such an inverse correlation also applied to Graeco-Roman agriculture, as argued 
by G. Kron189.  
 
   
The discussion which precedes urges us to argue, following Carey, Sraffa and Keen, 
that, in the case of agricultural production, the law of diminishing returns should be 
regarded as the exception, rather than the rule. Therefore, we could not agree more 
with J. D. Van Der Ploeg when, discussing the common misconceptions in agricultural 
studies, he writes :  
‘A second series of mystifications center on the ‘law of diminishing returns’ as 
formulated by neo-classical economics. But this ‘law’ has already for several 
decades been rejected in theoretical agronomy. Whenever diminishing returns 
emerge this is seen as a temporary exception which after correction will make 
way again for constant or even increasing returns’.190  
It is thus quite regrettable to notice the pervasiveness of this principle in the scholarly 
literature as well as the fact that it is never subjected to a critical analysis, either in the 
 
                                               
188 Among an enormous literature : Carter (1984), pp. 131-145 ; Bachta & Chebil (2002) ; Barrett et al. 
(2010), pp. 86)97 ; Ünal (2012), pp. 95-127 ; 
189 Kron (2008), pp. 88-89 ; contra Pleket (1993), p. 321 
190 Vand der Ploeg (2011), p. 46 
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broad field of agricultural economics, or more specifically in ancient economic 
history191. 
  
2.3.6 Town and countryside: modelling interactions 
2.3.6.1 The spatial division of labor 
So far, we have examined grain production at the farm level, that is, from a 
microeconomic point of view. But what are the implications of both the Neo-classical 
model and the ‘Sraffa-Hill’ model for average per capita quantity of grain ? What we 
will try to do in this section is to relate the grain output potential to easily computable 
parameters such as, for instance, soil and labor productivity, the urbanization rate, and 
ultimately the proportion of agricultural population, the rate of rents and 
taxation,…etc. Here, it is important to stress that we are dealing with a potential per 
capita output. Relating total output to population is actually a measure of overall 
production taking into account the effect of population; it says nothing at all, of 
course, of the quantity of grain which individuals actually consumed since we do not 
factor in the impact of social inequality on the mechanism of grain distribution. At 
best, it helps defining a ceiling. 
 In the course of this section, a number of assumptions will be made in order to 
make the construction of the model easier. The first of these assumptions is to 
assimilate rural population and agricultural population, and urban population with 
non-agricultural population. I am however well aware that ancient towns were not 
atolls of non-agrarian production in oceans of agriculture. Important scholarship has 
indeed revealed that a non-negligible agricultural production took place in the 
suburban areas192 and even within city centers193. In Pompei, W. Jashemski has 
estimated that gardens and cultivated land accounted for a little less than 18% of total 
urban area194. However, most suburban and urban agriculture consisted of orchards 
and legumes, cereals being only marginal among them. Yet, to the extent that urban 
agriculture gave products that could be partly substituted to cereals, this feature 
 
                                               
191 Agricultural economics : Smedshaug (2010), p. 136 ; Debertin (2012 [1986]), p. 19 sqq; ancient 
economic history : Jongman (1988), p. 26, pp. 76-77 & p. 86 ; Erdkamp (2005), p.62 ; Temin (2013), p. 15 & 
p. 23; Erdkamp (2015), p. 31. 
192 On suburban agriculture : Goodman (2007), p.47, pp. 54-55,. 72-73 & 76-77. 
193 Jashemski (1979), pp. 201 sqq & 251 sqq. 
194 Ibid., p.24. 
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undoubtedly undermined the level of dependency of urban areas with regard to their 
hinterland. But at the same time, significant non-agrarian production was also carried 
out in the countryside, hence also reducing the dependency of rural dwellers upon 
urban production regarding capital goods.  
 To be more accurate, then, we should rather speak of a dichotomy between those 
who produce their means of subsistence (population engaged or primarily engaged in 
agriculture) and those who do not (populations primarily engaged in non-agricultural 
activities)195, rather than of a strict economic dichotomy between town and 
countryside. But in a first approximation, it does not seem unreasonable to consider 
that the urban agrarian population was roughly counterbalanced by the rural non-
agrarian population196, and hence that in quantitative terms, this simplification may be 
applied without affecting the results too much. In the last part of this section, we will 
try to move beyond this initial assumption and develop a more realistic approach. In 
the meantime, however, it is worth comparing the outcome of the Cobb-Douglas type 
and Sraffa-Hill models regarding the link between per capita potential output and 
labor-land ratio. 
 
2.3.6.2 The Neo-classical model 
Per capita output is obtained by dividing total quantity (Q) by total population (P). 
Since total output is defined with regard to a Cobb-Douglas function197, we have : 
 
𝑞 =
𝑄
𝑃
=
ℎ ∙ 𝐿𝑟
𝛼 ∙ 𝐴1−𝛼
𝑃
 
 
Yet, total population can be divided into urban and rural population, the former being 
mostly agriculturally non-productive. Since total population is the sum of urban and 
rural population, and since the rural labor force is a certain proportion (actually the 
employment rate, noted k) of total rural population, we can express total population in 
terms of the ratio of urban to rural population (φ)198. Injecting this expression in the 
per capita equation and transforming the remaining variables in terms of labor 
productivity provides us with a final equation for per capita grain output: 
 
 
                                               
195 Lo Cascio (2011), p. 89 
196 Despite N. Morley’s skepticism regarding this assumption (Morley (2011), p. 152.) 
197 With the assumption of diminishing marginal returns and constant returns to scale. 
198 𝑃 = 𝐿𝑟 ∙ (1 + 𝜙)/𝑘 
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𝑞 = ℎ ∙
𝑘 ∙ ?̅?𝐿
1 + 𝜙
=
ℎ ∙ 𝑘
1 + 𝜙
∙ 𝛾𝛼−1                    (6) 
 
These two equations state that the grain output potential per capita of a production 
unit is directly proportional to the employment rate and to the average productivity of 
labor and land, and conversely proportional to the ratio of urban to rural population. 
  Of course, this does not imply that this quantity was the actual average share of 
grain at the disposal of one individual, since it does not take into account the 
mechanisms of output distribution, income inequality or fluctuation of prices and 
purchasing power. But this expression of per capita quantity of grain provides us with 
an evaluation of the grain output “potential” of a city or region with respect to the 
distribution of its population.  
 From this equation, it is now possible to assess the effect of population 
distribution between town and countryside on per capita potential supply. This can 
easily be done by expressing the ratio φ in terms of urbanization rate (u) :  
 
𝑞 = ℎ ∙ 𝑘 ∙ ?̅?𝐿 ∙ (1 − 𝑢)          (7) 
 
As illustrated by the graph below, this relationship implies that per capita potential 
grain supply decreases linearly as urbanization increases. Here, I want to be very clear 
for the reader: I am not saying that this is what actually happened. Rather, I want to 
stress that this is the consequence that follows from relying on the Cobb-Douglas neo-
classical function to describe agricultural production. 
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2.3.6.3 The Sraffa-Hill model 
Here also, per capita potential output is obtained by dividing total production (Q) by 
population (P), but instead of a Cobb-Douglas function, we represent it by the Sraffa-
Hill equation199. The expression is thus : 
 
𝑞 =
𝑄
𝑃
=
ℎ∗ ∙
𝐴 ∙ 𝐿𝑛
𝜃 ∙ 𝐴𝑚 + 𝐿𝑛
𝑃
                        (8) 
 
Here again, we may express total population in terms of rural labor and the ratio of 
urban to rural population200 which, after simplification and rearrangement provides 
the following equation linking per capita output to the labor/land ratio :  
 
𝑞 = ℎ∗ ∙ 𝑘 (
1
1 + 𝜙
) ∙
𝛾𝑛−1
𝜃 ∙ 𝐹 + 𝛾𝑛
             (9) 
 
 
                                               
199 With ε = 1 
200 See above, n.45 
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This expression could likewise be formulated in terms of population density through 
the following transformation201 :  
 
𝛾 =
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎
 
 
However, at the macro-economic level, the labor/land ratio provides a good proxy for 
population density; displaying both equations would thus be redundant. The graph 
below compares the results of the Neo-classical and Sraffaian models: when modeling 
agricultural production on the basis of the Sraffa-Hill production function, the 
intensification – or, similarly, increase in population density – does not always play 
against per capita output, but rather exhibits an optimum value, defined by the specific 
conditions of production. Here again, the hyperbolic decrease exhibited by the neo-
classical model results from the absurd assumption – intrinsic to the Cobb-Douglas 
function – that marginal returns on labor decrease continuously as the use of labor per 
unit of land increases, which implies that average labor productivity – or, here, per 
capita output – when there is no labor at all would be infinite… 
 
 
 
                                               
201 Indeed : 
𝐿
𝐴𝑎
=
𝑃𝑎
𝑃
𝐿
𝑃𝑎
𝑃
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But what do we get if we now examine per capita output with regard to urbanization ? 
Let us go back to eq.(9) above. By comparison with eq. (4) defining average labor 
productivity we easily notice that the equation can be rewritten as: 
 
𝑞 =
𝑘 ∙ ?̅?𝐿
1 + 𝜙
 
 
Hence, when developing the Sraffa-Hill production function at the macro-economic 
level, we obtain the same relationship than that obtained by the Neo-classical model 
(eq. 6), namely that per capita output decreases as urbanization increases. In this 
regard, the Sraffa-Hill model and the Neo-classical model would diverge regarding 
production at the microeconomic or mesoeconomic level, but converge at the 
macroeconomic level. 
2.3.6.4 Urban-driven growth or diminishing returns…but not both 
At first sight, it would thus seem that the process of urbanization would undermine 
agricultural per capita output – leaving out, needless to say, the effect of monetization 
and trade, that will be discussed in chap. III (section 4) and technological change – 
which prompts the question of the role of cities regarding agricultural production. This 
conclusion however relies on the assumption that labor productivity itself cannot 
increase as the ratio of urban to rural population increases too; this assumption is 
perfectly consistent with the Neo-classical hypothesis of monotonously diminishing 
marginal returns (cf. supra), but not with the Sraffa-Hill hypothesis of a non-linear 
response of productivity to intensification. A numerical example might well illustrate 
this point. Let us consider a city or region of 5,000 inhabitants, with a rural labor force 
of 3,400 workers, average labor productivity (𝜋𝐿,0) being 1 ton/ worker/ year. Total 
gross agricultural production is thus 1 x 3,400 = 3,400 tons, and per capita output is 
3,400/5,000 or 0.68 tons per head. If over a certain period, this same city experiences a 
process of increasing urbanization, this implies that, while total population would 
grow, the urban population will have grown more than the rural population, resulting 
in a higher urbanization rate and a higher φ coefficient. Let us thus assume that total 
population will have reached 6,500 inhabitants, and that rural labor force – which is 
always a share of rural population – would be 4,200 people. In this new situation, 
assuming that average labor productivity remained the same would make a total of 
4,200 tons, and a per capita output of 4200/6500, that is, 0.64 tons/head. What would 
thus be the condition under which agricultural per capita output would remain the 
same, or even grow ? We can demonstrate that this condition is : 
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𝜋𝐿,1 =
1 + 𝜙1
1 + 𝜙0
∙ 𝜋𝐿,0 
 
where 𝜋𝐿,1is labor productivity after the phase of urbanization. Since urban population 
increased more than rural population, 𝜙1 > 𝜙0, and hence 1 + 𝜙1 > 1 + 𝜙0, which 
thus implies that labor productivity has increased too. Thus, for per capita output to 
rise in parallel with urbanization, labor productivity needs to rise too (𝜋𝐿,1 > 𝜋𝐿,0).  
 This conclusion might seem obvious to the reader, but we must draw his 
attention on the fact that this is precisely inconsistent with the hypothesis of 
diminishing marginal returns ! Indeed, at the macroeconomic level, total agricultural 
surface may be considered as inelastic, and thus approximately constant between the 
two periods. Hence, the increase of the rural labor force (from 3,400 to 4,200 people) 
results in a higher labor/land ratio (γ). However, as we have seen above, the Cobb-
Douglas model based on diminishing marginal returns and constant returns to scale 
necessarily implies that an increase of the labor/land ratio causes average labor 
productivity to drop. A parallel increase of average labor productivity and of the 
labor/land ratio is forbidden by the assumption of diminishing marginal returns, which 
thus renders impossible the idea of a parallel increase of agricultural per capita output 
and of urbanization rate. This, of course, is only true without significant technological 
change or major impacts of intensification practices (now organization of production, 
cultivation of other crops, or increased fertility by fertilizers). Again, I do not say that 
this was the case, since in the previous chapter I precisely argued that intensification 
techniques played an important role in Graeco-Roman agriculture. What I am trying to 
do here is to isolate the effect of specific variables to reveal the underlying assumptions 
of the process of urban-driven agricultural growth. This contradiction, under specific 
hypothesis, between urbanization and diminishing returns is shown on the graph 
before:  
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As urban population increases faster than rural population, the demand curve is 
shifted towards the right of the graph (with equal absolute displacements between 
phase (1) and (2) and between phase (2) and (3)). In the meantime, due to the 
assumption of diminishing marginal returns, the convexity of the supply curve is 
turned upwards202. As the urban demand curve would shift, the price of agricultural 
products would be driven up, thus stimulating production. Total production would 
thus rise too, but due to the marginal diminishing returns (represented by the upward 
convexity of the supply curve203), equal increments on the demand side (i.e. equal 
displacements of the urban demand curve, or equal increments in urban population 
size) will result in less than proportional increases of production (ΔQ2 < ΔQ1) and, 
hence, in smaller per capita output. Leaving apart the effects of money and trade, the 
only way to assume that urbanization would not drive agricultural output per capita 
down is to consider that agricultural production faces constant or increasing marginal 
returns. Hence, W. Jongman’s claims that urbanization would induce a rise of per 
 
                                               
202 Remember that the agreement in economics is to put quantities on the X axis and prices on the Y 
axis. 
203 Temin (2013), p. 15 
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Fig.14. Market for agricultural produces under conditions
of urbanization
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capita production and that agricultural production faces diminishing returns appear as 
two contradictory assumptions204. 
 
2.3.6.5 Urbanization and agricultural production: a generalized model 
 
In the analysis undertaken so far, the Cobb-Douglas and Sraffa-Hill models mostly 
concern the microeconomic level (the agricultural unit) and mesoeconomic level (a 
city). But we now need to consider the interplay of urbanization and agricultural 
output per capita at the macro-economic level (a whole region and beyond). An 
attempt in this direction has been done by Elio Lo Cascio, but his model suffers from 
important flaws. The most important one lies in his equation defining per capita 
income205 (y) : 
𝑦 =
𝑃
𝑃 − 𝑃(𝑈𝑟 − 𝑅𝑛𝑎)
=
1
1 − 𝑈𝑟 − 𝑅𝑛𝑎
 
 
In this equation, Ur stands for urbanization rate, and Rna is the share of rural workers 
engaged in non-agricultural activities. As the reader will easily notice, per capita 
agricultural output in this equation is solely defined on the basis of population 
aggregates. There is no parameter converting population in terms of output, that is, 
there is no mention of productivity. In economic terms, the ratio defined by Lo Cascio 
is what we might call a ‘dependency ratio’, i.e. the quotient of the consuming 
population by the producing population. At best, it is a proxy for the constraints lying 
upon the agricultural workforce, but it is certainly not per capita output.  
 Second, neither Lo Cascio’s model nor mine (so far at least) takes into account 
urban agricultural production. However, while we assimilated urban population to 
non-agricultural population on the one hand, and rural population to agricultural 
population, Lo Cascio allows for rural non-agricultural production without 
symmetrically considering urban agricultural production, which seems particularly 
inconsistent to me. 
 Thirdly, the model developed by Lo Cascio sticks to the demographic variables, 
but fails to account for the impact of rents, taxes, and soil productivity. While I have 
also left these variables out of my model so far, I would now like to close this chapter 
 
                                               
204 Jongman (1988), p. 88 
205 Lo Cascio (2011), p. 93 
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on an attempt to develop a more sophisticated model of the links between agricultural 
output per capita and urbanization at a meso- or macroeconomic level.   
 To do this, I first propose to divide total population in four aggregates (cf. figure 
below)  :  
 
• The urban agricultural population : Pu,A 
• The urban non-agricultural population : Pu, NA 
• The rural agricultural population : Pr, A 
• The rural non-agricultural population : Pr, NA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With this division in mind, let us now go back to the initial equation of this section 
(section 2.3.), that is, the one defining the distribution of total produce.  
 
𝑌 = 𝑁 + 𝑆 + 𝑅 + 𝑇 + 𝐵   (1) 
 
Both taxes and rents can be split into a part that is extracted (for rents : either hoarded 
by landlords, exchanged with another region without any ‘trickle-down’ effect on the 
local civic economy,…; for taxes : the share levied in kind and exported for the supply 
of Rome206) and a part that remains in the local economy (rents and taxes in kind sold 
on the urban market, or grain sold on the market to pay for rents and taxes in money). 
The extracted part is labelled e :  
 
(2) {
𝑅 = 𝑒𝑅𝑅 + (1 − 𝑒𝑅)𝑅
𝑇 = 𝑒𝑇𝑇 + (1 − 𝑒𝑇)𝑇
 
 
                                               
206 On this, see section 2.5 below. 
P
r,A
 
P
u,NA
 
P
r,NA
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Injecting these relations in the initial equation and splitting the extracted grain (put to 
the left) and the grain circulating in the economy (to the right) provides the following 
equation : 
 
𝑌 − 𝑒𝑅𝑅 − 𝑒𝑇𝑇 = 𝑁 + 𝑆 + (1 − 𝑒𝑅)𝑅 + (1 − 𝑒𝑇)𝑇 + 𝐵  (3) 
 
The grain output that is not extracted (the right side of the equation) can be equated 
with total grain consumption (CTOT): 
 
𝑁 + 𝑆 + (1 − 𝑒𝑅)𝑅 + (1 − 𝑒𝑇)𝑇 + 𝐵 = 𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇 (4) 
 
Moreover, rents, taxes and seed can all be expressed as a share of total output through 
the rate of rents (r), the taxation rate (τ) and she share of seed in total output or seed-
yield ratio (s) : 
 
(5) {
𝑅 = 𝑟𝑌
𝑇 = 𝜏𝑌
𝑆 = 𝑠𝑌
 
 
Putting equations (4) and (5) into (3) yields : 
 
𝑌(1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏) = 𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇 
 
⇒ 𝑌 =
𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇
1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏
        (6) 
 
Here, we now have an expression that relates total output to total consumption as well 
as to the seed-yield ratio, taxation rate and rate of rents. But total output may also be 
expressed simply as a function of average net labor productivity (𝜋𝐿) and total 
agricultural labor (LA): 
 
𝑌 = 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝐿𝐴 = 𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑃𝐴            (7) 
 
Obviously, the two definitions of grain output must equal each other : (6) = (7) : 
 
𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇
1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏
=  𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑃𝐴 ⇒ 𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇 =  𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑃𝐴(1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏) 
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However, total consumption (CTOT) is simply per capita consumption (q) multiplied by 
population (P). Total consumption is obviously equal to the sum of the consumption of 
each of our four population aggregates: 
 
(5) 
{
 
 
𝐶𝑢,𝐴 = 𝑞𝑢,𝐴𝑃𝑢,𝐴
 𝐶𝑢,𝑁𝐴 = 𝑞𝑢,𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑢,𝑁𝐴
𝐶𝑟,𝐴 = 𝑞𝑟,𝐴𝑃𝑟,𝐴
𝐶𝑟,𝑁𝐴 = 𝑞𝑟,𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑟,𝑁𝐴
 
 
Developing CTOT analytically yields the following equation :  
 
𝑞𝑢,𝐴𝑃𝑢,𝐴 + 𝑞𝑢,𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑢,𝑁𝐴 + 𝑞𝑟,𝐴𝑃𝑟,𝐴 + 𝑞𝑟,𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑟,𝑁𝐴 =  𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑃𝐴(1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏)    (6) 
 
From here, we need to wonder whether agricultural consumption per capita is more 
strongly dependent upon the economic activity of a given population or by its location. 
Said differently, should we consider that urban agricultural populations consume 
agricultural products at the level of urban consumption or at the level of the 
agricultural population as a whole ? Let us examine the two possibilities.  
 
❖ Geographical division 
 
If we consider that the geographical position defines the level of consumption, then we 
should apply a single level of consumption to the two urban aggregates. By doing so, 
the equation is simplified to : 
 
𝑞𝑢(𝑃𝑢,𝐴 + 𝑃𝑢,𝑁𝐴) + 𝑞𝑟(𝑃𝑟,𝐴 + 𝑃𝑟,𝑁𝐴) =  𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑃𝐴(1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏) 
 
     Pu            Pr 
 
By dividing both members of the equation by PA , it comes :  
 
𝑞𝑢
𝑃𝑢
𝑃𝐴
+ 𝑞𝑟
𝑃𝑟
𝑃𝐴
=  𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅(1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏) 
 
Reminding that : P = Pu + Pr, and dividing both the numerator and denominator by of 
the left member by P, we obtain :  
 
𝑞𝑢
𝑢
𝛼
+ 𝑞𝑟 (
1 − 𝑢
𝛼
) =  𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅(1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏) 
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Now, if we finally express urban and rural per capita consumption proportionally to 
the average agricultural per capita consumption (with μ equals the ratio or urban to 
rural per capita consumption, with μ > 1 since I assume urban dwellers being better off 
regarding total agricultural consumption taken as a whole), we get the final equation : 
 
 
 
  
 
What this equation states is fairly logical: average per capita consumption (or available 
output, since macroeconomically speaking these aggregates are equal to one another), 
is directly proportional to labor productivity and to the proportion of population 
engaged in agricultural activities, and conversely proportional to the rate of rents and 
taxes, to the extent that they are extracted from the economy. This equation also states 
that, if labor productivity and the share of agricultural population do not change, per 
capita available output decreases when urbanization increases. Despite the existence of 
urban agricultural production, this consequence is logical : since the majority of urban 
population is engaged in non-agricultural activities, when urbanization occurs, the 
bulk of non-agricultural population grows faster than the agricultural workforce 
which, if the share of non-agricultural population in total rural population is left 
unchanged, and if labor productivity is stable, results in lower agricultural output per 
capita.  
 
❖ Economic division 
 
If we now consider that the level of consumption is primarily related to the economic 
sector into which a given population is primarily engaged (hence either agricultural or 
non-agricultural), then eq. (6) above becomes :  
 
𝑞𝐴(𝑃𝑢,𝐴 + 𝑃𝑟,𝐴) + 𝑞𝑁𝐴(𝑃𝑢,𝑁𝐴 + 𝑃𝑟,𝑁𝐴) =  𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑃𝐴(1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏) 
 
⇒ 𝑞𝐴
𝑃𝐴
𝑃𝐴
+ 𝑞𝑟
𝑃𝑁𝐴
𝑃𝐴
=  𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅(1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏) 
 
Since total population is simply the sum of agricultural (PA) and non-agricultural 
population (PNA), we have : 
 
𝑃 = 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑃𝑁𝐴 ⇒ 𝑃𝑁𝐴 = 𝑃 − 𝑃𝐴 ⇒
𝑃𝑁𝐴
𝑃𝐴
=
𝑃 − 𝑃𝐴
𝑃𝐴
 
 
𝑞 =
𝛼 𝑘 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅(1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏)
1 + (𝜇 − 1) 𝑢
          (7) 
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Here, the ratio 
𝑃𝑁𝐴
𝑃𝐴
 can easily be expressed in terms of the share of agricultural 
population : 
𝑃𝑁𝐴
𝑃𝐴
 =
𝑃𝑁𝐴/𝑃
𝑃𝐴/𝑃
=
1−𝛼
𝛼
 ; The final equation for per capita available grain is 
thus :  
 
𝛼𝑞𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑞𝑁𝐴 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ (1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏) 
Or : 
 
 
 
 
Just like the former ‘geographical’ version, this equation integrates per capita available 
agricultural output, labor productivity, proportion of agricultural population, seed-
yield ratio, rate of rents, and taxation rate. Logically, it states that per capita available 
quantity of grain is directly proportional to labor productivity and to the share of 
agricultural population, and conversely proportional to the average seed-yield ratio and 
to the rate of rents and taxation, but only to the extent to which they are extracted from 
the local economy. Writing the extraction rate of surplus as : 𝜆 = 𝑒𝑅𝑟 + 𝑒𝑇𝜏, the 
equation reduces to : 
 
𝑞𝐴 + (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) 𝑞𝑁𝐴 = 𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ (1 − 𝑠 − 𝜆) 
 
Regarding the division of labor, this equation also means that, at constant productivity 
of labor, constant extraction rate of surplus, and constant proportion of population 
engaged in agriculture, there is a negative linear relationship between the possibility of 
grain consumption per capita of agricultural populations and that of non-agricultural 
populations (cf. figure below). Indeed, at constant 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ and λ, the link between per 
capita grain consumption of agricultural and non-agricultural population is :  
 
𝑞𝐴 = 𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ (1 − 𝑠 − 𝜆) − (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) 𝑞𝑁𝐴 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑞𝐴 + (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) 𝑞𝑁𝐴 = 𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ (1 − 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑅𝑟 − 𝑒𝑇𝜏)           (8) 
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The equation resulting from the ‘economic’ division of labor may also be reformulated 
in terms of average available grain output per capita, once we express the ratio of per 
capita agricultural output of agricultural populations to that of non-agrcultural 
populations by the letter ε :  
 
 
 
 
A quantitative assessment is now easily computable: in a region where average labor 
productivity is worth 600 modii of grain/worker/year207, if agricultural labor force 
makes up 90% of total agricultural population (k = 0.9), if 30% of taxes and 20% of 
rents are extracted from the regional/local economy (with a taxation rate of 10% and a 
share of rents equal to 20%); if we further assume that the non-agricultural population 
is better off by some 25% (ε = 1.25), reckoning with a proportion of (primarily) 
agricultural population of 85%, average agricultural per capita output in this region 
approaches 340 modii/person/year, or 2.2 tons/person/year.  
 The fundamental equations (6), (7) and (8) refine the previous arguments: for 
agricultural and non-agricultural populations to simultaneously experience an increase 
of their available per capita quantity of grain (or, alternatively, for urban and rural per 
capita consumption to increase in conditions of urbanization) there needs to be either 
 
                                               
207 For labor productivity estimated between 450 and 700 modii of grain/worker/year, cf. Erdkamp 
(2005), p.47. 
𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 = −(
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) 
qA 
qNA 
The ‘consumption possibility frontier’ 
?̃? =
𝑘 ∙ 𝜋𝐿̅̅ ̅ ∙ (1 − 𝑠 − 𝜆) 
1 + 𝜖 (
𝜈
𝛼
)
           (8) 
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(1) a reduction in the rate of surplus extraction or in the level of rents (or taxes), (2) an 
increase in average labor (or land) productivity. These equations also confirm that if 
(and only if) the level of rents/taxes and of surplus extraction is constant, then, a 
general increase in per capita grain output both for agricultural and non-agricultural 
populations (or of urban and rural populations) in conditions of urbanization, without 
preceding technological change in agriculture, is incompatible with the assumption of 
diminishing marginal returns. 
 These equations do not mean, of course, that urbanization itself is necessarily 
or even generally deleterious to average agricultural per capita available output. H. 
Pleket has convincingly argued for sustained urbanization in Asia Minor under the 
Principate, with no signs of decrease in per capita incomes208. The question, however, 
is to understand the conditions under which such a process could have been met. 
Basically, there are three such conditions, which are not mutually exclusive, and which 
partly meet the factors of agricultural development listed by H. Pleket209 : 
 
(1) Change in labor productivity (either from technical improvements or by a more 
favorable labor/land ratio) 
(2) Increase of the share of agricultural population 
(3) Development of trade 
(4) A reduction of the extraction rate of surplus 
 
In order for an urbanization process to be sustainable in terms of agricultural output 
per capita, one or more of these changes must have been undertaken either 
simultaneously or prior to the increase of the share of urban population. However, 
each of these processes has its own obstacles to face : (1) an increase in verage labor 
productivity, as stated earlier, is inconsistent with the idea of inevitability of 
diminishing marginal returns; (2) an increase in the share of agricultural population 
reduces the room for non-agricultural surplus ; (3) for the case of inland cities, an 
increase in the volume of grain trade is limited by the cost of transport; (4) finally, 
reducing the extraction rate of surplus is limited by the predatory210 and ‘acquisitive 
mentality’ of the landowning élite211, and by the imperial requirements in the form of 
taxation… 
 
                                               
208 Pleket (2003), pp. 87-90 
209 Pleket (1993), p. 321 
210 On predation by the Roman élite : Bang (2008), pp. 204-212. 
211 Finley (1973), p. 144. 
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2.4 Rents, land values and grain production  
The first two sections of this chapter have been devoted to the analysis of the 
conditions of surplus production: the forms of land ownership and management on the 
one hand, and the utilization of land and labor on the other. This section and the 
following now aim at emphasizing the main channels of surplus extraction, namely 
rents and taxes.  
2.4.1 The economics of land resources 
First of all, it should be emphasized that there is substantial evidence for the payment 
of rents in kind in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor212; as we will see later, this has 
important consequences for the differential availability of grain surpluses between 
town and country. Yet, before discussing the documentary evidence, we need to shed 
some light on the logical economic relationships between land values, rents, and grain 
prices by recourse to some minimal yet incompressible mathematical formalism, in 
order to construct a consistent interpretative framework of the sources. In order to be 
as clear as possible, the argument will be structured into four questions which we will 
be answered successively :  
 
(1) Which variables does the value of land depend upon ?  
(2) How is income derived from land related to land value and its determining 
factors? 
(3) How do the changes in land value affect the return on land ? 
(4) How is return on land related to ground-rent ? 
For the sake of simplicity, we make the two guiding assumptions that (1) the 
considered plot of land produces solely grain ; and (2) that the land surface of the 
considered estate is inelastic. 
 
1 – Which variables does the value of land depend upon ?  
 
Two different components must be distinguished ab initio : the intrinsic land value, 
determined by aggregate demand for land and population pressure (1), and the value of 
 
                                               
212 LBW, 331 ; Buckler (1917-1918), p.214; De Ligt (1993), p. 136 & pp. 140-142  
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the agricultural produces of the land (2). The table below sums up the mathematical 
symbols used in the development that follows :  
 
Symbol Agro-economic meaning units 
pA price of land per hectare d(enarii) 
A plot size ha 
pg price of grain per unit of volume d/mod. 
Qg total quantity of grain  mod. 
f proportion of land left fallow – 
πA average soil productivity  mod./ha 
πS average seed productivity  – 
rS sowing rate mod./ha 
 
The total value (V) of a plot of grain-land is equal to the intrinsic land value ((VA), the 
price of land per hectare multiplied by the area), plus the value of the produces (VQ), in 
this case, grain213 :  
 
𝑉 = 𝑉𝐴 + 𝑉𝑄 = 𝑝𝐴 ∙ 𝐴 + 𝑝𝑔 ∙ 𝑄𝑔 
 
Since the total quantity of grain is equal to the average soil productivity multiplied by 
the cultivated area (the area which is not under fallow), this equation can be rewritten 
as :  
 
𝑉 = 𝑝𝐴 ∙ 𝐴 + 𝑝𝑔 ∙ 𝜋𝐴 ∙ (1 − 𝑓) ∙ 𝐴 = 𝐴 ∙ [𝑝𝐴 + 𝑝𝑔 ∙ 𝜋𝐴 ∙ (1 − 𝑓)]  (1) 
 
This equation signifies that in the limiting case where land surface is zero (if there is 
no land at all), the value of land is (obviously) zero; however, if the land does not 
produces anything (VQ = 0), it still has an economic value.  
 There is of course some criticisms to address to this formula. First, the price of 
land cannot fully be separated from the price of the produces, for higher grain prices 
might stimulate the demand for land and thus ultimately raise land prices too, but this 
expression provides a reasonable approximation. Second, the equation implicitly 
assumes that fallowing is exogenous to the soil productivity; to be more accurate from 
an agronomical point of view, the model should consider that the soil productivity at 
year t depends upon the proportion left fallow during years t-1, t-2…etc. Land 
exploitation is indeed a dynamic process, with lots of intertwining between variables. 
 
                                               
213 Sartre( 1991), p.81 
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But considering the phenomenon in a static perspective nevertheless allows 
formulating the essence of the structural relationships between the variables affecting 
the exploitation of agricultural resources. 
 
2 – How is income derived from land related to land value and its determining factors ? 
 
Gross income (Y) is simply the absolute variation214 in total land value (over a certain 
period)215 : 𝑌 = Δ𝑉. Total value is described as the sum of intrinsic land value and the 
value of agricultural produces. To express the total income derived from land, we must 
determine the absolute variation of the value of land according to the variables upon 
which it depends: grain and land prices, average productivity, proportion of fallow, and 
land surface. To simplify the mathematical calculus, we will make the assumption that 
some of these variables do not significantly vary on the short run, and may thus be 
considered constants:  
 
(1) total land surface, assuming a relative inelasticity of land supply (Δ𝐴 = 0) 
(2) the proportion of fallowing 
(3) average soil productivity 
 
We are thus left with a function (V) of two variables : the price of grain (pg) and the 
price of land (pA). To formulate the expression of total income, we should thus 
examine how total land value varies according to variations in prices. This problem can 
therefore be summarized as that of the variation (the ‘differential’, in mathematical 
terms) of one function as a result of the variation of two separate variables. This 
problem can be solved by applying the basic rules of derivatives216. The result is 
expressed by the following equation relating total gross income to the variation in 
prices : 
 
𝑌 = 𝐴 ∙ (Δ𝑝𝐴 + 𝜋𝐴 ∙ (1 − 𝑓) ∙ Δ𝑝𝑔)    (2) 
 
                                               
214 Noted by the differential operator Δ (for a discrete variation), or d (when considering  infinetisimal, 
continuous, variations). 
215 In economic terms, land value is a stock, while income from land is a flow. 
216 For a function z depending on two variables x and y which are multiplied between each other (z = 
x.y) the total variation is given by : Δ 𝑧 = 𝑥 ∙ Δ𝑦 + 𝑦 ∙ Δ𝑥 : the derivative of a product of two variables is 
equal to the sum of two terms : a first term equal to the variation of the first variable multiplied by the 
second variable (taken as constant) ; and a second term equal to the variation of the second variable 
multiplied by the first variable (taken as a constant). In case of a sum of variables (z = x + y), the total 
variation is the sum of the variation of each variable : Δ 𝑧 = Δ𝑥 + Δ𝑦. 
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It must be emphasized that, just like total land value, gross income can be separated 
into two distinct components: the intrinsic income from land (YA), and income from 
produces, or available income (Yd) : 𝑌 = 𝑌𝐴 + 𝑌𝑑  (3) 
Gross income per unit of land (y) is thus :  
 
𝑦 =
𝑌
𝐴
=
𝑌𝐴
𝐴
+
𝑌𝑑
𝐴
= Δ𝑝𝐴 + 𝜋𝐴 ∙ (1 − 𝑓) ∙ Δ𝑝𝑔   (4) 
 
As expressed by this equation, the income per hectare is directly proportional to the 
variation in land prices per hectare and to the variation in grain prices. On the basis of 
this relationship relating to income from land exploitation, we can now derive an 
expression for return on land. 
 
3 – How is return on land related to the changes in land value ? Or, stated differently, 
 how does a change in land value convert into return on land ?    
 
Aggregate return on land is simply equal to gross income divided by the initial land 
value (the purchasing value). Here we make the simplifying assumption that, at the 
time of purchase, land value reduces to the intrinsic land value (area x price of land), 
either because we deal with uncultivated land, or because, when a plot of grain-land is 
sold, the buyer does not purchase the quantity of grain harvested on that year, which is 
already consumed and/or sold ; even in the case of a vineyard, the buyer purchases the 
land together with the vines, but in all likelihood does not buy the wine produced 
during the year when the transaction takes place. Return on land (in %) is thus 
expressed by the ratio of gross income to the initial value:  
 
      𝑟 =
𝑌
𝑉𝐴,0
  (5) 
 
Yet, this way of calculating the return on land is tributary to the considered surface, 
since both gross income and total initial value depend upon the size of the terrain. 
How thus could we express the return on land independently from plot size, that is, 
solely as a function of prices ? Replacing total income in eq.(5) by its full expression 
given by eq.(2), rearranging the terms and simplifying allows writing the final 
equation: 
 
 𝑟 = 𝑔𝑝𝐴 + (1 − 𝑓) ∙
𝜋𝐴
𝑝𝐴/𝑔,0
∗ ∙ 𝑔𝑝𝑔 (6) 
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Here, 𝑔𝑝𝐴 and 𝑔𝑝𝑔 are respectively the growth rate of land prices and grain prices, and 
𝑝𝐴/𝑔,0
∗ is the relative price of land with respect to grain. The understanding of this 
equation is straightforward : gross return on cereal land over a given period is directly 
proportional to the growth rate of land prices and grain prices over that same period, 
as well as to the average soil productivity, but is conversely proportional to the initial 
relative price of land with respect to grain (i.e. the price of land expressed in grain-
equivalent)217. 
 
 
4 – How is return on land related to ground-rent ?  
 
The total contractual rent paid (R) is equal to the land per hectare (l) multiplied by the 
terrain area : 𝑅 = 𝑙 ∙ 𝐴  (7) 
 As we have seen above, total gross income (from the tenant’s point of view) can 
be divided into five main components : consumption, seed, rent, taxes, and benefit. 
Since taxes are an exogenous variable, they can be left out of this operation for the 
moment in order to simplify the calculus218. From the four remaining components of 
gross income, consumption, seed and benefit constitute the available income (Yd), 
while rents are captured by the landowner. Rents thus represent the difference 
between gross income and available income (of the producer), since after deducting 
the share of his income that he will consume, use as seed, and possibly keep for 
himself, the tenant needs to have sufficient money to pay the rent :  
 
𝑌 − 𝑌𝑑 = 𝑅  
 
If we recall equation (3), total rent is thus equal to the intrinsic income from land (YA) : 
 
𝑅 = 𝑌𝐴         (8) 
 
Since, income from land is equal to the rate of return on land applied to the intrinsic 
land value, we may write :  
 
 
                                               
217 Another formulation of the equation would be that gross return on land is equal to the intrinsic 
return on the value of land (i.e. the growth rate of land prices) plus the return on the produces (i.e. the 
growth rate of grain prices), each of them being weighted respectively by the share of intrinsic land 
value in total value (VA/V) and the value of agricultural produces in total value (Vg/V). 
218 For a full discussion on taxation, see section 4. 
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𝑌𝐴 = 𝑟𝐴 ∙ 𝑉𝐴 = 𝑟𝐴 ∙ 𝑝𝐴 ∙ 𝐴      (9) 
 
Putting eq. (7), (8) and (9) together yields the following equation : 𝑙 = 𝑟𝐴 ∙ 𝑝𝐴, or : 
 
     𝑟𝐴 =
𝑅
𝑉𝐴
=
𝑙
𝑝𝐴
    (10) 
 
Return on land can thus be safely approximated by dividing total rents by total land 
value, or by dividing rent per hectare by the price of land per hectare.  
2.4.2 Rents and land returns in historical perspective : a case study 
from western Asia  Minor 
Two series of documents inform us about the level of rents, land values and rates of 
return on agricultural investment in Asia Minor : a first very important group of 
documents from Mylasa-Olymos dating back to the late 2nd and early 1st c. BC ; and a 
second group of inscriptions coming from a monument in Aphrodisias dating back to 
the 2nd c. AD. The interest in comparing those two series of documents is that Mylasa-
Olymos and Aphrodisias are all cities of Caria, which renders the comparison more 
robust, and that both series of documents have been quite narrowly dated. 
 
❖ Early 1st c. BC 
 
 The cities of Mylasa and Olymos have yielded an important collection of 
documents related to land transactions which exhibit much complementarity and shed 
some interesting light on leases and purchases of landed estates in Anatolia. These 
documents describe three types of operations: (1) the assignment of the rent to sub-
lessees by the tenant, (2) suretyship to guarantee the payment of the rent, and (3) the 
sale of private estates to a temple, the most frequent situation. The documents contain 
detailed information about the content of the estates as units of agricultural 
production, the practical conditions of rent payment, the level of rents, and the value 
of land. Advanced discussion on the conditions of rent will take place in section 2.4, so 
we shall mainly focus on the last two categories.  
 One noticeable feature of these documents is that most transactions related to 
these estates regard the land itself as well as all the other possessions it contains. As 
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explicitly stated in the contracts, terrains and fields ( 219 ) are 
clearly distinguished from vineyards, or olive trees, 
(and other similar formulations220). 
The values that we encounter in those documents – as well as in the documents from 
Aphrodisias which come next – are thus gross values, not intrinsic land values, and the 
same applies therefore to the returns that we will calculate. 
 An important subgroup of the Mylasa-Olymos documents concern the sales by a 
certain Thraseas of two pieces of land to the temple of Zeus Osogo : a first terrain of a 
value of 5,000 Rhodian drachmai221 (or rather ‘pseudo-rhodian’ drachmai, a lighter local 
coinage worth about 2/3 of a denarius222) and a second one worth 7,000 Rhodian 
drachmai223. The land in question is then leased to its former owner, who, in exchange 
for the loss of his property rights and the payment of a modest rent, obtains the 
hereditary leasehold of his domain224. The rent to be paid on the first estate is 
comprised between 100 and 199 drachmai (the line is mutilated but ends with 
)225 and on the second estate 300. As stated by eq. (10), this implies a 
gross return on land of maximum 4% in the first case and 4.3% in the second. Editors 
of the inscription have suggested that the low level of rents is due to the peculiarity of 
the type of contract passed between Thraseas and the temple. This may perhaps have 
played some role, but was probably not the main explanation. Indeed, the most crucial 
counterpart to the transfer of property was most likely the hereditary leasehold. 
Moreover, by two other documents from Mylasa relating a different operation, a 
similar return can be deduced: a certain Korris and others have assigned some land 
which belonged to the temple of Zeus Labraundos; the fourth share of the land was 
worth 700 drachmai on which each tenant had to pay his proportion of the total rent 
less one drachmè226. One such rental has been restored as 32.25 drachmai227. Total rent 
is thus (4 x 32.25) – 1 = 129 drachmai. Since total value is 4 x 700 (=2,800 drachmai), the 
rate of return is equal to 129/2800, or 4.6%. Other land values and rents, summed up in 
the table below, are mentioned in the Mylasa-Olymos documents, but since they do 
 
                                               
219 CIG, 2694b, l.5 
220 LBW, 414, l.8 & 415, l.8; see also LBW 322 & LBW, 338; BCH 12 (1886), n°9, l. 13; CIG, 2694a, l.9
221 BCH 5 (1881), n°11 A, l.12 
222 On which see : Apostolou (1995) ; Doyen (2012), pp. 89-91 
223 Ibid., n°11 B, l.4-5 
224 LBW, 415-416 (= CIG, 2699e); BCH 5 (1881), pp. 113-116; BCH 12 (1886), p.21 
225 BCH 5 (1881), n°11 A, l.18 
226 ABSA XII (1917-1918), V.β & VI.α-β.  
227 Ibid., pp. 206-209 
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not refer to the same texts, we could unfortunately hardly deduce more return values 
from them. 
 
Table 1. Land values, rents and land returns in Mylasa-Olymos (late 2nd – early 1st c. BC) 
Land value (drachm.) Rent (drachm.) Return (%) Reference 
10000 –  CIG, 2694b 
8000 –  ABSA XII, (1917-18), I 
7000 300 4.3 BCH 5 (1881), n°11 B 
6500 –  ABSA XII, (1917-18), II.γ 
– 250  ABSA XII, (1917-18), II.β 
– 200  ABSA XII, (1917-18), III 
– 200  ABSA XII, (1917-18), IV 
5000 100-200 2-4 BCH 5 (1881), n°11 A 
4000 –  CIG, 2694a 
4000 –  LBW, 331 
3000 –  LBW, 338 
2800 130 4.6 ABSA XII, (1917-18), V.β 
– 100  LBW, 323-324 
 
Le-Bas & Waddington have claimed that ‘these returns were low compared to the usual 
interest rate of money in Antiquity’. The comparison would be valid if dealing with a 
foundation – indeed most often invested in land – but no such thing is mentioned in 
the inscription. This statement obviously confuses return on landed wealth with 
interest rate on cash loans. Another document from Olymos, which they also edited, 
clearly emphasizes the difference : it is asked to the trust-commissioners who will buy 
some land in the name of the temple of Apollo and Artemis to lease the land at a rent 
equal to at least half the value of the interest rate on the money borrowed to buy it : 
(…)
228, thus implying that interest rates were on average twice the return on landed 
wealth. In yet another inscription from Mylasa, the interest rate required reached 
24%229. The editor of the text convincingly relates such high interest rates to the 
financial crisis of Asia Minor in the 1st c. BC and the requisitions by Rome, which 
explains the double advantage of the transactions between private citizens and sacred 
domains : citizens needed cash to pay for additional taxes required in these 
 
                                               
228 LBW, 332, l.6-7 
229 BCH 46 (1922), n°24 
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circumstances, while temples preferred to fix their capital in land in order to avoid 
having to lend money to the city.230  
  
❖ Early 2nd c. AD 
 Another insight into the value of land in Anatolia is provided by a second group 
of documents from Aphrodisias recording the benefactions of a certain Attalos, son of 
Adrastos and member of a prominent family231 of the city, most likely dating back to 
the first half of the second century AD232. Attalos gave 122,000 denarii to the goddess 
Aphrodite233 ; this sum is established as a foundation and is lent out at interest to a 
series of borrowers, each sum being insured by estates (or other types of property) 
given as mortgages. It is this specific feature of Attalos’ foundation that matters to us, 
since for each piece of land mortgaged, the value of the loan is specified. The 
inscription also records the total value of the interests generated within four years (49 
months), the number of plots and their size measured by the quantity of seed they 
require ()234, as well as the name of the borrower and guarantor235. 
Unfortunately, only a few lines of the total have remained intact and provide full 
information. The usable data have been summed up by the editors in the following 
table :  
 
 
Borrower 
Capital 
(HS) 
Interest over 49 months  
(to the 30 of Apellaios; in HS) 
Mortgage Guarantor(s) 
? > 2,000 4,800 (?) 
2 terrains 
(Apollonia S.) 
Diodoros son of 
Musaiois 
Diodoros, son of 
Musaios 
40,000 9,800 
1 field 
(Apollonia S.) 
Tydeus 
Diodoros son of 40,000 9,800 3 plots of 240 P. Albius 
 
                                               
230 Ibid., pp.422-425; see below for full discussion on the impact of the financial crisis of Asia on cash 
loans and land returns. 
231 His father, Adrastos, son of Nicoteimos, is known by other inscriptions testifying that he had been, 
among other prestigious offices, archipriest of Augusts: IAph2007, 12.4; 12.5 & 12. 308;. 
232 Broughton (1938), p. 667 dates it to the 2nd c. AD, but is dated by B. Laum to the reign of Hadrian 
(Laum, 1964 [1908] ), p. 103), which is consistent with the dating of the inscriptions of Attalos’ father to 
the end of the 1st c. AD. Attalos is also known from his funerary inscription (IAph2007, 1.123), but of 
which little remains and which is thus of little help for verifying the date; see also Robert (1966), pp. 389-
390. 
233 REG 19 (1906), n°138 
234 The kupros is a measure of volume often in use in Asia Minor : 1 kupros = 2 modii 
235 REG 19 (1906), n°140 
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Musaios kuproi Atinetus & 
Apollonios 
P. Albus Atinetus 
18,000 4,408 
1 plot of 65 
kuproi + 1 plot 
of 40 kuproi 
Diodoros & 
Damas 
P. Albus Atinetus 6,000 1,470 
1 plot of 15 
kuproi + 1 
town house 
Tydeus 
C. Julius C. (f.) > 12,000 ? ? ? 
 
Let us first discuss the controversial elements of the document :  
 
1°) In the first line, the capital guaranteed by Diodoros is uncertain; the text reads 
 [: the sum was thus of minimum 2,000 denarii, but the 
exact value is difficult to assess. T. Reinach considered the possibility that the first 
word would be which would make a total sum of 12,000 denarii236, while B. 
Laum accepts the 2,000 denarii as the actual value237. Both are plausible, but none can 
be assured, since there is always the possibility that the text would have specified the 
number of myrias by using a letter instead of expressing it in full words. In any case, 
there is something wrong with the values mentioned at this line, as already noticed by 
Reinach, since 2,000 denarii lent out at 6% (which, as we will see, is the interest rate 
applied) would have generated 490 denarii over 49 months. If the sum was 12,000 
denarii, the four year interest would have been 2940 denarii.  
2°) A difficult issue is whether the three plots of land mentioned at line 3 are of 240 ku. 
each or together. In order to assess the land value per hectare, this is indeed a crucial 
problem, since it implies completely different surface figures. This issue is not 
discussed, neither by Reinach (who seems nonetheless to imply that each plot requires 
240 kuproi) nor by Laum or Broughton. Yet in this case, I think the 240 kuproi refer to 
the value of the three plots of land all together. Assuming they are of 240 kuproi each 
would imply unlikely land prices per hectare and hence implausible returns. A careful 
reading of the text supports this interpretation. At lines 11-12 of inscription n°140, we 
read:  (…). If 
the text intended to mean that each plot of land required 240 kuproi of seed, given the 
usual accuracy of Greek language – especially in such technical matters as conditions 
of credit – we would expect to have 
 
                                               
236 Ibidem, p. 238 
237 Laum (1964 [1908]), p. 175. 
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(…)
or any similar formulation.  
3°) Finally, lines 2 and 6 also display missing information : at line 2, the seed value of 
the plot given as mortgage is not mentioned, which does not allow to estimate its 
income and size, while line 6 exhibits the same problem as line 1, namely that the value 
of the capital is incomplete. The value we read from the text is (…), i.e. 
between 3,000 and 3,999 denarii. Furthermore, neither the four year interests not the 
seed value is mentioned, which renders any calculation impossible. We are thus left 
with three lines of complete information. Leaving apart the identity of borrowers and 
contributors, we get the following table : 
 
Capital 
(HS) 
Interest over 49 months  
(to the 30 of Apellaios; in HS) 
Number of estates 
mortgaged 
Seed requirement 
(modii) 
40,000 9,800 3  480 
18,000 4,408 
1 130 
1  80 
6,000 1,470 1 (+ 1 town house) 15 
 
Since the 3 pieces of land of the first line most likely are worth 480 modii of seed 
together, we might rewrite the table as if we were dealing with one single terrain. On 
line 3, moreover, we see that the mortgage does not only consist of one piece of land 
but also of one town house. The value of the terrain alone must therefore be much 
lower than the 6,000 HS mentioned. There is virtually no data on the price of common 
houses in Asia Minor, but assuming that the terrain makes up 50% of the total value, it 
would be worth 3,000 HS.  
 
 
Capital 
(HS) 
Interest over 49 months  
(to the 30 of Apellaios; in HS) 
Seed requirement 
(modii) 
40,000 9,800 480 
18,000 4,408 
130 
80 
3,000 1,470 15 
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If, as is probably the case, we are dealing with cereal-land, reckoning with an average 
sowing rate (for wheat) of about 5 modii per iugerum238 (or 20 modii per hectare), it is 
now possible to estimate the size of the plots of land as well as the price per hectare. 
Total value (HS) Seed requirement (modii) Surface (ha) Price per ha (HS) 
40000 480 24 1,666.67 
18000 
130 6,5 1,800 
80 4 1,714.3 
3000 30 1,5 2,000 
 
As we can see, those are rather moderate landholdings. But most importantly, we get 
some insight into the price of land in Asia Minor. The estates we are dealing with range 
from 415 – 500 HS per iugerum, which is broadly consistent with the revision of 
Columella’s land price figures (concerning the mid-1st c. AD) by Duncan-Jones239.  
 Some further information can still be extracted from Attalos’ foundation : we 
might now try to calculate the rate of return on those land pieces. But, since we do not 
know the exact mode of exploitation of those plots of land, two cases must be 
considered :  
 
(1) Direct exploitation (autourgos)  
(2) Tenancy  
 
The main difference lies in the relative share of the different components of gross 
income : in case (1), no rent is paid, while in case (2) a rent is to be paid by the tenant 
to the landlord. This would most probably influence the share of the seed-value into 
the total gross income. The difference may be quite small, but has a significant impact 
on the calculation of return. If we suppose those terrains are leased, and thus subject 
to a rent, it is probably safer to estimate the return on the basis of their rent. Let us 
thus examine the two cases separately:  
 
Case (1) – Direct exploitation. To estimate the return, we must first calculate the 
monetary value of the seed requirement. A typical grain price figure for Asia Minor is 
about 2-2.25 HS per modius240 (for a more detailed discussion of grain prices, see chap. 
 
                                               
238 Varro, R. r., I, 44, 1 ; Columella, De r. r., II, 9, 1 ; Pliny, NH, XVIII, 198. See also : Duncan-Jones (1982), 
p. 49 & 328 ; Erdkamp (2005), p. 48 
239 Duncan-Jones (1982), p. 51. 
240 Ibidem 
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III). Yet, this reflects a market price, whereas what matters to us in order to assess the 
overall value of the estate’s agricultural produces is the production price. Broadly 
speaking, the difference between production price and market price is made up by 
transport cost and the profit margin of retailers (if any). 
 There has been a long discussion on the relative cost of overland transport, 
mostly on the basis Diocletian’s Price Edict on which nothing new will be added here. 
Colin Adams has recently criticized traditional views about the share of land transport 
costs in the total market price of wheat (55% of the price for every 100 Roman miles 
according to Duncan-Jones241), inviting us to a lower picture but without revised 
quantification242. Without arguing against his observations, it nevertheless remained 
true that overland transport of grain was very costly243. W. Scheidel provided a 
quantitative estimate of 0.035 denarii/kg/km244. If we assume a rather moderate 
distance of 5 km (i.e. local trade), the share of transport costs in the market price 
would be about 30%. In the case this figure would be exaggerated, we might 
hypothesize that transport costs plus the retailers’ margin make up 25% of market 
price together. In this case, the production price per modius would be 1.68 HS. We can 
thus calculate the cost of the seed requirement, and deduce the overall gross income in 
the – rather pessimistic – case where seed represents 20% of gross yield245. It must be 
specified that the second mortgage, fragmented into two separate terrains of 6.5 ha 
and 4 ha respectively, has been considered as a single terrain of 10.5 ha, since this does 
not change anything to the rate of return. The return thus easily follows by dividing 
gross return by the total land value, as stated by eq. (5). The results are presented in 
the following table: 
Value 
(HS) 
Seed requirement 
(mod.) 
Seed cost 
(HS) 
Annual gross income 
(HS) 
Gross return 
(%) 
40,000 480 810 4,050 10.125 
18,000 210 354 1,771.9 9.8 
3,000 30 51 253.1 8.4 
 
 
                                               
241 Duncan-Jones (1982), p. 369 
242 Adams (2012), pp. 220-224 
243 Erdkamp (2005), p. 198 
244 Scheidel (2013), p. 4 [work in progress] 
245 As said in Chap. I, Collumella’s figure of 1:4 seed/yield ratio most likely concerns rather bad soils and 
cannot be taken as average value for seed productivity throughout the empire. Erdkamp has shown that 
yields of the range of 8:1 or 10:1 provided reliable estimates for fertile soils well suited to cultivating 
cereals (Erdkamp (2005), pp. 34-46).  
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Case (2) – Tenancy. If the estates are leased to tenants, it would be safer to infer the 
value of the rents in order to assess the return. This can be estimated on the basis of 
the interest rate of the loans. We know from inscription n°142 that the interest rate 
applied was 6% : (…) 
][] 
The borrower owes the lender a sum of 9,200 denarii at a rate of 46 denarii per 
month, or 552 denarii per year, which is 6% of the total sum. This is confirmed by the 
expression , mentioned further in the text: it means a rate of 8 
asses (half a denarius) per 100 denarii per month, which makes 6 denarii for 100 denarii 
per year, that is, 6%246.  
 It must be noted at this time that the interest practiced here are simple interests 
and not compound interests : the 1,102 denarii generated over 49 months at a rate of 
6% on the capital loan of 4,500 denarii imply that the 4 year interest ((48/49) x 1,102 
denarii, or 1,080 denarii) are simply the annual interest (6% of 4,500 denarii) 
multiplied by the number of years. With compound interests the result would have 
been about 1,181 denarii after four years. 
 From the interest rate (or the 4 year interest sum), we can easily calculate the 
value of the annual interest. If the borrowers are landowners and perceive a rent on 
their estates, the annual rent must in all likelihood be higher than the annual interest 
they pay on the capital loan, and sufficiently higher to still generate a profit. Assuming 
that total annual rent was on average 10-20% higher than the annual interest, we can 
easily derive the rate of return by using eq. (10) and dividing total rent by total value : 
 
Value 
(HS) 
Annual interest 
(HS) 
Total rent 
(HS) 
Return 
(%) 
40,000 2,400 2,640-2,880 6,6-7,2 
18,000 1,080 1,188-1,296 6,6-7,2 
3,000 180 198-216 6,6-7,2 
 
Overall, whether considering the case of possession or that of tenancy, the returns of 
the estates mortgaged against the capital loans made out of Attalos’ foundation range 
between 6.5 – 10 %. 
 
                                               
246 REG 19 (1906), n°142, l. 28-30 (p.247). 
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2.4.3 The share of rents in total produce as a proxy for the degree of 
surplus extraction 
Up to this point, the reader might well wonder what the precise purpose of these 
calculations is for the broader subject of grain supply. In fact, in the context of 
fragmentary data regarding the share of produces in the total land value, returns on 
land allow us to reconstruct the relative share of rents in the total income derived from 
land exploitation. Eventually, the weight of rents in agricultural income gives us an 
idea of the level of surplus appropriation This might be easily described by prolonging 
the model outlined as a prelude to the examination of documents. The weight of total 
rents (R) in total produce can be represented as a share 𝜓𝑅 of income:  
 
𝜓𝑅 =
𝑅
𝑌
 
 
As stated by equation (7), total rents are equal to the rent per hectare (l) multiplied by 
land surface (A), whereas the income value is the total produced quantity (Q) 
multiplied by its price (p). We may thus rewrite the fraction of rents as : 
 
𝜓𝑅 =
𝑙 ∙ 𝐴
𝑝𝑔 ∙ 𝑄
 
 
If we recall equation (10), land rent per hectare is equal to the intrinsic land return 
multiplied by the price of land per hectare., and the ratio A/Q is nothing but the 
inverse of the average soil productivity (πA). By expressing the ratio of land prices to 
grain prices as the relative price of land, as in equation (6), we can write the 
fundamental equation : 
 
𝜓𝑅 =
𝑙
𝜋𝐴 ∙ 𝑝𝑔
=
𝑟𝐴 ∙ 𝑝𝐴
𝜋𝐴 ∙ 𝑝𝑔
=
𝑟𝐴
𝜋𝐴
∙ 𝑝𝐴/𝑔
∗            (11) 
 
The share of rents in the total agricultural income is directly proportional to the level of 
returns (and hence to the level of nominal contractual rents) and to the relative price of 
land with respect to grain, but conversely proportional to the average productivity of 
land. The value of rents is obviously not constant but fluctuates over time, according to 
the demand for land tenancy. 
 
Now, what share of total produce would be captured by rents, if we applied the figures 
derived from our documents from Caria as if we were mostly dealing with cereal land? 
In these two series of documents, the lower limit of land returns are in the range of 3-
 98 
6.5%, while the range of land prices vary between 415 and 500 denarii/ha (or HS/iug). 
With an average price of grain of 2.5 HS/modius (= 91 d/ton), and assuming land 
productivity of 1 ton/ha, the share of rents in total produce varies between 13.8 and 
35.7%. Refining this calculation by assuming that the price of land is correlated to its 
productivity (0.8 tons/ha on the cheapest land, 1.2 on the more expensive one) would 
narrow the margins to 17.5-29.7 %. Relying on these calculations, it would seem that 
the 20% given as a standard value by S. Mitchell for Roman Asia Minor247 is closer to a 
low estimate, and that the share of rents in total produce may experience a rather wide 
margin of variation. 
 In particular, the weight of rents was obviously not constant over time. It must 
have been greatly dependent upon the population pressure on land resources. Indeed, 
rewriting equation (11) in real terms (in quantities) yields :  
 
𝜓𝑅 =
𝑙
𝜋𝐴
∗  
 
where π*A is the land productivity in volume. On the numerator, as population density 
increases, the level of nominal contractual rents per hectare would go up. On the 
denominator, however, the impact of population density (of which the labor/land ratio 
is a very good proxy) on land productivity, although non-linear as we concluded from 
the works of Sraffa, is straightforward: the lower the labor-land ratio, the lower the 
average yield per hectare. Documentary data on the level of nominal rents in Asia 
Minor are unfortunately very meagre. But hundreds of land lease contracts specifying 
the level of rents are known from Roman Egypt, and have been recently assembled by 
Kyle Harper in an impressive project of compilation of quantitative data on prices, 
wages and rents in Egypt (1st-7th c. AD). In order to represent the share of rents in total 
produce, we have taken Harper’s series of nominal contract rents and divided it by the 
average grain yield per hectare for Egypt reconstructed by Dermody (average gross 
yield of 12.2 hl/ha248). In order to account for a likely decrease of soil productivity after 
the Antonine plague249 (party due to the sharp loss of manpower per unit of land), I 
have scaled down this value for the decades following AD 170. The result is displayed in 
the following figure : 
 
 
                                               
247 Mitchell (1993), p. 254 
248 1.15 tons per hectare assuming a volumetric mass of grain of 800 kg/m3 (=80kg/hl) 
249 On a decrease in soil yields in the end from the late 2nd .c. AD to the mid 3rd c. AD, cf : Van Minnen 
(2000), pp. 211-212. 
  99 
 
 
Two aspects are interesting concerning this graph. First, the share of rents in overall 
produce is usually very high, oscillating between 40% and 80%. This is only possible 
because, due to the very high productivity of land in Egypt, the remaining produce is 
still sufficient for rural consumption and seed. In Asia Minor, as shown above, the 
share of rents was clearly lower on average. Second, the evolution : the surplus 
extracted by rents steadily increases over the 1st c. AD, experiences an absolute peak in 
the mid-2nd c. AD, and falls drastically just after the Antonine plague : with the brutal 
decrease of population density, the demand for land was reduced, and hence the value 
of rents diminished250. This is interesting for our case study because, although the 
absolute value of the share of rents was lower in Asia Minor, its evolution through 
time, in particular as a result of the Antonine plague, must have been in all likelihood 
similar to that revealed in the Egyptian documents. We may indeed expect that, with 
the sharp contraction of population and the subsequent decrease of population 
density, the demand for land relative to the available surfaces dropped, hence driving 
the level of contractual rents down.  
 
                                               
250 Scheidel (2012), p. 280 sqq 
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Egypt (AD 22 - AD 350) on a 20 year moving average. Elaborated from : Harper
(2016), Dermody (2014).
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2.5 Direct taxation and tribute 
So far, we have only discussed the nature and effect of rents on the agrarian economy. 
But taxes and tributes played also a major role on the extent of available grain produce. 
In this section, we will not discuss the broader impact of taxes on the economy of the 
empire as a whole, nor shall we try to account for every type of taxation. As far as 
agriculture and disposable surpluses are concerned, we will mostly focus on direct 
taxation. More precisely, this section will account for the evolutions in tax collection 
between the late Republican period and the 3rd c. AD (1), and discuss the extent to 
which direct taxes were levied in kind or in cash in Roman Anatolia (2). 
 (1) Two forms of direct taxation of the provinces existed in the first c. AD : the 
vectigal certum (a fixed contribution) and the censoria locatio which resulted from the 
Lex Sempronia establishing the farming of the collection of all direct taxes to publicani 
in the ‘frumentary’ provinces such as Africa or Sicily251. Asia Minor did not formally 
belong to this category, but contributed in all likelihood to the provision of Rome252 : 
its important production and ‘exportation’ is praised in 66 BC by Cicero (Asia (…) 
multitudine quae exportantur, facile omnibus terris antecellat)253, who later (in 62) 
mentioned the tribute as one reason for inhabitants of Asia Minor to hate the Roman 
administration254. Of the censoria locatio resorted, during the Republican era, the 
tributum soli, a ground tax affecting all provincial land that did not possess the ius 
italicum255, as well as the pasture tax. If the land was cultivated, the tax took the form 
of a tithe256, a share of the produces, which we know to have been 10% of production as 
explicitly mentioned in the Lex portorii Asiae (257) and Cicero’s 
orations (decuma). In this respect, the 25% tax on crops imposed by Lucullus in 70 BC 
()258 was only temporary. The question wondered by C. 
Nicolet as to whether additional requisitions such as the 20,000 talents required by 
Sylla in 74 BC 259 or those imposed by Lucullus were substituted or supplemented to 
 
                                               
251 Cic., 2Verr., III, 12; Badian (1972), p. 62; Lintott (1993), pp. 74-76 ; Mitchell (1993), p. 248 
252 Nicolet (1994), p. 223 ; contra Pierobon-Benoit (1994), p. 306 
253 Cic., De Imp. Gn. Pomp., 14 
254 Cic. Pro Flacco, 19 
255 Sartre (1991), p. 81 
256 On the tithe as a farmed tax in Asia : Nicolet (1988), p. 200 
257 EA XIV (1989), l.72 
258 App., Mithr., 83 
259 Plut.,Syll., 25, 4 ; Plut., Lucullus, 20, 4  
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the decuma260 is legitimate, since the decuma appears in Cicero’s discourses about ten 
years later261, but cannot be answered so far. Yet, that the tithe was farmed is in any 
case doubtless, for Cicero reports having seen the decumani – the publicans 
responsible for the levying of the decuma262 – while on his way to Cilicia263. The 
complete and direct collection of the tithe by the publicans however concerned the 
province of Asia Minor only, for in Bithynia and Cilicia a slightly different system 
applied which originated in Pompey’s governorship, following which direct collection 
of taxes from the communities was forbidden to the publicans264, and since Phrygia 
had been exempted from taxes before its inclusion to Asia265.  
 The farming of such taxes, of course, did not go without problems. The greed and 
extortions of the publicans, on which Plutarch, Appian and Dio agree, could hardly 
have been a mere topos266. The power gained by the publicans and their abuses are 
even well reported by Cicero267, whose political careerism made him want to square 
the circle of ‘[preserving] the provincials from ruin without offending the publicani’268. 
Overtaxation and illegal requirements were indeed not uncommon (alia exactionibus 
illicitis nomina publicani invenerant)269. Although the farming of taxes ensured Rome 
with regular revenue, these troubles initiated a process of progressive revision of the 
publican’s contracts in 61 BC which ended in 48 BC with Cesar’s reform through which 
the publicans were dismissed270 and the collection of taxes withdrawn from them and 
transferred to the communities themselves271. The subsequent reduction of the taxes 
by one third reported by Appian and Suetonius272 might be somewhat exaggerated due 
to ‘Caesarian propaganda’273, but nevertheless indicate that considerable pressure was 
 
                                               
260 Nicolet (1994), pp. 221-222 
261 Cic., Pro leg. Man., 16;  
262 Lintott (1993), p.75 
263 Cic., Att., V, 13, 1 
264 Broughton (1937), pp. 537-538; Lintott (1993), p. 77 
265 App., Mithr. 57 
266 Cass. Dio, XLII, 6, 3 ; Plut., Lucull., 20, 1; App., Bell. Civ., V, 19 
267 Cic., Ad Q. fr., I, 1, 32 
268 Badian (1972), p.80 
269 Tac., XIII, 51, 2 ; cf. Heller (2014), pp. 218-219 
270 Cass. Dio, XLII, 6, 3 
271 App., Bell. Civ., V, 4, 19; De Ligt (2002), p. 55 ; Heller (2014), p. 219 
272 Ibidem ; Suet., Caes., 20 
273 Badian (1972), pp. 116-118 
 102 
made upon the provincials. Yet, the dismissal of the publicani must have been only 
temporary since they are mentioned under Nero as collectors of the tithe274. 
 Little had changed, apparently, by early imperial times. In the early 2nd c. AD, 
Hyginus describes the various existing taxation regimes, which still exhibit 
resemblances with the republican dichotomy between the censoria locatio and the 
vectigal certum: 
Tax land display various regimes. In some provinces a certain share of the harvest 
is paid, in some one fifth, in others one seventh, while others provinces pay in 
money; all this according to the value of the soil. Definite values have been 
established for land, as in Pannonia : ploughed land of first category, of second 
category, meadows, acorn forest, ordinary forest, pasture...For all these lands the 
vectigal has been defined by iugerum according to the fertility275. 
As far as Asia Minor is concerned, direct taxation undoubtedly still took the form of a 
tithe on agricultural produces farmed to publicans, as stated in the Asian Custom’s 
law276. The most important change occurred in the course of the 2nd c. AD, when the 
collection of taxes was once again redirected to the civic authorities : the taxes were 
paid for in advance by the and  (the ‘first ten’ or ‘first twenty’ 
men) who were ultimately responsible for the collection from tax-payers277. This, 
however, did not prevent abuses, for complaints from peasants and countrymen are 
documented until the 3rd century AD278.  
 
 (2) The fact that the tribute was collected as a share of agricultural produces 
might indicate that the decuma was levied in kind and that, consequently, publicans 
managed important stocks of staple foods279. It seems, however, that publicans were 
holding cash stocks rather than grain or agricultural produces280 and that the Roman 
treasury received money from them rather than grain or other commodities281. T.R.S. 
Broughton, and C. Nicolet after him thus suggested that tax-farming companies 
 
                                               
274 Tac., XIII, 51, 2 ; EA XIV (1989), l. 73 : 
275 Hyg., 205 
276 EA XIV (1989), ll. 72-73; cf. Mitchell (1993), pp. 248-249 ; Tac., XIII, 51, 2  
277 Magie (1950), p. 648 ; Sartre (1991), p. 86 ; Sartre (1998), p. 347 ; Dmitriev (2005), p.198 
278 AE (1990), 949 (Pertinax) ; OGIS, 519 & TAM V, 1, 419 (Philip the Arab) ; cf. Sartre (1998), p. 348 
279 Nicolet (1994), p.223 
280 Caes. De Belll. Civ., III, 3, 3 (magnam <pecuniam> societates earum provinciarum (…) sibi numerare 
coegerat) ; Ps.-Asconius, 157 (summa pecunia); cf. Broughton (1937), p. 541 
281 Lintott (1991), p. 77 
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converted the collected produces into money in the provinces282. L. De Ligt however, 
arguing on the basis of the literary references to the publican’s money and on two 
Lycian documents implying that villages took money from their treasury to pay for the 
tax-requirements, claimed that publicans received most of their revenues in cash283. 
Arguing convincingly that the collection in kind did not bind the publicans to 
receiving their dues in money, he draws the somehow hasty conclusion that ‘we can 
rule out the possibility that the land tax in Asia, at least, was transmitted in kind’284. 
 The key element to this controversy probably lies in the interpretation of a 
passage of the Asian Custom’s law285, in which Nicolet sees an exemption from custom 
duties for the transportation of the tithe by the publicans, while L. De Ligt interprets it 
as a mere indication that customs duties applied to agricultural produces subjected to 
the decuma coming from other districts286. The question here is whether at least some 
agricultural produces coming from Asia Minor contributed or not to the supply of 
Rome; or said differently, the extent to which Asia Minor was indeed a ‘frumentary 
province’, on which precisely Nicolet relies for his argument. No such grain furniture is 
explicitly stated in the documents, but some indices nevertheless make this hypothesis 
very plausible : the reference to the abundant ‘exports’ of produces from Asia Minor, 
first, but most importantly the mention by Cicero of a custos frumento publico 
praepositus – a guardian of the public grain – in Temnos287, a formulation which 
echoes the Roman institution known from the Lex Gabinia as the custodia publici 
frumenti – the management, storage and supervision of the grain destined for Rome288. 
Hence, Nicolet’s proposition that the Custom Law of Asia actually referred to the 
exemption from custom duties for the transportation of the decuma finds some ground 
in the (obvious) interest of Rome to facilitate the circulation of tax-grain. Thus, if De 
Ligt is right in arguing that the publicans received most of their revenues in cash, this 
does not invalidate the idea that they might still receive some of it in kind. Nicolet’s 
claim might thus be rephrased: instead of arguing that the disputed passage referred to 
‘the tithe’ – in his mind, all of it –, it is probably more realistic to consider that the 
Custom Law exempted from custom duties a certain share of the tithe, namely the one 
which the publicans did not receive in money, and which was geared to contribute to 
 
                                               
282 Broughton (1938), p. 540 ; Nicolet (1991), pp. 476-477 
283 De Ligt (2002), pp.57-56. 
284 Ibid., p. 57. 
285 EA XIV (1989), ll. 72-74 
286 Nicolet (1994), p. 224 ; contra De Ligt (2002), pp. 56-57 
287 Cic. Pro Flacco, 45 
288 Nicolet (1991), pp. 476-477 
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Italy’s supply. In any case, however, primary collection of taxes undoubtedly appears to 
have mostly been levied in kind289 - perhaps as much as 80% 290- even though in 
certain regions some direct taxes were paid in money from the Principate291. 
 
* * * 
This partial reconstruction of the forms and level of rents and taxes in Asia Minor 
suggests that the appropriation of agricultural surpluses by the Roman power and the 
landowning élite must have been an important factor affecting the availability of grain 
surpluses. The tithe and the rents together could have represented minimum some 
27.5 – 40% of total production, although this estimate cannot so far be confirmed by 
other empirical evidence. Moreover, a non-negligible part of both taxes and rents was 
in all likelihood paid in kind – but how much exactly is difficult to estimate with the 
current body of evidence – which prompts the question of the actual management of 
this tax-grain or rent-grain. In any case, the primary production of such surpluses no 
doubt required a significant flexibility in the use of land and labor by tenant-farmers 
and peasants. The connection between surplus extraction and surplus production is 
outstandingly summed up by P. Bang when he compares the Roman and Mughal 
Empires: 
 
‘In the longer term other factors [i.e. : than weather hazards] take on greater 
prominence in shaping the size and distribution of the surplus. Chaudhuri lists 
conditions such as the general fertility of the area, population density and the 
level of technology. One factor, though, is conspicuous by its absence: surplus 
extraction. (…) peasant households are not normally oriented towards producing 
a large surplus for circulation outside the farm. They aim rather to fulfil the basic 
needs of the household with as little effort as possible. Usually they have not 
been the main beneficiaries of the production of substantial surpluses above their 
own subsistence needs. The bulk of their surplus produce was normally claimed 
by various political lords and would not have been produced without pressure 
from above. Changes in patterns of surplus extraction are thus likely to constitue 
a key factor in explaining developments in economic circulation.’292 
 
                                               
289 Duncan-Jones (1990), pp. 190-191 ; Mitchell (1993), p. 248 
290 Katsari (2011), p. 149 
291 Duncan-Jones (1990), p. 192 
292 Bang (2008), pp. 78-79 
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Chapter 3  
The grain supply systems and their functions 
3.1 Famines, grain prices and grain-related interventions 
3.1.1 Introduction 
Although harvest failures and food shortages were recurrent in the Ancient world, the 
frequency and gravity of such events varied significantly from one region to another 
and from time to time, due to the important environmental fragmentation an climatic 
evolutions emphasized in chap.I. The actual causes of food shortages should thus not 
solely be sought into the fragility of agricultural production, but also to an equally 
important extent, in the problems of distribution raised by ecological fragmentation, 
topographical peculiarities, prohibitive land transport costs and logistic weaknesses 
(though significantly improved by the roman road network), in predation by tribute 
and rents (cf. chap. II) and in speculative behaviors (cf. infra) – aspects which 
unfortunately cannot all receive detailed discussion here. In this respect, we should 
probably speak of food accessibility restriction rather than systematically of ‘shortages’ 
which implicitly puts too much emphasis on the a priori assumption of widespread 
insufficiencies, ‘irrational’ choices and the determinism of technological weaknesses in 
agricultural production.  
 Yet, it remains that food crisis were doubtless a structural feature of Graeco-
Roman economy. This section will thus be opened on a presentation of ancient 
epigraphical and literary evidence of grain shortages in Asia Minor as avatars of the 
structural character of such events. After a chronological survey of shortages and 
grain-related intervention, we devote a separate discussion to grain prices. For the 
broader topic of grain availability, grain prices are both a visible symptom of shortage 
and a location-dependent variable. A specific discussion of grain prices is thus needed 
in order to make a clear distinction between the conjuncture of price variation 
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(shortage or civic subsidies) and the structural difference in their level between various 
regions of the Mediterranean. Finally, grain-related interventions will be refined by 
highlighting the different levels at which such interventions were undertaken. The 
scope, the technicalities, and the sustainability of grain supply civic schemes will be 
discussed in section 2, while section 3 will be devoted to the analysis of the social, 
institutional and political factors underlying their rationale. Section 4, finally, will be 
devoted to discuss some specific issues on the role of markets. Overall, as crisis in food 
accessibility were a structural feature of Graeco-Roman economies, this chapter will be 
geared towards the argument that grain-related interventions were similarly a 
structural response to this constrain.  
3.1.2 A chronological overview 
Writing a quantified history of famines and shortages in Asia Minor is no easy task. 
Two major problems are faced in particular : (1) contrary to Rome for which abundant 
literary evidence records in sufficient details the famines or episodes of dearth 
experienced by the urbs, literary testimonies of famines regarding Asia Minor can be 
counted on one hand; (2) among the 24 inscriptions explicitly recording episodes of 
shortage or famines, only 13 can be dated with a relative accuracy (in an interval of half 
a century or less). Since these inscriptions refer to different cities, it is not even 
possible to account for the evolution of the difficulties in grain supply for one single 
city. Some documents, however, provide valuable information on local events. 
 In Apameia in Phrygia, a benefactor is praised for having ‘fed the city by 
distributions in times of shortage’293; the plural δυσχρήστοις καιροῖς implying that this 
city experienced several episodes of dearth during the career of this benefactor. The 
same applies to the honorific inscription for Agathemeros and his kin who are praised 
for having performed benefactions ‘during many shortages’ (σειτοδεία̣[ις])294, and to 
the inscription of Metropolis honoring Sosthenes who ‘provided food cheaply many 
times during shortages’ (ἔ ̣ν τ̣ε̣ ἐνδείαις (?) λυσιτελεῖς παρασχόντα̣ τροφὰς)295. What is 
quite interesting with these three texts is that they all come from Phrygia and all date 
from the third century AD, thus suggesting a period of repeated food crisis in this 
region at this period.  
 
                                               
293 IGR IV, 785 = BCH (1893), p.302, n°2 
294 MAMA XI, 160 
295 MAMA IV, 130 
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 Another dossier comes from Stratonikeia in Caria. A first inscription honoring 
the benefactor Marcus Sempronius Clemens (second half the 2nd c. AD) makes 
reference to a ‘bad harvest’ during the benefactor’s priesthood (ἐν στενοχώροις 
καιροῖς)296. A second, more detailed inscription, relates to the numerous food-related 
interventions of a priest named Tiberius Flavius Theophanes; in the end of the text, an 
interesting sentence stipulates that the ‘bad weather’ did not undermine the generosity 
of the benefactor: καίτοι τοῦ καιροῦ περὶ τοὺς καρποὺς πάντας καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα 
τειμ<ί>ωρ{ι}αν ἔχοντος297. In this case, the inscription can more accurately be dated 
between AD 164 and AD 166. Finally, another document from the same city records the 
gifts made by a priest and his wife or daughter, in which it is said that the city 
experienced ‘five years of shortage’ (ἔτη πέντε ἐν σιτοδείᾳ)298. Just like the previous 
inscription, this document is to be dated to the mid-second c. AD.  
 A similar ‘cluster’ of inscriptions concerns the Bithynian city of Prusias of Hypios 
: a benefactor named P. Domitius Iulianus is honored two times for having distributed 
grain, wine and oil for to the citizens during a shortage299. Later on, three inscriptions 
praise local notables for having held the office of agoranomos in time of shortage (or 
‘during urging circumstances’)300. This same expression is mentioned in yet another 
document relating to an official whose curriculum specifies that he was ‘agoranomos 
during a grain shortage’301. The two inscriptions of Domitius Iulianus date back to the 
2nd century, but the four inscriptions mentioning agoranomoi in office in times of 
dearth are concentrated between the late 2nd c. AD and the first quarter of the 3rd c. 
AD. Since the inscriptions preserved are only a modest proportion of the actual 
number of inscriptions that once existed, it is probable that such a concentration of 
evidence of food crisis indicates that, in Stratonikeia in the middle of the second 
century AD, in Phrygia during the 3rd century and in Prusias between the late 2nd and 
early 3rd c. AD, several episodes of shortage seem to have occurred in a rather small 
time interval.  
 These are however the only cases of repeated evidence from a well circumscribed 
area. From elsewhere, only isolated evidence for grain crisis is available : in Cilicia 
during the Republic, where according to Cicero, ‘famine (…) was rampant (…) after the 
 
                                               
296 IK-Stratonikeia, 293, ll. 13-14 
297 IK-Stratonikeia, 203, ll. 30-32 
298 IK-Stratonikeia, 254, l. 12 
299 IK-Prusias, 18 & 19 
300 IGR III, 60 ; IK-Prusias, 6 ; IK-Prusias, 17 
301 IK-Prusias, 13 
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total failure of the harvest’302 – although Cicero might have exaggerated the gravity of 
events in order to emphasize his role as governor; in Aphrodisias during the Late 
Republic where a benefactor was agoranomos ‘during the most difficult shortage’303; in 
Hierocaesarea (Lydia) under Augustus304; in Aspendos (Pamphylia) during the reign of 
Tiberius305; in Pergè (Pamphylia) under Trajan306 ; in Aizanoi (Phrygia) in AD 156/167307 
; in Apollonia (Phrygia) in AD 162, where a certain Sagaris makes a dedication to Zeus 
to thank him for saving his beasts from the famine by leading them to the Galatians308; 
in Ancyra (Galatia) at some point between AD 257 and AD 284309. It should be stressed, 
however, that the evidence from Asia Minor does not show any particular sign of the 
great famine which, according to Luke, struck ‘the whole inhabited world’310 during the 
reign of Claudius (around AD 45-47), and which some scholars acknowledged to have 
been a ‘universal famine’311. This famine is however well documented for Egypt and 
Judaea312.  
 In some other cases, however, episodes of shortage can be suspected due to 
information on prices. An imprecisely dated imperial inscription records a price of 8 
HS per modius during a shortage in the city of Sebastopolis313. Around AD 92-93, St 
John’s Apocalypse which we know to have been written in Asia Minor, makes allusion 
to very high grain prices :  
And I heard like a voice [coming from] the middle of four animals, [saying] : one 
choenix314 of wheat for a denarius, and three choenices of barley for a denarius! 315  
As one bushel is the 48th part of the medimnos, the value of 1 denarius per bushel 
easily converts into a price of 32 HS per modius, or about 10 times the value of 3 HS per 
 
                                               
302 Cic., Ep., V, 21, 8 : Iter igitur per Asiam feci ut etiam fames, qua nihil miserius est, quae tum erat in hac 
mea Asia (messis enim nulla fuerat), mihi optenda fuerit. 
303 IAph2007, 12.701 
304 TAM V, 2, 1309 = IGR IV, 1355 
305 Phil., Vita Apoll. Tyan., I, 15 
306 IK-Pergè, 58 
307 SEG 35, 1365 
308 Kaibel, Epigrammata, 793. Cf. Mühlenbock et al. (2015), p. 30. 
309 IGR III, 206 
310 Luke, Acts, XI, 27-30 
311 Gapp (1935), pp. 258-263.  
312 Ibid., pp. 258-261. 
313 McCabe, Sebaastopolis, 6 = Robert, Et. Anat., pp. 343 sqq. 
314 The choenix was a dry measure which was worth 1.09 liters (cf. Bresson (2016), p. 439). 
315 St John, Apocalypse, 6 
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modius fixed by Nero after the great fire in Rome in AD 64316. At the same period, after 
a shortage that affected the city of Pisidian Antioch, the governor limits the price to 8 
HS, from a usual price of 4 HS, or a full 100% rise317. A final explicit example comes 
from the Historia Apollonii Tyriensis, dating back to the 3rd c. AD, in which a price of 
100 HS per modius is mentioned (singulos modios singulos aureos mercabantur)318. 
Apart from the inscription from Sebastopolis, many of such instances should of course 
be taken cautiously, either because the price value is rhetorical, or because, when 
dealing with Christian authors, it may sometimes result from anti-pagan propaganda, 
as is probably the case in the depiction of disastrous shortages by Eusebius319 (2,500 
attic drachmai per mètron – in this context probably the modius castrensis)320 and 
Lactantius (hinc fames agris ferentibus, hinc caritas inaudita)321.  
 Beside the impressionistic picture provided by local evidence, however, we now 
need to look at the broader distribution of the data covering the whole Anatolia along 
the first three centuries AD, to see which evolutions arise on a global scale. For this, we 
represented the chronological distribution of the average annual number of food-
related interventions (mostly grain, but some inscriptions record distributions of oil322) 
in Asia Minor, displayed on figure 10323. 
 
                                               
316 Tac., Ann., XV, 39 
317 AE (1925), 126, col. II. 
318 Hist. Apoll. Tyr., 9-10. 
319 Euseb., Hist. Eccl., IX, 8, 1 ; IX, 8, 12 
320 Ibid., IX, 8, 4 
321 Lact., De morte persec., 37 
322 The purpose of such oil was obviously not only or even primarily for consumption, though. Much of 
oil distributions concern the gymnasium. Yet, it was also used for cooking, and it is often difficult to 
determine the respective share of consumption and gymnasiarchic use. 
323 This graph, by definition, focuses only on inscriptions which can receive a ‘quantified’ dating, since 
such expressions as ‘late Republic’ or ‘early Empire’ could hardly be represented on a graph. On the basis 
of these inscriptions, we counted the number of grain-related interventions recorded in each document, 
and divided this number by the number of years of the dating interval of the document. We then spread 
out the data in inscriptions dated by two centuries, one century, half a century, reign, precise year, or 
any other time interval, and we added up the value of the average number of interventions per year for 
each year between AD 1 and AD 301, which provided us with an index capturing the average intensity of 
grain-related intervention per year. On this method, see Zuiderhoek (2007), p. 18.  
 We then displayed the 7-years moving average of this index in order to exhibit the tendencies. 
The interval of 7 years was not chosen randomly: it is based on the fact that we estimated that harvest 
failures in Asia Minor occurred on average once over a period of 6 years (or a probability of about 16.5 
%). 
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Before even analyzing the tendencies, the reader must be aware that the graph suffers 
from an important bias for the period running from AD 10 to AD 33 : indeed, the rather 
high values of the index for this precise interval are mostly due to one single 
inscription from Pessinous in Galatia (OGIS, 533) which records several food 
contributions, hence distorting the distribution on this part of the graph. Removing 
this inscription from the data would significantly alter the average value of the index 
for these years (the correction is shown on the graph by the dotted zone), leaving only 
the important peak around AD 10-15. The technique of spreading the data over the 
dating period of each inscription (cf. n. 17 above) allows inferring and representing 
both the short term fluctuation and the general tendencies; but it remains biased 
regarding the density of information per document which is not constant : a single 
inscription may mention as many benefactions as 10 inscriptions taken together; since 
these pieces of evidence will most likely be dated with different levels of accuracy, this 
will be reflected in the chronological concentration of the information.  
 Overall, the sample consists of some 160 interventions recorded on 142 
inscriptions. This is of course a rather small sample for studying a region as large as 
Anatolia over a period of nearly three centuries. Yet we are bound to what is left of 
ancient documents. Moreover, we might reconsider the level of representativeness of 
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Fig. 16. Evolution of the intensity of food-related interventions in Asia Minor (AD 1 -
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our sample. In section 2.2.3 below, I have estimated at 30,000 the number of 
inscriptions of Asia Minor over the considered period. Let us assume that this is a 
strong underestimation, and that the actual number of inscriptions produced over the 
period was nearly twice as large, i.e. about 60,000. What proportion of this epigraphic 
production might have recorded interventions by officials, benefactors or Roman 
authorities? Mainly three categories of inscriptions are concerned: honorific decrees, 
dedications and the miscellaneous. In the Inscriptiones Graecae (II/III), these three 
categories together represent a little less than 25% of the total. If this proportion can 
roughly be extrapolated, this means that for our period, the number of inscriptions 
belonging to one of these three categories was about 15,000. Yet, not all these 
inscriptions recorded euergetism or official interventions; some of the miscellaneous (a 
little more than 5% of the total) as well as honorific decrees might have concerned 
other aspects of civic life. But if we assume that 80% of these three categories together 
were dealing with benefactions and/or interventions in the broader sense, this leaves 
us with a body of 12,000documents. Now, which proportion of these inscriptions 
potentially concerned food-related benefactions? In his study of civic munificence in 
Asia Minor, A. Zuiderhoek has calculated that 3% of his total sample of some 500 
interventions was dealing with food324. Naturally, the proportion of interventions and 
inscriptions might well be different, but again, if we consider this as an underestimate 
by a factor of two, this would mean that total food-related inscriptions would make up 
at best some 6% of total euergetic inscriptions lato sensu. Hence, this would imply that 
the total potential corpus of food-related inscriptions in Asia Minor over the first three 
centuries AD would consist of some 720 documents. Compared to that number, our 
sample of 142 inscriptions does not seem so dramatically small anymore. This resulting 
graph, of course, is merely illustrative, and should not be expected to provide very 
accurate depiction of fluctuations in grain market intervention. To some extent, 
however, our body of evidence might be considered as converging towards the actual 
distribution of grain-related interventions.  
 What do we see on the graph, then? First, it should be stressed that the peaks of 
high value and thin time span should not be assigned too much importance since these 
crucially depend on the level of accuracy with which the inscriptions reporting them 
could be dated. What matters for the present data is the pattern suggested by the mid- 
to long-term evolutions, which are revealed by the dashed trend curve. This curve 
exhibits two important overall increases : the first starts from the middle of the reign of 
 
                                               
324 Zuiderhoek (2009), p. 172 
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Trajan and lasts until the end of the reign of Marcus Aurelius, the second starts under 
Septimus Severus and ends in the middle of the 3rd c. AD. 
 Since this curve represents all kinds of interventions related to grain (and, in a 
few cases, oil), its interpretation is not straightforward. Should we interpret a rise as a 
signal of increased food distress? Or rather as testifying of pervasive and recurrent civic 
supply systems and intense participation of benefactors, which would thus indicate 
increased access of urban populations to (stores of) grain? Or does this curve simply 
reflect the variation of the ‘epigraphic habit’, since the chronological distribution of 
Greek and Latin inscriptions as such has been shown to follow its own independent 
evolution325 ? There is sufficient ground to claim that we are not witnessing the 
changes of a mere ‘fashion’. Indeed, these long-term evolutions in the intensity of 
grain-related intervention broadly follows the chronology of élite munificence (all 
purposes together: public buildings, games & festivals, distributions of food or 
money…) in Asia Minor already emphasized by A. Zuiderhoek : a rapid increase in the 
beginning of the 2nd c. AD, an absolute peak in the first half of the 2nd c. AD, and a 
general decline in the first decades of the 3rd c. AD326. Moreover, the pattern displayed 
by grain-related interventions finds some similarities with those exhibited by other 
type of data throughout the empire: animal bones assemblages in the provinces, 
although rising from mid-second c. BC, reach their peak around AD 150 and decline 
after that327; even more interestingly, the evolution of the femur length, although not 
focused on samples from Asia Minor alone, also exhibits a double-peaked curve, with a 
depression between the mid-second c. AD and the beginning of the 3rd c. AD328. 
 
 This gap, which roughly lasts from AD 165 to AD 200 is undoubtedly the key to 
the understanding of the long-term trends exhibited on the graph. A few years ago, 
François Kirbihler has argued for the presence of a subsistence crisis in Asia Minor 
under Marcus Aurelius329, whose reign falls exactly in the depression visible on the 
graph. However, is this depression in grain-related interventions a symptom of 
distress, or rather a sign that civic interventions were not needed to ensure a regular 
and sufficient food supply? We should probably interpret variations in grain-related 
interventions as co-variating with the fluctuations of food accessibility; but we should 
not consider this covariation as being instantaneous: the fact that we argued above 
 
                                               
325 MacMullen (1982), pp. 243-245 
326 Zuiderhoek (2009), pp. 18-19 
327 Jongman (2007), pp. 191-193 
328 Jongman (2007), pp. 193-194. 
329 Kirbihler (2006), pp. 613-640. 
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that the structural nature of food crisis generated a structural response in the form of 
food supply institutions and food munificence does not mean that any historical 
occurrence of such food-related élite participation – or even most of it – is the 
symptom of a food crisis. Such an interpretation would reduce food-related 
institutions and munificence to a circumstantial, conjuncture-oriented phenomenon, 
while we precisely argued that they were a structural response to a structural problem. 
Of course, in some cases, some serious and isolated food crisis undoubtedly fostered 
élite munificence and stimulated a response by civic supply systems, especially in 
emergency situations, but it is unlikely that this was the major driving mechanism. In 
this respect, a rise in aggregate grain-related intervention might indicate a troubled 
access to basic foodstuffs – just as it might indicate particularly efficient civic supply 
schemes and high élite participation –, but which would not necessarily result from a 
contemporary disruption of supply channels. On the other hand, however, low levels 
of grain-related intervention are naturally unlikely to reflect a food accessibility crisis, 
either past or present. Therefore, Kirbihler’s suggestion of a more or less global crisis 
under Marcus Aurelius, although well attested in his data concerning Ephesos and 
western Asia Minor, is not reflected by aggregate evidence.  
 How then can we account for the two long term peaks? It is, I think, a dead-end 
to seek for a single factor explaining all trends in the variation of food-related 
interventions. The early-second century peak should most logically be interpreted as 
reflecting the overall rise of munificence in Asia Minor, rather than a period of 
particular food distress which no comparative data supports. The early 3rd c. peak, 
however, should in my opinion be regarded as an indicator of increasing grain supply 
difficulties. Supports for this can be found when looking at the occurrences of the 
honorific title τροφεύς (foster-father) in Asia Minor, usually awarded to benefactions 
intervening in the food supply330, often in critical situations : four out of the fifteen 
epigraphic references for this term can be dated between AD 200 and AD 235, precisely 
in the most intense part of the peak (cf. table 1).  
 Yet, what would have been the cause of this period of food distress? As can be 
seen on the graph, this supposed crisis develops at the very beginning of the 3rd c. AD, 
just a few years after the Antonine Plague struck the region of Anatolia. Although 
chronology is not an argument of itself, one might agree that the link between the 
epidemic and recurring food crisis is not far-fetched: the plague drastically and rapidly 
reduced the number of producers, while the amount of land under cultivation 
remained constant in the short run. As the labor-land ratio diminished, production per 
 
                                               
330 Dio Chr., Or., 48, 10 
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hectare dropped, and so did aggregate production331. Of course, the plague also 
reduced the number of mouths to be fed. But the two effects probably did not 
compensate each other: although both supply of and demand for grain were inelastic, 
demand is likely to have been even more inelastic than supply – for the adjustment to 
the level of prices was probably easier on the production side than on the consumption 
side. Hence, in the very short run, equal movements of supply and demand would not 
have a null effect on the average level of prices: despite a combined reduction of supply 
and demand, the price of grain must have experienced an overall upward pressure, and 
even more so as the average amount of money per capita was increased332. To this, we 
should add the fact that, in the short run, the spatial distribution of population did not 
change as fast as population size, resulting in a lower population density, which must 
have rendered the logistics of grain supply more laborious since the unit cost of labor 
per capita was increased. As a result, the overall effect on grain accessibility must have 
been damaged by the Antonine plague, at least until a new configuration between 
population and resources would take place. For the moment, however, I will not 
further in the discussion, since a detailed analysis of the effects of the Antonine Plague 
on the availability of grain will be undertaken in section 3.2.4 below.  
 
Table. 2. Occurrences of the honorific title τροφεύς in Asia Minor 
CITY REGION PERIOD (AD) REFERENCE 
Synnada Phrygia 41 - 54 Head, BMC, Phrygia, p. xcix  
Amastris Paphlagonia 62 IGR III, 89 
Attaleia Pamhpylia 75-125  SEG 15.1570 
Oenoanda Lycia 135-150 IGR III, 495 
Pergamon Mysia II c.  IGR IV, 1680 
Prusias ad Hypium Bithynia II c.  IK-Prusias ad Hypium, 18 
Prusias ad Hypium Bithynia II c.  IK-Prusias ad Hypium, 19 
Pednelissos Pisidia II c.  SEG 53.1597 
Ephesos Ionia 200-225 IK-Ephesos, 3061 
Amastris Paphlagonia 209 
IGR III, 90 & 1435 + OGIS, 
531 
Amastris Paphlagonia <209 
IGR III, 90 & 1435 + OGIS, 
531 
Selgè Pisidia 215-235 IK-Selgè, 17 
Parlais Pisidia ? L. Robert, OMS III, 1450 (1) 
Pergamon Mysia Roman period IvP II, 589 
Pergamon Mysia Roman period IvP II, 606 
 
 
                                               
331 Jongman (2007), p. 197. 
332 Temin (2014), p. 204. 
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3.1.3 Grain prices in Asia Minor: variations, evolutions and ideas 
Variations in the availability of – or access to – grain are strongly linked to of price-
levels , but only because prices are often an indicator of grain shortages, as we saw in 
the previous section. Indeed, assessing a ‘typical’ price of grain in ‘normal’ 
circumstances is necessary for any calculation we need to make regarding the cost and 
efficiency of grain-related interventions. This is a difficult task, first because most 
documented prices are either shortages prices or subsidized prices, hence biased in 
one way or another, and second because grain prices, in Anatolia and elsewhere, are 
affected significantly by geographical variability, and experienced non-negligible 
changes during the first three centuries AD. Finally, the following survey of prices 
would not be complete (?) without a discussion of ancient Greek and Roman 
perceptions of prices, which had a significant effect on grain supply institutions and 
political interventions in the food market.  
 There was no such thing as a ‘standard’ price of grain that would have been 
universally valid throughout Asia Minor; prices differed greatly from one region to 
another. ‘We know how much the value of things varies between different places, 
especially wine, oil and grain’, can we read in the Digest333. A similar statement had 
been made by Cicero around 70 BC : when discussing the levies in kind due to Rome 
by the Phrygian city of Philomelium, which should be delivered at Ephesus, Cicero 
writes : 
 
I know the usual difference between the prices of corn at those two places; I 
know how long the journey takes; I know that it suits the farmers of Philomelium 
to pay, there in Phrygia, a cash sum corresponding to the price of corn at 
Ephesus, rather than transport the corn to Ephesus or send agents to Ephesus 
with money to buy corn there.334 
 
Such geographical variability of prices is, according to Cicero, characteristic of some 
provinces like Hispania or Asia, contrary to the regularity of prices encountered in 
Sicily (provinciae in quibus unum pretium frumento non solet)335. This situation does 
 
                                               
333 Dig., XIII, 4, 3 
334 Cic., 2Verr., III, 191 : (…) uideo quid inter annonam interesse soleat, uideo quot dierum uia sit, uideo 
Philomeliensibus expedire, quanti Ephesi sit frumentum, dare potius in Phrygia quam Ephesum portare aut 
ad emendum frumentum Ephesum pecuniam et legatos mittere. See also : Rathbone & Von Reden (2014), 
pp. 180-182. 
335 Cic., 2Verr., III, 192 
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not only owe to the regional fragmentation and transport costs, but also results from 
the proximity of big cities. A similar situation is described in 4th c. AD Syrian Antioch, 
a city regularly supplied from Egypt, where the price of grain was double the basic 
Egyptian price336. A final mention of such typical interregional price variation is to be 
found in Dio Chrysostom’s orations in which he claims that the price of grain in Prusa 
in times of crisis was still lower than the usual price in other cities337, although Dio’s 
statement might be less valuable since it may partly have served to calm down the 
angry mob accusing him of contributing to the shortage by stockpiling. 
 Beside this geographical and seasonal variability, how did prices evolve through 
time over a longer run ? For the second century AD, there are some indications of an 
upward pressure on grain prices, showed in the bread tariffs of Ephesos338 (fig. 5 
below). Due to the scarcity of the data, it is however impossible to know whether these 
price increases occur abruptly or were the results of a slow and continuous rise. What 
appears quite clearly from the Egyptian documents, however, is that the price of grain 
doubled between 170 and 190 AD onwards339. After this period, though, Egyptian grain 
prices remain very stable until the last quarter of the 3rd c. which suggest that the 
eastern provinces did not experience actual nominal inflation before the reign of 
Aurelian340, despite the regular debasements of the silver Roman coinage that took 
place from the late second c. AD341.  
  
 
 
                                               
336 Jul., Misopogon, 369 
337 Dio, Or. 46, 10 
338 Duncan-Jones (1994), pp. 26-28. For a general discussion of inflation in Roman times: Jones (1953), 
pp. 293-318 ; Duncan-Jones (1982), pp. 7-11 & 356-357 ; Temin (2013), pp. 70-92 ; Temin (2014), pp. 189-207 
(esp. pp. 189-201).  
339 Rathbone (1996), pp. 321-339 ; Rathbone (1997), pp. 183-244 ; Lerouxel (2016), pp. 296-297 
340 Katsari (2011), pp. 126-127 ; Lerouxel (2016), pp. 297-298. 
341 On the debasement of the denarius, see Christiansen (1988), p. 87. 
  117 
 
 
 As we have seen, the recorded prices that reached us are almost always crisis 
prices or maximum prices. Added to the fact that prices varied greatly along modest 
distances, any attempt to derive what would have been the ‘typical’ price of grain for 
Asia Minor would seem doomed. Yet, that a precise quantitative estimate of a regular 
price in Asia Minor as a whole is impossible to derive, does not mean that a subjective 
perception of what would have been a ‘normal’, or ‘fair’ price in a specific place did not 
exist. The question of ‘fair’ or ‘just’ price is a recurring philosophical issue in the history 
of Greek and Roman societies. Plato is perhaps the first author we know of who 
discussed the problem. When discussing market regulations for his ideal community in 
the Laws, he proposes upper and lower legal limits for the variation of prices342. Later 
on, he explains the foundations of such limits, which must be set according to the 
‘reasonable profit’ to be made by merchants (κέρδος ποιεῖ τὸ μέτριον)343. This idea of 
controlled profit is also found in Lysias’ discourse Against the grain dealers in which he 
refers to a law forbidding the merchants to sell grain at a price more than one obol 
above their purchase price344, which corresponds to a profit rate of 16.6 %345. 
 
                                               
342 Plato, Laws, VIII, 14 [850a] : (…) τὸ δὲ ὠνηθὲν ἢ πραθὲν ὅσῳ πλέον ἂν ᾖ καὶ πλέονος ἢ κατὰ τὸν νόμον, 
ὃς εἴρηκεν πόσου προσγενομένου καὶ ἀπογενομένου δεῖ μηδέτερα τούτων ποιεῖν, ἀναγραφήτω τότ' ἤδη 
παρὰ τοῖς νομοφύλαξιν τὸ πλέον, ἐξαλειφέσθω δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον. 
343 Plato, Laws, XI, 4 [920b-c] 
344 Lysias, Against the grain dealers, 22, 8. One obol per drachma means a profit of one sixth, or 16.6%. 
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 A similar, though in some respects different, view is expressed by Aristotle, when 
searching the foundations of ‘justice’. Justice, he says, is what preserves ‘equality’. But 
what then defines equality? In his conception of exchange, equality is first and 
foremost a matter of equivalence. More precisely, equality is seen as a proportion 
between what exchanging parties respectively had before and after the exchange, or 
stated differently, a relative equivalence in the gains realized through the process of 
exchange346. This is, according to Aristotle, the criterion of ‘fair exchange’ and hence a 
condition for ‘fair prices’347. Yet, later on, he explores the possibility that such 
proportionality would be defined by the intrinsic properties of objects and 
commodities, which approaches the modern idea of an ‘objective’ theory of price 
formation.  
 References to the idea of ‘fair’ or ‘just’ price are also known from the Roman 
context, especially in the Digest through the notion of iustum pretium. In Roman Law, 
the concept of ‘just’ price seems rather to emerge from an ‘objective’ approach, 
according to which the price can be determined from the properties of the commodity 
within the process of exchange: iusta pretia non ex praeterita emptione, sed ex praesenti 
aestimatione constitui348. Yet, the ambiguity between the ‘moral’ definition and the 
‘substantive’ definition is also present, since in book 50 we can read : ‘It is naturally 
equitable that no one can be enriched at the expense of someone else’s loss or 
injury’349. This ambiguity is well summarized in the beginning of the Athenaion 
Politeia, where the tasks of the agoranomoi are laid out, among which the following : 
‘they ensure that grain is sold at the just price’ (σῖτος ἀργὸς ὤνιος ἔσται δικαίως)350. 
The word dikaios can be translated by ‘correct, just’ or ‘fair, even’. The first sense refers 
to a substantive definition, based on intrinsic properties and/or legal processes (cf. 
infra), while the second rather reflects a moral connotation.  
 The interest of this discussion is that the concepts of fair price is not limited to 
philosophical developments or legal principles; it is also reflected in inscriptions 
dealing with matters of grain supply, hence showing the importance of this idea in 
daily operations : in the first or second century AD, a benefactor named Bassontas is 
said to have ‘distributed grain at a fair price in time of shortage’ (εὐώνω τειμῆ τὰ σεῖτα 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
345 Migeotte (2011), pp. 423-424. 
346 Berthoud (1991), p. 147. 
347 On this development, see mainly : Arist., Nichomach. Ethics, V, 1131 a – c. 
348 Dig., XLIX, 4, 3, 5. For other mentions of iustum pretium : Dig., X, 3, 10, 2 ; Dig. XX, 1, 16, 9; Dig. XXIV, 
1, 36.pr. ; Cod., III, 37, 3.  
349 Dig., L, 17, 206 : Iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et iniuria fieri 
locupletiorem. 
350 [Arist.], Ath. Pol., 51, 3 
  119 
μετρήσαντα ἐνδείας οὔσης)351; Even more interestingly, in AD 156/157 in the city of 
Aizanoi, a benefactor named M. Ulpius Apullianus Flavianus sold grain below market 
price (an operation known as paraprasis, on which see below); in order to account for 
his benefaction, the decree reads : ‘he distributed grain at the price of abundancy’ 
(ἐπευωνίσαντα τὴν τιμὴν εὐθηνίαν)352. Hence, despite an emerging conception of prices 
based on the intrinsic properties of commodities and their relationship to others 
within the circuits of exchange, both Greek and Roman literature display constant 
references to a moral framework of (grain) price variations linked to the ancient topos 
of ‘moderation’, which testifies that conceptions of what a ‘regular’, or ‘normal’ price 
should be were not unfamiliar to citizens of ancient poleis; as the inscription from 
Aizanoi reveals, an idea of the level of grain prices in times of abundant supply was 
also conceived. As Jean Andreau convincingly argues, when ancient Greeks and 
Romans talk about the price of the year – without further reference, or without moral 
connotations, it should be stressed – they refer to the lowest price of the year, namely 
the price just after the harvest353, which probably accounts for the τιμὴν εὐθηνίαν 
encountered in the inscription from Aizanoi. These facts, to a certain extent, nuance 
the criticisms that could be addressed to the concept of ‘regular price’354, i.e., that 
prices followed a seasonal cycle and varied greatly from one region to another. 
 This of course does not allow conjecturing ‘the’ normal price for Asia Minor; yet, 
a quantitative reference point might be reached : when L. Antistius Rusticus limited 
the price of grain, he fixed the maximum limit at twice the price before winter (which 
was 8 or 9 asses, or 2 HS), namely at 1 denarius per modius. Similarly, the benefactor of 
Sebastopolis sold the grain at 1 denarius per modius. It seems, thus, that 1 denarius 
might have been conceived as an upper limit to what was acceptable or affordable. In 
the same vein, it is also broadly documented that, despite huge intra-regional 
variations, prices in the Roman Mediterranean also obeyed certain patterns : intense 
urbanization would drive the price up (as in Italy), while very fertile areas resulting in 
important production caused prices to drop, as was the case in Egypt. As Asia Minor 
was somehow an intermediate region both in terms of fertility and urbanization, and 
given what the scant numerical evidence at our disposal suggests, I think that in 
further calculations or simulations we might safely use a price of 2-2.5 HS per modius 
 
                                               
351 MAMA, VII, 11, ll. 6-9. 
352 SEG, 35, 1365, ll. 12-13. 
353 Andreau (2004), p. 135 
354 For a moral general discussion of the conception of prices in Roman Antiquity, see : Nicolet (1988), 
pp. 166 sqq (Rome). 
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as reflecting a regular, common price in many regions of Asia Minor in normal 
circumstances.  
3.1.4 Levels of grain-related interventions 
To cope with the structural nature of food crisis either explicitly reported in 
inscriptions and literary texts or revealed by price spikes, specific measures could be 
set up, some of which have already been highlighted in the preceding discussion of the 
chronology of shortages. Yet, the generic expression ‘grain-related intervention’, useful 
for grasping decisions and operations which are geared towards a similar objective, 
nevertheless foreshadows the different political levels at which such measures could be 
decided, and hence the scale at which they operated. Three levels can be identified in 
the sources : (1) the Imperial level, (2) the provincial level, (3) the civic level. In 
outlining each of these scales of intervention, we will follow a chronological order. 
 The first imperial intervention we know of for Asia Minor dates back to the reign 
of Claudius. An inscription reports important difficulties experienced by the city of 
Kibyra, the details of which have now been clarified : a notable of the city, Tiberius 
Nikèphoros, was operating ‘a grain market cartel’, through which he managed to extort 
money from the city355. In order to end this practices and their subsequent effect on 
the city’s grain supply, a benefactor named Quintus Veranius Philagros undertook an 
embassy to Rome in order to report these troubles to the emperor Claudius. Philagros’ 
embassy was successful, and the emperor decreed that 75 modii of grain should be sold 
per iugum of land, and that such sale was to take place nowhere except in the market 
area356. The most likely way to understand the measures ordered by Claudius is to 
consider that some landowners of Nikephoros’ cartel were hoarding grain and 
exercising a pressure upon the supply of grain. Hence, Claudius commanded that a 
minimum quantity of grain – this is the way I think we should understand the value of 
75 modii – per unit of cultivated area should be sold. As most of the grain was probably 
extracted through rents in kind, the imperial measure responding to Philagros’ request 
puts legal limits to what the landowners could do with the surpluses that ended up in 
their hands.  
 A second measure to be examined is Domitian’s edict on vines, as reported by 
Suetonius:  
 
 
                                               
355 Kokkinia (2008), pp. 143-158. 
356 IK-Kibyra, 41 
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One year when wine was abundant, and grain was in short supply, estimating 
that the exaggerated cultivation of vineyards resulted in the disregard of land, he 
forbade to plant any more of it in Italy, and ordered to cut off vine stocks in the 
provinces, leaving only half of the existing ones, at best357. 
 
Beside the moral connotation of this measure which finds parallel in other aspects of 
Domitian’s policy, this edict might have been motivated by the major increase in wine 
production in the provinces in which vineyards had grown at the expense of cereal 
land358, partly because of their higher profitability. This view is supported by the 
chronology: Domitian’s Edict is dated to AD 90-91, almost precisely at the same time as 
the shortage occurring in Pisidian Antioch in AD 93 (cf. previous section), and as the 
reported dearness of wheat mentioned in St John’s Apocalypse, which was written 
around AD 92. This body of converging evidence invites considering the last decade of 
the 1st c. AD as one of the rare phases of large scale grain crisis that can be identified in 
the sources.  
 As far as Asia Minor is concerned, Hadrian is no doubt the emperor of whom the 
most abundant evidence for actions dealing with the grain supply remains. The large 
granaries of Patara and Andriakè were constructed under his reign359. Besides, while 
Italy disposed of a monopoly on the Egyptian grain supply, Hadrian allowed several 
cities to officially import grain from Egypt360, as is made clear in two inscriptions from 
Ephesus, one of which praises Hadrian himself for this allowance (σειτοπομπή[ας δέ] 
ἀπ’ Αἰγύπτου παρέχοντα)361. An inscription from Tralleis recording a sitonès (cf. below) 
who imported grain from Egypt362, and another one from Cyzicus363 also indicate that 
 
                                               
357 Suet., Dom., 7 
358 I do not claim that this is the only possible interpretation of Domitian’s Edict, nor do I take for 
granted that it was actually set up – although we now by Philostratus the embassy led by Scopelianos of 
Clazomenai who appears to have been successful in preserving Asia Minor from the application of the 
rmoval of vines. The emperor probably did not have the means to ensure that such an Edict would be 
respected empire-wide. Yet, what matters for my argument here is the intention rather than the actual 
occurrence of what Suetonius describes. He might well have exaggerated Diocletian’s actual measure, 
but the link he makes between extension of vineyards and subsistence crisis nevertheless tells us 
something of how these cultivations could interfere with one another. 
359 TAM, II, 397 & ILS, 5908 ; cf. Cavalier (2007), pp.51-65. The functions of these granaries are discussed 
in section 2.2.2. below. 
360 For a specific discussion of the related documents : Wörrle (1971), pp. 325-349 ; Garnsey (1988), pp. 
255-257. 
361 IK-Ephesos, 274. The second inscription mentions benefactor for having been ‘responsible for the 
carrying of the grain from Egypt’ (σειτο[πο]μπὸς ἀπ[ὸ τῆς Αἰ ]γύπτου) : IK-Ephesos, 3016. 
362 IK-Tralleis, 80 
363 OGIS, 389 
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these cities have been allowed to receive Egyptian grain under Hadrian. But the 
document which probably best describes the concern of the emperor himself for 
matters of grain supply of provincial cities is perhaps the letter addressed by Hadrian 
to the association of Dionysiac artists at Alexadria Troas in AD 134 : the beginning of 
the text forbids the use of the funds for any other purpose – fluidity between the 
finances of different sectors of civic life was indeed characteristic of ancient Greek 
cities – unless, he says, it would be for the purchase of grain in time of shortage364. 
These instructions given by Hadrian should be compared to similar dispositions 
mentioned in the Digest, which forbid employing money devoted to the purchase of 
grain for any other purpose: if the money happens to be used for any other expenditure 
than grain, the sum must be integraly paid back to the city365. The comparison of these 
two dispositions reveal the high concern and the particular status of matters of grain 
supply : while the funds for Dionysiac artists could only be redirected from their 
original purpose for financing grain purchases, monetary reserves for the purchase of 
grain cannot, in any circumstance, be affected to other expenditures.  
 Further authorizations to import grain from Egypt were delivered later on by 
Caracalla and Severus Alexander to the city of Tarsus, as is revealed by coins of this 
city366. After the Severi, the only imperial intervention on the grain supply which also 
influenced Asia Minor is the Edict of Maximum prices established by Diocletian in AD 
301, in which he fixes a maximum limit to prices of many different commodities in 
order to address the ramping inflation in the empire. In this edict, Diocletian fixes the 
price of wheat at maximum 100 denarii per modius castrensis, and that of barley at 60 
denarii per modius castrensis. 
 The provincial level also intervened on various occasions in matters of grain 
supply. The first of such provincial interventions documented in Asia Minor is the 
already mentioned edict taken by the governor of Pisidia Lucius Antistius Rusticus in 
AD 92-93 during a shortage that struck the city of Pisidian Antioch. The measures 
ordered by Rusticus are the following : (1) he decreed that rural dwellers should declare 
the quantity of grain at their disposal, the share of their grain which they will use as 
seed, and the quantity they need for feeding their families; all the rest should be put 
for sale to the official buyers of grain of the city (emptores); (2) he commanded 
 
                                               
364 SEG 56, 1359, ll.9-11. 
365 Dig. L, 2, 4 : Ad frumenti comparationem pecunia restitui civitati, non compensari in erogata debet. Sin 
autem frumentaria pecunia in alios usu quam quibus destinata est conversa fuerit, (…) solvi autem a 
curatore reipublicae iubetur. 
366 Ziegler (1977), pp. 34 sqq ; Erdkamp (2005), p. 281. 
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everyone who knows of hoarding practices to report to the civic authorities367; and (3), 
he fixed a maximum price for the sale of grain at 1 denarius per modius368. The strategy 
of Rusticus is thus to maximize the available supply of grain, and to ensure its 
affordability for the citizens, and for this purpose resorts to coercive measures. 
Another interesting measure taken at the provincial level concerns the city of Ephesos, 
where, in the second half of the 2nd c. AD, an unknown proconsul promulgated a 
decree concerning the bakers of the city369 :  
I therefore order the bakers not to gather together as a faction and the leaders 
not to act boldly. Rather they are to obey completely the regulations established 
for the common welfare and to supply the city with the necessary production of 
bread without fail370. 
The interpretation of the text is somehow dubious: on the one hand, it might seem 
that the proconsul attempted to prevent bakers from constituting a cartel, by which 
they might exercise upward pressures on bread prices. Indeed, as stated at the 
beginning of the text, the decree is motivated by troubles among the population 
because ‘of the recklessness of the bakers on the market’ (διὰ τὴν σ[ύλ]λ̣ο̣γον καὶ 
ἀθρασίαν τῶν ἀρτοκόπων ἐπὶ τῇ ἀγορᾷ). On the other hand, the word ἑταιρία could 
also be translated by ‘association’ (in the sense of the latin collegium), which might 
suggest that the behavior of the bakers was not mostly speculative or profit-oriented, 
but that they might have stopped producing bread for other reasons which could deal 
with their working conditions or status, or with an increase in the price of grain371. This 
edict echoes a passage in Petronius’ Satyricon, which I do not resist quoting :  
‘Thus spoke Phileros, and after him Ganymedes : ‘You are telling things that 
make no sense, while nobody cares about how the lack of grain harms us. Today, 
I swear, I couldn’t even find a piece of bread! And why is that? Because of this 
persistent drought. This hunger has been there for a year now. May these aediles 
be cursed, who collude with bakers : “Do me a favor now, I will serve you back 
 
                                               
367 AE (1925), 126, col. II. 
368 Ibid., col. III. For a recent discussion of the decree : Dalaison (2008), pp. 139-140 ; 142-145 ; 149-150 & 
156-158. 
369 IK-Ephesos, 215 
370 Translation by Harland (2014), p. 238. 
371 Levick (2014), p. 215 ; Harland (2014), p. 238 ; Morgan (2015), pp. 30-39 for a thorough discussion of 
the edict and the analysis of the role of bakers and their relationship to civic authorities.  
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later”.This way the little people always endures, while thos large fishes keep 
feasting at their expense.’372 
What is interesting in this passage is that it explicitly emphasizes that weather patterns 
are not the only factor to be blamed for the shortage of grain: social reactions, here the 
collusion of bakers and market officials to keep prices high, plays a crucial role. It is 
therefore not impossible that the ‘cartel’ against which the governor intervenes also 
implied corrupted agoranomoi….In any case, this edict reveals that food market was 
subject to regulations (albeit not always formally expressed) at Ephesos, and is but 
another illustration of the concern of political authorities for the civic food supply. 
These are the two instances of explicit proconsular intervention on the cities’ grain (or 
bread) supply in Asia Minor. A third one, however less certain, is nevertheless worth 
mentioning: in a honorary decree of AD 170-171, the proconsul Marcus Nonnius 
Macrinus is referred to as ‘savior of the province’ (τ[ὸν] τῆς ἐπαρχείας σωτῆ[ρα·])373. At 
first, one might think of a military role in fighting threatening tribes, but F. Kirbihler 
recalls that Asia Minor remained rather unaffected by the raid of the Costoboces and 
Bastarnae. The decree is also contemporary with the plague (most likely smallpox) 
epidemic which struck the province under Marcus Aurelius, but we hardly see what a 
governor could have done against this. Hence, Kirbihler argues tentatively that we 
should see this expression as testifying to measures taken by the proconsul to address a 
period of grain scarcity374, an interpretation which finds some ground in the fact that, 
at the origin of the decree for Macrinus, we find Flavius Damianus, a famous 
benefactor who distributed some 201,200 medimnoi of grain to the city375. Yet, the 
interpretation is not entirely convincing, for we fail to understand why, if Macrinus’ 
interventions were mostly oriented towards solving grain supply issues, he was not 
awarded the common title of foster-father (tropheus) typically used in such events in 
addition to that of savior.  
 Finally, beside imperial and provincial regulations – to which should be added 
inter-city solidarity376 – the civic level, whether in the form of institutions or 
benefactions, was the major channel of grain-related interventions : on 178 
 
                                               
372 Petron., Satyricon, 44 : Haec Phileros dixit, illa Ganymedes: « Narrat is quod nec ad terram pertinet, 
cum interim nemo curat quid annona mordet. Non mehercules hodie buccam panis inuenire potui. Et 
quomodo siccitas perseuerat! Iam annum esuritio fuit. Aediles male eueniat, qui cum pistoribus colludunt: 
'Serua me, seruabo te.' Itaque populus minutus laborat; nam isti maiores maxillae semper Saturnalia 
agunt. 
373 IK-Ephesos, 3029, ll. 23-24. 
374 Kirbihler (2006), pp.630-631. 
375 IK-Ephesos, 672 & 3080. 
376 Ael. Arist., Or., 19, 12 
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interventions of which the agent can be identified, 170 are city-based, 2 are performed 
by governors, and 5 by emperors. City-originating interventions hence make up some 
95% of the total. Of course, not all of these interventions were performed by citizens : 
some freedmen benefactors appear here and there, while some of them might not have 
been citizens in the city where their intervention took place. But overall, it is 
reasonable to ascribe the major part of grain-related interventions to citizens. These 
civic interventions operated mostly under two forms: (1) formally established 
distributions schemes and institutional systems alleviating food crises on the hand, 
and (2) élite individual initiative in performing distributions or contributing to existing 
systems. The two following sections will each be devoted in analyzing in details these 
two forms of civic intervention.  
 On a final note, an interesting observation is worth being mentioned: from 
comparative data assembled by Braudel in his first opus on the Mediterranean, it is 
surprising to see how civic measures aimed at dealing with grain supply issues in early 
modern Italy were strikingly similar to those undertaken by ancient cities : 16th century 
cities facing grain supply difficulties often made it compulsory to sell grain or flour in 
specifically designated public places377, which echoes Claudius’ decree forbidding the 
sale of grain outside the market area in Kibyra. Similarly, during shortages, most towns 
would start by making an inventory of available stocks – just like in the decree of 
Antistius Rusticus during the shortage of Pisidian Antioch – and by forbidding export 
of grain378, a measure known to have been implemented in various ancient cities, like 
Athens379 or Selymbria380. This strong similarity in urban grain supply interventions 
between ancient and modern cities suggests that, despite significant variations in 
environmental conditions, agricultural practices, institutions, or market development, 
grain supply issues and the way of addressing them remained a structure of the pre-
industrial Mediterranean, at least until the Industrial Revolution. 
 
                                               
377 Braudel (1990 a), p. 403 
378 Ibid., pp. 403-404 
379 Plut., Solon, 15 & 24; Ps.-Arist. Athen. Pol., II, 2, 9, 1; Garnsey (1988), pp. 74-75; Bresson (2016), p. 404 
380 Ps.-Arist., Econ., 1348b 
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3.2 Institutions  
3.2.1 The lexical diversity of food-related offices 
3.2.1.1 Preliminary remarks 
The various forms and levels of grain-related interventions already outlined above 
strongly suggest the existence of a consistent administrative framework for food supply 
in the cities of the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet, so far we still do not know the details of 
such interventions: what exactly did the various officials do ? And first of all, which 
exactly are the offices related to the supply of grain? In this section, I undertake a 
systematic analysis of grain-related officials. This is indeed the first step in accounting 
for the roe of civic institutions in this matter. It consists, in other words, of a glossary 
of grain-related intervention. Later on, I will examine how these offices are spread 
throughout Asia Minor, and I will focus on two major offices for a more detailed case 
study.  
 The striking characteristic that arises from the documents when looking into the 
civic structure for dealing with the grain supply is the impressive lexical diversity 
affecting the titles of grain-related officials, from late classical times to the edge of the 
late Roman period. How can we explain this linguistic sophistication? Does it result 
from an intense specification of tasks in relation to the supply and distribution of 
grain? Despite their lexical distinction, different offices often appear to have 
overlapping tasks while similar functions are sometimes named differently, which 
prompts the question : why are they distinguished from one another in the first place ?  
To a modern observer, such complexity for an apparently clearly circumscribed 
sector of civic life may seem strange. In this section, we start by exploring the 
numerous terms relating to aspects of the grain-supply, in order to identify the tasks 
associated with each official and with different supply systems. All the while, we will 
try to distinguish between formal-institutional terms (those referring to magistracies 
or liturgies) and honorific titles, as well as between regular and temporary offices. 
Second, we will try to account for the different meanings of grain-related terms in the 
inscriptions and literary sources. By doing so, we will attempt to provide an 
explanation for the apparently overcomplicated lexical situation regarding the grain 
supply and to understand what this complexity might tell us about the economic 
involvement of civic authorities in the post-classical Greek city. 
In order to complete and the documents from Asia Minor, the overall question 
will be illuminated by an extensive use of comparative material coming from all over 
the Greek world, both in the Hellenistic and Imperial period. Here, we will be looking 
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at the cities of the Roman East from a wider geographical perspective, and we will 
consider the linguistic continuity between Hellenistic and Roman periods.  
3.2.1.2 The data : grain-related terminology in the inscriptions and 
literature 
In our epigraphic database and in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG), no less than 
12 different words can be found that relate to grain-related offices or supply systems. 
To establish this list, we deliberately dismissed the terms referring to a granary 
understood as the physical structure for storing grain and not as a related public 
charge. Similarly, our list does not include the terms paraprasis or epeuonismos, 
referring to sales of grain below market price (but usually higher than ‘normal’ price) 
organized by civic benefactors and which has recently received a thorough analysis by 
Arjan Zuiderhoek381. Finally, we do not take into account the term tropheus382 (foster 
father) which, like sotèr (savior) or ktistès (builder) deserves a separate discussion 
focused on the rhetoric of honorific titles. Figures 1 and 2 below indicate the 
distribution of grain related terms according to their occurrences both in our corpus of 
inscriptions and in the TLG : 
 
 
 
                                               
381 Zuiderhoek (2014), pp. 1-29. 
382 On which see : Robert (1948), pp. 74-81. 
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As we can see, despite a similar ‘profile’ with two leading categories and the 
presence of the agoranomia and the sitometria among the three most frequently 
attested terms, the two distributions are quite different. The offices/functions appear 
with significantly different frequencies in the two corpora : the sitonía, the leading 
category in the epigraphic database, is only a minor category in the literary sources, 
while the sitodosia, fairly rare in inscriptions, is the fourth most frequent grain-related 
term in the TLG. In the following sections, we shall try to identify the criteria on which 
the observed institutional differentiation is founded and to explain the discrepancies 
between literary and epigraphic sources. 
3.2.1.3 Agoranomoi, sitophylakes and sitopolai 
The magistrate most concerned with the urban grain supply is of course the 
agoranomos, whose first epigraphic attestation dates back to the 5th century BC in 
Kerkyra383. The agoranomos acted as the ‘superintendent’ of the market384. He was in 
 
                                               
383 Descat (2003) p. 591. 
384 The control exercised by the agoranomos was understood to be over the market as the physical 
location of commercial exchange; but through the regulation of prices, he also contributed to the 
regulation of the market in the abstract sense as we now understand it, i.e. the locus of the 
confrontation of supply and demand.  
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charge of the logistical organization of the market, the control of weights and 
measures, , the regularity of the supply – for the purpose of which he was managing a 
public fund – of price control, of the levying of taxes, and was also responsible for 
ensuring that transactions were conducted using the allowed currencies385. In case of 
infringements in those matters, the agoranomoi had the judicial prerogatives to launch 
lawsuits386. Agoranomoi also ensured the price and quality of the grain sold on the 
urban market, and often tried to exercise a downward pressure on prices by 
negotiating with merchants387. As magistrates they managed a public fund for the 
expenses related to their charge, but they also often used their own resources for the 
import of grain or for purchasing grain and reselling it at a loss to keep prices low388.  
 Similar yet more specialized tasks concerning the control of grain prices were 
exercised by the sitophylakes, mentioned only once in the inscriptions of Roman Asia 
Minor389 but widely attested in IVth c. BC Athens. According to the Athenaion Politeia, 
the role of the sitophylakes was to ensure that unground wheat and barley was for sale 
at the ‘right’ price and measured out with the approved weights390, and that the price 
of bread and flour were in reasonable proportion with the price of crops391. They were 
also responsible for currency issues, registered the imported quantities of grain and 
ensured that grain dealers (sitopolai) would not buy more than the legally authorized 
quantity392, in order to prevent stockpiling and speculation. 
 These merchants, the sitopolai, are best known through the famous discourse of 
Lysias Against the grain dealers, which sheds some light on the relationship between 
 
                                               
385 Capdetrey & Hassenoh (2012), pp. 14-15. See also : Dmitriev (2005) p.29 & p.34. 
386 Bresson (2008), p. 30. 
387 Migeotte (2010), p. 346. 
388 Not in Classical Athens, but in various cities, especially from early Hellenistic times. See : Couilloud-
Le Dinahet (1988), pp. 322-324 ; Frézouls (1991), p. 7 ; Migeott (2010), p. 346. On agoranomoi intervening 
with their own money in Asia Minor : Dmitriev (2005), p.34, p.144 & p. 148; Bekker-Nielsen (2008), p. 75. 
389 IMT Kyz. Kapu Dağ, 1449 = Dumont-Homolle, 378, n°64a. 
390 For a discussion of the theme of ‘fair’ and ‘just’ price, see above. 
391 [Aristotle], Ath. Pol., 51, 3-4; Garnsey (1988), p. 141; Erdkamp (2005), p. 295 & 310. For the sitophylakes 
in Asia Minor : Garnsey (1988), p. 73. The ambiguity of the word dikaios has briefly been discussed 
above; it can be understood in two different, yet non mutually exclusive ways : ‘correct, just’ or ‘fair, 
even’. In the first sense, it might refer to the control exercised by market officials on merchants in order 
to ensure that they sold their products at a price close to the one they declared when entering the city; 
in the second, it might rather indicate a moral connotation close to the Roman rhetoric of iustum 
pretium. Yet, this linguistic difference matters little from a political point of view : whether reflecting the 
idea of an a priori defined ‘fair price’, or a legal procedure ensuring that merchants would apply the price 
resulting from the negotiation with civic authorities, this expression merely indicates the concern of city 
officials to exercise a downward pressure on grain prices. 
392 Demosthenes, Against Leptinos, 32; Against Phormio, 7; Lysias, Against the grain dealers, 5-6 & 11-12; 
Couilloud-Le Dinahet (1988), pp. 324-326 ; Migeotte (2014), p. 75. 
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such traders and the city : grain was first imported into the harbour by the emporoi – 
wholesale dealers –, and bought from them in legally restricted quantities by the 
sitopolai. The question arises of whether sitophylakes elsewhere in the Greek world 
had similar duties to the ones they had in Athens. As will be discussed below, the tasks 
of grain officials throughout the classical and post-classical Greek world display 
considerable chronological and geographical variation, but they also exhibit common 
traits. At least one inscription from Asia Minor mentions sitophylakes having a similar 
role to their Athenian counterparts393.  
3.2.1.4 Sitonai and sitonia 
Among the most frequently encountered terms associated with grain supply in our 
epigraphic sources are those relating to grain funds : the sitònia394, sitonika, or sitonika 
chrêmata. Its mechanism has been well described: the sitonìa consisted of a cash 
reserve395, aimed at cushioning the rising of prices in times of dearth : the sitònai – 
sometimes helped by treasurers of the grain fund (tamiai tôn sitonikôn chrêmatôn) – 
were entitled to use the fund for purchasing grain when shortages occurred396. This 
task must have implied strong negotiations with landowners who possessed stocks of 
grain in order to convince – or, with the help of governmental authorities, compel – 
them to sell their grain397, and with merchants in order to obtain the lowest possible 
price. As suggested by documents from the Hellenistic period, grain was then resold on 
the urban market398, either at cost price or even at a loss399 (the gap being made up for 
by the personal resources of the sitònai), and the produce of the sale went back to the 
grain fund. It is interesting to note that a similar institution, though with broader 
functions, is known in 15th and 16th c. Italian cities (Florence, Venice, Como,…): the 
Uffici del grano, or Uffici del Abbondanza, which subsidized grain merchants, bought  
and resold grain at a loss400. In ancient and early modern cities alike, the purpose was 
 
                                               
393 IPriene 81, l. 4-9. Cf. Migeotte (2010), p. 347. 
394 One should not confuse the feminine noun sitonìa, which generically describes the institution as a 
whole, with the neuter plural noun sitònia (sing. : sitònion), describing the grain fund itself.  
395 Zuiderhoek (2008), p. 163. 
396 Erdkamp (2005), pp. 269-270. 
397 An example of such forced sales to the sitònai is given in an inscription from Pisidian Antioch in 93 
AD : AE 1925, 126.  
398 See Darmezin (1991), p. 116; Bresson (2008), p. 129; Migeotte (2014), p. 176. For the documents, see : 
Syll3, 344; IErythrai, 28; ISE, 64.  
399 Bresson (2008), p. 130. 
400 Braudel (1990), pp. 403-406 
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to increase the supply of affordable grain on the urban market and exercise a 
downward pressure on market prices.   
 The working of the cash fund required of course an initial input of money. This 
money could come either from the city itself, from a benefactor401, or from a public 
subscription or loan402. As clearly attested by epigraphic sources, the sitonìa was 
funded by both civic and private funds : in a first inscription from Attaleia, a certain 
Dionysios is honored for having held the sitonìa (among other charges) ‘on his 
personal expenses’ (ἐξ οἰκείων δαπανημάτων)403, while in a second inscription, from 
Erythrai, an official is honored because he ‘has been sitònès many times on his own 
revenue’ (πολλάκι σειτώνης ἐκ προσόδων ἰδίων)404. Finally, a Phrygian inscription 
praises a benefactor for having undertaken the sitonìa ‘two times, without using the 
public money’ (σειτωνήσαντα̣ βʹ δίχα δημοσίων χρημάτων)405. Beside the explicit 
mention of civic funds in the last document, the epigraphic emphasis on private 
contributions is in itself an indication that such payment were unconventional and 
that civic finances did not play a marginal role in the constitution and upkeep of the 
grain funds406. 
 We do not wish to reopen the debate about whether the sitonìa should be 
classified among the magistracies or liturgies, nor is this the place to discuss its 
financial sustainability407. What matters for the present argument is that the sitonia 
was an original, pervasive and long-lasting institution of the Greek cities : first attested 
in Attica in the IVth c. BC408, the sitonìa is documented until the late IIIrd c. AD. 
Initially a temporary institution, some cities had already developed it into a regular 
 
                                               
401 We should carefully distinguish liturgical payments from sitonai in office (cf. notes 20, 21 & 22 below) 
from spontaneous gifts of money to the grain funds by benefactors independent from the sitonìa : LBW, 
648, 985 & 992; IGR IV, 1632 ; IK-Stratonikeia, 1028 ; BCH, 10, 1886, n°1, p. 500; IDidyma, II, 255, among 
other examples. 
402 For the different cases, see Bresson (2008), p. 128 & Migeotte (2014), pp. 177-186. 
403 TAM V, 829, l. 9-10 
404 IK-Erythrai, 66 
405 MAMA VII, 11, l. 10-12. 
406 For a complementary discussion on the sitonia, see also : Quass (1993), pp. 238-248 (Hellenistic) & 
pp. 267-268 (Roman). 
407 See : Silver (2007), pp. 95 – 104; contra Erdkamp (2005) & Zuiderhoek (2008)., pp. 159-180. 
408 We know that Demosthenes held the office of sitones in Athens in 338/337 BC (Plutarch, Dem., 21, 1). 
For one of the first epigraphic occurrences, see : IG II2, 1628. Cf. Garnsey (1988) p. 163 & Migeotte (2010), 
p. 306 & Migeotte (2014), p. 176.  
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mechanism in the Hellenistic period409; by the Ist c. AD, the system had become 
permanent410. 
 In the literary sources, the sitonìa appears as a minor category, while it is the 
second most frequently attested grain-related system in our body of inscriptions. Yet, 
the meaning of the word sitonìa (and its derivatives) is the same in literary and 
epigraphic documents, as is the case for the agoranomia. The discrepancy in frequency 
attestations between epigraphic and literary sources is explained by the area of 
distribution of the sitonìa : while the agoranomia is attested all over the Greek world, 
the sitonìa is geographically concentrated in Greece, in the Aegean basin and Asia 
Minor. Since our epigraphic database focuses on Asia Minor, it is therefore a dominant 
category among the registered offices, but is only represented in a modest share of the 
whole of Greek literature. Similarly, since much of the Greek literary sources refer to a 
western context, the dominance of the agoranomia in the textual corpus might well 
partly be a consequence of the common utilization of the Greek word agoranomos as 
equivalent to the Latin word aedilis411. 
3.2.1.5 Sitometria 
Contrary to the monetary nature of the sitonia, it appears from inscriptions that the 
σιτομετρία (sitometrìa) consisted of an allowance of grain in kind. The term is indeed 
connected to the word sitomètrion, which must be translated as ‘grain reserve’, and all 
the inscriptions mentioning contributions to a sitometrion (or referring to the 
sitometria as an action) are expressed in terms of grain, not money : during the reign of 
Antoninus Pius, a public slave named Onesimos contributed (προσέθετο) 352 modii of 
grain a year – but for how long we do not know – to the sitometrion of Balbura412. A 
similar contribution was made to the sitometrion of Myra by a certain Amyntas413. As a 
last example, probably one of the most explicit, an inscription from Ancyra in Galatia, 
dated from the first third of the 1st c. AD, refers to another Amyntas who ‘provided 
sitometria by shares of 5 modii’ (σειτομετρίαν ἔδωκ[εν] ἀνὰ πέντε μοδίους)414. In most 
inscriptions however, the fact that grain is given in kind must be understood from the 
function itself : σιτομετρέω is nothing but σίτον + μετρέω, that is ‘measuring – or 
allowing a measure of – grain’. It is therefore not surprising that explicit mentions to 
 
                                               
409 Darmezin (1991), p. 117; Migeotte, (2010). p. 306 sqq. 
410 Strubbe (1989) p. 118. 
411 Mason (1974), p. 19 
412 LBW II, 1228 ; see also : Coulton, Milner & Reyes (1988) pp. 134-139. 
413 TAM II, 774, l. 8-9. 
414 OGI, II, 533, l. 36-37 = IGR III, 157 
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grain in kind in sitometria inscriptions are not so frequent, for such statement would 
most often be redundant. On the other hand, only two inscriptions explicitly mention 
contributions to a sitometrion in money: the first, quoted by Garnsey, refers to a 
certain Ammias who provided 10,000 drachmai ‘for the grain distribution’415, while the 
second (dating from 152 AD at the latest) informs us of a gift of 10,000 denarii to the 
sitometrion of Patara416. However, neither of these two inscriptions can support the 
idea that the sitometrion would have been a ‘grain fund’ in the monetary sense, which 
would make it indistinguishable from the sitònion. Rather, these texts most probably 
imply that the gifts of money were intended to serve for the purchase of grain 
specifically devoted to the provision of the sitometrion, or to specific costs related to 
the maintenance of those infrastructures and to the logistic organization of the 
distribution of grain.  
 The question arises of whether the term sitometria refers to an institutionalized 
system or to occasional, informal distributions of grain. Evidence is ambiguous on this 
aspect : in inscriptions, indeed, the sitometria is often mentioned among the list of the 
different functions occupied by the official or benefactor concerned : σειτομετρήσαντα, 
as we can read for instance in an inscription from Kadyanda417. Yet, contrary to what 
Peter Garnsey argues418, this is not sufficient to say that the sitometria was a munus. 
Besides the fact that Aristotle classifies the sitometrai among the epimeleiai and not 
among the archai419, the aorist participle σειτομετρήσαντα is never accompanied by the 
usual laudatory adjectives related to the epigraphic presentation of magistracies or 
liturgies in honorific inscriptions, like ἁγνῶς, φιλοτείμως…etc. Secondly, there is not a 
single mention of any public fund that would have to be managed by the one who 
performed the sitometria, as is usually the case for magistracies. Thirdly, the language 
of inscriptions seems to indicate clearly enough that the sitometria had solely a verbal, 
transitive meaning, as in the inscription quoted above (σειτομετρίαν ἔδωκ[εν]), or even 
more explicitly in an inscription from Oenoanda honouring Gaius Licinnius 
Thoantianus Fronto in which we can read ‘σειτομετρήσαντα πάλιν τοὺς πολείτας ἔκ τε 
τοῦ δημοσίου πυρο[ῦ ] καὶ οὗ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπέδωκεν’420. It is clear that the form 
σειτομετρήσαντα is implied in a relationship to another entity (here, the citizens), and 
may not be considered as a self-sufficient concept that could be isolated from the 
receivers. As we have seen above, the very etymology of the word does not refute this 
 
                                               
415 Garnsey (1988), p. 263. I unfortunately could not find the text of the inscription. 
416 Balland (1981), n°67. 
417 TAM II, 661. 
418 Garnsey (1988) pp. 262-265. 
419 Aristotle, Pol., IV, 15, 3 (1299a); cf. Migeotte (2010b), p.348. 
420 IGR III, 493, ll.10-12. 
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argument. The passage of the inscription from Oenoanda should thus be translated as 
follows : “having again distributed grain to the citizens from the public wheat and from 
the one he gave from his own resources”.  
Complications result from the fact that the term sitometria is not only used in 
the straightforward sense of institutional distributions connected with public reserves, 
but also in a more common sense of an informal distribution of grain (which may be 
by individual or governmental initiative421), or to signify any role played in supplying 
grain (for example to an army)422. It is mostly in this second – vague – meaning that 
the word sitometria is used in the literary sources, which also explains the important 
frequency of this apparently very specific and technical term in the Greek literature of 
all periods and all genres. Louis Robert had therefore precisely understood the 
meaning of the sitometria when he considered it as being close to the sitodosia, that is, 
a mere distribution of corn423 – since the sitodosia was no official charge and ‘had 
primarily a social significance’424.  
Both terms, however, are by no means synonyms. A first difference lies certainly 
in the procedure through which they were performed : while the sitodosia is nothing 
but a fairly informal distribution of grain from private resources, the sitometria, 
understood in its primary epigraphic meaning, was linked to a municipal structure, the 
sitometrion, supplied both by ‘private’ and ‘public’ grain. But both practices/ 
procedures also certainly differ with regard to their receivers. Being a sitodòtès, as 
attested in an inscription from Selge and in another from Philadelphia425, seems simply 
to imply organizing a distribution of grain, without specifying any restriction, which 
suggests that it was open to any member of the citizen body, and perhaps any resident 
of the city. The recipients of the sitometria, on the contrary, are not as easily 
identifiable. It has often been argued, indeed that the sitometria targeted a specific 
group of citizens called sitometroumenoi 426, whose status has been long debated. 
While some authors consider they formed an élite group who benefitted from the 
privilege of receiving an allowance of grain427 – in the spirit of the epidoseis where 
higher status individuals are privileged – , Michael Wörrle argues that the term rather 
referred to the citizens financially able – and therefore perhaps entitled – to perform 
 
                                               
421 See for instance : Diodorus Siculus, Hist., II, 41, 1; Genesis (Sept.), 47, 12, 1 & 47, 14, 3 
422 Polybius, Hist., I, 68, 9 & IV, 63, 10 
423 Robert (1948), p.75. 
424 Dmitriev (2005) p. 220. 
425 IGR IV, 1631 ; IK-Selgè, 16 
426 TAM II, 578 & 579 ; SEG 27, 938 ; Balland (1981), n°67 
427 SARTRE, 1991, pp. 183-184 ; Coulton, Milner & Reyes (1988), p. 138 
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grain distributions and/or supply the sitometrion 428. As for A. Balland, he sees the 
sitometroumenoi as the oriental counterpart to the plebs frumentaria429, considering 
thereby the sitometria as an Anatolian version of the roman grain-dole. 
 The connection between the sitometria and the sitometroumenoi is typical of 
Lycian inscriptions from the Roman imperial period. In this particular context, it is 
probably more convincing to understand the sitometroumenoi as a privileged group 
receiving an allowance of grain rather than as entitled suppliers of this system, since 
we argued above that the sitometria was no munus. Moreover, the expression 
‘sitometroumenoi’ is the medio-passive form of the present participle of the verb 
siometrêo. If this group of citizens were responsible for the supply and distribution of 
grain, one may wonder why ancient Greeks did not refer to them using the active form 
‘sitometroûntes’ instead, unless we should imagine that they were both suppliers and 
receivers…Yet, the sitometria is attested in several places outside Lycia430, and the 
association of sitometria to the sitometroumenoi andres cannot, I think, be used to 
support the idea that the sitometria was generally or even primarily oriented towards 
the specific category of the sitometroumenoi elsewhere. As Maurice Sartre argues, the 
‘public wheat’ referred to in the abovementioned inscription from Oenoanda431 is not 
likely to have been reserved to such a restricted group432. This same inscription, 
moreover, states that the receivers of the distribution were the citizens (τοὺς 
πολείτας), without further limitations, which is somehow confirmed by the expression 
σειτομετρουμένω δή[μω] in the inscription from Phrygia quoted above. Finally, a 
document from Patara dating from the reign of Hadrian or Marcus Aurelius refers to 
an ‘ἔπαρ[χο]ν σειτομετρίου δήμου Ῥωμαίων433, a Greek translation for praefectus 
annonae434. Although no such corn-dole as the annona ever existed in the Roman East, 
the use of the word sitometrion as a lexical parallel to the annona seems to indicate 
that the sitometria could have had a much broader target than the restricted group of 
sitometroumenoi that we encounter in Lycia. As for the sitoumetroumenoi strictly 
speaking, they include members of the bouleutic order as well as sub-élite or ‘middle 
 
                                               
428 Wörrle  1988), p. 131; Dmitriev (2005), p. 323 – n. 160 
429 Balland (1981), p. 215 sqq  
430 Caria : IK-Stratonikeia, 227, l.8 ; Phrygia : MAMA IV, 143, ll. 10-11 ; Galatia : OGI, II, 533, ll. 36-37 = IGR 
III, 157. In Egypt, sitometrai are mentioned in connection with granaries, and seem also to have been 
responsible for the transport of grain from granaries to harbours (WALLACE, 1969 [1938], p. 37). 
431 Cf. n. 39 
432 Sartre (1991), p. 184. 
433 TAM II, 426, l. 11. 
434 Mason (1974), p. 84 & p. 138 
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class’ citizens; like Peter Garnsey writes, ‘they may well have included poor people, but 
it is unlikely that poverty would have been a criterion for inclusion’435. 
 In the cities of Lycia, the sitometria appears to be an institutionalized form of 
grain distribution in kind, provisioned though a public channel (sitometrion) and most 
often restricted to a privileged group. In other regions, the lack of evidence for the 
presence of a sitometrion or the relative infrequency of occurrences is not sufficient to 
argue that the sitometria was a mere informal distribution there. These cities most 
likely relied on both civic and private grain, as in the inscription from Oenoanda, in 
which case some public grain reserve – and thus some supervision by civic authorities 
– must have existed. The most striking difference the Lycian and non-Lycian cities 
probably concerned the recipients of this grain : although there probably was some 
variation over time, a specific group of citizens does not seem to have been clearly 
defined outside Lycia. Finally, in some cities, the word sitometria must also have been 
used in more common contexts of informal or euergetic distributions of grain, as is the 
case in the literary sources. In those respects, we can safely argue against the view, 
expressed by Peter Garnsey, of the sitometria being ‘privately funded’, having ‘all the 
hallmarks of (yet another) liturgy’, reducible to a ‘Lycian system’ and being restricted 
to a group of privileged citizens consisting of a Greek version of the plebs 
frumentaria436.  
 
The sitometria understood as a formalized grain dole targeting a specific population437 
is in fact similar to another grain-related institution of the Greek world : the σιτηρέσιον 
(siterèsion; plur. : siterèsia). The term has mostly been used to describe a grain 
distribution system widely documented in Egypt between the mid IInd and early IVth c. 
AD, especially in Oxyrhynchus, Hermoupolis, Antinooupolis and Alexandria. The 
earliest Egyptian attestation of the sitèresion originates from Antinooupolis in 154 AD, 
but this case is particular since it is an imperial foundation. Despite the concentration 
of the evidence in the last quarter of the IIIrd century, Jean-Michel Carrié has shown 
that we should acknowledge the regular organization of sitèresia for many decades 
during the IIIrd and early IVth century AD 438. Except for Antinooupolis where we might 
reasonably assume the involvement of imperial finances, the sitèresia in the other 
Egyptian cities seem to have been mostly a municipal concern, though local 
benefactors also probably intervened on occasion.  
 
                                               
435 Garnsey (1988), p. 263. 
436 Garnsey (1988), pp. 263-265. 
437 In Lycia : most often a priviledged group ; elsewhere, potentially a larger body of recipients. 
438 Carrié (1975), pp. 1087-1088 
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As for the recipients of those frumentationes, their registration was slightly 
different from city to city. In Alexandria, they were organized in age classes, without 
further limitations439, while in Antinooupolis and Oxyrrhynchus a numerus clausus 
appears. In Oxyrhynchus, three different categories are mentioned : the επικριθὲντες, 
the metropolitans whose civic status had been verified at the age of 14 ; the ρὲμβοι, 
who were granted the right to claim an allowance of grain for having performed 
liturgies; and the ὁμόλογοι, whose criteria of admission are still unclear (they may have 
received grain on special authorization, or had only one metropolite parent)440. When 
we put all categories together, the total number of beneficiaries did not exceed 4,000.  
Despite notable differences between the cities, Egyptian frumentationes also 
shared certain characteristics : categories of recipients of the sitèresia were selected per 
tribe441, and some random draw appears to have taken place, for example when a 
deceased beneficiary had to be replaced. Regarding the concrete organization of the 
distribution, the procedure is known from the material of Hermoupolis and 
Oxyrhynchus: recipients were given tablai (pieces of ceramic, similar to the Roman 
tessera) exchangeable for a definite quantity of grain442.  
In Asia Minor, the term sitèresion appears in seven inscriptions dating from the 
IIIrd and IInd centuries BC describing three different situations : grain rewards given by 
the city to prominent citizens443 (1), euergetic distributions of grain444 (2), and 
occasional grain distributions organized by the city445 (3). For the Roman period, only 
two documents are known, both from the Antonine period. In four out of those nine 
inscriptions, a formalized distribution system can be assumed446, but the evidence is 
insufficient for us to be certain447. 
 A full parallel between Egyptian sitèresia and the Roman frumentationes cannot 
be established : per capita quantities are smaller, and the annual frequency of the 
distributions is different448. But Roman and Egyptian grain doles also exhibit 
resemblances : there was a finite number of beneficiaries, selected by tribe; admission 
 
                                               
439 Eusebius, Hist. Eccl., 7, 21, 9, quoting a letter from Dionysius of Alexandria. 
440 Lewis (1974), pp. 158-162; Garnsey (1988), pp. 265-267; Husson and Valbele (1992), p.241 ; Virlouvet 
(1995), pp. 216-218 & p.246 ; Alston (2002), p. 151 & p. 276. 
441 Alston (2002)., p. 149; Virlouvet (1995), p.248. 
442 P.Lips.inv, 483, quoted in : Carrié (1975) p. 1081. See also : Virlouvet (1995), p. 23. For a detailed 
discussion about the tessera in the Roman world : Ibidem, pp. 309-369. 
443 IK-Tralleis, 21, l.19 & IK-Tralleis, 25, l.8 
444 IK-Erythrai, 28, l.22 
445 IPriene, 108, l.154 
446 IK-Erythrai, 24, l.18 & IK-Erythrai, 117, l. 33 
447 For the Roman period : IGR III, 495 and IK-Pergè, 181 
448 Virlouvet (1995), p. 23 sqq 
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criteria encompassed both geographic and social parameters; and the logistic 
organization and procedure are remarkably similar449. Both in the case of the Egyptian 
sitèresia and the Lycian sitometria, beside the difference regarding the source of funds 
(municipal and euergetic versus imperial), further differences with the Roman annona 
seem mostly quantitative: smaller quantities and fewer beneficiaries (4,000 in 
Oxyrhynchus, 1,100 sitometroumenoi in Tlos450). Yet, the systems are of a similar nature 
: they consist of a more or less regular allowance of free grain to a definite number of 
(mostly) citizens.  
The relative abundance of the word sitèresion (and its variants) in the literary 
sources might seem disconcerting with regard to the geographic and institutional 
specificity of the term, and compared to its scarcity in our body of inscriptions : it is 
indeed the third most frequent grain-related term in the TLG database (see Fig. 2). The 
reason for this lies in the generic sense in which the word siterèsion is used in the 
literature, encompassing three different situations : provisions to an army451 (1), 
distributions of grain, whether as benefaction452 or as an allowance of grain to 
soldiers453 (2), and, closer to the inscriptions and papyri, the annona454 (3). 
3.2.1.7 Sitobolarioi and sitologoi 
The description of grain distribution systems, whether from public or private stores, 
prompts the question of grain storage. Among the list of grain-related offices, two 
terms are associated with granaries in the epigraphic documents : the sitologos and the 
sitobolarios455. The function of sitobolarios is only attested in one inscription from Asia 
Minor, but most probably refers to the guardian of the granary – the σῑτοβολών or 
σῑτοβολεῖον456 – in the sense of ‘physical’ surveillance.  
 In Asia Minor, the word sitologos appears only in one – very mutilated – 
inscription from Nikaia457. Its functions can be illuminated by recourse to Egyptian 
documents : sitologoi were in charge of public granaries where they registered the 
inputs of tax-grain. After bringing their grain to the village threshing-floor, peasants or 
 
                                               
449 Ibidem, p. 250 sqq 
450 SEG 27, 938 
451 Demosthenes, Phil. 1, 28-29 ; Xenophon, Anab., VI, 2, 4 
452 Plutarch, Crassus, 2, 3 
453 Herodotus, Hist., III, 3, 8 & IV, 4, 7 
454 Cassius Dio, Hist. Rom., LIX, 6, 4 
455 The word sitodokos is also a synonym.  
456 Cf. page 2. Several different terms refer to granaries and storage structures, and terminology varied a 
lot across space. 
457 IK-Iznik, 1260 
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tenants brought it to the granary, where the sitologos issued receipts testifying to the 
payment and kept records of the grain received458. As part of the registration, one of 
their important tasks was to distinguish tax-grain from grain paid as rents on public 
domains459. Finally, sitologoi were also responsible for organizing the transport of a 
share of the collected grain towards Alexandria460, a task which required them to keep 
in contact with negotiatores (nauklèroi)461. The connection of sitologoi with the 
harbours, possibly for commercial reasons in Ptolemaic times, could likewise be linked 
to the supply of Rome with Egyptian tax grain after the Roman conquest. Support for 
this statement might be found in the intermittent replacement of the sitologoi by the 
dekaprotoi462 as grain-collectors. Dekaprotoi formed a social group consisting of a 
Greek equivalent of the Roman decemprimi; the institution resulted from the 
integration of the Eastern Mediterranean into the framework of Roman law463. Here 
again, one may wonder whether the sitologoi in Asia Minor and Egypt had an identical 
role, especially with respect to the observation that in Asia Minor too dekaprotoi were 
engaged in tax collection464. In the inscription from Nikaia the term sitologos is 
surrounded by other food-related charges (agoranomos, treasurer of the oil fund) 
which most probably belong to the curriculum of a local official, indicating that it was 
understood in an institutional sense. This contrasts with the literary sources, where the 
words derived from the word sitologein are used in the unspecialized sense of 
‘collecting grain’ in order to supply a specific population, often in a military context465; 
a difference which explains the discrepancy between the abundance of the word in 
literary texts and its scarcity in epigraphic/papyrological documents, given the 
widespread presence of war-related subjects in the ancient literature. But most 
importantly, sitologoi are not mentioned elsewhere except in Egypt and Asia Minor, 
suggesting that the term had a similar meaning in the two regions whose respective 
grain-related institutions – the sitometria and the sitèresia – have already displayed 
some resemblance.   
 
                                               
458 P. Lond. III, 1586a, quoted in Hobson (1993), pp. 73-74 ; Herodotus, II, 109 ; Genesis, xlvii, 24-26 ; 
Wallace, (1961), pp. 34-35; Adams (2007), pp. 162-163; Adams, (2013), p. 6273. 
459 Wallace (1969), p. 37. 
460 Adams (2007), p. 171. 
461 Ibidem, pp. 191-194. 
462 Thomas (1975), pp. 111-119; Adams (2007), p. 170. Dekaprotoi replaced sitologoi from ca. 242-246 until 
ca. 303-303 when sitologoi reappear : Thomas (1971), pp. 60-68; Alston (2002), p. 278. 
463 Whether dekaprotoi were defined as a group of officials or as leading members of the city is still 
unclear. On the dekaproteia in the East, see : Dmitriev (2005), pp. 197-200. 
464 Magie (1950), p. 648 ; Sartre (1991), p. 86 ; p. 347 ; Dmitriev (2005), p.198 
465 For example : Appian, Mithr., XI, 72; Appian, Bell. Civ., II, 6, 42; Polybius, Hist., III, 101, 4 
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3.2.1.8 Generic terms  
Apart from all those supply systems, offices and grain-related interventions, 
documents also mention some slightly more obscure officials : the 
eubosiarchai/euposiarchai (literally ‘in charge of the well-being’) and euthèniarchai (‘in 
charge of the abundance’), on which very little is known from the sources466. Scholars 
usually agree to describe eubosiarchai as chief officials in charge of the food supply467. 
As for the eutheniarchai, according to some documents from Oxyrhynchus, one of 
their functions was to exercise a control over the bakeries468. The fact that 
eutheniarchai and eubosiarchai are a middling category in inscriptions but are 
completely absent from literary sources suggests that they did not belong to the 
common language of grain supply intervention and that they were characteristic of a 
specific (institutional) context. As the vague signification of those terms might 
indicate, they were most probably circumstantial officials, appointed perhaps in 
particular difficulties, either as expedients in cities lacking institutional responses, or 
as complementary officials to existing schemes in cities already endowed with grain 
supply infrastructures. The use of emphatic titles probably reflects a symbolic reward 
which must have played a significant role in convincing citizens to undertake such 
burdensome charges. What Sviatoslav Dmitriev writes about the variety of terms 
categorizing officials in the Greek cities in general also applies to the specific case of 
generic grain-related officials : ‘The use of these epithets by the Greeks reflected the 
social prestige of such offices rather than their administrative importance.’469 
3.2.1.9 Regional variations 
As we have seen with the Lycian sitometria and the Egyptian sitèresion, similar grain-
supply schemes may bear different names in different regions. Besides being a product 
of functional differentiation, one might thus wonder to what extent lexical diversity 
resulted from geographical variation. A good example is that of the triteia and its 
officials, the triteutai470. Solely attested in Pergamon and Thyateira, the triteia appears 
to be a mere regional variant of the sitometria, since it consists of an allowance of a 
 
                                               
466 Migeotte (2010b), p. 348. 
467 Robert (1960), pp. 236-237 ; Schmitt-Pantel (2011), p. 372. 
468 Carrié (1975) p. 1081. 
469 Dmitriev (2005,) p. 127. 
470 Migeotte (2010b), p. 348. 
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ration of one third of a medimnos (triton)471, but no clear identification of the 
recipients can be made from the documents. Similar geographic particularities can also 
be discerned in the case of circumstantial offices : all the references to euposiarchai 
come from the Aegean Basin (Thrace, Asia Minor and islands) – with the variant 
‘eubosiarchai’ (instead of euposiarchai) being restricted to Pisidia – while another 
generic grain-related official, the sitothetès, is only known from Samothrace472. The 
eutheniarchai, however, appear as a more widespread designation, since they are 
known in Asia Minor, Thrace, North Africa, Egypt and Sicily473, even though on the 
whole, the office remains fairly rare.  
 Regional variability is not limited to the titles of grain officials; it also affects their 
functions. The clearest case is probably that of the sitophylakes. As we have seen 
above, in Athens sitophylakes were overseers of the resale of grain. In some documents 
from Tauromenion, however, they seem to play an active role in the storage and 
management of public grain474. This matter of custodia publici frumenti is also the 
subject of a passage of Cicero concerning the Anatolian city of Temnos475; in this case 
however, Claude Nicolet dismisses the idea that it would refer to a sitophylax and 
argues that it concerns an ephemeral official of the granary476. 
3.2.1.10 Artificial diversity ? 
Beside such variations due to regional denominations of similar offices or to the 
attribution of different tasks to identical offices in different places, we also notice that 
different officials sometimes exercise the same functions in the same city. Similar 
interventions are indeed performed by agoranomoi and sitonai477 : such overlap is 
suspected for Prusias478, for instance, in some other cities we see agoranomoi adding 
funds of their own resources to keep prices low or to purchase additional grain, an 
intervention typically associated with grain funds managed by sitonai or to euergetic 
parapraseis (sales below market prices)479. The interventions of sitophylakes and 
 
                                               
471 The evidence is the following : TAM V, 2, 939 ; TAM V, 2, 963 ;TAM V, 2, 982 ; IGR IV, 414 ; IGR IV, 
1228 ; IGR IV, 1244 ; IGR IV, 1256 ; IGR IV, 1680 ;  
472 SEG 26, 1027, SEG 31, 803 & SEG 36, 788 ; Migeotte (2010b), p. 347 & Migeotte (2010a), pp. 318-319. 
473 Data from PHI inscriptions. 
474 Syll3, 954 ; Battistoni (2013), pp. 6273-6274 ; Migeotte, 2010b, p. 347. 
475 Cicero, Pro Flacco, 19 (45) 
476 Nicolet (1982), p. 88. 
477 Erdkamp (2005), p. 270. 
478 Fernoux (2004), p. 334. 
479 Dmitriev (2005), p. 148 ; Migeotte (2010b), p. 346. 
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agoranomoi appear to display an even greater degree of similarity: both officials act as 
overseers of the agora, control the price at which grain is for sale, and ensure that the 
right measures and weights are used. 
  Such overlap in the tasks of different officials within the same city could make us 
wonder about the extent to which the administrative diversity of Greek cities could be 
deliberate. Grain-related interventions were costly, both for the city and for its élites. 
The diversification of offices might thus represent a significant advantage : by creating 
distinct offices – collegial, most of the time –, the number of potential contributors 
from the civic élite (the social stratum to which most office holders belonged) was 
increased, resulting in a smaller financial charge per magistrate or liturgist, while the 
symbolic prestige of such offices might have represented an important incentive for 
wealthy citizens to undertake such charges. To examine this hypothesis, the different 
documented functions of grain-related offices (except generic terms) are summarized 
in Fig. 3 infra. As we can see, a clear overlap between two or more offices occurs in four 
out of eight types of functions (col. II, IV, VI & VII). Yet what are the underlying 
reasons for this overlap ? In the case of the sitometria, triteia and siteresia, we have 
already seen that their lexical differentiation derives mainly from regional 
idiosyncrasies. As for the apparent overlap between sitologoi, sitobolarioi and, in some 
places, sitophylakes regarding the control of the granary (col. IV), we are dealing with a 
mere illusion of similarity : sitobolarioi are responsible for the physical protection of 
the granaries, while sitologoi are officials recording the inputs of tax-grain. Although 
both related to the management of the granary, the details of such functions are 
actually clearly distinguished.  
 Let us now turn to the most significant cases of overlap : agoranomoi and sitonai 
on the one hand (col. VII), and agoranomoi and sitophylakes on the other (col. VI). As 
explained above, agoranomoi were the superintendents of the market; through this 
task, they often exercised a price control over the sale of grain. Like all magistrates, 
they managed a public fund for the expenses related to their functions. However, with 
the growing confusion between magistracies and liturgies that develops from the 
Hellenistic period and after480, magistrates were increasingly expected to contribute 
from their own resources (a financial participation that was already suggested in 
Aristotle’s Politics481). As demonstrated by Léopold Migeotte, the role of the 
agoranomoi moved slowly from a predominantly judicial function of oversight over the 
 
                                               
480 For a good overview of this question, see : Jones (1940), pp. 167-168 & 175-176; Dmitriev, (2005), pp. 
114-119 ; Sartre (1991), pp. 139-141 ; Couilloud-Le Dinahet (1988), p. 324; Pavis D’escurac (1987), p. 120 ; 
Frézouls (1991), p. 8. 
481 Aristotle, Pol., VI, 7, 6 
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transactions taking place in the agora, in the Vth and early IVth century, towards a 
broader involvement in the supply of foodstuffs to the city during the course of the IVth 
century and after, a role which often exceeded the restricted sphere of the agora482. 
This shift in the functions of the agoranomoi coincided with the independent 
development of the sitonia and resulted in a partial overlap between the two functions. 
 Even more identical are the interventions of sitophylakes and agoranomoi : 
leaving aside the regional variability for a moment and focusing on the Athenian 
evidence, both sitophylakes and agonoromoi act as overseers of the agora, control the 
price at which grain is for sale, and ensure that the right measures and weights are 
used. At this stage, it is difficult to understand how those offices differ from each other. 
But, as already highlighted above, sitophylakes were tasked with regulating 
transactions taking place between importers (emporoi) and resellers (sitopolai, 
kapeloi). Raymond Descat has recently clarified the specific tasks of the sitophylakes 
through a revised interpretation of the Athenaion Politeia and of Lysias’ discourse483 : 
sitopolai bought grain from emporoi in the emporion, and sold it on the agora of the 
Piraeus and of the city. Sitophylakes were present in both agorai and controlled the 
sitopolai on arrival: merchants were expected to show the contract of purchase realized 
in the emporion and to declare the price at which they would sell the grain. The 
sitophylakes could thus ensure that the officially allowed price margin was observed 
and that no sitopolès would hold more than the maximum quantity of grain legally 
authorized (50 phormoi).  
 But how can this reconstruction account for the fact that agoranomoi were also 
responsible for verifying that grain dealers actually sold their grain close to the price 
they declared ? A plausible solution is to consider that sitophylakes exercised an a 
priori control, while the agoranomoi exercised an a posteriori control. Indeed, the fact 
that sitopolai would declare a price fitting the maximum benefit allowed at the 
entrance of the agora did not guarantee that they could not sell their grain at a higher 
price a couple of days later. The role of the agoranomoi, among their various other 
tasks, would thus have been to ensure that the sitopolai would keep their prices at 
more or less the same level during the whole time of their activities in the agora. As for 
the agoranomoi, the mention – even if only narrative – by Apulleius of an agoranomos 
trampling the fishes of a merchant because of apparently excessive prices seems to 
confirm the idea of an a posteriori verification484. 
 
                                               
482 Migeotte (2015), pp. 34-39. 
483 R. Descat (2003)., pp. 598-599. 
484 Apull., Metamorph., I, 24-25 
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 Regarding the sitophylakes, however, there remains the question of whether we 
can generalize the Athenian case to the whole of the eastern Mediterranean in classical 
and post-classical times. As argued by Léopold Migeotte, the intense administrative 
fragmentation noticeable in Athens between sitophylakes, agoranomoi and 
metronomoi, the very specific distribution of tasks between them as well as the 
importance of the involvement of sitophylakes in the operational chain of the grain 
supply most likely resulted from the size of the city and its vital dependence upon 
commercially imported grain485. While this argument seems perfectly valid, it does not 
in and of itself imply that a similar distribution of tasks between agoranomoi and 
sitophylakes could not occur elsewhere, even in a smaller city. The only inscription 
recording a sitophylax in Asia Minor during the Roman period comes from Cyzicus and 
refers to a certain ‘Μ. Αὐρ. Ἀμερίμνου σειτοφύλακος τῆς πόλεως’486. In this text, the 
expression ‘sitophylax of the city’ seems pleonastic: sitophylakes were obviously civic 
officials, something of which the stonecutter or those instructing him could hardly 
have been unaware. The most logical explanation is thus to understand the expression 
σειτοφύλαξ τῆς πόλεως as being distinguished from the σειτοφύλαξ τοῦ ἐμπορίου, just 
like in Athens sitophylakes exercised control both at the harbour and in the city, for we 
know that Cyzicus had a harbour.  
 Even though geographical specificities cannot be denied, as in the case of the 
sitophylakes of Tauromenion, the overlap between the tasks of different officials was 
mostly a trompe-l’oeil : administrative differentiation – within the same city – was for 
the most part not artificial or irrelevant, but corresponded to distinct – though not 
always hermetically separated – institutional functions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
485 Migeotte (2015), p. 28. 
486 IMT Kyz. Kapu Dağ, 1449, l.9-10. 
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  Table. 3 – Main functions of grain-related offices and supply systems 
Distribution 
Grain 
purchase 
Control of 
the 
granary 
Collection 
of  
tax grain 
Control 
weights& 
measures 
Price  
regulation 
Recording 
quantities 
From 
private 
stock 
From 
public 
stock 
Sitonès                 
Agoranomos                 
Sitometria                 
Triteia                 
Sitodotès                 
Sitologos                 
Siteresion                 
Sitophylax                 
Sitobolarios                 
  I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
 
 
3.2.1.11 Conclusion 
The analysis of the evidence undertaken in this section has so far revealed two driving 
forces behind the lexical diversity observed in source references to grain-related 
interventions and institutions : an important functional differentiation on the one 
hand, and substantial regional idiosyncrasies on the other hand. From the functional 
point of view, the twelve recorded terms refer to merchants (sitopolai), grain 
distribution schemes (sitometria/triteia and sitèresion), and city officials. Among those 
offices, five appear to be regular or permanent functions (agoranomoi, sitophylakes, 
sitonai, sitologoi, and sitobolarioi – or any similar designation for the guardian of the 
granary), while the eutheniarchai and eubosiarchai seem rather temporary. However, 
the differentiation of tasks does not fully account for the lexical diversity observed : the 
Anatolian sitometria and the Egyptian sitèresia, although exhibiting differences 
regarding their technicalities, consisted of a similar feature of civic life, i.e. more or less 
regular grain distribution schemes. Even more meaningful are the differences observed 
between the tasks of identically named officials in different places (mostly agoranomoi 
and sitophylakes), which reveal that the institutional and geographic explanation 
cannot account for the entirety of the observed lexical diversity. As Jean Andreau 
explains, the distribution of tasks between officials in Greek and Roman cities was not 
organized on the basis of radically separated spheres of competence, but was in fact 
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affected by significant flexibility487. To which we should add the importance of the 
symbolic aspect of institutional divisions : in addition to fulfil objective needs, civic 
offices were also a mean of acquiring social prestige. To quote Sviatoslav Dmitriev : 
‘Greek texts divide city offices in very many ways, and it is unlikely that each of these 
divisions corresponded to the institutionalized structure of city administration.’488  
 Comparing the frequencies of grain-related terms between epigraphic and 
literary sources has shed another light on the question, beside the fact of completing 
our knowledge of the most frequent and universal offices or functions (sitonai, 
agoranomoi, sitopolai, sitophylakes). Observed discrepancies are firstly due to the 
differential geographical areas encompassed by both kinds of sources : our epigraphic 
database refers solely to the cities of Anatolia (geographically speaking : the Roman 
province of Asia Minor, Cilicia, Bithynia, the central plateau of Galatia and 
Cappadocia), while the literary sources come from all over the Greek-speaking world. 
A second explanatory factor lies in the type of document concerned : inscriptions 
register the technical, institutional life of a city, taking account of its own cultural, 
linguistic and political peculiarities as well as of its insertion into a broader political 
entity (league, koinon, Empire,…); literary texts, on the other hand, while also 
influenced by the origin of the writer, do not always use words in their precise 
administrative or legal meaning, regarding a specific context. Rather, they sometimes 
use them in the metaphorical sense – this is particularly true of religious sources of 
course –, or in the sense of their most ‘common’, colloquial use. In any case, the 
pervasiveness of the grain-related vocabulary in the literary sources as well as the 
administrative sophistication revealed by inscriptions both betray the crucial 
importance of the matter of the grain supply for the cities of the ancient 
Mediterranean : a regular grain supply was a conditio sine qua non for the effective 
functioning of civic life. 
3.2.2 Grain funds and grain doles : a case study  
Now that I have presented and described the different offices, whether temporary 
of regular, involved in the regulation of the urban grain supply, and highlighted their 
functional and regional differentiation, I would like to undertake a more detailed study 
of two of these grain-related institutions: the sitonía and the sitometrìa. I will discuss 
 
                                               
487 Andreau (2012) p. 263. This is particularly true in a context where no conscious distinction between 
legal, executive and legislative offices exists (cf. Dmitriev (2005) p. 14). 
488 Dmitriev (2005) p. 128. 
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each of these two systems with respect to a different issue : for the sitonía, I will try to 
reconstruct its working, identify its supply channels, and examine its financial 
sustainability; for the sitometria, I will examine the possible link between the 
development of this particular scheme in Lycia and the Mediterranean-wide 
circulation of grain for the supply of Rome. Then, I will analyze and discuss the 
geographical spread of these two systems throughout Asia Minor and see what we 
might learn from the emerging pattern. 
3.2.2.1 The working of grain funds  
 Contrary to the Early Modern grain funds of northern Europe and Italy, the 
sitónia were cash funds; ancient Greeks and Romans stored money rather than 
grain489, as attested by the expression sitonika chrêmata (translated by frumentaria 
pecunia in the latin texts490). On the one hand, this feature could be seen as a weakness 
since buying grain in times of dearth exposes the fund to higher prices and reduces its 
purchasing power; but on the other hand, it eliminates the problems induced by the 
difficult conservation of crops491 : grain indeed perishes quickly, and when a succession 
of good harvests happened, the urban demand was firstly directed towards fresh grain 
rather than stored grain, making it rapidly useless492. Funds of stored grain, therefore, 
are more likely to be efficient when shortages occur on a regular, constant and short 
enough time interval, which is precisely inconsistent with their erratic, random and 
thus unpredictable nature. In this respect, cash funds seem to be a more appropriate 
response than stored grain to face the unpredictability and randomness of shortages.  
 However, would the acquisition of grain at scarcity prices not undermine the 
purchasing power of the fund, and thus reduce the amount that could be bought? In 
fact, the efficiency of grain funds was not solely commanded by the deterministic 
power of the inputs and outputs of money. Prices, indeed, were not completely 
exogenous to the sitonía. Officials in charge of the grain fund – the sitónai – were not 
only managers but had also a political role : they would do their best to buy grain at 
 
                                               
489 Whether this was mainly fiduciary or scriptural money is a quite controversial issue, on which we 
cannot expand here. Indeed, the fact that the sitonìa consisted of a monetary system does not imply that 
all, or even most, of this money was actually in the form of coins. It is indeed perfectly possible that a 
cetain proportion of the gifts from benefactors or civic contributions was made of deposits in the form of 
credit, debt recognition or promises of giving an actual amount of coins later. This is even more possible 
since evidence from Egypt, records deposits of grain associated to a credit system : Sharp (1998), pp. 237-
259 ; Adams (2007), p. 171. 
490 Dig., L, 8, 2, 3 
491 See below : section 2.2.3. 
492 Erdkamp (2008), 116 
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the cheapest possible price from a neighboring region, and convince – or, with the 
support of civic authorities, compel – reluctant landowners to make their stocks 
available for sale at a ‘reasonable’ price493 (sometimes paying the loss of income with 
their own money). In some cases, they were helped in this task by provincial 
legislation. Negotiation and coercion were therefore also part of the mission of the 
sitónai to maximize the amount of grain they could buy with the minimum amount of 
money so as to avoid a shortage of cash. 
 
 
 a) Funding 
 
 Yet, how was the sitonía funded494? The idea that grain funds were solely, or even 
largely, funded by private – euergetic – contributions has had a long life in the 
academic literature. Mainly supported by P. Garnsey and M. Silver495, this idea has also 
been expressed by J. Strubbe who, while defending a rather optimistic view concerning 
the scope of the grains funds, nevertheless sees them as being “at the mercy of rich 
benefactors”496. Yet, such a statement can no longer be taken for granted. In his recent 
study of municipal grain funds, A. Zuiderhoek has convincingly argued that the 
epigraphic sources suffer from a congenital bias : they tend to over-represent private 
gifts – for obvious reasons of prestige and symbolic capital – and to under-represent 
the normal, usual contributions coming from public funds (demôsia chrêmata), well 
attested for instance in an inscription from Phrygia497. Moreover, some inscriptions 
emphasize the fact that a benefactor has performed the sitonía “from his personal 
expenses”, or “on his own revenues”498, implying thereby that this was unusual 
behavior. This strongly suggests that, contra Strubbe and others, civic funds normally 
 
                                               
493 Cf. supra 
494 As a preliminary issue to the actual funding of the sitonía, one should wonder whether this function 
was a magistracy – a honorific charge through which the official managed a public fund, sometimes 
adding from his own resources, and associated with political privileges – or a liturgy – a compulsory 
burdensome, yet honorable, charge of public interest which the official has to finance almost entirely 
from his own funds. Macro (1980), 680 considers the sitonía as a magistracy, while Sartre (1991), 132 and 
Frezouls (1991), 8 classify it among the liturgies. Actually, like most graeco-roman offices in the post-
classical period, the sitonía exhibits characteristics of both categories, which merely reflects the growing 
de facto confusion between those two types of public offices that took place in the post-classical era. The 
institutional analysis is therefore of little help in determining the precise channels through which the 
sitonía was financed. 
495 Silver (2007), 96 
496 Strubbe (1989), p. 118 
497 MAMA VII, 11, l. 12 
498 TAM V, 829, l. 9-10 ; IK-Erythrai, 66 
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bore the main part of the burden of financing the grain funds. The sources of money of 
the grain funds are therefore likely to have been of two types 
 
(1) The monetary contributions of benefactors to the sitónia, either in the form of 
direct gifts or of interest from foundations; 
 
(2) The public funds, most likely derived from the various taxes levied by the city ; 
 
There is also a variant of the sitonía in which the capital accumulated by gifts, civic 
funds and/or a public subscription is lent out at interest, with the interest being used 
to purchase grain when needed 499. But those circumstances where grain funds worked 
like foundations or through loans are unlikely to have been the standard case: such 
mechanisms are rarely stated in sitonía inscriptions and, most importantly, as far as 
grain funds were concerned, money needed to be available immediately. Money could 
occasionally be borrowed from grain funds500, but this does not mean that the sitonìa 
consisted of foundations; it probably rather means that, in good years, cities allowed 
short-term loans to be made from the cash reserve, which would increase the fund 
through interest payment. Yet, these must have been controlled scrupulously, and the 
Digest states that debts towards grain fuds should be repaid as quickly as possible501. 
We should thus consider the foundation paradigm as the exception, rather than the 
rule502.  
 
 b) Expenses 
 
 Now, how were the withdrawals of money determined ? In his study, J. Strubbe 
argues that the grain bought through the sitonía was distributed for free. If this was 
the case, there would be no clear difference between the sitonía and the sitometría (cf. 
supra): it would indeed reduce the grain-funds to mere grain-doles while we have seen 
above (in section.2) that the institution which most resembled Egyptian grain-doles 
was the sitometria. In sitonía inscriptions, no criteria of admission, no specific targeted 
group are mentioned, and I personally doubt that they would be a distribution of free 
grain to potentially everyone… Moreover, Greek and Latin are synthetic languages, 
putting emphasis on the economy of words. In that sense, ancient Greeks would not 
 
                                               
499 For example : CIL III, 6998 ; other such examples are known from the Hellenistic period. 
500 Digest, L, 8, 2 (2), 3 & 5 
501 Ibid., L, 8, 2, 3 
502 Strubbe (1989)., p. 113 
 150 
use two different words to describe the same institution in the same location : as the 
lexical analysis has revealed, for the most part, the variability in terminology for grain-
related offices which is not explained by regional differentiation is due to a significant 
specification of tasks between offices and systems, although such specification is never 
completely sealed. Yet, Strubbe dismisses the idea that the grain bought buy the 
sitònai would be resold, arguing from the a silentio argument that such a procedure is 
not explicitly attested in Asia Minor. However, neither is it explicitly stated that the 
grain was distributed. But there is more; in fact we do have evidence of grain being 
resold: an inscription from Thespiae dated between 220 and 210 BC mentions a grain 
fund managed by two sitónai helped by a treasurer; it is said that a group of sitopólai 
(grain resellers, as explained earlier on), was actually in charge of the sale of the grain 
to the population503. For these reasons, I consider more plausible that the grain of the 
sitonía was resold rather than used for distributions, and that the value of the sale 
went back to the grain fund, as was already the case in many Hellenistic attestations of 
the sitonía504.  
 This whole divergence is the origin of the noticeable difference between our 
assessment of the annual income of the grain funds and that made by Strubbe, who 
reckons with an average of 5,000-7,000 denarii505. To obtain this value, the author 
relies onto the fact that ‘gifts of 10,000 denarii for sitónia were quite common’506. His 
argument then works as follows: if several such gifts were performed over a few 
decades, they might constitute a fund of around 50,000-70,000 denarii which, when 
loaned at an annual rate of 10% – as were most foundations –, would bring an annual 
income of 5,000 – 7,000 denarii. The problems with this argument are numerous. First, 
by choosing the mode of his distribution of sums (10,000 denarii) as reflecting the 
value of an average gift to the sitónia, Strubbe implicitly considers that the inscriptions 
we have recording monetary gifts to the grain funds mirror the actual (ancient) 
statistical distribution of such gifts. By doing so, he takes no account of the 
conspicuous character of honorific inscriptions which most probably tend to over-
represent larger gifts and under-represent the smallest ones. In statistical terms, he 
considers our fragmentary body of epigraphic evidence as an unbiased sample of what 
the complete actual distribution of sums looked like in Antiquity.   
 Secondly, the author passes over the question of how such a fund of 50,000 
denarii (at least) would have been constituted. He simply says it would require gifts 
 
                                               
503 I. Thespies, 84, ll. 30-37. Cf. Bresson (2016), p. 334 
504 Migeotte (2014), 176 
505 As we will see below, this is 2-3 times our estimate of 2,650 denarii. 
506 Strubbe (1989), 115 
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‘spread over some decades’. In that case, it would make the sitonía a rather laborious 
mechanism, since it would need 15, 20 or perhaps 25 years to constitute a capital able 
to provide the 5,000 denarii annually. Not only would this feature be inconsistent with 
the rather short-term nature of euergetism, but it would also imply that during this 
period the city would be more strenuously exposed to shortages... On the other hand, 
if we suppose that such a fund was accumulated more quickly, say, in 5 years, it would 
require an annual élite contribution of 10,000 denarii per year on average, which 
represents some 4% of the aggregate income of 200 councilors owning their census 
minimum of 25,000 denarii507. In his study of munificence in Asia Minor, A. 
Zuiderhoek has estimated that the average élite expenditure on public buildings 
represented some 3 to 5 % of aggregate élite income508. Since public buildings 
represented by far the most expensive category of benefactions, and that civic élites 
were, relatively speaking, more reluctant to spend money on the food supply compared 
to other sectors of civic life (cf. infra : section 2.4), it is quite unlikely that they would 
allocate a similar proportion of their annual income to the sitonía alone (that is, 
excluding informal distributions of grain, public banquets, interest-free loans to the 
city for the import of grain,…etc) and to public constructions, which were far more 
conspicuous than the financial support of a grain fund.  
 There are, of course, reasons that might explain the high value of Strubbe’s 
estimate of the annual income of the grain funds. He assumes indeed that in most 
cases such funds were aimed at distributing grain for free to the citizens. As we have 
already seen above, this statement must be reconsidered. Moreover, he argues that 
grain was bought every year because sitónai were appointed annually, which seems a 
hasty conclusion. We can indeed think of many other roles that the sitónai could have 
had apart from negotiating with landowners and purchasing grain. In normal years, 
they might have been in charge of more administrative functions, such as receiving the 
gifts, writing down the accounts when there is no associated treasurer, ensuring that 
promises from benefactors (pollicitationes) were fulfilled, planning where and when it 
would be appropriate to buy grain,…etc. As far as grain funds are concerned, none of 
these functions can explicitly be supported by epigraphic evidence but they are fairly 
similar to the functions of many other officials in Greek cities. In any case, it is by no 
means sufficient to state that the best known functions of the sitónai were the only 
ones they exercised and that this implies an annual purchase of grain, even in years of 
good harvest. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. For all those reasons, I 
 
                                               
507 Again, under the assumption that élite patrimony consisted mainly of landed property, set at an 
annual rate of return of 5%. 
508 Zuiderhoek (2009), 27 
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consider that sitónai only bought grain when necessary – that is, when signs of a bad 
harvest appear– and that, most of the time at least, this grain was resold to the urban 
consumers509. 
3.2.2.2 Anatolian grain-doles and the supply of Rome 
 Apart from the sitonìa, the second most important grain supply system we 
encounter of Asia Minor on which some further discussion is needed is indisputably 
the Lycian distribution schemes known as the sitometria510. Although its mechanism 
has been quite thoroughly discussed above, the reasons of its development in that 
particular region remain obscure. Going back to the Lycian evidence, it was of course 
very tempting to see a relationship between the inscriptions mentioning sitometria or 
sitometroumenoi andres – most of which date back to the reign of Hadrian or after – 
and the construction of the storage structures (horrea) of Patara and Andriakè in 
southern Lycia, which also took place under Hadrian. From this parallel, it was 
tempting to argue, as did A. Balland, that the concentration of the sitometria in Lycia 
was due to the strategic position of this region as a stage in the carry-over of the 
Egyptian grain for the annona of Rome511. But this implies a view of these horrea as 
mere stage granaries for the supply of Rome. Recent research has however contested 
this statement : why would such granaries have been set up under Hadrian, while 
precisely during his reign, the Egyptian grain became relatively less important for the 
Urbs, since there was an increasing complementary supply from Africa512 ? 
  However, the link between the Lycian storage structures, the grain distribution 
schemes and the supply of Rome should not be discarded too hastily. In his work The 
ship or the wishes, Lucian of Samosata, writing a few decades after Hadrian (floruit 
~AD 165)513 reports the tale of young man named Lykinnos who encounters in the 
Piraeus a huge cargo carrying grain from Egypt to Italy (ἀπ´Αἰγύπτου ἐς Ἰταλίαν 
σιταγωγῶν)514. What is particularly interesting about this passage is that Lucian’s 
character, Timolaos, describes in detail the journey of the ship :  
 
 
                                               
509 The working of the sitonía was already understood in that way by A.H.M. Jones (1940), 216-217 and by 
A. Macro (1980), 680, but both authors are mistaken about its precise functioning: Jones’s analysis was 
the basis of Strubbe’s view that sitónai bought grain every year, while Macro considers that the main 
part of the grain fund was financed by the sitónai themselves. As we have seen, both those statements 
must be reconsidered.  
510 For a broader discussion of the term, see above : section 1. 
511 Balland (1981), pp. 215 sqq 
512 Virlouvet (2011), p. 19. 
513 Gonzàlez (2005), p. 137 
514 Lucian, The Ship, 1 (translated by A. M. Harmon (Loeb Classical Library)). 
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When they left Pharos, he said, the wind was not very strong, and they sighted 
Acamas in seven days. Then it blew against them from the west, and they were 
driven abeam to Sidon. After Sidon, a severe storm broke and carried them 
through Aulon to reach the Chelidonenses on the tenth day. (…) I myself have 
sailed by the Chelidonenses and I know the size of the waves there, especially in a 
sou’westerly gale with a touch of south; this, you see, happens to be where the 
Pamphylian and the Lycian seas divide. (…) Then, having now lost their course, 
they sailed across the Aegean beating up with the trade winds against them, and 
yesterday, seventy days after leaving Egypt, they anchored in Piraeus, after being 
driven so far downwind. They should have kept Crete to starboard, and sailed 
beyond Malea so as to be in Italy by now.515 
 
The route described by Lucian is well known : it is the traditional coastal navigation 
route from Egypt to Greece, starting in Alexandria, going along the coast of Phoenicia 
and Syria, passing between Rhodos and Cilicia, and finally entering the Aegean Sea. 
The last step before the Aegean Islands and the route to Attica, as clearly 
understandable from the text, is the Lycian peninsula – a point where the apostle Paul 
already stopped on his way to Rome516. 
 This ship, writes Lucian through the words of Samippos, ‘was said to carry corn 
enough to feed all Attica for a year’517. Whether this statement proceeds from an 
exaggeration of Lucian in the fictional context of his story matters little; the message is 
clear: this ship was a big one. And it is unlikely that this was a rare event : the ship 
described by Lucian, though extraordinary in size (says the story), is only ‘one of its 
kind’ (μίαν τῶν (…) σιταγωγῶν). Two important elements are thus to be learned from 
this passage : although probably relegated to the second position after Africa, Egypt 
remained a major source of large-scale grain supply towards Rome some decades after 
the reign of Hadrian; second, and most importantly, these cargoes passed regularly 
near Lycia. This does not in and of itself prove Balland’s statement to be right, but it 
shows at least that the idea of Lycia as being one stopping point for such cargoes on 
their way to Rome during this period is not implausible at all. The horrea of Myra and 
Patara would thus be aimed at providing a safe storage structure during the time of the 
halt. 
 Yet, this should not lead us to reduce the function of these granaries to this 
purpose alone. It is also perfectly logical to relate them to Hadrian’s measures allowing 
 
                                               
515 Ibid., 7-9. 
516 Paul, Acts, 27, 5-6. 
517 Lucian, The Ship, 6 
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some privileged Anatolian cities to import grain from Egypt (cf. supra) : the 
concomitance of such measures and the construction of these horrea could hardly be a 
coincidence. According to recent scholarship, those granaries could have served as 
temporary storage structures that facilitated the dispatching of the Egyptian grain 
towards these cities of Asia Minor that were granted the right to import it 518. But what 
would then be the link with the Lycian sitometria? To understand this, we should first 
imagine the impact of this storage on the neighboring cities. In particular, two 
consequences might derive from such a concentration of available grain in Lycia :  
 (1) These structures doubtless necessitated very careful surveillance and hence 
generated logistical costs which, for some part, were to be paid by local communities. 
In this perspective, it is possible that a small share of these (huge) quantities of grain 
was granted to the neighboring cities in return for externalizing to them some of the 
costs of the storage; this grain might then contribute to the provision of the 
widespread distribution schemes witnessed in Lycia in this period.  
 (2) A second way to think of this situation would be to envisage the major issue 
represented by the storage of these large quantities of grain. For merchants and local 
élites, this grain must have represented an important source of greed, which most 
likely did not go without corruption at some point of the logistic supervision of these 
infrastructures. Hence, even minor leaks from these important stocks might well have 
allowed local élites to contribute to the Lycian distribution schemes in which, like any 
target of euergetism, considerable social, political and symbolic interests were at 
stake519.  
 As is often the case, a combination of both processes is perhaps more realistic. All 
this remains very speculative of course, and I am unable to offer proof based on local 
evidence, but the reader will probably agree that they are far from implausible. In this 
perspective, it would thus be possible to argue that the prominent rise of the sitometria 
in Lycia was both due to its situation on the route of the annona, and a direct or 
indirect consequence of the storage of such Egyptian grain to be dispatched to some 
privileged Anatolian cities. 
3.2.2.3 Geographical synthesis : storage, distribution and supply schemes 
After this case study on two specific grain supply institutions, one might want to bring 
the evidence together and see how these two patterns combine with one another and 
how they are distributed across space. My colleague Gerben Verbrugge and myself 
 
                                               
518 Carre (2011), p.29 ; Virlouvet (2011), p. 19. 
519 See below : section 3. 
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have thus conceived and built a map (cf. below) displaying the geographical spread of 
grain funds (sitonìa) and grain distribution schemes (sitometria) in Asia Minor. On 
this map, we added the documented or suspected grain storage facilities (from 
archaeological, literary and epigraphic sources). The map is of course merely 
illustrative, since it relies on about 90 inscriptions and a handful of literary mentions 
and archaeological remains spread over nearly three centuries. Yet, displaying this data 
from a spatial point of view might nevertheless suggest some patterns, or at least bring 
some research questions to the agenda . 
 
 The distribution of the sitonìa and the sitometria reveals an interesting feature: 
the two systems only coexist in three cities, namely Thyateira, Pergamon and 
Stratonikeia. Elsewhere, they seem to be mutually exclusive: the cities where the 
sitonìa is documented do not have references of sitometrìa, and where the sitometria is 
mentioned, no grain funds are present. Regarding their regional concentration, the 
sitometria displays a cluster in Lycia, but is also documented in Lydia, Mysia and 
Galatia, while the sitonía is ubiquitous throughout Anatolia. I have already argued 
above that, despite a stronger institutionalization of the sitometria in Lycia, and 
although the word undoubtedly covered different realities in the different regions 
(different criteria for recipients, and differences in the regularity of distribution), they 
share the common characteristic of consisting of a distribution in kind (as opposed to 
the monetary system of the sitonía), partly financed by civic money. These two 
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observations strongly suggests that the sitometría lato sensu – a more or les regular 
grain distribution scheme, funded by both civic and private funds – was not restricted 
to Lycia, while they simultaneously support my earlier claim that the two schemes 
were radically separated, supplied by different channels and had a distinct functioning.  
 The map however also poses an important puzzle: how should we explain the 
prominent concentration of the sitonía in Caria (Miletus, Stratonikeia and Tralleis) ? 
Indeed, Tralleis is located in the Maeander Valley, one of the most fertile regions of 
Asia Minor, while Miletus is located on the coastline and must therefore have have 
been easily supplied. Miletus and Tralleis thus do not seem good candidates for cities 
experiencing recurring shortages. This is even more surprising when we notice the 
sharp difference between Ephesos and Miletus: Ephesos, too, is a coastal city, and the 
biggest of Asia Minor, but not a single trace of the sitonìa is present. This does not 
mean, however, that grain-related interventions were less frequent in Ephesos: they 
might well have been performed by agoranomoi, which I did not display on the map 
due to their well-known intrinsic polyvalence. We have indeed several inscriptions 
from agoranomoi of Ephesos who have been praised for keeping the price of bread or 
grain affordable520. But perhaps the assumption that sitònai had a rather narrowly 
defined task should be revised, at leats in some cities: it is indeed possible that the 
sitònai of Tralleis, Miletus and Stratonikeia had more various tasks than just 
purchasing grain to cope with shortages and keeping the accounts of the fund. They 
might have been more broadly involved in the regulation of the grain market, and 
hence less distinguishable from agoraonomoi…Another, not exclusive possibility, 
would be that Ephesos was more strongly connected to external trade networks521 than 
the cities of Caria, and thus did not have to rely as much on the local élite for its grain 
supply. Finally, differences in the epigraphic habit and euergetic traditions between 
these cities could also have played a role.  
  In any case, the distribution and purchase of grain prompts the question of its 
physical storage. Grain storage facilities thus also appeal some commentary. I am well 
aware that most cities, especially in inland regions, would have had civic granaries or 
storage infrastructures. The ones shown on the map are only those for which either 
undisputable evidence or suggestive indices exist, and I do not pretend that my 
collection of data is exhaustive. The difficulty to locate grain storage facilities with 
greater accuracy arises from two major factors: first, because the buildings themselves 
have often disappeared; second, because in numerous cases only few architectural 
 
                                               
520 For example : IK-Ephesos, 917 ; IK-Ephesos, 3016 
521 Ruffing (2008), p.230 sqq. Cf. Strabo, XIV, 1, 24 
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characteristics are specific features of granaries522. The upper levels of the so-called 
‘market-building’ of Sagalassos, for instance, are well suited to store grain – the place 
was ventilated, which would prevent moisture from accumulating, and sufficiently 
high to keep grain away from rodents and other destructive animals – although no 
archaeological evidence exist to back this hypothesis. A final element might well 
illustrate both the probable pervasiveness of grain storage facilities and the difficulty to 
identify them in archaeological remains. A recent study on buildings in Asia Minor has 
summed up the various cases in which, from the Hellenistic period onwards, the 
storage of grain did not take place in a specific ad hoc building, but rather in other 
structures such as cryptoporticos or basilicae (Aspendos, Smyrna, and perhaps Tlos)523. 
In any case, the daily grain supply, the purchase by city officials, and the development 
of specific distribution schemes would not have been possible without storage 
facilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The map we have just seen hence raises the question of a possible differential intensity 
of grain-related interventions between the various regions of Asia Minor. One might 
indeed wonder how the grain-related offices are spread over Asia Minor if we take into 
 
                                               
522 The reference study on the subject is still Rickman (1971). 
523 Cavalier (2012), p. 246 & p. 253-254 (Aspendos) ; p. 250 (Smyrna) ; p. 254 (Tlos). 
The so-called ‘market building’ of Sagalassos (picture taken during field trip in July 2016) 
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account not only the sitonia and sitometria but also all the other offices (agoranomoi, 
euthèniarchai,…etc.) which have been discussed in section 2, together with the 
benefactions. But simply taking the absolute number of attestations, as we have done 
for the map of grain funds and grain distribution schemes, exposes to the problem of 
variations in epigraphic density and epigraphic fashion524 : the total number of 
inscriptions was not the same in all cities, which means that our number of grain-
related inscriptions themselves was consequently primarily dependent upon the 
primary epigraphic production. Furthermore, absolute values are subject to a series of 
bias which have been clearly summed up by Duncan-Jones:  
‘The fact that town A has left more inscriptions than town B in the same area 
almost never indicates in itself that A was larger, wealthier, or had a bigger 
population than B. (…) The local rate of survival depends on a series of variables 
which includes the proportion of the town area that has been excavated (if any) ; 
the durability of the local stone ; the extent to which later generations used the 
Roman town as a quarry ; how far continued occupation of the site has erased the 
Roman town from view;…’525  
 
In order to (partly) overcome these problems, I have thought of constructing an index 
which more appropriately reflects the intensity of grain-related interventions per 
region. The major idea was to correct the number of grain-related inscriptions from 
their dependence to the number of remaining inscriptions. I therefore propose to use 
the following index (I) which consists of the number of grain-related inscriptions of 
one region (n), divided by a proxy of the total number of inscriptions of the considered 
region (N), multiplied by 100 in order to make the result readable:  
 
𝐼 = (
𝑛
𝑁
) ∗ 100 
 
Naturally, the proxy of the total number of inscriptions of one region does not itself go 
without problems: what we are seeing is merely the number of published inscriptions. 
A lot more is still unused in the reserves of various museums and institutes. Yet, I 
claim that this does not jeopardize the reliability of this index : clearly, the rate of 
publications is not the same from one region to another, but if one region has been 
more (less) thoroughly surveyed, and thus yielded more (less) inscriptions, it will also 
have yielded more (less) grain-related inscriptions. In other words, if the absolute 
 
                                               
524 Bodel (2001), p. 9; MacMullen (1982), pp.233-246 
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number of grain-related inscriptions is obviously dependent upon the excavation and 
publication process, the proportion of grain-related inscriptions is left unaffected. Of 
course, this leaves us with the practical difficulties of the counting: however surprising 
this may seem, obtaining data on the absolute number of (published) inscriptions from 
a city or region is far from easy. I thus crossed the online databases (mostly PHI) with 
the main regional and local corpora (IK, TAM, MAMA, etc…). Assuredly, my totals are 
not exhaustive – especially given the impossibility to find the number of published 
inscriptions of specific cities like Arneai, or Arsada, and most probably involved some 
double-counting. Overall however, it is unlikely that these gaps and duplications are 
significant enough to substantially overrule the effect of the law of large numbers.  
 Remains one important element : on which geographical grid should this index 
be mapped ? My opinion was that using the Roman frontiers of the 2nd -3rd century was 
nonsense : the province of Asia Minor or Bithynia are so big that they would conceal 
more fine-grained variations. I thus preferred to use a map realized by Samuel Butler in 
his 1907 Atlas of Ancient and Classical Geography526 displaying the historical regions of 
Anatolia (partly reflecting the ancient kingdoms) which has been digitized by my 
colleague G. Verbrugge. Some regions however, namely Pontus, Armenia, Cappadocia 
and Lycaonia yielded insufficient data to allow a reliable calculation and are therefore 
represented with dashed lines on the map. These divisions better mirror the ecological 
fragmentation of the Anatolian peninsula and thus allow a clearer reading of the 
possible influence of the environment. I am well aware that these frontiers were fictive 
and largely permeable, and I admit that the value index ascribed to a region mostly 
relies on the data emerging from the towns, and hence mostly overlooks the conditions 
of rural settlements. Yet, I thought realizing this map was worth the try.  
 
                                               
526 Posthumous publication. 
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Overall, the spatial distribution of the index relies on 182 grain-related inscriptions, 
against a total body of 31,380 counted inscriptions. As we can see, the regions with the 
lowest intensity of grain-related interventions are Mysia and Cilicia, while the highest 
value is found in the more landlocked region of Phrygia. In Western Asia Minor, 
moreover, there seems to be a North –South gradient of increasing intervention. The 
interpretation of this map is not straightforward: the contrast between Bithynia and 
Paphlagonia is difficult to explain, since they were equally close to the grain-producing 
regions of the Black Sea, and given that the same trade routes passed along their shore. 
Similarly, commercial routes went along the shore of southern Anatolia down to the 
Aegean Sea, whereas we notice a marked difference in grain supply interventions 
between Cilicia, Lycia and Caria. The proximity with external commercial circuits thus 
does not completely account for the observed patterns. Maybe then should we seek 
some further explanation in the internal environmental and demographic conditions? 
To test this hypothesis, it seemed sound to compare our map with the one realized by 
B. Dermody via GIS systems, which displays an index of the surplus and deficits of 
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Virtual Water (hereafter VW)527. Since cereals are the main agricultural production of 
the region, and the principal consumer of water, VW surpluses and deficits are a good 
proxy of the difference between local grain production and basic grain requirements.  
 
 
 A first interesting aspect of this map is that on the western coast of Asia Minor, 
the northern part exhibits more surpluses than deficits, while the opposite is true for 
the southern part. This feature hence agrees quite well with the higher grain-related 
intensity index observed in Caria and Lycia compared to Mysia. Similarly, we see a 
light blue zone of VW surpluses in Central Anatolia which broadly corresponds to the 
historical region of Galatia, in which the intensity of grain-related interventions is 
quite low. The same is true, finally, of Cilicia : its western part is either at equilibrium 
or in slight surplus, while its eastern part, i.e. the region known as Cilicia Pedias with 
its fertile alluvial plains of the rivers Pyramos and Saros, appears to be in massive VW 
 
                                               
527 Virtual Water is here defined as ‘the freshwater resources embodied in food production and traded 
among regions’ relying on the subsistence consumption of 200 kg of grain per person/year : Cf. Dermody 
et. al. (2014), p. 5025 
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surplus. In these regions, although Dermody’s map has a higher resolution than mine, 
we see a rough correspondence between the VW budget and the level of intervention 
on the grain-supply. For Paphlagonia however, the correspondence is more 
ambiguous: here we notice a rather high intervention index, while the region does not 
particularly exhibit higher deficits than the neighboring Bithynia where interventions 
are notably of lower intensity. One region even more strongly departs from the overall 
pattern: Phrygia. Here, the intensity intervention index is the highest, whereas most 
parts of the region exhibit quite high surpluses of VW. Here, I cannot rule out the 
possibility of having severely underestimated the total epigraphic production of this 
region. Nevertheless, neither the potential trading connections nor the combination of 
demographic and environmental conditions provide definite explanation for the 
geographical spread of the intensity of grain-related intervention, although in some 
regions it appears to be a quite well correlated with the VW budget. So far, I do not 
pretend being able to explain the observed discrepancies, but an interesting aspect to 
be looked into which might provide complementary explanations would be the 
differential level of surplus appropriation: indeed, most of the VW surplus was in the 
form of grain, and hence mostly possessed by the landowning élite. Different 
management strategies of this surplus might therefore account for the spatial 
differences in grain-related intervention. 
3.2.3 Modelling the financial sustainability of grain funds 
Now that we have discussed the geographical spread of grain doles and grain funds, 
and since the structure and working of grain doles has now been quite extensively 
discussed, both in the lexical analysis and in section 3.2.2.2. above, it would be worth 
looking into more detail how the sitonìa actually worked and how efficient it might 
have been. 
 Beside the technicalities of its funding which have been discussed earlier, the 
sitonìa is the subject of an important controversy regarding its sustainability : 
‘Pessimistic’ scholars have developed a strong skepticism about the ability of grain 
funds to constitute a viable response to grain shortages: P. Garnsey, for instance, 
argues that the sitonía consisted of a ‘merely incidental response’ to food crisis, while 
M. Silver considers civic grain funds as not only inefficient but also counterproductive 
since, he claims, they distorted the market and discouraged farmers and landowners 
from selling their produce on the urban market528. Recent research has however 
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increasingly emphasized the underestimation of the role of public money in the 
funding of the grain supply, and developed a more ‘optimistic’ view of the sitonía : J. 
Strubbe – who showed that this institution had become permanent by the 2nd c. AD – 
and more recently A. Zuiderhoek and P. Erdkamp. Starting from a revisionist view of 
the capabilities of civic funds, and downplaying somewhat the major role often 
ascribed to benefactors, they argue that the sitonía illustrates the widespread concern 
of pre-industrial societies for ensuring a regular affordable supply (like its counterparts 
in the form of the grain offices of Early Modern Europe), and therefore should be seen 
as a regular, structural response to food crisis529.  
 From both sides of this debate, however, the arguments arise from the analysis of 
the same – fragmentary – material, namely inscriptions and some texts of Roman law. 
The problem we face here is that we have no continuous statistical series, no 
quantitative accounts of the grain funds that could inform us about the relative 
importance of their intervention or let us know how successful or durable they were 
from a financial point of view. All the indications we have consist of honorific decrees 
mentioning monetary contributions of some spontaneous benefactors or sitónai to the 
grain funds, and of some excerpts of the Digest. In this section, we aim at moving 
beyond this stalemate: in the absence of continuous series, we suggest using the tools 
provided by modern informatics and statistics in order to ‘simulate the ancient past’530, 
to borrow W. Jongman’s phrase. More precisely, we will employ a Monte-Carlo model 
in order to simulate the financial dynamic of grain funds, based on what we know of 
the working of the sitonía’s funding channels which have been outlined in section 2.2.1 
above, and relying on the quantitative data provided by ancient documents as well as 
some reasonable guesstimates. The main interest of Monte-Carlo simulations lies in 
their probabilistic nature: instead of producing a fixed quantitative assessment 
computing a mere set of guesses, Monte-Carlo models provide a wide range of 
scenarios with different probabilities of occurrence. But most importantly, perhaps, the 
fact that these models work with random variables appears particularly convenient for 
the study of the urban food supply in pre-modern societies, for it allows taking into 
account the average probability of shortages while specifying that their chronological 
distribution is random. Simple analytical models would be completely unable to 
integrate the randomness of harvest failures.  
 
                                               
529 Strubbe (1989), 118 ; Erdkamp (2005) ; Zuiderhoek (2008) 
530 Jongman (1988), 19 
 164 
3.2.3.1 The solvability condition 
The first criterion to deal with in order to assess the sustainability of grain funds is 
their solvability, i.e. the balance between their revenues and expenditures over a 
certain period. In the following sections, we will try to provide a quantitative 
assessment of the variables affecting the cash reserve of the fund, namely the 
contribution of benefactors, the amount of civic funds, and the average cost of the 
grain purchase in time of shortage. 
3.2.3.1.1 Dynamic of the grain funds 
 In the preceding discussion on the funding of the grain funds, we have 
established that the sitónia were mostly funded by monetary gifts from benefactors 
and by civic funds, and that their only expenditure was the purchase of grain when 
shortages occurred. It has also been argued that this grain was then resold, most likely 
at a loss, on the urban grain market, and that the produce of the sale went back to the 
grain fund. These characteristics can be combined to construct a schematic 
representation of the sitonía, that we suggest as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a more formal way, the evolution of the cash reserve of the fund follows a simple 
balance sheet equation :  
 
Cash fund  
(F) 
Withdrawal for 
purchase (W) 
Contribution 
from 
benefactors (B) 
Civic funds  
(C) 
Sale on the urban market 
→ produce of the sale 
Fig. 20. Funding of the sitonia 
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𝐹𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 − 𝐺𝑊𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡 
 
F : value of the fund  
B : value of gifts from benefactors  
C : value of the civic contributions 
GW : value of the gross withdrawal for the purchase of grain 
S : value of the sale realized on the urban market 
 
Since the sale is made at a loss (the selling price being inferior to the purchase price), 
the fund’s dynamic can be described in terms of its net withdrawal (NW) :  
 
𝐹𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 − 𝑁𝑊𝑡   (1) 
 
with : 𝑁𝑊 = 𝐺𝑊 − 𝑆 
 
The value of the fund at year t equals its value of the year before (t-1), plus the private 
contributions and public money received during year t (Bt and Ct), minus the money 
withdrawn on year t for facing the shortage (Wt, if any). This is the fundamental 
equation describing the evolution of the grain fund as a function of its input and 
output variables. In the following section, we attempt to provide a quantitative 
assessment of those variables for us to introduce them into the model. In order to 
determine whether the sitonia was indeed sustainable, the system must obey the trivial 
solvability condition that its cash reserve has to be positive: 𝐹𝑡 > 0. 
3.2.3.1.2 The variables of the model : a quantitative estimate 
❖ Estimating the cost of a shortage  
 In order to estimate the average amount of money that would be needed to cope 
with a shortage, I calculate the gross cereal requirements of our provincial city. Let us 
consider a population of 15,000 residents531 (urban and rural) and an urbanization rate 
of 15%. As usual in economics, this gross cereal requirement can be approached from 
the expenditure side and from the production side. I will thus make both calculations 
and take the average value as our starting point. 
 
 
                                               
531 Here we are taking the high boundary of Stephen Mitchell’s statement that in Roman Asia Minor, 
most cities would have had between 5,000 and 15,000 people ; see Mitchell (1993), 244. 
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Expenditure side – The cereal requirements can be divided in terms of rural 
consumption (Cr), seed (S), rents (R) and taxes. As taxes are exogenous to both urban 
and rural consumption, their inclusion is unnecessary for assessing the effect of 
shortages as long as the rate of the decuma did not change between before and after 
the harvest shock. Grain requirements can thus be reduced at : 
 
𝑌 = 𝐶𝑟 + 𝑆 + 𝑅    (1) 
 
Rents define the share of production which will end up on the urban market. 
Reminding that a small part of rents will be hoarded by landowners according to the 
hoarding rate 𝑟𝐻, urban consumption is given by :  
 
𝐶𝑢 = (1 − 𝑟𝐻) ∙ 𝑅 ↔ 𝑅 =
1
1 − 𝑟𝐻
∙ 𝐶𝑢 
 
Finally, seed can be expressed as a share ψS of total produce :  
 
𝑆 = 𝜓𝑆 ∙ 𝑌  
 
where ψS is simply the inverse of the yield/seed ratio. Hence, we can rewrite equation 
(1) as :  
 
𝑌 = 𝐶𝑟 + 𝜓𝑆 ∙ 𝑌 + (
1
1 − 𝑟𝐻
) ∙ 𝐶𝑢 
 
Re-arranging the terms, we get an expression of gross grain requirements as: 
 
𝑌 =
𝐶𝑟 + (
1
1 − 𝑟𝐻
) ∙ 𝐶𝑢
1 − 𝜓𝑆
 
 
Total rural consumption is equal to per capita rural consumption multiplied by the 
rural population : 𝐶𝑟 = 𝑞𝑟̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑃𝑟; The same applies to urban consumption : 𝐶𝑢 = 𝑞𝑢̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑃𝑢. 
Subsistence consumption has been estimated by W. Jongman at 250 kg of wheat-
equivalent per person per year532. Assuming that peasant consumption is just 20% 
 
                                               
532 Jongman (2007), p. 599. I admit that this value is a high count. Zadoks (2013), p. 79, has set 
subsistence consumption in pre-modern societies in a range of 150-250 kg of grain. Allen (2009) reached 
a bare bones subsistence basket in the Roman world worth 172 kg of grain per person per year (pp. 327-
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above subsistence on average and that, at this level, 80% of total consumption is made 
up by grain, grain consumption per capita of the rural population is about 35 modii of 
grain533. Similarly, if urban dwellers are better-off with a level of consumption of 50% 
above subsistence on average, and if, at this level, grain forms 70% of their intake – as 
stated by Bennet’s Law, the share of income devoted to cereals decreases as 
consumption above subsistence increases –, per capita grain consumption by urban 
resident is worth 38 modii534. Reckoning with a moderate yield to seed ratio of of 6:1 
and a hoarding rate of 5%, gross grain requirements from the expenditure side are a 
little under 666,300 modii.  
 
Production side – Since we operate at the meso-economic level of a city (nor the 
microeconomic level of the estate, neither the macro-economic scale of the whole 
region of Anatolia), we can safely use the production function constructed in chapter 2 
from the works of P. Sraffa and H. C. Carey :  
 
𝑌 = ℎ∗ ∙
𝐴𝑎 ∙ 𝐿𝑟
𝑛
𝜃 ∙ 𝐴𝑚 + 𝐿𝑟
𝑛 
 
With h* being capturing maximum attainable productivity per hectare (set at 3 
tons/ha) and technological development; n is the effect of cooperativity on the 
productivity of labor; m and θ are constant parameters; Lr the rural workforce (derived 
from the urbanization rate and the share of rural population at work, that is, nearly 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
345); Scheidel & Friesen (2009), p. 67, p. 67 calculated a ‘respectability basket’ of 175 kg of grain 
equivalent per capita per year. Hence, accepting Jongman’s figure of 250 kg of wheat equivalent, and 
assuming that at this level of subsistence, grain accounts for 85% of caloric intake results in a bare bones 
consumption of 212,5 kg of grain per person per year. However, this does not change the outcome of my 
argument : since overall grain requirements (or production) is computed from per capita consumption, 
a lower per capita would simply induce a lower estimate of gross grain requirements. What matters for 
the present argument is the change in urban grain supply following a shortage. Ths loss in supply 
quantities depend upon the assumption on the average gravity of the harvest failure, not on the initial 
value of per capita consumption. 
533 The calculation works like this : we multiply the reference level of subsistence consumption 
expressed in wheat equivalent (here : 250 kg) by the share of total consumption represented by cereals 
(cc), and by the level above subsistence (k : if 10%, 1.1 ; if 20%, 1.2…etc). We then divide this value by the 
volume of one modius (8.62 liters) multiplied by the volumetric mass of grain set at 800 kg/m3 (or 0.8 
kg/liter, for which see : http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/x5163f/x5163f02.htm). We thus get the actual grain 
consumption (q) in modii from the formula :  
 
𝑞𝑔 (𝑚𝑜𝑑) =
𝑐𝑐 ∙ 𝑘 ∙ 𝑞𝑠(𝑘𝑔)
8.62 ∙ 0.8
 
 
534 Urban residents thus consume a little bit more grain than countrymen in absolute terms, but they 
consume relatively less in proportion of their income. 
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everyone); and A the total grain-producing agricultural surface, which we assume to be 
25% of total surface535. The important aspect of this equation is that, since we are 
considering a ‘fictional’ city, total surface will be a function of population density. 
Obviously, we cannot extrapolate the very high urban population densities to their 
hinterland. On the other hand, it would be equally unsafe to apply the average 
population density of Anatolia (around 0.2 hab/ha). We thus reckoned with an average 
population density of 1 hab/ha (or 100 hab/km2). With these parameters, we reach a 
gross production of around 1,627,500 modii, from which we have to subtract the overall 
losses (assumed to be 30%536), as well as seed and taxes. The net available grain output 
from the production side thus slightly exceeds 835,000 modii. If we now average our 
expenditure-side and production-side estimates, we reach a value of about 750,000 
modii. 
 From this estimate of overall grain requirements, we need to assess the part 
which will reach the urban market. S. Mitchell has suggested that 20% could be taken 
as a standard value for assessing the weight of rents537. As we have seen in chapter 2, 
the weight of rents in total produce might significantly vary, and should often have 
exceeded that value, but accepting Mitchell’s estimate as a canonical starting point 
keeps the urban supply on the low count and thus makes the calculation more 
pessimistic. Reckoning further with a hoarding rate of 5%, the quantity reaching the 
urban market would be around 142,000 modii. 
 How then was this urban supply affected during a shortage ? To assess this effect, 
I constructed a simplified supply-demand model of the grain market of a provincial 
city (see figure 21 below). For this, I hypothesized an initial price of grain of 2.25 
HS/modius (cf. section 1.2 above), and applied a fairly inelastic demand curve and a 
slightly less inelastic supply curve538. Indeed, the demand for foodstuffs, especially in 
pre-industrial economies, is characterized by a fairly low price-elasticity: if the price of 
grain increases, people cannot long consume fewer calories than they need to 
survive539 ; on the other hand, if grain prices go down, after a certain threshold people 
 
                                               
535 Cf. chap. I 
536 Cf. chap I 
537 Mitchell (1993), I, p. 154 
538 For the detailed model and parametrization, see Appendix 2. 
539 This might seem in contradiction with my earlier claim that intensive agricultural practices often 
took place in Graeco-Roman agriculture, and that agrarian production experienced a sufficient 
interspecific (between species) and intraspecific (within species) variation. In fact, the assumption of 
high inelasticity of demand plays against the point I am trying to make, namely that grain funds were 
overall more sustainable than previously acknowledged. Adopting a higher level of elasticity of the 
demand curve would actually reduce the cost of intervention of a grain fund in times of shortage. 
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will not proportionally increase their consumption of grain. The demanded quantities 
of grain show therefore little variation when its price fluctuates. The supply is also 
quite inelastic – since it is likely that most producers could only marginally adapt the 
quantity they produce to the level of prices – but probably less than the demand .Now, 
in order to represent the effect of a shortage, I considered a harvest shock implying a 
reduction of total grain output by 15%. Yet, the urban supply after shortage would not 
merely be 15% lower than our initial value, since it is unlikely that the hoarding rate 
remained constant: farmers and landowners would probably store some grain either 
for security or speculation. We have naturally no quantitative data to assess the share 
of grain that could have been hoarded, but for the sake of this argument, I assumed the 
hoarding rate would be doubled (from 5 to 10%.) The urban grain supply after shortage 
would thus be of 114,500 modii, or a loss of some 27,500 modii. In economic terms, an 
exogenous shock like this is represented on the graph by a movement of the curve 
concerned : here, the supply curve would be displaced upwards and backwards540.  
 This reduction in supply would of course not have left prices unaffected. The 
equilibrium between supply and demand indeed moves from e0 to e1, and stabilizes at a 
higher level of prices for a smaller available supply. With the parameters of the model, 
given a loss of 15%, the new price would be 4.25 HS per modius541. Here is where the 
sitonai intervene: as explained earlier, their purpose is to buy this grain as cheaply as 
possible. What they would do in most cases is to import it from a region which does 
not experience a situation of scarcity, or even produces a surplus. But they would 
strongly negotiate with owners of grain stocks and mobilize their social and political 
influence in order to lower the price. It is thus unlikely, to go back to our example, that 
sitònai would buy grain at 4.25 HS. Most probably, they would manage to obtain a 
rebate on the price. Yet, the discount they would get would be lowered once we factor 
in transport costs, which were notably prohibitive, especially for land transport. All in 
all, and in the perspective of staying as pessimistic as possible, we assumed that the 
sitónai of our city would obtain a net discount (transport costs included) of ¼ of HS 
per modius, which would result in a purchase price of 4 HS per modius. As explained 
above, this grain was most likely sold at a price close to the initial price (2.25HS in our 
 
                                               
540 Remember that economists usually put the quantities on the X axis and prices on the Y axis, which 
means that a displacement of the curve backwards and upwards implies a smaller equilibrium quantity. 
541 This result broadly fits Arjan Zuiderhoek’s and Paul Edkamp’s statements that, due to the inelasticity 
of demand, even a minor reduction of output would provoke a significant price increase (Zuiderhoek 
(2008), 160 ; Erdkamp (2005), 147). Here, we neglect the positive retro-active effect of the shortage on 
the demand: some categories of individuals would anyway reduce their consumption, driving thereby 
prices downwards and counterbalancing, even if to a limited extent, the price increase. Neglecting this 
phenomenon, again, makes the situation we consider even worse. 
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simulation), but probably a little above – the sitonìa being, in our understanding, a 
form of institutionalized paraprasis. We thus set the resale price at 2.5 HS. Since the 
price differential is of 1.5 HS, the total cost of the 27,500 modii would represent an 
expenditure of some 41,500 HS. 
 
 
 
It is probably unrealistic, though, to consider that grain funds were the community’s 
sole defense against shortages. Even if they constituted a structural response, in so far 
as they became permanent institutions with officials appointed every year, they must 
have represented only one solution to food crisis among various measures : the city 
could strengthen its relationships with neighboring regions to directly import grain 
from them (i.e. aside from the mechanism of the sitonía), use local stocks of grain, fix 
maximum prices, restrict exports of grain from its own hinterland, etc542 Yet, in order 
to stay as close as possible to the most pessimistic situation, we will ignore those 
 
                                               
542 Migeotte (2010), 305-306 
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Fig.21. Supply-Demand model of the grain market in a provincial town of the
Roman Empire experiencing an exogenous shock.
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complementary strategies. Under those conditions (purchase at 4 HS and resale at 2.5 
HS), such a shortage would thus require the withdrawal of 41,500 HS from the grain 
fund on average.  
 
 Yet, one parameter is still missing from the model: the frequency of shortages, 
defining how often money would be withdrawn from the frain fund. In his study on 
food crisis in Antiquity, P. Garnsey has reached the conclusion that Attica – a region 
known for its drought – faced crop failures every 3-4 years (or a probability comprised 
between 25 and 30%)543. In the case of Asia Minor, J. Kobes suggests rather that 
shortages occurred once every 5 years544 (or a probability of 20 %) – a frequency 
considered pessimistic by F. Kirbihler545. Hence, in the following computation, and 
given that Asia Minor was a far more fertile region that continental Greece, as 
demonstrated in chapter I, we consider that harvest failures occurred on average once 
every 6 years (or one year for every 5 years without shortage, i.e. a probability of 1/6 
(16.6%)). Those probabilities, it must be said, refer to the wheat harvests and are 
therefore particularly pessimistic since wheat requires much more water than barley. 
But for the sake of the robustness of our estimate, we will apply the probability of crop 
failures for wheat only.  
 As a final assumption, the model considers that the grain fund would remain 
unused for a short period546 after its ‘foundation’ in order to ensure a starting capital 
before proceeding to the first withdrawals. What allows this hypothesis is first that 
such a procedure is widely attested for foundations547 and, second, that even for the 
grain funds whose capital could be used – the majority of them –, it is likely that 
ancient Greeks and Romans had realized the need to allow them to accumulate money 
in order to increase their probability to be sustainable in the longer run.  
 
 
❖ Assessing the contribution of benefactors 
 What was the sum contributed annually by the élite to the grain fund of an 
average provincial city ? To answer this question, we need to start with an estimate of 
the average sum spent annually by the élite on benefactions. This annual élite 
 
                                               
543 Garnsey (1988), 17. This applies for wheat only ; crop failures of barley are less frequent.  
544 Kobes (1999), 81-98 
545 Kirbihler (2006), 617 
546 Here, we assumed that grain funds would not be used during the first year only, which sets them 
with an initial capital of some 10,000 HS.  
547 Migeotte (2014), 184 
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expenditure on benefactions (AEB) is equal to the number of potential benefactors, 
multiplied by the price of an average benefaction (all purposes mixed) and their 
frequency during the course of the benefactor’s career, divided by the length of its 
career. The most complicated assessment of this equation is to calculate the value of 
an average – generic – benefaction.  
 To do this, we assembled the data provided by T.R.S. Broughton and those 
presented by A. Zuiderhoek, and completed them with our own database focused on 
food-related munificence. Through this, we collected a range of 131 benefactions whose 
sum is explicitly mentioned (see table 4, appendix 1)548. This distribution of sums 
cannot however be used as it is, for it is heavily biased towards expensive benefactions. 
What we need to bear in mind here, is that we attempt to calculate the value of a 
theoretical, generic, unitary benefaction that would take into account the probably 
numerous, common, smaller acts of euergetism which are probably concealed behind 
the most prestigious and conspicuous benefactions performed by the top ranks of the 
city’s élite. We thus first decided to truncate the distribution by eliminating the 7 
benefactions over 125,000 denarii – among which three benefactions are simply 
excessively expensive (2,000,000, 550,000 and 400,000 denarii). If those seven sums 
severely distort the statistical parameters, their suppression is however, from a 
statistical point of view, not a big problem, since they represent only about 5% of the 
total data. There is however, as mentioned above, another bias: the one affecting the 
smallest gifts. Indeed, even if the small benefactions are more frequent in the data than 
the more expensive ones, it is likely that, proportionally to their actual occurrence in 
ancient times, they have been less represented epigraphically than bigger gifts; we 
therefore deliberat increased the number of sums inferior to 1,250 denarii (the annual 
revenue of a city councilor owning exactly the required census minimum of 25,000 
denarii set at 5% rate of return549) to reconstruct what the actual distribution might 
have been550.  
 Through these procedures (truncation and increase), we corrected the problem of 
the variance of the distribution. But since we want to estimate the value of the most 
common benefactions, we also need to take into account their frequency. We thus 
organized the sums in classes of 2,500 denarii and calculated the class frequencies (i.e., 
the number of sums of each class divided by the total number of sums of the 
 
                                               
548 Some of those sums are expressed in drachmai; while this would impose a conversion for the 
Hellenistic period or even the 1st c. BC, for the Imperial period, numismatists largely agree on a simple 
equivalence between the denarius and the drachma, for which see Doyen (2012), 62 & 99.  
549 Zuiderhoek (2009), 29 
550 I am thankful to M. Maxime Fontaine, teaching assistant at the department of Applied Economics of 
the ULB (DULBEA) who informed us about this technique. The details are described in Appendix 1. 
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distribution), with which we constructed a weight coefficient equal to the class 
frequencies normalized from 0 to 1, and multiplied each sum by the weight coefficient 
of its class551. This leaves us with a distribution corrected from both the variance and 
the frequency; to estimate the value of our average unitary benefaction, we simply 
calculated the median of this new, corrected distribution, which provided a result of 
6,170 sesterces (noted HS below) or a little more than 1,540 denarii.   
 Yet, how many such benefactions would be performed annually on average ? To 
answer this question, we first need to estimate the number of potential benefactors. 
Let us go back to out provincial city of 15,000 inhabitants. The most likely benefactors 
are of course the members of the bouleutic élite, for which a size of 200 members 
probably constitutes a reasonable average552. Here, we assume that this first category of 
benefactors would perform the equivalent of 4 average benefactions in a 25 years 
career, that is, a little less than two average benefactions per decade, which does not 
seem unreasonable especially if we compare the value of our average gift with the 
minimum wealth criterion of the ordo decurionum553. Yet, the city councilors do not 
make the whole population of benefactors. Indeed, there are equally wealthy 
households who do not belong to the decurional order, and whose number is 
 
                                               
551 See Apendix 1 for the full procedure. 
552 But we need to bear in mind the huge variation, between the 60 bouleutai of Cnidus and the 500 of 
Oenoanda.  
553 This equivalent of 4 average benefactions might seem arbitrary. The problem faced with the data is 
that, in inscriptions, the exact number of benefactions performed is almost never clearly stated, unless it 
refers to the trivial situation of a single act of munificence, which is the vast majority of cases. But when 
the benefactor has done multiple gifts, his actions are simply expressed in the plural rather than 
rigorously counted. In those cases, we only understand that the dedicatee of the inscription has 
performed ‘more than one or two’ acts of euergetism. We know, of course, of some exceptional 
benefactors, like Opramoas of Rhodiapolis, who performed dozens of different acts of munificence. But 
Opramoas was extraordinary wealthy, and was undoubtedly an exception, even among the highest 
echelons of the city’s élite. Moreover, generosity and wealth must also have varied from one councilor to 
another. In another database focused on benefactions towards public buildings in Asia Minor in the 1st 
and early 2nd c. AD, we find that the most involved benefactor has intervened 9 times. This case is, again, 
exceptional : 64% of the recorded benefactors have performed two interventions or less, 13% have made 
3 benefactions, 8% have made 4 of them, and another 8% intervened 5 times. The value representing 
realistically the number of interventions of the top ranks of the city’s élite must therefore be somewhere 
between 3 and 5. Yet, since low-value benefactions are most probably under-represented in the sources 
(relatively to their actual frequency), and given that most of those low-value benefactions were in all 
likelihood performed by modest benefactors who intervened only once in their career, we must admit 
that the proportion of individuals performing less than 2 gifts should be increased, which would 
mechanically lead to reduce the proportion of individuals performing 3, 4 and 5 benefactions. In the face 
of this rough distribution, the number of 4 average benefactions in 25 years career seems reasonable for 
the members of the bouleutic order. Some might find it too low since the database considered here 
refers only to public buildings and does not take into accounts food distributions and festivals, but 
conserving this modest value tends to limit the inputs to the grain funds, which works against our 
argument that such funds would, overall, be financially successful enough.  
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estimated by W. Scheidel and S. Friesen as being at least half the number of decurions, 
which leaves us with 100 more potential benefactors. But we also need to account for 
non-elite munificence554. For this, we suggest to use the non-elite income scale 
established by W. Scheidel and J. Friesen for the Roman Empire as a whole. To 
estimate the number of sub-elite benefactors, we gathered the income categories of 
level 2 to 5 from Scheidel & Friesen (the people whose income goes from 3 to 10 times 
subsistence, making 3.5 % of the total population)555 representing the benefactors who, 
we assume, perform 1 average benefactions in 25 years. We would thus end up with 525 
sub-elite households potentially able to perform benefactions (3.5% of 15,000). Yet, 
Scheidel and Friesens’s categories are based on households, and thereby include wives 
and children. If we reckon with an average number of 4 people per household, the total 
number of adult males potentially of this category would be 525/4, which is 131. Yet, 
those are not the only effective benefactors, since we know of women performing 
benefactions in their own name, both in the Hellenistic and Roman periods556. But how 
can we estimate their proportion? In our database of food-related munificence, only 5 
out 145 benefactors are women, which makes a little less than 3.5%. However, among 
98 benefactors from another database on public buildings, 8 women are mentioned, 
making some 8% of the total. Since we are trying to estimate the intensity of female 
munificence on average, generic benefactions (i.e. considering a basket of gifts where 
all purposes are mixed (buildings, food, etc…)), the proportion of women must have 
been somewhere between those two values, and we assumed therefore that the 
proportion of female benefactors was about 5%. Hence, we must increase the number 
of non-bouleutic élite members and that of sub-elite benefactors by 5%. The following 
table sums up the different categories of benefactors, their size and our assumption 
about the number of gifts they performed : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
554 Non-elite benefactors are clearly documented in inscriptions : IK-Ephesos, 3006 (cf. Halfman (2004), 
pp. 43-44); IK-Ephesos, 411 & 4123 (cf. Halfman (2004), p. 54 & Pont (2010), p. 261 & pp. 270-271) ; 
IDidyma, 140, 264 & 327 . For a recent account, see in particular : Kantirea (2016), pp. 471-494. Non-élite 
or sub-élite benefactors however start disappearing from the documents during the 2nd c. AD. 
555 Scheidel & Friesen (2009), 83-84. 
556 Bielman-Sanchez (2003) ; Van Bremen (1996) 
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The average number of benefactions per year (ñ) is thus easily derived:  
 
ñ =  
(200×4) + (105×2) + (131 + 7)×1
25
=
1148
25
≈ 46 
 
To calculate the annual private expenditure on benefactions, we just need to multiply 
this number of average benefactions per year by the value of one average benefaction 
(6,170 HS), which yields 283.820 HS. This sum, however, concerns all targets of 
munificence : public buildings, festivals, food, money distributions,…etc. Which part of 
this sum would go specifically to food benefactions ? In the data collected by Arjan 
Zuiderhoek, food-related munificence makes only a little 3% of the total557. Taking 3% 
of our 283.820 HS yields us an annual average expenditure on food-related munificence 
of 8,515 HS. Of course, percentages in volume and in value may well differ, but since 
we seek a rough estimate rather than a precise number, it is not much of a problem. 
Yet, again, this sum concerns all the food-related acts of munificence, of which the 
funding of the sitonía is only one aspect. In order to estimate which part of this sum 
actually entered the grain fund, we need to know the relative weight of the sitonía in 
the landscape of food supply systems, that is, the ‘probability’ for a contribution to be 
targeted towards a grain fund558. In our database, the sitonía occurs 70 times in a 
 
                                               
557 Zuiderhoek(2008), 172 
558 The propensity for élites to contribute to the grain fund must have varied: in times of dearth, most 
municipal élites would have been concerned about avoiding the riots that could emanate from the 
scarcity of grain. However, the same notables who act as benefactors are also the landowners who would 
also make profit from hoarding grain in the case of bad harvests, waiting to benefit from higher prices. 
 
   
Table 4 – Number of benefactors and gifts by social category 
Category of benefactors Size Number of gifts per 25 years 
Elite   
Bouleutic order 200 4 
Non-bouleutic elite 105 2 
Non-elite   
Sub-elite benefactors   
   (Men) 131 1 
   (Women) 7 1 
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sample of 170 food-related interventions, that is, a rough 40%. The annual average 
private contribution to the grain funds may thus be set at 40% of 8,515 HS, which is 
about 3,400 HS. 
 
❖ Assessing the value of civic funding 
From this sum, it is now possible to derive an estimate of the average amount of civic 
money financing the grain funds each year. Indeed, the average total annual revenue of 
the sitónion (RTOT) is equal to the sum of the private contributions (B) plus the civic 
contributions (C) :  
 
?̅?𝑇𝑂𝑇 = ?̅? + 𝐶̅     (2)  
 
Yet, both civic and private funding can be expressed as a share (θ) of the total: 
 
?̅? = 𝜃𝐵 ∙ ?̅?𝑇𝑂𝑇 
𝐶̅ = 𝜃𝐶 ∙ ?̅?𝑇𝑂𝑇 
 
with 0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜃𝐺 = 1, by definition ; rearranging the terms of these two 
equations and isolating C gives us :  
 
𝐶̅ =
𝜃𝐶
𝜃𝐵
∙ ?̅?         (3) 
 
The share of private and public contributions (θC / θB) in the total is not very difficult 
to estimate : in our database, among the 70 attestations of the sitonía, 23 explicitly 
refer to a benefaction or to a liturgical contribution from the sitónès in office, that is, a 
mere 33% of the total. Including the ex officio payments in the private contributions is 
questionable, because financial participation from officials was, if not compulsory, at 
least highly recommended – despite the growing confusion between magistracies and 
liturgies that we notice from the late Hellenistic period559. Yet, doing so increases the 
proportion of private funds (θB) and therefore lowers the assessment of the public 
contributions – they are indeed inversely proportional to this coefficient in equation 
(3) – and therefore goes against our argument, for it also drives the total contributions 
to grain funds downwards. It is of course difficult to prove that the remaining 67% of 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
For the simplicity of the model, we could therefore assume that speculation and euergetism would 
counterbalance one another. 
559 Cf. below 
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the attestations of the sitonía were financed with civic money, since we argue precisely 
that most of the time such customary payments were not explicitly stated. However, 
inscriptions usually do not miss mentioning ex officio contributions (liturgic payments 
or ob honorem munifence); this is true a fortiori for spontaneous gifts. If it was not the 
benefactors or the liturgists who paid for the sitonía in those 67% of cases, then ‘the 
civic government’, as Arjan Zuiderhoek notes, ‘is the most likely candidate’560. If we 
round those values, we can set the ratio of the share of public to private funds at 
0.65/0.35. Multiplying this ratio by our estimate of the private contribution to grain 
funds yields a value of around 6,325 HS spent each year by the city to finance the 
sitonía. The average total sum allocated to the grain funds annually may thus be 
estimated at 9,840 HS, or a little less than 2,500 denarii. 
 However, would the city have been able to draw in sufficient revenues to finance 
its contribution to the sitonía? Contrary to the widespread pessimistic approach of 
civic finances, Greek cities of the Hellenistic and Roman periods had various sources of 
revenues at their disposal561 : incomes from public estates, tolls and fees from public 
amenities, bequests, indirect taxes on commerce, sometimes direct taxation in kind, ex 
officio payments…to which public subscriptions and euergetism are probably only a 
complement. Let us make a quantitative assessment: given that the value of a year’s 
subsistence for one individual roughly equals 115 HS, the subsistence GDP of our 
community of 15,000 people is about 1,725,000 HS. If, following Hopkins’ estimate, we 
assume that actual GDP equals 1.5 times subsistence GDP562, the actual GDP of our city 
is worth 2,600,000 HS. Reckoning with a low overall tax rate of 2.5%, the value of 
public revenues from taxation alone equals 65,000 HS. In those circumstances, our 
estimate of the civic contribution to the grain funds (6,325 HS) would make up some 
10% of the city’s public expenses. Even in this fairly restrictive approach of civic 
resources, it is not unreasonable at all to consider that the cities would devote one 
tenth of their budget to a system facilitating the access to an affordable supply of grain 
to the citizens. On the other hand, table 3 sums up the range of variation of the 
proportion of civic funds spent for the sitonía for different shares of taxation in civic 
revenues. As we can see, in the middling situation where taxation accounts for 75% of 
all civic incomes, the city’s expenditures on grain funds would represent only 7.3% of 
its budget.  
 
 
 
                                               
560 Zuiderhoek (2008), 170 
561 Migeotte (1995), 86 ; See also Fröhlich (2005), 251 
562 Hopkins (2002), 200-201 
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 Table 5 – Proportion of civic expenses for the grain 
funds as a function of the share of taxes in civic 
revenues  
Share of taxation in civic revenues 
2/3 3/4 4/5 
Proportion of civic 
expenditures for 
the sitonía (%) 
6.5 7.30 7.78 
 
 
❖ Feedbacks 
 
As it has been conceived up to this point, the model is dynamic but does not account 
for the possible feedbacks in the propensity of civic governments or benefactors to 
modify their contribution to the grain fund according to its cash reserve. In other 
words, so far we have considered that the civic and euergetic contributions to the grain 
funds were independent from the value of the fund. As far as civic expenditures are 
concerned, grain supply was likely too important a subject to take the risk to deviate 
strongly from their average contribution. But the same does not apply to private 
munificence, and it is probable that benefactors would be tempted to increase their 
contribution when the fund’s reserve was being eroded. Similarly, as the fund would 
experience significant cash surpluses, benefactors would likely feel their participation 
as less indispensable and hence would probably contribute less. I thus added a 
retroactive effect of the cash reserve upon private munificence according to the 
following formula: 
 
𝐵(𝐹) =
Λ
𝐹𝑡
∙ ?̅? 
 
B(F) is the benefactor’s contribution as a function of the cash reserve Ft, and Φ is a 
threshold value set at 7,000 HS563. This equation means that, if the cash reserve Ft is 
lower than the critical threshold (Λ), the contribution of private munificence would be 
higher than its average value ?̅?. Conversely, if the cash reserve is higher than the 
threshold value, the benefactor’s contribution would be lower than average. 
 
                                               
563 This value is critical since, if the fund stays at or under this value for 6 years (the average time span 
during which one shortage occurs), it would not be able to face the average withdrawal of about 42,000 
HS. In other words, the threshold value can be seen as the average withdrawal multiplied by the 
probability of a shortage to occur (42,000 x (1/6) = 7,000). 
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 Here, I need to insist on the fact that the whole argument which has been 
constructed so far is based on quite pessimistic hypotheses. In every case, my 
assumptions tend to lighten the income of the grain funds and to drive up its expenses 
as much as possible, but not so much as to counter my own reconstruction of the 
working of the funds. Firstly, my calculation relies on the value of an average, generic 
benefaction, which was calculated by using two statistical procedures (truncation and 
correction of frequency) which both tend to drive the result downwards. Since, in this 
model, the estimate of the average value of civic expenditure on the grain funds is 
derived from the value of the average private contribution to the fund – cf. equation (3) 
– , this downwards tendency also affects the value of the total contributions to the 
sitónia. Secondly, it is based upon the assumption that each of the wealthiest 
benefactors of the city, namely the bouleutic elite, would only perform the equivalent 
of four average gifts in 25 years564. Thirdly, it reckons with a ratio of public to private 
funds that is quite favorable to the latter565, which also tends to limit the result of my 
assessment of the yearly public contribution to the sitonía. This set of assumptions, 
therefore, makes it even more difficult for me to prove that grain funds were overall 
financially sustainable in the mid and long run. 
3.2.3.1.3 Basic principles of Monte-Carlo simulations and settings of the model 
 Let me now expose the working of this Monte-Carlo simulation566. It is of major 
importance to understand that the model which has been constructed does not simply 
introduce our set of assessments and guesses as they are. The values I obtained for the 
average income of the grain funds and for the average withdrawal in times of shortage 
are considered by a Monte-Carlo simulation as random variables. We must therefore 
specify – or assume – what probability distribution best describes them567 (Gaussian, 
binomial, uniform, Poisson,…etc.). How the model proceeds once this specification is 
done is quite simple: for each variable, the model will simply generate random 
numbers along the variation margin of its probability distribution. It will then 
 
                                               
564 Four such gifts would represent a little 24,700 HS, or 6,200 denarii. If the patrimony of this bouleutic 
élite consists mostly of landed property set at a 5% rate of return (cf. Duncan-Jones (1982), 33), and if 
they own no more than their census minimum of 25,000 denarii, their patrimony would yield 1,250 
denarii per year, or 31,250 denarii in 25 years. Our guess then assumes that such members of the élite 
would spent maximum 19% of the income they would accumulate during their career on benefactions. 
565 Since we included the liturgic payments as ‘private contribution’, which is debatable in itself because 
liturgies could be seen as a classical mechanism of civic finances rather than a helpful financial 
assistance of the citizens in their own name.  
566 The model has been coded on MATLAB – 2011 
567 See appendix 3 for the discussion 
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determine the value of the dependent variable (the amount of money inside the grain 
fund) following the initial equation. However, in order to acquire a statistical 
significance, the model will run this procedure thousands of times and will then derive 
the average scenario among all those which have been generated. Said differently, a 
Monte-Carlo simulation runs a huge number of different scenarios within the variation 
margin of the considered variables. The outcome they produce, therefore, is not a 
‘fixed’ result, but an average scenario with a statistically significant probability.  
 In those respects, Monte-Carlo simulations are more analytically sophisticated 
than the procedure of mere computing of a series of parameters and guesses: they 
actually strengthen the picture they provide by running a calculation that takes into 
account the variation margin applied to each variable. As we can see from table 2, we 
have applied fairly large variation margins to our input variables in order to consider a 
wide range of scenarios:  
 
Table 6 – Inputs of the model  
Variable/parameter Value Error margin Distribution 
Private contributions (B) 3,400 HS 75% Uniform 
Civic contributions (C) 6,325 HS 25% Uniform 
Withdrawals (W) 41,500 HS 50% Binomial568 
Probability of shortage (P) 1/6 ––– ––– 
 
With those parameters, the model has simply computed the value of the cash reserve 
(F) of the grain fund, as expressed by equation (1) :  
 
𝐹𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 − 𝑁𝑊𝑡 
 
We have thus run this computation for 1,000,000 scenarios over 50 years. This means 
that our model examines the evolution of the cash reserve of 1 million grain funds 
during 50 years, and then calculates how many of them have collapsed over this time 
lapse and when they did.  
3.2.3.1.4 Analysis of the model (I) : how long could grain funds survive ? 
 The first and most important outcome of the model is to display the probability 
of survival of the grain funds according to their lifespan. Stated differently, what is the 
probability that a grain fund would remain in operation for, say, 15 years? Or, after how 
many years and how frequently would the reserve of the grain fund become 
 
                                               
568 For the explanation, see Appendix 3 
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insufficient to face the next shortage? This result is illustrated in figures 22a and 23a 
(the probability distribution curve) and 22b and 23b (the cumulative probability 
curve), where each point represents a group of scenarios (all the funds collapsing at 
age t), the probability of which is indicated by its color.  
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Fig. 22 displays the survival probability distribution of grain funds with an alternative 
error margin of 25%, while Fig. 23 represents the probability distribution with the 
standard error margin of 50%. On both graphs, the probability distribution takes the 
form of a hump-shaped curve, massively skewed in favor of the earliest ages. What 
these graphs reveal is that grain funds with long lifespans are less likely to occur than 
grain funds of shorter lifespans. However, although most grain funds would collapse 
between in their first ten years of operation, we still observe on the cumulative 
probability curve that about 20% of the funds could survive more than 50 years, since 
the maximum value on the Y axis is 0.8.  
 A striking characteristic of those figures is the important number of grain funds 
crashing in their early development: a little less than 50% of them collapse within the 
first 5 years, and the probability for a fund to crash in its first year is about 17% (one 
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year of shortage for 5 years without, or, once in 6 years)569. On the cumulative 
probability curves – the maximum value is approximately 0.8. This means that in our 
simulation, which, as we saw, is based on quite pessimistic assumptions, 80% of the 
funds would crash in less than 50 years. But this also means that in this pessimistic 
scenario, still 20% of the funds could theoretically570 survive more than half a century. 
Moreover, despite the significant mortality of grain funds in their first years of 
working, some 20% of them could survive for a period between 10 and 50 years.  
 The different shape between Fig. 22a and 23a requires an explanation. One could 
expect the probability distribution to be continuously decreasing on both figures, 
meaning that funds which survived for longer periods were less common than those 
which survived for shorter periods. Yet, this is not exactly what appears on the Fig. 22a, 
since we can clearly see oscillations of the curve : the probability for a fund to survive 
exactly 6 years is lower than the probability to survive 8 years, just like the probability 
for a fund to survive exactly 12 years is lower than its probability to survive 15 years. 
The explanation for those oscillations is to be sought in the random distribution of 
shortages through time as well as in the width of the error margin. An example could 
make things clearer to the reader : let us consider a first grain fund of 50,000 HS and a 
second of 75,000 HS. Since the average withdrawal generated by a shortage is roughly 
40,000 HS, both these funds would crash after 2 shortages. However, it is less probable 
that those two shortages would occur in 6 years than in 8 years. The oscillations of the 
probability distribution curve are therefore a consequence of the discontinuous – or 
discrete – character of the event commanding the withdrawals. Yet, mathematically 
speaking, increasing the margin of error on the withdrawals is the same as increasing 
the randomness of the occurrence of shortages, or, said differently, as spreading the 
withdrawals over a higher number of years. The result is that differences occurring 
from the discrete character of shortages are evened out.  
 A final feature of these figures worth emphasizing is that there is no marked 
decrease in the probability of survival of grain funds between a lifespan of 25 years and 
one of 50 years. This seems to imply that, after a determined threshold, the grain funds 
 
                                               
569 In this case, we notice that the probability for a fund to collapse in its first year is simply equal to the 
probability of occurrence of a shortage. This is simply because the average withdrawal required during a 
shortage largely exceeds the money accumulated after one year : after the 1 year security period, the fund 
has accumulated a little more than 10,000 HS. If we add the money accumulated in the first year during 
which the fund can be used, its cash reserve reaches some 20,000 HS. Yet, the average withdrawal equals 
some 42,000 HS.  
570 The emphasis is important: that those funds could be financially solvable over half a century does not 
mean that they could not be removed or shut down by an administrative decision. Economic 
sustainability does not prevail over institutional changes.  
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become financially more stable, but at the cost of a huge number of funds collapsing in 
their early years of working.   
3.2.3.1.5 Analysis of the model (II) : scenarios of financial trajectory of grain funds  
Now that we have seen the relationship between the lifespan of grain funds and their 
probability, we need to examine how the cash reserves of grain funds of different 
lifespans evolved through time, from their foundation to their collapse. For this, we 
examine 4 scenarios : the grain funds collapsing at the age of 5, 10, 20 and 40 years. 
 
❖ Grain funds with a lifespan (T) of 5 years  
 
 
How has this graph been produced? The procedure is quite simple: among the 1 million 
grain funds simulated, the model considers all the grain funds that collapse at the 
exact age of 5 years. It then determines the average financial trajectory of this sample 
of funds (the middle curve). Yet, to analyze a wider number of situations, we required 
the model to produce the curves defining an interval of one standard deviation around 
the mean scenario. According to fundamental statistics, about 68% of the grain funds 
with this lifespan are comprised between the limits of those curves. As for the top and 
bottom curves, they simply define the limits encompassing 100% of the trajectories of 
those grain funds (in mathematics, they are called ‘envelope curves’). In this graph, as 
well as in the others, the color of the curve represents the probability of the scenario 
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(scaled on the color bar), or here, the probability for a grain fund to collapse after 
exactly 5 years. In the present case, this probability is approximately 5%. 
 Two features are noticeable on this graph: first, we see that the average trajectory 
of the funds is concave, meaning that money accumulates in the grain fund until a 
critical point from which the value of the fund drops sharply. Secondly, we see that, for 
the main part of the graph, the surface comprised between the lower envelope curve 
and the lower standard deviation curve is greater than that between the upper 
standard deviation curve and the upper envelope curve. This means that, in this 
pattern, only a small proportion of funds experienced an average financial trajectory 
much better than the average, while the majority of them experienced a rather 
precarious situation.   
 
 
❖ Grain funds with a lifespan of 10 years  
 
In this pattern, we find the same overall concave trajectory, but with an interesting 
difference with the previous scenario: on the lower standard deviation curve and on 
the upper envelope curve, we see that a certain proportion of funds might experience a 
small relief after a phase of decline, resulting in a non-linear trajectory. In that sense, a 
downward tendency of the account of the grain funds does not seem to be irreversible.  
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❖ Grain funds with a lifespan of 20 and 40 years  
 
Let us now turn to patterns of grain funds with longer lifespans, namely 20 and 40 
years: 
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 The main difference appearing on those figures lies in the area between the 
standard deviation curves and the envelope curves. As we can see on the graphs, the 
space between the top envelope curve and the upper standard deviation curve is much 
greater than the space encompassed by the lower standard deviation curve and the 
bottom envelope curve, contrary to what appeared on the graphs referring to grain 
funds with a shorter lifespan. As I have already argued, this indicates that, in those two 
patterns, a bigger proportion of grain funds followed a better-than-average financial 
trajectory. This result confirms the analysis of figures 22 and 23: it looks as if, once a 
certain age threshold is reached, grain funds become financially more sustainable, with 
some of them accumulating quite large amounts of money. Even if, from a critical 
point, they get into a declining path leading to their collapse – the facing of shortages 
being, over the long run, stronger than the inputs of money –, grain funds become 
increasingly successful and secure as they persist through time. This can be understood 
quite easily with an analytical example: a fund that survived 15 years have received 
150,000 HS on average, and normally experienced two shortages (one in 6 years, as 
stated above), occasioning a withdrawal of some 80,000 HS. The value of its cash 
reserve is thus 70,000 HS. For this fund to crash, it would require 2 (average) 
shortages. Let us now consider a fund that survived 25 years: the total sum received 
over that period is 250,000 HS. In 25 years, this fund must have experienced 4 
shortages, generating an expenditure of some 160,000 HS on average. The remaining 
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cash reserve of the fund is thus worth 90,000 HS, and would thus require 3 shortages 
to collapse. This can be generalized to different lifespans:  
 
Table 7. Sustainability of the grain funds (all sums are ins HS) 
Age of the 
fund 
Average input 
of money571 
Number of 
experienced 
shortages 
Average 
output of 
money 
Value of the 
cash reserve 
Required number of 
shortages to crash the 
fund 
10 100,000 1 -40,000 60,000 2 
15 150,000 2 -80,000 70,000 2 
20 200,000 3 -120,000 80,000 2 
25 250,000 4 -160,000 90,000 3 
30 300,000 5 -200,000 100,000 3 
35 350,000 5 -200,000 150,000 4 
 
 
Of course, we speak here of average scenarios (average inputs of money and average 
gravity of the shortage) and we consider a restricted number of cases; the actual 
evolution of the sustainability of the funds is not linear, but the overall tendency is 
upwards. Therefore, as we can deduct from table 3, the longer a grain fund survives, 
the more shortages it is able to endure.  
3.2.3.1.6  A reliable enough and long-lasting institution 
 Earlier on, I tried to reconstruct the institutional and technical working of the 
sitonía. I then tried to quantify the value of private (euergetic) and civic contributions 
of the grain funds, challenging the widespread opinion according to which they were 
almost solely financed by benefactors and, hence, suffered from a chronic financial 
instability. However, if our reconstruction is probably more optimistic than that of 
Garnsey and Silver, for they deny to a large extent the role of civic money, it is 
nevertheless more pessimistic than Strubbe’s assessment, who, in our opinion, 
overestimates the contribution of benefactors. As we have already argued, this mistake 
of his owes much to his assumption that grain funds would be used every year and 
aimed at distributing grain for free rather than selling it at a loss.  
 The analysis undertaken with the aid of our Monte-Carlo simulation allows 
suggesting another reconstruction of this innovative system developed by the Greek 
cities, which simultaneously challenges both Garnsey and Silver exaggerated 
pessimism and Strubbe’s misunderstanding of the sitonía’s purpose. Grain funds often 
seem to have collapsed during their first few years of operation. At the same time, 
 
                                               
571 All sums are in sesterces (HS) 
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however, a significant proportion of them appears to have remained in operation over 
the mid- to long-term. What actually allowed those funds to become financially 
sustainable was precisely that they were not used every year: it is the accumulation of 
money in normal years (and of potential surpluses in the case of soft shortages) that 
allowed the constitution of a cash reserve that would become large enough to face an 
important shortage. The longer the fund continued in operation without the 
occurrence of a serious shortage, the greater the probability that it would succeed in 
facing such a shortage. Moreover, when they managed to survive withdrawals of 
money during their early years, we have seen that a certain proportion of grain funds 
could experience a relief and a new (although brief) phase of accumulation. From a 
critical point, however, the majority of grain funds would see their cash reserve decline 
inexorably as they had to cope with more shortages. What actually must have been 
fatal to almost any grain fund was the occurrence of a succession of serious shortages 
over a relatively short period of time. Yet, despite the significant frequency of crashes 
in the first years, and even though most grain funds would collapse at some point, this 
institution appeared sufficiently resilient to ancient Greeks and Romans to be kept in 
use. Case studies of grain funds of the Hellenistic period seem to confirm these 
conclusions: at Delos, J. Sosin has challenged the idea that the sitonía suffered from a 
chronic deficit572, while L. Migeotte reached similar conclusions with regard to grain 
funds of Samos573. Epigraphic documents also provide empirical examples of very long 
term survivals of civic funds: the sitonía of Delos lasted for about a century and a 
half574, while the famous foundation established by Demosthenes of Oenoanda a little 
before AD 124 for the funding of a festival (the Demostheneia) was still in operation by 
AD 260575. In this respect, the long institutional life of the sitonìa (4th c. BC – 3rd c. AD) 
is probably due to the fact that, in spite of being an unstable system, it allowed a 
significant proportion of funds to remain sustainable over a sufficiently long period to 
provide a shield against the effect of shortages  
3.2.3.2 The efficiency condition  
 That a significant proportion of grain funds remained financially sustainable does 
not mean, however, that the system was efficient. Sustainability relates to the 
difference between revenues and expenditures, while efficiency concerns the number 
of mouth that can be fed through this mechanism, i.e. the per capita quantity of grain 
 
                                               
572 Sosin (2003), 78-79 
573 Migeotte (2014), 665-667 
574 Bresson (2016), p. 335 
575 Initial foundation : Mitchell (1990), pp. 183-193 ; mention in AD 260 : Hall & Milner (1994), p. 30 
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purchasable via the fund. Thus, we should turn towards the question of whether the 
sitonìa could have been an efficient system. Or, to phrase it differently, to examine 
under which conditions the efficiency of grain fund was preserved or altered. 
 Let us consider an initial cash reserve of the fund (F0) made of several monetary 
contributions (both public and private). The quantity of grain that can be purchased 
with this sum is :  
𝑄0 =
𝐹0
𝑝0
 
 
Where p0 is the price per modius of grain at initial time; the evolution of the cash 
reserve of the grain fund is a function of the difference between the monetary 
contributions to the fund and the withdrawals of money to buy grain in times of 
shortage. The aggregate income represented by the contributions (B, C) and the 
withdrawals (W) expresses the absolute variation of the cash reserve (ΔF). 
 
𝐹𝑡 = 𝐹0 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 −𝑊𝑡 = 𝐹0 + ∆𝐹  
 
The quantity of grain purchasable at time t is thus :  
 
𝑄𝑡 =
𝐹𝑡
𝑝𝑡
        (1) 
 
where pt is the price at time t ; the evolution of prices through time is simply given by :  
 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝0 ∙ (1 + 𝜏)
𝑡   
 
where τ is the annual growth  rate of prices. Through linear interpolation, we can 
estimate pt using the aggregate rate of price increases over the period : 
𝜏̅ = ∑ 𝜏𝑡
𝑇
𝑡     𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝0 ∙ (1 + 𝜏̅)       (2) 
Injecting equations (2) into (1) yields : 
 
𝑄𝑡 =
𝐹𝑡
𝑝0 ∙ (1 + 𝜏̅)
         (3) 
 
The per capita purchasable quantity (q) can now simply be obtained by dividing both 
members of the equation by the population of potential recipients (P) :  
 
𝑞𝑡 =
𝑄𝑡
𝑃𝑡
=
𝐹𝑡
𝑝0 ∙ (1 + 𝜏̅) ∙ 𝑃𝑡
 (4) 
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Similarly, the initial purchasable per capita quantity is :  
 
𝑞0 =
𝑄0
𝑃0
=
𝐹0
𝑝0 ∙ 𝑃0
         (5) 
 
For the per capita purchasable quantity to remain constant over time, q0 must be equal 
to qt; after isolating p0 in equations (4) and (5), equalizing them, and rearranging, we 
obtain :  
 
𝑞𝑡 = 𝑞0 ∙
𝐹𝑡
𝐹0
∙
𝑃0
𝑃𝑡
∙ (
1
1 + 𝜏̅
)   (6) 
 
The equation can be further transformed by accounting for the variation in population. 
Population growth obeys a simple exponential function of the form : 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃0 ∙ (1 + 𝑔𝑝)
𝑡 
which can be approximated using the aggregate population growth rate over the 
period, as we did above for the simplification of price increases : 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃0 ∙ (1 + 𝑔𝑝̅̅ ̅)  
 
After rearranging, we can rewrite equation (6) 576 : 
 
𝑞𝑡
𝑞0
=
1 + 𝑔𝐹
(1 + 𝜏 ̅) ∙ (1 + 𝑔𝑝̅̅ ̅)
 
 
In order for purchasable quantity of grain to remain at least constant, we must have :  
 
𝑞𝑡 ≥ 𝑞0 
 
The efficiency condition of the grain funds is thus :  
 
1 + 𝑔𝐹
(1 + 𝜏 ̅) ∙ (1 + 𝑔𝑝̅̅ ̅)
≥ 1 
 
⇒ 1 + 𝑔𝐹 ≥ 1 + 𝜏 ̅ + 𝑔𝑝̅̅ ̅ + 𝜏 ̅ ∙  𝑔𝑝̅̅ ̅ 
 
Since 𝑔𝑝̅̅ ̅ and 𝜏 ̅ are rather low, the expression 𝜏 ̅ ∙  𝑔𝑝̅̅ ̅ can be taken as negligible; after 
simplification, the efficiency condition reduces to : 
 
                                               
576 Since: 𝐹𝑡
𝐹0
= 1 + 𝑔𝐹 , where gF is the growth rate of the cash reserve. 
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𝑔𝐹 ≥ 𝜏 ̅ + 𝑔𝑝̅̅ ̅ 
 
We thus arrive at the following rule :  
 
For a grain fund to remain efficient (i.e. to be able to purchase a constant per capita 
quantity of grain), the annual growth rate of its cash reserve must be superior or equal to 
the sum of the aggregate rate of price increases and of the aggregate growth rate of the 
number of recipients over the considered period.  
 
We naturally have no more data on the efficiency of grain funds than we do 
concerning its sustainability. A full assessment of the question would require an 
extended Monte-Carlo simulation which would take into account population growth 
and price dynamics. This was unfortunately beyond the scope of this investigation. 
 
3.2.4 The decline of grain-related institutions in the 3rd c. AD : an 
attempt of explanation 
3.2.4.1 The demographic and economic impact of the Antonine Plague 
 
After this thorough discussion on two specific grain supply institutions, it is now worth 
going back to the chronological graph presented at the beginning of this chapter 
(section 3.1.2) and trying to explain the observed pattern. The first ‘peak’ around AD 
130-150 largely results, in my opinion, from the general flourishing of the Roman 
economy and of élite munificence in the mid-second c. AD, which are also exhibited in 
various other datasets, albeit not always with the same sequence. For what regards the 
second peak, in the early 3rd c. AD, I have suggested above that it might be a side-effect 
of the Antonine Plague. In order to properly examine this hypothesis, let us open a 
digression on this subject and assess the evidence we have regarding the plague in Asia 
Minor and its impact.  
 As far as documents are concerned, recent accounts of literary (Aristides, Galen 
and Lucian) and epigraphic evidence of the plague in Anatolia have been presented 
and discussed separately by Alfredina Storchi-Marino577 and Danielle Gourevitch578. 
 
                                               
577 Storchi Marino (2012), pp. 37-44 
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Despite the fact that no palaeopathological study has yet (to my knowledge at least) 
definitely confirmed the presence of smallpox in Roman Anatolia, and although much 
of the literary evidence is indirect, it is in my opinion very difficult not to admit that 
the province has indeed been struck by the epidemic. 
 How grave its demographic and economic effects were, though, is debatable. An 
important prerequisite for this is the ever-increasing confidence in the identification of 
the plague as smallpox579, which allows narrowing the range of the intrinsic mortality 
rate of the epidemic. Estimates of its actual mortality rate however vary significantly: 
from about 1-2% 580 to 50%581. With a cautious and critical calculation, Littman & 
Littman nuance those extremes and arrive at an overall mortality rate of 10%, while 
Harris considers a 16% mortality rate (for the first wave) as optimistic582. Yet, in what is 
the only stochastic model of the plague’s diffusion (that is, a model accounting 
together for the intrinsic properties of the disease, some quantitative data and 
assumptions regarding the Empire’s population size and density, and the randomness 
of contagion through human-to-human interactions), Yan Zelener concluded that the 
mortality rate ranged between 22% and 24% in the first 20 years. Moreover, as Asia 
Minor was among the most densely populated regions of the Empire, and since 
smallpox is a density-dependent disease, it is probable that its effects were closer to the 
higher mortality estimates, and that mortality rates were higher in cities than in the 
countryside.  
 These estimates, however, only regard the ‘direct’ mortality rate, that is, the 
mortality due to the plague specifically. But one should also consider its indirect 
mortality. Indeed, as Braudel noted concerning the preindustrial era, a disease is only 
rarely diffused alone: more often, epidemics involve various pathogenic agents583. This 
is a very important aspect because, while the surviving population has gained a higher 
level of immunity regarding the diseased by which it has been infected (here, 
smallpox), it ends up with a lower degree of immunity regarding other infections or 
pathogenic agents, as several immunological studies tend to demonstrate584. This 
means that people who were not killed by the Plague itself were more likely to die from 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
578 Gourevitch (2013), pp. 85-95 
579 Littman & Littman (1973), pp. 243-255 ; Haas (2006), p. 1093 sqq. 
580 Seeck (1910), pp. 398 sqq 
581 Gilliam (1961), pp. 228 sqq 
582 Harris (2012), p. 336 
583 Braudel (1979), p. 81 
584 See for example : Zavitz et al. (2010), pp. 2001-2013 ; Mehsen-Cêtre & Cazanave (2017), pp. 29-33. One 
typical example is that of the Staphylococcus Aureus, most often contracted by immunocompromised 
individuals. 
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other pathogenic agents against which, in normal circumstances, they would have 
been more resistant. As a consequence, starting from the relatively low estimate by 
Littman & Littman, the total mortality rate of the epidemic must have been higher 
than 10%. 
 Yet, mortality rate alone does not account in and of itself for the economic 
consequences of the epidemic, and an important stream of scholars has precisely 
contested the seriousness of such an impact on the Roman economy. Therefore, in 
order to avoid mere speculation and allow us to identify a quantifiable behavioral 
mechanism, we need to examine how our Sraffa-Hill model of agricultural output 
evolves under conditions of population contraction. At this stage of the argument, this 
is, at least, the contribution I would like to bring to this debate, in the absence of any 
new dataset. To do this, mathematics provides us with a powerful tool: differential 
calculus. From a mathematical point of view, the impact of a demographic contraction 
on agricultural production can be expressed as the derivative of our production 
function with respect to population, that is : dQ/dP. In doing so however, two different 
time spans should be considered: a first phase where the demographic contraction 
occurs faster than any possible adjustment of the cultivated area or proportion of 
agricultural labor, and a second phase where agricultural labor and cultivated area can 
be extended or reduced.  
 
❖ Short run 
 
In chapter 2, the following function has been proposed :  
 
𝑄 = ℎ ∙
𝐴𝑎
𝜖 ∙ 𝐿𝑎
𝑛
𝜃 ∙ 𝐴𝑎
𝑚 + 𝐿𝑎
𝑛  
 
Yet, at the macroeconomic level, we may consider that land and labor are governed by 
the same coefficient of cooperativity, implying that they don’t evolve fully 
independently and with the same flexibility as they do at the microeconomic level. 
Hence, for the macroeconomic case, we should consider the production function for: 
m = n and ε = 1, that is :  
 
𝑄 = ℎ ∙
𝐴𝑎 ∙ 𝐿𝑎
𝑛
𝜃 ∙ 𝐴𝑎
𝑛 + 𝐿𝑎
𝑛           (1) 
 
In order to express total output in terms of population, we may express cultivated 
surface and agricultural labor the following way :  
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{
              𝐴𝑎 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝐴          (2)
𝐿𝑎 = 𝑘 ∙ 𝑃𝑎
𝑃𝑎 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑃
              ⇒ 𝐿𝑎 = 𝛼𝑘𝑃      (3)
 
 
Where a is the share of total land (A) devoted to agriculture (in %), k is the share of 
agricultural population at work (that is, roughly 90% taking into account young 
children and elderly people), and α is the proportion of agricultural population in total 
population. The equation can thus be rewritten as :  
 
𝑄 = ℎ ∙ 𝑎
𝐴 ∙ 𝑃𝑛
Φ𝐴𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛
 
 
Where : 
 
Φ = 𝐾 ∙ 𝑎𝑛        𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ     𝐾 =
𝜃
(𝑘 ∙ 𝛼)𝑛
     (4) 
 
By applying the rule of quotient derivatives, we can now calculate dQ/dP :  
 
Setting :  
 
𝑢 = ℎ ∙ 𝑎 ∙ 𝐴 ∙ 𝑃𝑛 
𝑣 = Φ ∙ 𝐴𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛 
We may apply the rule of quotient derivatives :  
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑃
=
𝑣∙
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑃
−𝑢∙
𝑑𝑣
𝑑𝑃
𝑣2
  considering that, in the 
short run, a, k and α are constants. The result is the following differential equation :  
 
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑃
= ℎ ∙ 𝑎 ∙ 𝑛
Φ𝐴𝑛+1 ∙ 𝑃𝑛−1
( Φ𝐴𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛)2
 
 
This equation however only provides a relationship between the absolute variation 
(dP) in population and the absolute variation of output (dQ). In order to infer the 
evolution of per capita output, we might want to compare the relative variation of each 
of these variables, that is, their growth rate: gQ = dQ/Q and gP = dP/P. The link between 
the derivative dQ/dP and the growth rate is a straightforward one and is expressed by a 
measure known in economics as the elasticity (here noted ζ) : the elasticity of output 
with regard to population is simply the ratio of the output growth rate by population 
growth rate: 
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𝜁 =
𝑑𝑄
𝑄
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
=
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝑄
 
 
Hence, the elasticity is simply the derivative of total output with respect to population 
(dQ/dP), multiplied by the (initial) ratio of population to output (P/Q). We thus have : 
 
𝜁 =
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝑄
= ℎ ∙ 𝑎 ∙ 𝑛
Φ𝐴𝑛+1 ∙ 𝑃𝑛−1
( Φ𝐴𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛)2
∙
𝑃
𝑄
 
 
As Q is simply the initial output function, the equation becomes : 
 
𝜁 = ℎ ∙ 𝑎 ∙ 𝑛
Φ𝐴𝑛+1 ∙ 𝑃𝑛−1
( Φ𝐴𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛)2
∙
𝑃
ℎ ∙ 𝑎
𝐴 ∙ 𝑃𝑛
Φ𝐴𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛
 
 
Which after simplification yields :  
 
𝜁 =
𝑛Φ𝐴𝑛
Φ𝐴𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛
 
 
By dividing the numerator and denominator by 𝐴𝑛 in order to make population density 
(𝜌 = 𝑃/𝐴) apparent, and expressing Φ in terms of its components (eq. 4), we get : 
 
𝜁 =
𝑛 ∙ 𝐾 ∙ 𝑎𝑛
𝐾 ∙ 𝑎𝑛 + 𝜌𝑛
 
 
Finally, we may once again divide both the numerator and denominator by 𝑎𝑛 in order 
to express the output-population elasticity in terms of the agricultural population 
density (noted 𝜔 = 𝜌/𝑎) measuring the number of inhabitants per cultivated hectare : 
 
𝜁 =
𝑔𝑄
𝑔𝑃
=
𝑛 ∙ 𝐾
𝐾 + 𝜔𝑛
 
 
In order to assess whether the per capita output increased, decreased or remained 
unaffected by the demographic contraction, the only thing to do is to calculate 
whether the elasticity is inferior or superior to 1 : if 𝜁 = 1, per capita agricultural output 
remained unchanged ; if 𝜁 > 1, the reduction of output is higher than the population 
contraction which means per capita output decreased, and the opposite is true for 𝜁 <
1. Obviously, what matters here is the order of magnitude rather than the exact value 
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of 𝜁. Now, the computation is farily easy : average population density in Asia Minor has 
been estimated at 15 hab/ha (or 0.15 hab/km2); if the proportion of land under grain 
approaches 0.3, this sets 𝜔 somewhere near 0.5; as for the parameters: I have set n at a 
rather modest level of labor cooperativity with n = 2, k equals roughly 0.9, and α is set 
at 0.85 (meaning that we assume 85% of population is engaged in agriculture). With 
these values assessed, we obtain that 𝜁 ≅ 1.99…This means that a contraction of 10 % 
of total population would have reduced grain production by approximately 20% (–0.1 x 
1.99). From this, it is now possible to calculate the impact on the growth rate of per 
capita production. Per capita output is simply total output divided by population : q = 
Q/P. Following an elementary rule of mathematics, the growth rate of a quotient of 
variables is equal to the subtraction of the growth rate of the denominator from the 
growth rate of the numerator :  
 
𝑔𝑞 = 𝑔𝑄 − 𝑔𝑃 = −0.2 − (−0.1) ≅ −0.1 
 
In these conditions, the short run, a mortality rate of 10% due to the Antonine plague 
would have caused a reduction of grain output per capita by a little less than 10%. If, 
taking into account indirect mortality, we set the mortality rate at 12.5 %, then, per 
capita grain output would have been reduced by some 12.3 %. Of course, such a generic 
conclusions obviously conceals different situations between town and countryside, as 
urban areas would be more damaged by the epidemic: an interesting passage in the 
Life of St-Nicholas the Sionite relates how the town of Myra has suffered important 
grain supply difficulties in the aftermath of the Justinianic Plague because many 
peasants stopped travelling to the city to sell their grain because they were fearing for 
their health585. 
 
 
 
❖ Long run 
 
 Now, what happens in the longer run? Basically, two important things change: 
first, the demographic decline has to a certain extent been compensated by new births; 
second, two parameters which were considered fixed in the short run are now variable: 
the extent of cultivated surfaces and the share of agricultural labor in total population, 
 
                                               
585 Vita Nicolai Sionitae, c. 52. Although peasant farmers did not represent the majority of urban grain 
suppliers, a general cessation of their activities might still hav a significant effect on the total available 
quantity of grain (cf. De Ligt (1993), pp. 212-213). 
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while the employment rate of agricultural population and the level of agricultural 
technology might still be considered constant. In order to provide a mathematically 
and economically accurate theorization of the mechanisms involved, the logic applied 
is exactly the same as the one developed for the short run case, that is, calculating the 
derivative of total output with respect to population. The mathematics are however 
substantially more complex, and for this reason I present only the final result (the full 
mathematical proof is at the reader’s disposal in the Appendixes). After developing the 
derivative dQ/dP in the long run, we obtain the following equation : 
 
 
 
In which gα, gA, gs, and gp are respectively the growth rate of the proportion of 
agricultural population, of total land surface, of the share of land devoted to 
agricultural activities, and of population, while H is a parameter measuring the effect 
of a change in one of these variables upon per capita output. The meaning of this 
equation is that the growth rate of per capita agricultural output is a weighted sum of 
the growth rate of the share of agricultural population in total population, of the 
proportion of land devoted to agricultural activities, of total land surface and of total 
population. 
  Since it is an equation containing four unknown (population growth rate is 
considered exogenous), there is no straightforward solution, and hence no single 
interpretation. But we may envisage a series of scenarios in which we consider some 
possible values of each variable, and hence compute the value of the fourth variable. 
Said differently, this equation may answer questions such as : ‘If the output of grain per 
capita is considered unaffected in the long run (i.e., if its growth rate equals 0), what 
should have been the values of the relative change in agricultural population and in 
agricultural surfaces ?’; or ‘if the share of population engaged in agriculture remained 
unchanged and if total land surface was reduced by 5%, how did per capita output 
evolved?’.  
 However, this equation contains a non-negligible element of complexity, because 
the factor H is not a constant. Indeed, H represents the elasticity of output with 
respect to agricultural labor force, that is :  
 
𝐻 = 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡. (𝑄, 𝐿𝑎) =
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝐿𝑎
𝑄
 
 
Since Q is the initial production function, the mathematical expression of H is :  
 
𝑔𝑞 = 𝐻 ∙ 𝑔𝛼 + (1 − 𝐻)𝑔𝑠 + (1 − 𝐻)𝑔𝐴 + (𝐻 − 1)𝑔𝑃 
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𝐻 =
𝑛𝜃
𝜃 + 𝛾𝑛
=
𝑛
?̅? 𝜔𝑛 + 1
=
𝑛
𝑘𝑛
𝜃 (
𝛼𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛
+ 1
 
 
In economic terms, the parameters H, 1–H and H–1 respectively represent the ‘impact’ 
of a relative change in (the share of) agricultural population, agricultural surfaces, total 
land surface and population on per capita output. The ratio α/a is simply the quotient 
of agricultural population (Pa) to agricultural surface (Aa), divided by population 
density; if we label σ the ratio Pa / Aa, and M the constant kn/θ, then, the expression of 
H can be reduced to : 
 
𝐻 =
𝑛
1 +𝑀𝜎𝑛
 
 
With :  
 
𝜎 =
𝑃𝑎
𝐴𝑎
=
𝛼𝜌
𝑎
      
 
As we notice, thus, H is conversely proportional to the ratio α/a : when the share of 
agricultural population grows faster than the proportion of agricultural surfaces, the 
effect of increasing the share of agricultural population is reduced, while the impact of 
a change in agricultural surfaces is increased. The opposite is true, of course, if a grows 
faster than α. Each change in α or a has thus a feedback effect on their specific impact 
upon per capita agricultural output, but not necessarily so as to cancel (or considerably 
multiply) this impact.  
 For the sake of the argument, let us consider the first question : what does the 
equation implies in the case of no sensitive effect of population contraction on per 
capita agricultural output in the long run ? In this situation, the equation becomes :  
 
𝐻𝑔𝛼 + (1 − 𝐻)𝑔𝑠 + (1 − 𝐻)𝑔𝐴 + (𝐻 − 1)𝑔𝑃 = 0 
 
As we are considering the question at the macroeconomic level, total land surface (that 
is, devoted to all sorts of activities) can be taken as fixed (gA = 0). This reduces the 
equation to : 
 
𝐻𝑔𝛼 + (1 − 𝐻)𝑔𝑠 = −(𝐻 − 1)𝑔𝑃 
 
Population growth rate on the long run, even compensated by increased fertility rate, 
remains negative; If we start with an optimistic population contraction (for the first 
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generation only) of minimum 10%, we may posit this initial demographic shock to have 
been reduced by half in the long run. Since H always superior to 1,it implied that the 
right side of the equation  if a positive term (a multiplication of two negative terms). 
This equation, therefore, describes a straight line of negative slope, showed on the 
graph below by the line AB :  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What this graph and its corresponding equation mean is fairly simple : in order for per 
capita agricultural output to have remained roughly constant in conditions of population 
contraction over the long run, then either the proportion of agricultural surfaces, or the 
share of population engaged in agriculture, or both, must have increased. If that is the 
case, we may well admit that the consequences of the Antonine Plague have been 
successfully overcome in the long run, but since this requires either the conversion of 
surfaces previously devoted to non-agricultural production into agricultural land, or an 
increased share of the population (primarily) engaged in agriculture, this would have 
lowered the proportion of total surplus available for urban/non-agricultural activities. 
As I have said previously in developing arguments of this sort, I am not saying that this 
is actually what happened in the first half of the 3rd century AD, since I have no 
archaeological or historical data to back this claim so far. I am arguing, however, that 
this is the necessary consequence of positing a roughly negligible effect of the 
population contraction due to the Antonine Plague on per capita agricultural output. 
 Yet, several arcaheological surveys have stressed that there is no reliable trace of 
agricultural crisis in the eastern provinces in the 3rd c. AD and after; on the contrary, 
𝑔𝛼 
𝑔𝑠 
g
q 
> 0 
g
q 
= 0 
A 
B 
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many of them point towards an expansion of rural occupation586 and lively rural 
production. If our scattered evidence is in any way representative of a general trend, it 
might be argued that the 3rd c. saw a progressive and relative de-urbanization of Asia 
Minor – partly as a consequence of the solutions set up as responses to the 
demographic changes of the late 2nd and early 3rd century – but which does not 
necessarily indicate that material conditions were in any way damaged.  
 
3.2.4.2 The disappearance of the sitonìa  
 
I have argued above that the sitonìa was probably a less fragile system than has been 
previously assumed. Yet, grain funds disappear from the documents in the course of 
the 3rd c. AD, and this is only one the manifestations of the general decline of grain-
related interventions. How should we explain the disappearance of this 700 years old 
institution? Several causes can be suggested, which I unfortunately can only briefly 
sketch out. Many aspects of this issue deserve further research, and I can do no more 
than suggest some potential dynamics. 
 The reasons of the disappearance of the sitonía should be sought, I think, into 
changes in the conditions determining its efficiency and sustainability. These 
conditions are summed up in the equation I have derived above (section 3.2.3.2) :  
 
𝑔𝐹 ≥ 𝑔𝑃∗ + 𝜏̅ 
 
The growth rate of the cash reserve of the fund must be equal or superior to the sum of 
the growth rate of the population of beneficiaries and of the “inflation” rate (more 
accurately the rate of increase of grain prices).  
 On the basis of the preceding analysis of the consequence of the Antonine 
Plague, I think it is reasonable to argue that a non-negligible pressure has been put on 
available grain output per capita in the aftermath of the Antonine Plague, even if these 
effects might have been softened in the long run at the cost of important changes in 
labor and land use. As far as grain funds are concerned, the first consequence of a 
reduced per capita available output is an increase of the proportion of the population 
which occasionally or regularly relied on the intervention of grain funds on the market.  
 A second effect, however, should not be disregarded: the rate of price increases. 
Here, it should be made very clear that we are not considering any general increase of 
 
                                               
586 Lewit (1991), p. 48 & p. 86. 
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the price of grain itself – since available evidence shows an overall stability of grain 
prices during the most part of the 3rd c. AD – but on the cost of grain purchase by the 
grain funds. Broadly speaking, the price of grain can be divided in two components: its 
intrinsic price (p0), and the unit cost of transport (c):  
 
𝑝 = 𝑝0 + 𝑐 
 
Regarding the funding of the sitonía, it is rather unit transport costs per capita that 
matters, that is : c/P. A very simple model might usefully illustrate this point. Since 
unit transport cost can be seen as a linear function of distance (c = β*δ, where δ is 
distance ), unit transport cost per capita can be described by the following equation : 
 
𝑐̅ =
𝑐
𝑃
=
𝛽 ∙ 𝛿
𝑃
=
𝛽 ∙ 𝛿
?̅? ∙ 𝜌
 
 
In which β is the unitary cost of transport per unit of distance, ρ is population density, 
and A is total surface, taken as a constant since we operate at a macroeconomic level. 
From this equation, one easily understands that unit transport cost per capita increase 
as population density decreases, unless imports are operated from shorter distances. 
Said differently, because of the sharp decrease in population density, the dispersion of 
population through space maintained roughly similar levels of transport costs with 
fewer people to pay for them, resulting in a higher unit cost of transport per capita. 
Since the grain of the sitonia was often resold at a loss on the urban market, this 
phenomenon allows explaining why grain funds started facing higher costs whereas 
the overall level of grain prices remained stable. 
 In addition to that, as argued in Chap. II (section 3.3.4), with the reduction of 
population density, the level of contractual rents must have fallen. Since towns were 
largely supplied by the commercialization of a share of those rents, this must have put 
the urban grain market under stress. Furthermore, civic finances were probably not left 
unaffected: with the decrease in output and population, the amount of taxes collected 
by the cities is likely to have been reduced too, as well as the level of rents collected on 
city-owned land. 
 Further, and more general effects, should also be considered : as stated in Chap.I, 
in the 3rd c. AD the favorable climatic conditions which had prevailed during the 
Roman Optimum started to fade away in different regions of the Mediterranean, 
although in Asia Minor it is still unclear whether the climatic pattern mostly changed 
in the 3rd or 4th c. The progressive end of the warm, wet and stable climatic period 
which had lasted some two centuries probably resulted in a lower productivity of land 
and in a higher frequency of bad harvests. The disappearance of the sitonìa in the 3rd c. 
AD is broadly concomitant to the overall decline of civic munificence which was 
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probably not unrelated to the Antonine Plague either, although fundamental changes 
in political culture seem to have taken place587. As far as grain-related institutions are 
concerned, the first effect of such decline in civic munificence was to reduce the 
number of potential candidates to the office of sitónès. A final, yet speculative 
explanation may be found in the monetary context. C. Kastari recently argued that the 
mid-3rd c. AD inaugurated a period of progressive demonetization in the eastern 
provinces of the Roman Empire588 – although partly compensated in Asia Minor by 
civic mints. If she is right, this decrease in the available money supply might also have 
jeopardized the efficiency of grain funds, since the sitonia was a monetary mechanism. 
At a time when the population relying on grain funds likely increased, less cash would 
have been available…None of all these factors gave a fatal blow to the sitonía, but their 
combination explains largely, I think, the disappearance of this civic institution.  
 
* * * 
On the basis of our digression regarding the economic impact of the Antonine Plague, 
it is now time to reconsider the graph of fig. 16 displaying the chronological evolution 
of grain-related interventions. I have argued above that the two peaks (125-160 AD and 
205-240 AD) should be explained by different dynamics. In fact, there is only one 
governing variable: the propensity for élites and civic institutions to intervene – 
against, of course, the evolution in epigraphic fashion. However, the reasons why such 
interventions took place may well vary through time. I think that the early 2nd c. peak 
is largely explained by the increasing prosperity in the Roman Empire as a whole589, 
and among its élite classes in particular. Civic revenues likely followed the general 
upward trend. Since benefactions and contributions to existing supply schemes were 
two major outlets of élite and municipal incomes, in a context of reassertion of civic 
ideals, it is logical that the overall index of grain-related intervention went up.  
 The 3rd c. peak is however, in my opinion, another story. Two factors should be 
presented separately: (1) I have claimed above that, despite increasing skepticism, the 
Antonine plague probably had deleterious effects on average per capita agricultural 
output. This effect was stronger in the short and medium run, and may have been 
softened in the long run at the expense of a higher proportion of agricultural labor and 
of extended agricultural surfaces; (2) As argued in Chap. I, there is substantial evidence 
indicating that the 3rd c. was one of progressive climatic cooling, inaugurating the end 
 
                                               
587 On the decline of civic munificence : Zuiderhoek (2009), pp. 155-157 
588 Katsari (2005), p. 270 sqq ; Katsari (2011), pp. 129-136 & 165-166 
589 Jongman (2007 b), pp 183-199; Jongman (2012), pp. 257-258 
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of the Roman Optimum. The first consequence of this colder and dryer climate was to 
increase the probability of bad harvests and to exercise a downward pressure on 
aggregate output.  
 As a corollary to these two external variables, two feedback mechanisms likely 
took place : (a) because agricultural per capita output was put under strain, episodes of 
food distress were probably more frequent, hence increasing the occurrences of 
malnutrition. But, as Garnsey rightly pointed out, malnutrition affects labor 
productivity590, which in return would add further constraints on output; (b) moreover, 
as is widely supported by medical research, malnutrition also lowered immune 
defenses, which raised the direct and indirect mortality of the Plague. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As described by the above scheme, it is likely that the aftermath of the Antonine 
Plague was a period of increased food distress, before its resolution over the long run 
by different possible adaptive strategies involving a new configuration between 
population and resources. I think therefore that this period of ‘frumentary’ difficulties 
fostered élite and governmental intervention, although a (temporary) urban revival 
under the Severi also played a role. However, as for why did grain-related intervention 
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started decreasing from the mid-2nd c. onwards, I have no definitive answer. Part of the 
explanation may be that, precisely because of an acme in living standards, such 
interventions became less needed; or perhaps, after an increasing phase of grain-
related interventions, civic élites were in search for benefactions which would be more 
rewarding in terms of symbolic capital591. But none of these suggestions can so far be 
firmly ascertained. 
3.3 Benefactors and officials: two sides of the same coin? 
3.3.1 Patterns of civic grain-related munificence 
In section 1 of this chapter we highlighted the different levels at which grain supply 
interventions took place, with civic interventions being the most frequent. Yet, 
interventions by citizens took many forms, which now need to be discussed in some 
detail. We have already seen in the previous part that a major form of intervention 
consisted in holding one or many of the numerous grain-related offices recorded in 
inscriptions and literary sources, the tasks of which have been described as accurately 
as possible. Yet, this still leaves out of the discussion the various types of benefactions 
that could be performed either by officials or by ‘spontaneous’ benefactors – i.e. those 
not bound by any public charge – outside the framework or grain-related offices. These 
can be organized into six categories :  
 
 1° – Closer to the working of grain fuds already described above, we encounter 
gifts of money to the different funds managed by grain-related officials – mostly the 
sitonia but also the agoranomia, as is the case in the city of Illyas in Pisidia during the 
3rd c. AD, where a woman named Ammia provided money ‘for the sitonia and the 
agoranomia’592, or in Phrygia somewhere after AD 165 where a chreophylax provided 
money for the grain fund593. Another example, also from Pisidia, records a certain 
Kleon who gave 500 denarii for the sitonìa594. The common feature of these three 
examples is that none of the three benefactors has ever held the office of agoranomos 
 
                                               
591 On this notion, see below : section 3.3.4 
592 Ramsay, CB, n° 146 
593 LBW, 992 = OGIS, 511 
594 BCH 10 (1886), n°1, p. 500 
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or sitonès during his career (except perhaps in the case of the individual mentioned in 
the Phrygian inscription, which is mutilated to such an extent that we cannot rule out 
that it contained references to other offices). In some other cities, however, no specific 
institutional mechanism is mentioned, as in Adada in Pisidia where a benefactor 
simply provided ‘2000 denarii for the provision of grain’, perhaps because this city did 
not develop the system of a grain fund595.  
 2° – Monetary contributions of the first category were channeled through one of 
the civic funds dealing with the grain supply. But we also encounter monetary gifts to 
the population : in Sardis in the first quarter of the second century AD, a benefactor 
gave ‘2 denarii to each citizen for buying grain’596; a similar distribution of money to 
the citizen was performed in Prusias during a shortage by a benefactor named P. 
Domitius Iulianus597.  
 3° – The third category of benefactions consists of sales of grain – or other 
foodstuffs – usually in time of shortage, at a price below the current crisis price but still 
higher than the market price before shortage. Such operations are known as 
parapraseis, paratima or epeuonismoi598. In only very rare cases are the details of such 
operations mentioned, as in Sebastopolis where an unknown benefactor is said to have 
‘sold 4,000 modii of grain below their value at a price of 1 denarius per modius, while it 
costed 2 denarii per modius’599, thus spending 2,000 denarii from his own resources.  
 4° – Another important category, which has already been analyzed in some detail 
supra is that of contributions (mostly in kind) to the sitometria or triteia. As explained 
in the beginning of section 2 above, the word sitometria has often been used in the 
straightforward sense of a simple and direct grain distribution to a specific population, 
while in some specific cases such as that Lycia or the triteia of Pergamon and 
Thyateira, it referred to a civic system which more closely resembled the Egyptian 
grain-doles (sitèresia).  
 5° – Apart from gifts of money and sales, direct distribution of grain in kind by 
benefactors are also a major category of grain-related euergetism which, just as in the 
case of monetary contributions, should be treated separately from the contribution to 
civic institutionalized mechanisms. Apart from unspecific benefactions such as the 
distribution of 1,220 medimnoi of grain (about 8,280 modii) by Titus Flavius Damianus 
 
                                               
595 Sterrett, WE 293, 414 
596 Sardis, VII, 1, 56 
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599 McCabe, Sebastopolis, 6 
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in Ephesos in the second half of the 2nd c. AD, two different forms should be 
distinguished :  
 
▪ Banquets or public meals : The recipients of such meals might however 
vary from one case to another : in Stratonikeia during the mid-second c. 
AD, the priest Demetrios and an unknown priestess organized a meal ‘for 
citizens, strangers and slaves, both men and women’600; in the same city, 
in the second half of the second century, a benefactor named T. Flavius 
Aeneas ‘provided meal to all citizens, to Romans, to paroikoi, and to 
slaves’601. The very specification of such non-civic categories seems to 
suggest that such public meals were generally reserved to citizens. 
 
▪ Distributions targeting specific social sub-groups : in Oenoanda in AD 127, 
the benefactor Licinnius Longus distributed annually 4 modii of grain ( 
but for how many years we do not know) to each of the 500 members of 
the Gerousia602; and in Sillyon (Pamphylia), in the first quarter of the 3rd 
c. AD, the benefactress Menodora gave 1 modius of grain to each 
councilor, senator and member of the Assembly603; finally, in Xanthos 
around AD 152, the great benefactor Opramoas of Rhodiapolis 
distributed 10 modii of grain to each bouleutès604. 
 
 6° – Finally, the sixth and far less frequent category consists of gifts of grain-land 
to the cities by benefactors, which undoubtedly facilitated its grain supply by allowing 
the city to be provisioned from civic land, most likely in the form of a rent in kind on 
the domain’s produces: an unknown benefactor of Thasos in the 1st c. AD gives grain-
land to the city605. Similarly, in Kibyra in AD 72-73 the unused funds of the 
gymnasiarchic foundation established by Quitus Veranius Philagros are to serve for 
purchasing grain-land for the city606. Finally, in AD 238, Dioteimos of Samos 
establishes a foundation by purchasing a plot of land, among which grain-sown land, 
which he gives to the city for possession and use of all produces607.  
 
                                               
600 IK-Stratonikeia, 254 
601 IK-Stratonikeia, 210 
602 IGR III, 492 
603 IGR III, 802 
604 Balland, Fouilles de Xanthos, VII, n° 67 
605 BCH 45 (1921), pp. 157-158 
606 IGR IV, 915b 
607 IGR III, 422 
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3.3.2 Liturgies, magistracies, and euergetism : beyond the 
public/private opposition 
However, did all these food-related benefactions emanate from citizens operating 
outside civic charges (spontaneous benefactions), or did they proceed from some kind 
of customary expenditure related to magistracies or liturgies (munificence ob honorem, 
to use Paul Veyne’s concept608)? The question is legitimate, since it is tempting to 
interpret contributions to the grain supply taking place independently from any civic 
office as an index of the share of ‘private’ funding, while food-related benefactions 
performed by magistrates would rather indicate the action of the city – magistrates 
were indeed managing a civic fund for their expenditures. This approach is however 
inappropriate. Indeed, how should we interpret a distribution of food by a 
gymnasiarch, for instance? Formally, this is not part of his attributions. Yet, he is 
holding magistracy when he provides this gift. I have grouped these examples under 
the label of ‘cross-functional’ benefactions, to refine Veyne’s typology. But the 
interpretation of such examples is far from easy. Moreover, as we can learn from the 
curriculum of the benefactors, we are sometimes facing the case of acts of euergetism 
performed by former officials, who are not in office anymore. Again, is this 
‘spontaneous’ or ‘ob honorem’? In my opinion, it is not possible to say. If we look at the 
data with these criteria in mind, and if I ignore for the moment the time of the 
benefaction - not always clearly understandable from the documents, it should be said 
– we obtain the graph displayed on Fig.30 (below), based on a sample of 68 explicit 
grain gifts. As we can see, spontaneous benefactions account for some 30% of cases, ob 
honorem benefactions also make up 30% of the total, while the dominant category is 
that of ‘cross-functional’ benefactions. The interest of this figure is that it shows us the 
limits of categorization. The purely institutional analysis is therefore of little help here. 
 Another approach would be to examine whether grain related offices (here, let us 
focus on the sitonía) belonged to the liturgies (leitourgeiai) – compulsory burdensome, 
yet honorable, charges of public interest – or to the magistracies (archai) – honorific 
charges through which the official managed a public fund, sometimes contributing 
from his own resources, and associated with political privileges. Liturgists have to pay 
for their expenses almost entirely on their personal funds, while magistrates had a civic 
fund at their disposal, despite being already encouraged to add money from their own 
funds by Aristotle609. Hence, whether an office was a magistracy or a liturgy would give 
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us an idea of the role played by civic finances in its funding. In his seminal study about 
the cities of Asia Minor under Roman rule, A. Macro places the sitonia among the 
magistracies610. However, the occurrence of individuals being exempted from the 
sitonia under the reign of Hadrian611 seems to imply that – at this time – the office was 
a liturgy, as it is considered by E. Frézouls612. Also, two instances are known of 
individuals choosing to finance public buildings instead of undertaking the elaiothesia 
(the provision of oil)613, which suggest that this matter was closer to the liturgies. The 
same applied, perhaps, to the sitonia…In fact, since the Hellenistic period, the 
distinction between magistracies and liturgies was increasingly blurred from the 
financial point of view614: the former became more and more costly, the latter more 
and more prestigious as wealth was becoming an almost indispensable springboard to 
the leading offices of the city. Moreover, the legal pressure on promises of benefactions 
(pollicitationes) became more and more formalized under the Empire615.As P. Erdkamp 
writes: ‘the line between voluntary [private] gifts and coerced contributions often 
becomes very thin’616. 
 Hence, neither the distinction between spontaneous, ‘ob honorem’ or even ‘cross-
functional’ euergetism, nor the distinction between magistracies and liturgies can help 
us much in determining the relative share of public and private funds. The dead-end 
that we are facing here results from a fallacy of the question asked: we are trying to 
apply to ancient cities the modern dichotomy between public and private funds. I am 
well aware that the concepts of public and private existed already in Antiquity, albeit 
not exactly with the same meaning as today. For the Greeks, the private sphere was 
defined by the oikos, while Roman Law already introduced the distinction between 
ager privatus and ager publicus. However, the fact that this distinction existed as a 
concept and as an element of society does not imply that it was already as prominent 
as today, or that the boundaries of what was ‘public’ and what was ‘private’ were the 
same. But more importantly, it does not imply either that the dichotomy between 
public and private was radical or that it was the basis of a political conflict. This is, for 
instance, the fallacy in M. Silver’s reasoning regarding the sitonía, when he depicts a 
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struggle between a private sector reluctant to contribute to the civic expenses and 
roughly inefficient coercion measures set up by civic governments617. The idea of a 
radical and regularly conflictual separation between private and public funds, both 
attempting to extend their ‘living space’ is inherited from the development of modern 
States – that is, of juridical persons imposing a sovereign power onto physical persons. 
This view, in other words, confuses the existence of a public/private division with the 
existence of the concept of legal person, which only emerges in the 11th century618. 
Silver’s analysis, in this respect, appears somewhat anachronistic. In the model I 
developed for analyzing the sitonía, I may have given the impression of radically 
separating the contributions of benefactors from the civic funds. This was largely done 
for the sake of simplicity, in order to identify clearly the sources of funds of the 
mechanism; yet, the public/private dichotomy which, to a large extent, shapes the 
institutional structure of the world we live in should not be incautiously transposed to 
the context of ancient cities, where the major distinction remained between civic and 
non-civic elements, even though our current views of the public and private spheres 
owes much to Roman law. 
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3.3.3 Social profile, status and institutional role of benefactors  
Citizens were by far the most prominent actors and recipients engaged in munificence, 
whether related to grain or to public buildings and festivals619. In order to understand 
the factors determining grain-related interventions, it is thus worth analyzing the 
‘profile’ and status of liturgists or benefactors, as well as their position in the city’s 
institutional apparatus. In this section, we shall not engage in a proper 
prosopographical study of benefactors – which could undoubtedly shed an interesting 
light on the subject –, nor shall we discuss in detail a restricted number of benefactors; 
rather we will focus on studying the curriculum of individuals intervening in the grain 
supply from a statistical point of view in order to see whether or not some patterns 
emerge.  
 In the absence of a detailed prosopography, very little can be said of the real 
socio-economic status of these benefactors and officials, except when explicit mention 
is made, as is the case for the ‘public slave’ Onesimus in Balbura620 and the freedman 
Publius Aelius Onesimus in Nacolia621. But these are the only two such cases in our 
total sample of 156 identifiable benefactors. Female benefactors, similarly, are recorded 
six times, and thus represent some 3.85 % of the total – to which must be added the 
two cases where the benefaction is being performed by both husband and wife622. This 
is significantly less than the percentage of 8.15 % women (8 out of 98 benefactors) 
recorded in a complementary database relating to public buildings in Asia Minor (3rd c 
BC – early 2nd C. AD). The relevance of the comparison of the two dossiers is however 
limited by their differential chronological span: even though female ‘private’ 
euergetism emerges simultaneously to the rise of civic benefactors in the early 4th c. 
BC623, it is likely that the development of the imperial political framework influenced 
the participation of women in acts of munificence or fostered their association to their 
husband’s benefactions, in the form of what R. Van Bremen identifies as the 
construction of an ‘image of the couple’624. Although Van Bremen minimizes the role 
 
                                               
619 The notion of citizenship might of course be considered relative since a benefactor might well be 
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GIBM, 813 (on which Dignas (2006), pp. 76-77), or the construction financed by Kourasiô in Aspendos in 
the 3rd c. BC (Brixhe (1978), n°17)). Also, there is no difference in the treatment of female munificence 
compared to that of male benefactors : Bielman-Sanchez (2003), p. 189 ; Pont (2010), p. 337. 
624 Van Bremen (1996),  
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of Augustan ideology in this process, it is likely that the imperial couple embodied an 
important exemplum of the Empire which the provincial élite both imitated and re-
interpreted625. In this respect, it is possible that public buildings – and their corollary: 
dedications on stone, visibility and durability – provided a more conspicuous support 
to the display of couple or family euergetism than grain distributions or contributions 
to grain-supply schemes, explaining to some extent the discrepancy in the 
participation of women between grain-related benefactions and public buildings. 
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 Leaving the ‘gender-focused’ analysis in order to turn towards the institutional 
characterization, one might wonder what the civic curriculum of the officials and 
benefactors engaged in the grain supply might tell us. In a sample of 152 benefactors, a 
total of 478 civic offices (whether liturgies or magistracies) are mentioned626; the 
frequency of each category of office is shown by figure 7 above. Some of these 
categories already proceed from a first ‘grouping’ (‘secretaries’ include secretaries of 
the boulè, of the demos or of the Koinon, food commissioners contain euthèniarchai 
and eubosiarchai (on which see supra, section 1.1) etc..) but broadly speaking, the list 
details the different civic charges as clearly as possible. Nearly all existing civic offices 
are attested in this list. Grain-fund or oil-fund officials (sitonai, elaionai and their 
treasurers) belong to the three most frequent categories, which seems perfectly logical 
if we remember that they already constituted the two most frequent categories among 
specifically grain-related terms (cf. section 1.1). Priesthood is the most frequently 
mentioned office, which in itself is not surprising either given the pervasiveness of 
religious offices in civic life. For the rest, the list displays quite obvious features: offices 
such as the strategy, the gymnasiarchia, or the agonothesia are quite frequent, which is 
consistent with their importance among civic institutions.  
 From this stage, it is difficult to extract any more meaningful information from 
this ranking of offices. Yet, we might want to know what the distribution would look 
like if we proceed to a more generic – and hence, more coarse – grouping of the 
attested offices. On a slightly more restricted sample of inscriptions (127 instead of 
152), I thus divided the 416 mentioned offices into six main ‘spheres’ of civic life : (1) the 
‘decisional-deliberative’ sphere (bouleutai, prytaneis, archontes, demiourgoi, provincial 
officials and gerousiasts), (2) the ‘administrative’ sphere (secretaries, treasurers, 
account managers, chreophylakes, grammatophylakes, and nomophylakes), (3) the 
‘cultural-festive’ sphere (gymnasiarchs, agonothetai, panègyriarchai, and 
stephanèphoroi), (4) the ‘market regulation’ sphere (agoranomoi and sitophylakes), (5) 
the grain supply sphere (sitonai, food commissioners, and triteutai), and (6) the 
‘religious’ sphere (priests and temple officials such as neopyoi, kleidophoroi, etc…). To 
some extent, of course, such a classification is artificial since it is unlikely that ancient 
Greeks thought of civic offices in this way, and since we have already seen that there 
were no strict boundaries between the tasks of different officials. Yet, that ancient 
Greeks and Romans did not subjectively divide civic institutions along these lines does 
not hamper our highlighting of objective similarities. In this respect, sitonai are in any 
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case closer to the triteutai than to gymnasiarchs or prytaneis. Looking at the data from 
this perspective yielded the following pie chart:  
 
 
 
As we can see, the six spheres that we defined seem to take a roughly similar share of 
the total number of offices recorded among our sample of benefactors involved in the 
grain supply. Yet, in the absence of comparative data, it is difficult to determine 
whether the observed pattern is in any way particular or meaningful. We thus 
proceeded to the same analysis on an – unfortunately – smaller sample of about 45 
inscriptions recording benefactions on public buildings in Asia Minor between 28 BC 
and 117 AD, and totalizing some 73 offices, which provided the following results:  
Cultural-festive 
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Fig. 32.1. Sectorial distribution of the functions associated to officials
intervening in the urban grain supply (1st - 3rd c. AD) | n = 416
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Here, religious offices are overwhelmingly dominant, representing some 46% of all 
attested offices while grain supply officials are only a very minor category, and the 
variation in the relative share of the different spheres is clearly more intense. In 
statistical terms, the dispersion of the data is much larger, with a standard deviation of 
15.36 compared to the 2.86 in the sample of grain-related benefactors. Yet, since the 
two samples do not have the same size and mean, we might want to consolidate the 
comparison by a second indicator taking account of these differences. To do this, 
statisticians usually rely on an index called the ‘variation coefficient’ (VC, usually 
expressed in percentage), which is equal to the ratio of the sample’s standard deviation 
(σ) to its mean (μ): 𝑉𝐶 = 𝜎/𝜇. For the sample of grain-related benefactors, the 
variation coefficient is equal to 17.2 %, against 106.5 % for public building benefactors. 
Given the difference in sample size, the error margin on the first sample is about 3.8 % 
against 14.3 % on the second627, which as we can easily calculate is unlikely to affect the 
significance of the variation coefficient. 
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 Yet, one might rightfully argue that there is an intrinsic bias to the record of 
offices of public building benefactors: since many of these inscriptions consist of 
dedications, they usually have to be quite short for obvious reasons of limited space, 
cost and maximum visibility. Benefactors would thus be inclined to mention only their 
most recent offices, or those which they consider the most important in their career, or 
those which are most suitable to be displayed on the building they are contributing to; 
since temples are the most frequently donated buildings, it is thus quite logical that 
religious offices would also be the most frequent when dealing with public buildings. 
However, temples are not sufficiently more frequent compared to other types of 
buildings in order to explain the discrepancy between religious offices and cultural-
festive offices for example. Moreover, since we are discussing the variability between 
institutional spheres rather than the absolute frequencies, the belonging of a specific 
office to one of the six institutional sectors should be considered as a random process 
which would thus be independent from the number of offices mentioned per single 
inscription. Thus, neither these objections nor the error margins can invalidate the 
conclusion that offices of grain-related benefactors display a particularly uniform 
distribution among the major spheres of civic institutions. The most straightforward 
and logical way to interpret this result is probably to argue that élites of each sphere of 
civic life were more or less equally concerned with matters of grain-supply, while 
interventions on public buildings were more strongly connected to the specific sector 
to which the concerned building was related.  
3.3.4 The determinants of munificence and civic intervention: 
interpretative frameworks 
So far, this chapter has emphasized inter alia the widespread concern for grain supply 
in the cities of the Graeco-Roman East, both at the imperial, provincial and civic levels. 
What were, however, the specific reasons of such concern? In this final section, I would 
like to discuss the question of the motivations for civic élites to contribute – or not – to 
the city’s grain supply. Indeed, although civic interventions in the channels of grain 
supply are ubiquitous, grain-related benefactions are still a very minor category of 
euergetism as a whole. In order to understand the determinants of élite propensity to 
contribute to the grain supply, we will start by summarizing the determinants of 
euergetism as a whole, before turning to the specificities of grain-related interventions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
probability that the considered type of benefaction would take place; or, said differently, the respective 
frequency of benefactions towards public buildings and grain-related benefactions.  
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In doing so, we will try to shed some light on the underlying determinants of generic 
and grain-specific munificence by framing it into the useful contribution sociology and 
anthropology theories.  
3.3.4.1 Euergetism as a social behavior : development, functions and 
ethics  
 In his pioneering study on the subject, Ph. Gauthier has suggested that the rise of 
civic benefactors in the Eastern Mediterranean is simultaneous to the decline of 
Hellenistic kingdoms (late 3rd – early 2nd c. BC) which, in the 4th and 3rd centuries BC, 
had regularly undertaken acts of euergetism – whether on public buildings or food 
distributions – towards the Greek cities. With the decline of royal euergetism, wealthy 
citizens progressively became the main providers of benefactions628. To this should be 
added the consequences of the integration of the Greek East to the Roman political 
and administrative framework as emphasized by J.-L. Ferrary629, and more particularly 
the diffusion of the relationships of clientele and patronage630 largely unknown to 
Greek political culture, as well as the tendency for the Romans to promote oligarchic 
regimes631.  
 This chronological-institutionalist explanation accounted for the rise of civic 
euergetism as a large scale phenomenon. But it does not explain why this phenomenon 
lasted, or why civic élites, either in the context of independent ‘city-states’, in 
Hellenistic kingdoms, or under Roman republican or imperial rule, continued 
performing benefactions; why, in other words, is this social conduct structural. The 
most thought-provoking study on the motives of euergetism is undoubtedly Paul 
Veyne’s monumental work Le pain et le cirque. Despite numerous contradictions which 
it would take too long to list, the central claim of Veyne’s book can be summarized as 
follows: munificence did not bear any function whatsoever and did not proceed from 
social relationships. In his view, euergetism consisted of the expression by élite 
members of a ‘social distance’ towards their fellow citizens, and nothing more. 
Munificence was, in this sense, disinterested. ‘Any other explanation’, he says – 
potlatch, redistribution, taxation otherwise labelled, (…) are inadequate explanations, 
or rationalizations.’632 This sentence summarizes the key issue of the subject : was 
munificence a rational behavior or not? Veyne categorically answers negatively. But 
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such a statement assumes that there would be a transcendental, universally valid 
definition of rationality. The sharpest critique of this assumption is owed to French 
philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis, when discussing the legitimacy of capitalism on the 
basis of its ‘rational’ character : 
 
(…) ce critère – être rationnel (…), est proprement institué [par le capitalisme]; et 
tout se passe comme si ce fait, d'avoir été très récemment institué, au lieu de le 
relativiser, l'avait rendu indiscutable. Pour peu que l'on réfléchisse, on ne peut 
pas éviter la question : qu'est-ce donc que la rationalité, et quelle rationalité ?633 
 
Castoriadis’ reasoning also applies to other historical contexts than modern capitalism: 
the criteria, the values defining rationality are always endogenous to a given society or 
political system. A native American tribal chief ruining himself by performing potlatch 
in the form of banquets, games, and gifts instead of investing this money might seem 
completely irrational to a 20th century businessman whose activities are considered 
with regard to the notion of profit maximization, but it is perfectly rational in the 
context of a society in which the conquest of political power and the ousting of 
opponents went hand in hand with a rivalry of expenditures. This substantial aspect of 
rationality depending upon the values of a specific context has been labeled 
Wertrationalität (or axiological rationality) by Max Weber. This rationality is however 
complemented by a formal aspect (Zweckrationlität, or instrumental rationality in 
Weber’s theory) in which rational behavior is defined, following Hegel, by the degree 
of conformity of a specific operation to its goal(s); a perspective which, however, as 
Castoriadis underlines, only displaces the problem from the rationality of the means to 
the rationality of the goal itself… 
 In order to determine whether or not euergetism proceeded from a rational 
conduct and the extent to which it was disinterested and external to the social 
relationships of ancient poleis, we should thus examine the phenomenon of 
munificence – and more particularly grain-related interventions – in relation with the 
set of norms and values of Graeco-Roman societies, as well as its place and significance 
among the social relationships between individuals and their communities. What 
should be highlighted first is that ancient attitudes towards euergetism are not always 
welcoming. Although recipients of munificence may naturally show gratitude towards 
benefactors, many authors exhibit a rather temperate or even reluctant attitude 
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regarding euergetism. In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle criticizes excessive and 
conspicuous behaviors in performing benefactions, and values a moderated 
munificence, both in size and frequency634. Cicero goes even further and considers the 
practice of munificence as a ‘necessary evil’ :  
 
As a consequence, the whole system of such largesse is by its very nature vicious, 
yet inevitable due to the circumstances, and should thus be adapted to its means 
and moderated by a sense of good measure635. 
   
Later on, however, Cicero explains why munificence is to some extent attractive: 
generosity, he says, is the community’s ‘safety net’ (commune perfugium est 
omnium)636. Benefactions, when performed with a large scope, thus do not allow 
remaining ungrateful (ingratis esse non liceat)637. The couple of beneficia and gratia is 
also attested in Pliny’s Letters to Trajan as well as in Seneca’s De Beneficiis. In fact, 
ancient views on euergetism, whether in an epicurean or stoic context, have always 
emphasized the idea of reciprocity.  
 Anthropologists have provided an invaluable contribution to the understanding 
of munificence as a process of reciprocity through the gift/counter-gift theory 
developed by Marcel Mauss and Bronislaw Malinowski in the early 20th century when 
studying west-pacific tribes, and best summed up by the principle of ‘donner oblige’. 
Any gift, they argue, implies and generates a counter-gift638, not always – it should be 
highlighted – to the initial giver. But since gifts and their direct counter-gifts are never 
perfect equivalents, the system provokes a continuous indebtedness of individuals with 
one another, which only reaches certain equilibrium at an aggregate level639, resulting 
in the fact that the gifts constitute the actual cement of society. Although initially 
dealing with insular societies, this theory has proven to be an anthropologic axiom – 
yet of variable intensity – as Mauss himself had already framed it into a comparative 
perspective with native American societies and their ritual of potlatch. Ancient 
evidence is also explicit about the importance of this principle in antiquity. A verse of 
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Hesiod’s Works and Days reads : ‘One gives to a giver; to whom who does not give, 
nobody ever gave’640. Even more explicit is the Rhetoric to Alexander :  
 
‘Those who make gifts are those who expect that we will be grateful, or those who 
pay back for a debt they contracted earlier on; when we serve others, it is always 
by interest, to obtain some sign of honor, by pleasure, or by fear.’641 
  
By crossing ancient literary evidence with the modern findings of anthropological 
theory, it appears that munificence only echoes the far more general principle of 
reciprocity which, in preindustrial societies constituted an important channel of 
circulation of commodities, as Polanyi rightly pointed out From which it also follows 
that munificence could hardly be seen as a ‘disinterested’ behavior, as is made very 
clear, e.g., in the Rhetoric to Alexander.  
 Yet, what is it concretely that benefactors might obtain from their munificence? 
What is it which is worth the considerable sums they spent on buildings and games ? 
Which form did the ‘gratitude’ of their communities take? To understand this, we 
should go beyond Mauss’ and Malinowski’s pioneering works, which focus on the gift 
of material commodities against other material commodities, and look at the theory of 
interest developed by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. One of the major 
contributions of Bourdieu to the sociology of élite behavior is no doubt his concept of 
‘symbolic capital’ which is defined as the value granted by social agents (individuals or 
groups) to any type of pre-existing capital (whether physical, economic, or cultural)642. 
Symbolic capital is, in other words, the social value ascribed to material or immaterial 
capital, the value of goods and deeds insofar as they are socially recognized. With 
recourse to the concept of symbolic capital – by far more efficient and relevant than 
Veyne’s odd ‘social distance’ – the loop of munificent behavior can be closed : 
benefactors (or officials) spent material capital and received in return symbolic capital, 
of which prestige and honor were two major forms.  
 Euergetism was thus indisputably a matter of symbolic exchange, of interest, and 
of reward; it was a structural feature of ancient Greek cities that echoed the dynamic of 
reciprocity so pervasive in preindustrial societies. As a matter of collective action and 
mobile of social enterprise, euergetism can definitely not be considered disinterested 
and external to conflicts and relationships, as in Veyne’s central statement. Of course, 
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benefactors, institutions, and recipients of euergetism might often not have been 
conscious of the issues that were at stake, and the rewards to munificence might not 
always (or not even often) have been consciously calculated by benefactors; but the 
unconsciousness of the social dynamic that underlined operations of munificence does 
not allow arguing that this dynamic did not exist or that it has no explicative power. In 
Bourdieu’s words, this dissonance between social facts and their perception is a 
disjunction between subjective truth and objective reality. In other words, some 
benefactors might well have been convinced that they acted disinterestedly, while 
some others attempted to create the illusion of selflessness – an illusion facilitated, as 
Bourdieu notes it, by the temporal disjunction between benefaction and reward, 
between gift and counter-gift. In this respect, Veyne was not so much ‘wrong’ as he 
appears to have been mystified by the subjective perception or communicational 
strategies of benefactors.  
3.3.4.2 The rationale of grain-related interventions 
 Since benefactions generated obligations, they should be seen as a matter of 
rational decision and, most importantly, as having a function within ancient cities. We 
thus need to briefly review some aspects of these ‘functionalistic’ approaches to 
euergetism as a whole before focusing on the specific functions of grain-related 
munificence and civic intervention. Apart from the view considering euergetism under 
the angle of charity and philanthropy643, which finds little ground before the rise of 
Christianity, the major recent reinterpretation of euergetism is no doubt A. 
Zuiderhoek’s Politics of munificence in the Roman Empire, in which the author argues 
convincingly that the rise of euergetism during the first two centuries AD responded to 
the dissonance between the civic discourse of Greek cities and the ever-increasing 
social inequality644. The key idea of Zuiderhoek is that munificence consisted of a way 
of legitimation of the élite’s leading political position by contributing to the upkeep 
and enhancement of symbolic structures common to élites and non-élites. This type of 
legitimation, developed by David Beetham, is indeed fruitful to explain euergetism, but 
does not tell the whole story. Indeed, the repeated emphasis of benefactors’s family 
lineage in inscriptions, the emphasis on their prestigious ancestors, and their regular 
performing of benefactions with other members of their kin less suits Beetham’s 
scheme than Max Weber’s concept of ‘traditional legitimation’645.  
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 Legitimation, however, was naturally not the only reason why benefactors 
provided gifts; more straightforward motives of prestige undoubtedly played a role. 
Moreover, we should also be cautious not to over-interpret munificence in terms of 
voluntary actions, for benefactions were also bond by significant constraint, both 
informal and legal. Informal constraint often took the form of the summa honoraria 
and other customary expenditures which went along with various magistracies, while 
legal constraint mostly concerned the promises (pollicitationes) that benefactors had 
done, and which they were compelled to perform, as attested by many passages of the 
Digest646. Finally, élite rivalry also played a significant role in fostering benefactions : 
ancient literary sources provide records of situations of jealousy and intra-élite 
competition related to benefactions647, echoing the ancient Greek mentality of the 
agôn. Such type of élite behavior have been studied in Thorstein Veblen’ famous 
Theory of the Leisure Class, which he conceptualized through the concepts of 
‘pecuniary emulation’648 and, more importantly, ‘conspicuous consumption’ : 
  
Conspicuous consumption of valuable goods is a means of reputability to the 
gentleman of leisure. As wealth accumulates on his hands, his own unaided effort 
will not sufficiently put his opulence in evidence by this method. The aid of 
friends and competitors is therefore brought in by sorting to the giving of 
valuable presents and expensive feasts and entertainments. Presents and feasts 
had probably another origin than that of naïve ostentation, but they acquired 
their utility for this purpose very early, and they have retained that character to 
the present.649  
 
 Legitimation, prestige, constraint and rivalry are however ‘generic’ motives for 
euergetism, to which should be added the specific opportunities related to each type of 
benefaction. As far as food munificence is concerned, festivals, especially religious 
ones, seem to have been a very suitable occasion for performing food distribution, 
although for Asia Minor the number of examples is limited to 4 records (3 of which are 
found in Stratonikeia, probably because of the sanctuary of Panamara where many 
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festivals would have taken place). In two of these three cases, benefactors’ curriculum 
specifies that they were ‘priest during the feast of Hera’, which would seem a rather 
useless indication unless we consider that the festival in honor of the Goddess went 
along with expenses, among which food, that were to be paid by the religious officials. 
Which specific reasons stimulated or dissuaded benefactors and civic institutions to 
perform grain-related euergetism ? This question allows us to consider the paradox of 
grain-related intervention : as has been shown along this chapter, ensuring a regular 
and affordable grain supply to the city was a constant concern of different levels of 
power and various social groups, yet food-related benefactions remain a very minor 
category of munificence. Which factors might thus explain the apparent reluctance of 
civic élites to contribute to the grain supply ? 
 Arjan Zuiderhoek has recently proposed one reason that might discourage 
benefactors to provide gifts of food. Civic food-related munificence, he claims, should 
be interpreted within the framework of ‘oligarchisation’ combined to the growing 
paternalistic relationships between cities and their élites. In this respect, food 
benefactions, despite a rather low level of conspicuousness, provided considerable 
short-term prestige and important popularity to the benefactor. In a context where 
civic élites increasingly formed an oligarchic order – the ordo decurionum, or 
 – such acquisition of prestige by members of the civic élite could 
threaten the cohesion and position of the group650. This dynamic finds parallel, 
Zuiderhoek argues, in the Roman context, where food distribution were often 
conceived as betraying a monarchic temptation651. With the growing imperial 
involvement and control in matters of grain supply, Zuiderhoek’s statement might be 
prolonged and confirmed, as performing food benefactions would increasingly risk 
being seen as an act of challenge to the emperor’s authority and providentia652. As far 
as the Greek part of the empire is concerned, to this dynamic might be added the 
propensity for euergetism – and food munificence in particular – to reflect demagogic 
behavior and hence attract a pejorative view653. 
 However, this might not tell the whole story. Reasons for the low frequency of 
food munificence should probably be sought in the core motivations of euergetism as a 
whole. Indeed, it has been argued that symbolic capital was one major reward of 
benefactions. If grain-related benefactions would, like any other, result in honorific 
decrees which could provide the same dose of prestige as decrees for other type of 
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benefactions, the gift itself is far less conspicuous than, for instance, public buildings. 
For benefactors do not only seek conspicuousness in their reward, they also expect 
their gift to remain visible, to attract admiration and a favorable consideration for as 
long as possible. All such things are clearly easier to find by donating or contributing 
to public buildings than to the food supply, games and festivals being somehow 
intermediary in this respect. This becomes even truer if we consider the financial 
burden that grain-related gifts might represent. Buildings are very expensive of course, 
but even the cheapest contribution to public infrastructure, the donation of a column, 
provides an important reward relative to the expense. The inverse is true when dealing 
with grain : even large-scale distributions of grain, or impressive sums spent on 
importing grain, remain discrete acts of munificence, and are in any case rather 
ephemeral contributions. As far as grain is concerned, the ratio of symbolic reward to 
financial expenditure is quite unfavorable. This statement finds even more ground if 
we turn our attention to gifts of food in societies of hunter-gatherers analyzed by 
anthropologists. Marshall Sahlins have extensively demonstrated that, in these 
societies too, food was considered an exceptional commodity whose exchange often 
obeyed radically different social rules654. But, even more interestingly, Maurice 
Godelier explains that, in the Melanesian and Polynesian societies that he studied, the 
level of prestige of objects increased with their distance from the sphere of subsistence : 
prestige objects had to be rare, unused, and most importantly, they needed to be 
suitable to embody symbolic attributes of power and religion, characteristic which 
were less easily found among foodstuffs655. Despite the structural differences between 
nomadic societies and the post-Neolithic societies to which Graeco-Roman civilization 
belonged, this particular status of food within the exchange of gifts is somewhat 
similar, and thus perhaps betrays a universal ambiguity. 
 Yet, in order to conclude this section, we also need to highlight the reasons why 
food benefactions and more particularly grain-related munificence still continued to be 
performed. First, as we have already seen, some circumstantial opportunities (like 
religious festivals) happened more favorable for the performing of grain-related gifts. 
But most importantly, the reason for the continuity and pervasiveness of grain-related 
intervention should probably be sought in the converging interests between 
benefactors and civic institutions. We should indeed be reminded that, in the post-
classical and increasingly oligarchic cities of the Graeco-Roman East, most benefactors 
and officials belonged to the top echelons of the city’s élite, and alternatively appear as 
 
                                               
654 Sahlins (1976), pp. 273-276. 
655 Godelier (1996), pp. 222-224. 
 226 
spontaneous benefactors, devoted liturgists, or generous magistrates. Benefactors and 
civic officials were, in this respect, two sides of one and the same coin.  
 Arjan Zuiderhoek’s theory that euergetism played an important role in the 
upkeep of the civic ideology in a context of growing social tensions has already been 
outlined, and certainly accounts for a part of grain-related munificence. But, besides 
the indirect, symbolic aspect of élite conduct, a second reason undoubtedly lies in the 
direct, straightforward dialectical relationships between élites and their communities. 
Ancient sources provide clear evidence for the troubles that can result from situations 
of food distress, and in particular the political and physical threat for local élites in case 
of riots656. Avoiding uprisings and social turmoil was thus an additional reason to 
preserving the legitimacy of social and political leadership657. However, and even more 
interestingly, food riots were not merely an expression of violence derived from hunger 
and deprivation, but also the political reaction to what was felt as the betrayal of a 
certain idea of justice and fairness, partly derived from customary political regulations. 
Studying the English crowd of the eighteenth century, British historian E. P. Thomson 
has labelled ‘moral economy’ the settings of beliefs, norms and values determining the 
crowd’s political reactions to various situations, the most crucial being the conditions 
of the food-supply658. Élites, however, did not act upon the mere pressure or 
expectations of the masses, but were themselves penetrated by the standards of such 
‘moral economy’, as indicated by reflections on the idea of ‘fair prices’, more 
extensively discussed earlier in this chapter. Grain-related munificence was thus also 
the manifestation of élite action as resulting from the ethical set of norms and values 
framing market interventions and took part, to a certain extent, to what we might call 
the ‘ancient social contract’. Needless to say, the rationality that drove civic élites to 
perform grain-related munificence converged to a certain extent with the rationality of 
the Roman power apparatus as a whole, which, like Hellenistic Kingdoms and other 
large-scale political constructs, relied to a significant extent upon its municipal basis.  
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3.4 Markets, traders and money 
For the most part of this study, I have largely overlooked the place of market exchange. 
This was done partly on purpose, in order to isolate the different factors affecting the 
grain supply, and partly because for avoiding useless repetition with earlier 
scholarship. Markets have been discussed above in terms of their regulation by city 
officials, and regarding their reaction to a contraction in supply due to an exogenous 
shock. But their actual functioning in relationship to the urban grain supply has yet to 
be highlighted. I would like to make my purpose clear and not let the reader build 
expectations I would not be able to fulfill: my point here is not to provide a 
comprehensive account of the nature of ancient markets (not even in the specific 
context of Asia Minor), neither to account in detail for logistic issues (the most obvious 
of which is overland transport), nor to provide a thorough analysis of the economic 
strategies of tenant farmers, landowners, merchants, consumers and civic authorities 
interplaying with one another on the grain market. These aspects are beyond the scope 
of my study, and have already been the subject of extensive discussion by scholars659. 
My main concern here is rather to provide some reflections on two specific questions: 
the efficiency of markets as a channel of urban grain supply on the one hand; on the 
other hand, the role of urbanization and urban markets as a stimulus of agricultural 
production. In order for me to develop those aspects as concisely as possible, I will 
phrase each of them through a specific question:  
(1) How did the grain merchants’ strategies influence the efficiency of markets as 
channels of urban grain supply ? 
(2) To what extent could urbanization have fostered agricultural production? 
3.4.1 Grain merchants and their strategies:  
What was the economic behavior of the grain merchants? What were their interests? 
And most importantly, how did these interests and the merchants’ strategies to pursue 
them interact with the cities’ needs in terms of grain supply? First of all, the generic 
label of ‘grain merchants’ or ‘grain traders’ conceals an important distinction which 
should be emphasized from the beginning. Not all merchants operated at the same 
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scale, nor did they all have the same role in the commercial process. B. Levick 
distinguishes four levels of trade: local, inter-city, regional and inter-regional660. This 
distinction partly overlaps that between wholesale merchants and retailers661, or 
importers and resellers. K. Ruffing could identify no less than eight different terms for 
grain merchants and seven for bread merchants662.Two important elements should be 
stressed regarding this specialization of tasks in the commodity chain. First, the 
distinction between farmer/producer, trader and merchant is not always very strict663: 
There were professional merchants of course, but a lot of farmers or landowners would 
on occasion sell grain on their own on the urban market. Second, resale by third 
buyers would eventually increase the retail price.  
 Evidence for the economic action of merchants is given by the famous discourse 
of Lysias Against the grain-dealers in which clear distinction is made between , 
(resellers) and (importers). The discourse mostly focuses on the 
practices of the resellers, accused by Lysias of practicing speculative stockpiling and 
exercising an upward pressure on prices by cartel arrangements. I shall not reconsider 
the actual relevance of the accusation, nor question the partiality of Lysias who 
demonizes resellers while leaving importers’ reputation intact– perhaps because the 
city had less means to constrain their activity and was heavily dependent upon 
external supplies…What is actually interesting in this discourse is the ‘economic 
psychology’ that Lysias attributes to the merchants, which reveals potential conflicting 
interests between importers, resellers, and consumers: 
 
‘Their interests are opposed to those of the public. When do they make the 
biggest profits ? When the signs of a disaster allow them to sell at a high price. 
They look on your misfortune with such a favorable eye that, sometimes they are 
aware of if before anyone, sometimes they make it up.’664 
This passage echoes another text from the Life of Apollonius of Tyana. In a dialogue 
with Apollonius, a young man exclaims:  
‘But what more godforsaken class can you name than merchants and ship’s 
captains? First of all, they sail around, looking for a depressed market; they 
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mingle wiith agents and retailers; they buy and sell, submitting their own persons 
to unwholly rates of interest, and striving after their capital’665. 
Three important things should be stressed regarding these texts: first, although they 
are separated by roughly six centuries, they depict very similar behaviors by 
merchants; secondly, they provide further illustration of market distortions resulting 
from cartel practices or collusion with agents or officials similar to the ones already 
mentioned concerning the bakers of Ephesos; thirdly, even if importers and retailers 
must have been in conflict for the price at which the former group would sell grain to 
the latter, they both profiteered from local shortages. This third aspect, namely the 
impact of grain trade in the context of harvest failure, requires some further 
discussion.  
 As P. Erdkamp reminds us, the price differences between regions, partly resulting 
from the ecological fragmentation of Asia Minor that I underlined in Chap.I, form a 
major driving force of interregional or even inter-city trade666. Here, I would like to 
focus on the precise short–term dynamic of grain trade as resulting from price 
differentials between neighboring regions or cities. Let me consider the case of two 
cities, A and B: A experiences a bad harvest while B experiences a ‘normal harvest’, that 
is, with moderate surpluses. As Paul Erdkamp rightly emphasizes, the intensity of grain 
exports from B to A will not solely depend upon the price of grain in place A, but also 
upon the transport costs667. If the unit cost of transport is higher than the price 
difference between the two cities, it is worthless for merchants or commercial farmers 
of place B to export. On the other hand, if the price difference is higher than the unit 
cost of transport, this will stimulate exports of grain from B to A. Yet, if a large number 
of merchants apply this reasoning, they will significantly affect the supply of grain in 
place A and hence lower its price. But as the price in A would be lowered, the profit 
margin will be reduced, and the exported quantities will eventually decrease, a 
phenomenon already described by Braudel for Mediterranean regions of the 16th 
century668. What we are facing here is what chemists and biologists call an 
autocatalytic process, that is, a process which is progressively hampered by the same 
interplay of variables which had initially triggered it. This can be represented by a 
simple model:  
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On the one hand, the inflow of grain imports from B to A (QM) over time as a function 
of the difference between the price differential in A and B (pAB ) and the unit cost of 
transport (cT) can be described by the simple differential equation: 
 
𝑑𝑄𝑀
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜅 ∙ (𝑝𝐴𝐵 − 𝑐𝑇) 
 
Where 𝜅 is a constant of proportionality. On the other hand, let me assume, for the 
sake of simplicity, that the price of grain in place A (and hence the price differential) 
decreases linearly by a factor 𝜉 as imports of grain from B increase : 
 
𝑑𝑝𝐴𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= −𝜉 ∙
𝑑𝑄𝑀
𝑑𝑡
 
 
Finally, available quantity of grain in place A is equal to the local quantity after the 
(bad) harvest (Q*) plus the quantities imported from B :  
 
𝑄𝐴,𝑡 = 𝑄
∗ + 𝑄𝑀,𝑡 
 
Solving the system of the two differential equations and injecting the result in the third 
one yields a final equation describing the evolution of available quantities in place A 
through time :  
𝑄𝐴,𝑡 = 𝑄
∗ + (
𝑏0
𝜂
) ∙ (1 − 𝑒−𝜅∙𝜉∙𝑡) 
 
In which b0 is simply the differential between the unit cost of transport and the price 
difference between A and B before the harvest shock. The short-term evolution of the 
available quantity of grain in place A is displayed on Fig 32 below. 
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This graph has been constructed with arbitrary values of course. What matters for the 
present issue is the dynamic: depending on the gravity of the initial harvest shock, on 
the response of prices to increased supply (i.e. of the elasticity), and on the initial 
differential between the price difference and transport costs, the traded quantities will 
or will not be sufficient to bring the supply of grain in place A at its pre-shortage 
conditions.  
3.4.2 Cities: money and the commercialization of grain 
It has been a widely held view among ancient economic historians that urbanization 
actually stimulated grain production by creating a strong solvable demand669. I have 
already emphasized in Chap. II that, let alone the hypothesis of technological change, 
this would only be possible if we abandon the idea of ancient cereal agriculture as 
being doomed to face diminishing marginal returns. Now, I would like to add the 
following remarks concerning this point:  
(1) First of all, although this is only a minor objection, claiming that urbanization 
generates an incentive to increase agricultural production reduces all grain 
 
                                               
669 Hopkins (2000), pp. 253-267 
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Fig. 33. Short-term evolution of the available quantity of grain in a 
city through imports after a bad harvest.
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production to either market-connected farming or commercial farming, and thus 
neglects the share of smaller-scale agricultural exploitations that were largely 
isolated from the market of goods.  
 
(2) Second, this statement overlooks the fact that, depending of course on the local 
level of demographic pressure upon the environmental resources, there is an upper 
limit to the increase of production, which is set by the level of ancient agricultural 
technology, the effect of innovative farming practices such as manuring, or crop 
rotation, and by the capacity of farmers to adapt their use of production factors. 
Raising total output levels requires changes in the quantity of production factors 
used, or changes in the productive process in order to increase average 
productivity, or both. Yet, changes in the quantity of input factors and changes in 
the level of productivity are not independent from one another: as we have seen in 
Chap. 2 when discussing the influence of the labor-land ratio on overall levels of 
production in a ‘Sraffaian’ perspective, it appeared that a reduction of cultivated 
area might well generate a higher level of total output depending on the quantity 
of labor used. On the other hand, an unlimited increase of labor inputs with a 
constant cultivated area will eventually make the producer reach the point from 
which diminishing marginal returns start to arise. 
 
(3) Most importantly, there a crucial element which is left undiscussed when arguing 
that urbanization represented intrinsically a stimulus to agricultural production : 
money. Money is indeed the reason why farmers would produce more grain in 
order to sell it on the market. Let me take the reader to a purely deductive 
reasoning in order for me to explain why this point is crucial to the validity of the 
argument.  
   As it has been repeatedly argued along this study, the total harvest of grain 
producers can only be divided among four main purposes : the peasants’ self-
consumption, seed-corn, the quantity of grain used to pay the rents to the 
landowner, and the share to be paid as taxes. The element which actually connects 
rural producers and urban consumers is rent. Whether the grain is given as a rent 
in kind and only resold afterwards by the landowner on the market, or whether it 
is commercialized by farmers in the first place to obtain the money with which to 
pay the rents matters little here : in the end, the money end up in the hands of the 
landowner.  
  In either of the two options, the sale of grain will take place in town. Who, 
then, will buy this grain ? Essentially the urban consumers which represent the 
whole diversity of existing professions and occupations : craftsmen (potters, 
tanners, blacksmiths,…), fishermen, innkeepers, merchants, unskilled 
workers…etc. But where do they get the money with which to purchase grain 
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from? This money has three origins: (a) the internal transactions occurring in 
town, in which these consumers are in turns buyers and sellers; (b) the wages paid 
to workers; and (c) the purchases made by the social élites, which are essentially 
the landowners receiving the payment of rents.  
  Let us leave out these purchases for a moment and focus on the internal 
transactions and wages. These monetary salaries, as well as the sums used in the 
transactions between urban dwellers can obviously not arise ex nihilo. Wages 
would have been either paid by civic authorities in case of ‘public works’, or by 
wealthy silent partners (themselves likely members of the local élite) at the origin 
of the project in which workers are employed. Internal transactions between 
dwellers, on the other hand, must at some point find their monetary counterpart 
in relationship with owners of monetary capital, mainly, again, the local 
landowning élite or the bankers and usurers. In every step of this process, thus, we 
see that the local élite should have played a crucial role in the input of liquid 
money on the urban market. But in this case, the argument of the urban stimulus 
of agricultural production becomes circular: the monetary income of landowners 
derived from the commercialization of the surplus extracted from farmers would 
arise, largely, from money that these landowners would have injected themselves 
in the first place through other networks (purchase of commodities, payment of 
wages, etc…). Interstingly, C. Katsari envisages the actual means through which 
landowners could have substantially benefitted from trading surpluses:  
 
‘The economic nature and profitability of trade in antiquity prompt us to suggest 
that commercial activities seemed to facilitate the accumulation of an 
increasingly important volume of wealth in coined money. The sale, 
transportation and marketing of goods could have been carried out in a variety of 
ways with the involvement of a range of people from different social strata (…). At 
each stage the person involved may very well have been dealing not with the 
principal but with the representative, a slave or freedman, or a member of the 
élite acting as an institor (…)  
 By means of these institutions also the rich landowners could have reaped 
the rewards of trade indirectly by creaming off the profits from the use of his or 
her representatives at each of the key stages in trade. In this model we should 
envisage a relatively closed market in which profits largely returned directly or 
indirectly to the wealthy landowners.’670 
 
                                               
670 Katsari (2011), pp. 179-180 
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  Moreover, in the Graeco-Roman world unlike nowadays, no continuous 
monetary creation exists, as we now know through the system of central banks. 
Monetary emissions are erratic, and often depend upon conjuncture (mainly 
military campaigns), mining resources, and political agenda. I am not saying, of 
course, that money was rare: there is now increasing consensus on the fact that the 
level of monetization of the Graeco-Roman world was much higher than 
previously acknowledged671. But emissions are neither continuous nor regular. 
Hence, if we are to consider possible sources of increase of local money supply to 
support the commercialization of agricultural production, I would be left with only 
three hypotheses :  
 
(a) The minting of local (provincial) coinage; 
(b) The inflow of credit through bankers; 
(c) The sale to neighboring regions or to Italian merchants of local staple foods, 
which would bring us back to the ‘taxes-and-trade model’, but which I personally 
fail to reconcile with the sharp critiques of R. Duncan-Jones672 and with the 
identification of ‘monetary circulation pools’673; 
 
  If, on the other hand, we are to abandon the hypothesis of the potential 
increase of money/credit supply, in other words if money supply is constant, then 
the whole argument of urbanization driving grain cereal production up is seriously 
damaged: what would indeed be the incentive for farmers to produce more grain 
since a larger output could in any case not be converted in an equivalent amount 
of money? I am aware that very little of the abovementioned statements of mine 
are backed by ancient sources. Yet again, this does not per se refute my reasoning. 
What one should wonder to counter my argument is rather to reveal how else 
could have things happen and suggest an alternative scenario. How would a 
constant money supply have nevertheless represented an incentive for increased 
agricultural production in the context of growing urbanization? Or, on the other 
hand, what were the sources of increased money emissions that might have 
allowed a higher level of production to be profitably converted on the market? On 
this last aspect, however, I do not claim that such increased money supply did not 
take place; I simply allow myself to raise this – in my opinion – crucial question.  
 
                                               
671 Duncan-Jones (1994), pp. 168-170 
672 Duncan-Jones (1994), pp. 172-178; A somehow intermediate position is offered by Howgego (1995), 
pp. 108-109 
673 Katsari (2011), p. 199 
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  My overall point here is not to argue that cities did not or could not 
represent an incentive to raise agricultural production, and were therefore a mere 
burden upon the shoulders of the countryside. What I intended to do with this 
thought experiment is rather to reveal the underlying assumptions – the ‘critical 
assumption’, as D. Rodrick would have written –which render this mechanism 
possible. Leaving these conditions unchecked necessarily implies to revise the now 
common dismissal of ancient towns as ‘consumer cities’, at least from the 
viewpoint of food resources.  
 
As far as urbanization and cities are concerned, I will leave the last words of this 
section to Moses Finley, whose nuanced statement I widely support : 
 
‘’Imports of food and other bulk commodities permitted a substantial increase in 
the size of population, no longer held down by the limiting factor of local 
agricultural production. (…) there might also be a feedback effect on the 
countryside in that imported necessities allowed more efficient exploitation of 
larger landholdings (though not of peasant holdings) through specialization, not 
really possible in more or less isolated, self-sufficient communities’’674 
* * * 
 
 It has been argued that markets and private merchants were in fact responsible 
for the main part of the daily grain supply of cities675. I do not wish to refute this claim, 
nor do I have sufficient evidence to do so. Market exchange was indeed crucial to the 
supply of grain, in two major aspects: (1) they were the necessary risk-taking entity, 
while famers usually were risk-avoiding actors; (2) as Dermody et al. suggested, one 
major achievement of the Roman economy is precisely to have interconnected regions 
of Virtual Water surplus with regions of Virtual Water deficits676. This is an interesting 
suggestion, even more since political conditions in the context of the Pax Romana are 
known to have fostered trade, but the authors probably overestimate the degree of 
 
                                               
674 Finley (1973), p. 128 
675 Garnsey (1988), pp. 233-234 
676 Dermody (2014), pp. 5036-5037 
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integration of the grain market677, while they also seem to confuse integration per se 
with market integration.  
 Yet, these two aspects seem undisputable to me. What I merely meant to stress 
here, is that (1) market supply channels, albeit necessary, were not always fully 
separated from the sphere of production or from the civic institutions (as we have seen 
above with the sitonìa), and that (2) just like civic schemes, they also had their 
drawbacks: stockpiling, cartel arrangements and collusion with agents or civic officials 
might result in upward pressures on prices, while aggregation of individual profitable 
behaviors is likely to have a retroactive effect on the initial stimulus of grain exports 
from a region in surplus to a region under shortage, and hence will probably tend to 
progressively reduce the inflow of imported grain. 
 
 
 
                                               
677 Cf. Bransbourg (2012) (ISAW Papers 3 : http://dlib.nyu.edu/awdl/isaw/isaw-papers/3/) 
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General conclusion  
Research perspectives  
This study is naturally only one more brick in the wall. Many aspects are yet to be 
examined, following the methodologies and conceptual framework which have been 
applied here.  
 
❖ As far as the primary production of surplus is concerned, it would be particularly 
interesting to develop a Monte-Carlo simulation model of Graeco-Roman 
agricultural production in a specific region: integrating, , soil productivity, the 
potential adjustment of sowing rates and consumption per capita to the size of the 
harvest, the fluctuations in the level of rents, as well as short term adjustments of 
the cultivated surface and labor input, would provide us with a dynamic model of 
agricultural production, instead of the deterministic model we have developed 
here. Such an approach would be particularly suitable to reconstruct the evolution 
of a region’s agricultural production through time within a range of variation 
determined by the uncertainties of the input variables.  
 
❖ If we now move to the appropriation of surplus, the most important aspect to be 
further examined is the exploitation of land and the details of the management of 
rents in produce. Here, a wide-ranging collection of literary and epigraphical data 
on landed property and tenancy in Asia Minor, together with the inclusion of 
archaeological information on estates and villas would be required to narrow our 
uncertainties regarding the level and the mode of perception of contractual rents 
and their evolution over time, and help us reconstruct this fundamental aspect of 
surplus extraction. 
 
❖ In order to improve our understanding of the connection between rural 
production and urban consumption of grain, an interesting complement to the 
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topic would be to undertake a geographical study of the ceramics of cereal storage 
and transport in Anatolia during the first three centuries AD.  
 
❖ Concerning urban grain-related interventions sensu stricto, the main gap yet to be 
filled is the connection of benefactors and officials with extra-civic networks of 
food supply, in particular money-lenders, merchants (mercatores, negotiatores), 
and Roman authorities. To do so, a full prosopographical study of all individuals 
involved in the grain supply should be carried out, and its outcome would deserve 
scrupulous statistical analysis. Following this protocol, it will then be possible to 
reconstruct the actual ‘social network’ of grain supply intervention.  
 
❖ Finally, in order to address the broader question of how far Graeco-Roman society 
succeeded in creating the conditions for its urban and rural populations to have 
access to an adequate supply of staple foods, the most objective approach, in my 
opinion, remains the analysis of skeletons. While palaeoanthropological analyses 
do exist for other parts of the ancient Mediterraean, to my knowledge, no such 
study exists for Graeco-Roman Asia Minor. Yet, the analysis of traces left by 
palaeopathologies due to dietary deficiency provide one of the most reliable pieces 
of evidence on the actual physical well-being of ancient populations. Obviously, 
samples are small and not representative of past populations, but it is probably 
possible to overcome this problem by calibrating the results via an 
interdisciplinary approach combining literary, epigraphical, archaeological, and 
palaeoanthropological evidence.   
Conclusions 
The time has come to sum up the empirical and conceptual findings of the three parts 
of this investigation.  
 
I 
 
In the first chapter, it has been shown that the productivity of cereal cultivation in 
Asia Minor has been underestimated. Asia Minor ranged among the most fertile 
regions of the Mediterranean, and its grain yields should most likely be placed closer 
to the upper limit experienced in ancient Mediterranean agriculture. The reasons for 
this underestimation mainly lie in the incautious extrapolation of the agro-climatic 
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characteristics of continental Greece as well as in the projection onto Antiquity of the 
agrarian system observed in early 20th c. Greece. Combined with existing estimates of 
the Anatolian population in the early or middle Empire, this reassessment of 
agricultural productivity in Anatolia reveals that the region did not outgrow its 
maximum carrying capacity. However, an equally important finding of the 
environmental setting is that Asia Minor was marked by a strong ecological 
fragmentation, which results in drastic geographical differences in terms of access to 
grain, even across relatively short distances.  
 
II 
 
The second chapter considered the economic factors which were superimposed on 
the environmental conditions and farming practices, mostly the use of land and labor 
and the consequences of tenancy as the dominant form of land management. The 
results of this analysis can be divided into two sub-categories: the first one regarding 
the conditions of surplus production, the second dealing with the modes of surplus 
appropriation.  
(a) Concerning the primary production of surplus, our analysis aimed at testing the 
consistency of Neo-classical economic theory in the economic modelling of cereal 
production in the pre-industrial context of Graeco-Roman farming. Relying on the 
critiques of marginalism developed by Italian economist P. Sraffa, it has been revealed, 
inter alia, that ‘diminishing marginal returns’ should not be seen as an iron law of 
agricultural production, but rather as a particular and reversible case arising only after 
a certain level of the labor/land ratio has been passed and if there is no change of 
farming practices or technology in the meantime. Moreover, the non-linear response of 
soil productivity to increases of the labor/land ratio implies that smaller plots of land 
are not necessarily synonymous with smaller surpluses.  
(b) Regarding the appropriation of the surplus produced, the reconstruction of the 
level of rents based on a sample of documents from Caria suggests that rents may have 
taken minimum 17.5-30% of the total produced. Added to the tithe (decuma) imposed 
by Roman authorities, it means that some 27.5-40% of the total produced was 
extracted from the primary producers as rents and taxes alone – of which a non-
negligible part must have been paid in kind –, and this, without considering additional 
extortions. Of course, the share of rents in total produce varied according to many 
different parameters: the mode of exploitation, the level of population density, soil 
yields, and the relative price of grain with regard to land.  
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III 
 
In the third chapter, which forms the core of this study, I showed that grain-related 
interventions were performed by all levels of power: imperial, provincial and civic, with 
the latter by far the most frequent. I then analyzed the various mechanisms of the 
cities’ grain supply. These mechanisms are three in number: civic grain-supply systems 
(civic funds and distribution schemes) (1), munificence (2), and markets (3).  
 
(1) Regarding the grain-supply systems set up by the cities, I showed that their 
extreme lexical diversity is partly due to regional idiosyncrasies and partly to a strong 
specification of tasks between officials, which betrays an intense institutionalization of 
the matters of grain-supply. Of these grain-supply systems, two have been the object of 
a more thorough case study : (1.1) the sitometria (in kind) and (1.2) the grain fund 
system known as the sitonía (in cash).  
 
(1.1.) Outside Lycia, the sitometria might have targeted a larger group of recipients 
than the privileged group of the sitometroumenoi attested in Lycian 
inscriptions. In Lycia, the development of the sitometria should be interpreted 
in connection with the construction of the imperial granaries which served 
both as stage granaries for the supply of Rome with Egyptian grain and as 
storage structures for the supply of Anatolian cities granted the imperial 
authorization to receive a share of Egyptian grain production.  
 
 
(1.2.) Grain funds were ubiquitous in Asia Minor, and represent one of the most 
visible civic grain-related supply channels. However, for reasons that are yet to 
be discovered, an important concentration of grain funds is attested in Caria. 
 Concerning its funding, the sitonía received both civic and private funds, 
and it appears from inscriptions that civic money probably was the major 
source of funds. Most importantly however, it arises from our Monte-Carlo 
simulation model that, despite a huge proportion of funds collapsing in their 
first years of operation, a significant proportion of grain funds turn out to be 
sustainable over the mid- to long run; or stated differently, that their 
probability of survival in the mid- to long run was significant : some 20%  
could theoretically outlive 50 years, while another 20% could have survived 
between 10 and 50 years. What actually must have been the most deleterious 
situation for grain funds was a succession of (even moderate) shortages over a 
rather short period of time.  
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Overall, the geographical spread of the intensity of grain-related interventions 
appears in several regions to be quite well correlated with the Virtual Water budget. 
However, the remaining discrepancies are sufficient to argue that, let alone 
miscalculations, other phenomena were engaged, perhaps differential levels and modes 
of surplus extraction and distribution.  
 
(2) Regarding grain-related munificence stricto sensu, the analysis of the social 
profile and status of the individuals engaged in grain-supply interventions further 
revealed that the proportions of offices of the six major spheres of civic life were more 
or less balanced.  
Finally, I have investigated the reasons why benefactors or officials would provide 
grain-related gifts. It appeared from this analysis that there existed both incentives and 
counter-incentives to grain-related benefactions: the fear of challenging the imperial 
authority and to echo the monarchic temptation, as well as the low prestige/cost ratio 
due to the less conspicuous character of grain gifts, conflicted with the principles of 
the ‘moral economy’ and the necessity of avoiding food riots. To a certain extent, 
imperial and provincial interventions were also a way for Roman authorities to ensure 
political stability at the municipal level. 
 
(3) Finally, I tried to offer some reflections on the working of markets in relation to 
the urban grain supply. These are of course only a modest contribution to a far larger 
debate, but I think that one overall remark should be kept in mind: market exchange, 
though crucial in making grain circulation more fluid, did not necessarily imply an 
easier access to grain per se : (a) markets may also leave space for the development of 
oligopolistic behaviors which could artificially keep prices up at the expense of 
consumers; (b) grain imports driven by price differentials, once considered at an 
aggregate scale, turn out to be a self-catalytical process. Depending on the difference 
between transport costs and the inter-regional price difference, the subsequent inflow 
of grain may or may not be sufficient to offset the effects of a local shortage. 
 
* * * 
 
I now would like to attempt to interpret those factual conclusions, on three major 
aspects: (1) chronology (2) the town-country interaction and (3) the structure and 
rationale of the grain-supply process.  
 
(1) In terms of chronology, the evolution of grain-related interventions in Asia 
Minor appears to roughly follow the global pattern of overall munificence: a sustained 
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rise in the late 1st c. AD, a peak in the mid-second century, and a general decline in the 
late third century. However, short-term variations are more complex. In particular, it 
seems that the Antonine Plague significantly disrupted the grain supply mechanisms: 
the sharp drop in population density reduced the grain output per capita. It also 
reduced the mouths to be fed, but as transport costs per capita increased due to the 
inertia of settlement patterns, it rendered the circulation of grain more complicated 
and costly. This applies, of course, only in very rough terms, that is, without 
considering the political responses or the differentiated effect on urban and rural grain 
supply. Over the long run, the deleterious effects of the Antonine Plague were likely 
reduced, due to the compensation of the initial demographic loss. The negative impact 
of population contraction of per capita agricultural might even have been canceled, 
but only at the cost of a higher share of agricultural surfaces in total available land, or 
of a larger share of the population engaged in agricultural activities. In any case, the 
demographic and economic consequences of the Antonine Plague as well as the end of 
the Roman climatic Optimum, combined to changes in élite behavior, probably 
increased grain supply difficulties and account for much of the decline of civic grain-
supply systems such as the sitonía.  
 
(2) The interaction between town and country was not a topic I intended to study 
initially, but it arose from the analysis as an unavoidable subject. I do not pretend to 
have brought much new information, but I think two aspects should be underlined. 
 
(2.1.) Roughly speaking, there was an intrinsic contradiction in the interests of 
urban dwellers and peasants: the grain available for urban producers (to the 
extent to which they were agriculturally non-productive) largely came from 
rents, but the perception of these rents precisely reduced the available (grain) 
income of producers (inasmuch as they did not buy their grain on the market). 
Hence, from a strictly mechanical point of view, the available grain per capita of 
urban residents and the available grain per capita of rural dwellers responded 
differently to similar economic or demographic changes.  
 
(2.2.) Urbanization might have represented an incentive to increase agricultural 
production, but only under definite conditions: (a) either technological change, 
intensification practices, or the dismissal of the law of diminishing returns as a 
governing principle of agricultural production; or a bit of all three; (b) an 
increase of money supply (either via inter-regional trade, minting or credit) 
equal or superior to the increase in solvable demand of agricultural produces. 
Yet, it would be equally possible to argue that growth of agricultural production 
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was the primum mobile of the process of which increased urbanization was only 
a consequence.  
 
(3) There is in my opinion a fundamental consistency between the high level of 
institutionalization of the grain supply, the relative reluctance of the élite to provide 
grain gifts, and the limitations of markets. To a significant extent, it is, I think, 
precisely because élites were more inclined to perform munificence related to public 
buildings or festivals rather than grain, and because in many regions trade alone was 
not sufficient to ensure a regular access to grain (with notable exceptions, I admit) that 
cities developed a sophisticated framework of grain supply intervention made of grain 
funds, public distribution schemes to groups on varying criteria, and market 
regulation. In a way, they were also incited to do so because of environmental vagaries, 
but as far as Asia Minor is concerned, I think that, following the findings of Chap. I, the 
frequency of shortages did not primarily arise from the inefficiency of agriculture or 
from any Malthusian ceiling, since the region did not outstrip its carrying capacity. 
Hence, in a context where agriculture is far from unproductive – and thus enables 
important surpluses to be built –, and which was not the theatre of considerable 
military operations (except perhaps during the reign of Marcus Aurelius), what would 
have been the main reason of the endemic character of shortages? I can only think of 
three possible candidates: either a lack of efficiency of arguably well developed food 
markets, taxation by the Roman power, or the predatory behavior of the landowning 
élite whose mentality was, to quote Finley, ‘acquisitive, not productive’678. Or, perhaps, 
a little of all three aspects. I might willingly nuance Finley’s statement by saying 
‘mostly’ acquisitive, or ‘more acquisitive than productive’, but this would not change 
the fact that patterns of surplus extraction must have been a crucial determinant of 
grain accessibility. What was actually done afterwards with this appropriated surplus 
is, however, the major puzzle. Some of it was commercialized, but perhaps not at the 
best time and place, hoarded for speculation, sold far away to purchase luxury 
commodities…. Overall, I am much tempted to agree with P. Bang when he writes that 
‘the role of market exchange and interregional trade is not first and foremost that of 
coordinating and organizing the economy in an interregional division of labor. Rather, 
its task is the subordinate one of acting as transformer and conveyer of the extracted 
surplus’679. My own evidence alone, however, is not sufficient demonstrate that for the 
moment and I can do no more than leave the question open.  
 
                                               
678 Finley (1973), p. 144 
679 Bang (2008), pp. 119-120. 
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More than half a century ago, Karl Polanyi argued that pre-industrial economies 
were structured by three ‘forms of integration’: reciprocity, redistribution and 
exchange680. It has already been discussed, here and elsewhere, that munificence 
consisted of a form of reciprocity. Redistribution, as Polanyi defines it, ‘designates 
appropriational movements towards a center and out of it again’681. As we have seen 
above, civic finances played an important part in the funding of civic supply systems. 
But this money itself was largely derived from the taxes and fees levied by the city; 
hence these grain-funds and supply schemes fit the definition of a redistributive 
process. Exchange, finally, straightforwardly refers to market exchange. Ancient 
responses to grain supply issues thus fairly well fit into Polanyi’s tripartite typology, 
although one striking feature of the cities’ grain supply, and of the ancient economy as 
a whole, is perhaps the intense fluidity that seems to have existed between the three 
forms of integration.  
On the other hand, through the works of Fernand Baudel, one realizes both the 
relative rigidity of Mediterranean structures682 as well as the considerable 
permanencies between Graeco-Roman antiquity and early modern times regarding 
grain supply systems. I see no incompatibility between Braudel and Polanyi on this 
subject, as I think we are dealing with one marvelous illustration of the interactions 
between structures and institutions, between exogenous and endogenous factors of 
historical change: none of them can independently account for the ability and 
difficulties of ancient cities to ensure a regular grain supply. It is the interaction of a 
given set of very slow-evolving structures with a specific set of institutional responses, 
and the relative suitability of such responses, which determined the achievements of 
ancient economies – understood as the improvement of the material conditions of an 
ever larger part of the population, rather than the sole performance of élites. 
Institutional and political settings, however, have their own life and historical 
trajectory, so as to often become a structure themselves. As Braudel outstandingly 
summarizes : 
‘C’est un fait que chaque univers de peuplement dense a élaboré un groupe de 
réponses élémentaires et a une tendance fâcheuse à s’y tenir, en raison d’une 
force d’inertie qui est l’une des grandes ouvrières de l’Histoire’683 
 
                                               
680 Polanyi (1957), p. 250 sqq 
681 Polanyi (1957), p. 251 
682 Braudel (1990 b), pp. 88-89 
683 Braudel (1979), p. 642. 
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Appendix 1: grain-related benefactions 
Technical appendix – Estimate of an average benefaction 
 
In the following table, we provide our collection of 131 sums (all expressed in denarii) 
for benefactions in decreasing order of value : 
 
  
Table 4 – Distribution of sums given for 
benefactions 
Sum Purpose Reference 
2000000 B IGR 3, 604 
550000 F IGR 4, 1632 
400000 
 
IGR 4, 915 
300000 B IGR 3, 248-249 
300000 F IGR 3, 800-801 
200000 
 
BCH 28 (1904), 39 
165000 D Lanck. II, 123 
125000 B Balland (1981), 67 
122000 A REG 19 (1906), 231-243 
105000 B CIG, 2782 
100000 B IGR IV, 1700 
100000 B 
 75000 B F.E. II, 37 
70000 B IGR IV, 501 
70000 B IGR IV, 337 
61000 D TAM II, 671 
60000 D IGR 4, 1632 
60000 B IGR 3, 739 
60000 
  56058 
 
TAM II, 15 
56000 B Balland (1981), 67 
54000 A IGR IV, 914 
50000 
 
Milet I,7 261 
50000 F MAMA V, 202 
50000 B IGR 3, 66 
50000 
 
IGR 3, 492 
50000 D IGR 3, 739 
50000 B Balland (1981), 67 
50000 B IGR 4, 1637 
45000 B Balland (1981), 67 
40000 
 
S.B.Berl., 1888, 884 
40000 
 
IGR 3, 794 
35000 B IGR 3, 739 
35000 B P.A.S.  III, 426 
30500 B Lanck. II, 201 
30000 B IGR 3, 739 
30000 
 
Balland (1981), 67 
27100 B TAM II, 550-551 
25000 B/A IK-Ephesos, 5113 
21500 A F.E. II, 27 
20000 A LW, 1006 
20000 A F.E. 
20000 B Jahresh. 28 (1933), 100 
20000 A 
 20000 B IGR 3, 739 
18000 B IGR 3, 739 
15000 B IGR 3, 833 
15000 B SEG 28 (1988), 1462 
15000 
  13000 B IGR 3, 351 
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12100 B Lanck. II, 83 
12000 F IGR 3, 739 
12000 A IGR 3, 739 
11200 
  11000 
 
LW, 1603 
11000 F SEG 27, 938 
10000 F P.A.S.  I, 25 
10000 F IGR IV, 941 
10000 A F.E. III, 66 
10000 F BCH 11 (1887), 379 
10000 D BCH 11 (1887), 383 
10000 B IGR 4, 1632 
10000 
 
IG4 4, 1637 
10000 
 
IGR 4, 1342 
10000 
 
IGR 3, 492 
10000 B IGR 3, 704 
10000 B IGR 3, 704 
10000 
 
IGR 3, 342 
10000 F IK-Stratonikeia, 203 
10000 F Balland, Xanthos, VII, 67 
10000 F BCH 11 (1887), 45 
10000 B IGR 3, 739 
10000 
 
IGR 3, 739 
10000 B IGR 3, 739 
10000 A/F IGR 3, 739 
9000 B BCH 28 (1904), 30 
8000 D F.E. IV, 1, 23 
8000 B IGR 3, 739 
7000 
 
IGR 3, 739 
7000 B IGR 3, 739 
6500 D IGR 4, 1222 
6000 B BCH 44 (1920), 94 
6000 
 
IGR 3, 739 
5000 F F.E. III, 71 
5000 A F.E. III, 58 
5000 D CIG, 2836b 
5000 F IK-Ephesos, 3071 
5000 
 
OGIS, 485 
5000 D IGR 3, 739 
5000 B IGR 3, 739 
5000 
 
IGR 3, 739 
5000 
 
IGR 3, 739 
4500 
 
BCH 16 (1892), 425 
4000 A SEG VI, 647 
4000 D CIG, 3417 
4000 F McCabe, Sebastopolis, 6 
3500 B W.E. 426 
3000 D BCH 14 (1890), 611 
3000 A IG4 4, 1637 
3000 
 
A.M. 16 (1891), 146 
3000 
 
IGR 4, 227 
3000 B IGR 3, 639 & 642 
3000 A LW, 1381-1383 
2800 D IGR 4, 1629 
2545 D CIG, 2817 
2527 D 
 2500 B F.E. III, 66 
2500 A/F 
 2370 D CIG, 2774 
2000 F W.E. 414 
2000 
 
IGR 3, 739 
1750 B IGR 3, 407 
1670 D BCH 9 (1885), 76 
1575 
 
Sardis VII, I, 48 
1500 
 
CIG, 2817 
1500 
 
BCH 16 (1892), 425 
1200 D MAMA III, 50 
1025 B IGR 3, 833 
1000 D IGR IV, 182 
1000 
 
IGR 4, 195 
1000 F TAM II, 578-579 
500 B CIG, 3841 
500 F BCH 10 (1886), 1 
300 D IGR 4, 209 
300 D IGR 4,278 
300 D IGR 4, 293 
250 B KP III, 87 
200 
 
IGR 4, 342 
150 
 
IGR 4, 133 
150 
 
IGR 4, 342 
50 B A.M. 20 (1895), 344 
A Advertisement B Public Buildings 
D Distributions F Food supply 
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1. Correcting the variance : truncation of the series and increase of the number 
 of low sums 
 
After taking the 7 highest sums out of the distribution (the lines highlighted in black in 
table 1), we multiplied the number of sums inferior to 1,250 denarii with the following 
coefficients684 :  
Thresholds Multiplication coefficient 
< 500 denarii   x 3 
< 1000 denarii x 2 
< 1250 denarii x 1.5 
We then organized the sums in classes of 2,500 denarii685 and calculated the class 
frequencies (fj) :  
𝑓𝑗 =
𝑛𝑗
𝑁
 
where nj is the number of observed sums in class ‘j’ and N is the total number of 
observations (N = 146). The histogram of the class frequencies, before and after 
correction, is illustrated in figure 1.  
 
                                               
684 In the table, we rounded up the non-integer products of the multiplication. The coefficients are, in a 
sense, arbitrary, but hey rely on an argument of common sense : it is probably unrealistic to consider 
that the smallest sum would have been 10 times less represented than their actual frequency. A 
coefficient from 3 to 5 would thus seem more reasonable. Yet, one could have chosen a coefficient of 3.5, 
or 4,…but this actually does not change much to the consequent calculation of the average benefaction. 
Since we assume that the smallest sums have been less epigraphically represented, and since they are 
also less frequent among the data, the multiplication coefficient for higher thresholds are lower, hence 
our table. The multiplication coefficient for the threshold of 1,250 denarii should have been 1 according 
to the linear decrease, but a coefficient of one simply reproduces the current distribution of the sums 
figuring in the sources? We therefore set this last coefficient at 1.5. 
685 The relative small size of such classes brings the problem that many classes are empty because the 
material is fragmentary and comes from different periods and different locations. But taking larger 
classes, say 5,000 denarii would reduce too much the resolution of the distribution. 
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2. Weighting by the frequencies 
 
On this basis, we constructed a weight coefficient normalizing the class frequencies 
between 0 and 1. This weight coefficient for class j (wj) is simply given by : 
𝑤𝑗 =
𝑓𝑗
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
were fj is the frequency of class j and fmax is the frequency of the largest class (0.322), 
that is, the frequency of the class comprising the largest number of observations (the 
sums inferior to 2,500 denarii). Applying this technique makes the weighting 
coefficients range from 0 (a class with a frequency equal to 0, that is, an empty class) to 
1 (the weight coefficient of the first class – the largest –, equal to 0.322/0.322, which 
gives 1). By multiplying all the sums by the weight coefficient of their class affects them 
proportionally to their relative frequency and generates a new distribution of weighted 
sums (S*) :  
𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝑤𝑗 ∙ 𝑆𝑖∈𝑗 
The weighted sum (Si*) is equal to the initial observed sum Si belonging to class j, 
multiplied by the weight coefficient of class j.  The reader must bear in mind that the 
modification we apply to the sums is only aimed at accounting for their frequency of 
occurrence in the distribution. The new distribution of the sums multiplied by their 
weight coefficient is therefore not to be considered as a distribution of actual ‘sums’ 
but as a series of numbers the median of which will provide an estimate of the value of 
an average benefaction that takes into account the frequency of the different categories 
of sums.  
 
N = 146
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2
5
0
0
7
5
0
0
1
2
5
0
0
1
7
5
0
0
2
2
5
0
0
2
7
5
0
0
3
2
5
0
0
3
7
5
0
0
4
2
5
0
0
4
7
5
0
0
5
2
5
0
0
5
7
5
0
0
6
2
5
0
0
6
7
5
0
0
7
2
5
0
0
7
7
5
0
0
8
2
5
0
0
8
7
5
0
0
9
2
5
0
0
9
7
5
0
0
1
0
2
5
0
0
1
0
7
5
0
0
1
1
2
5
0
0
1
1
7
5
0
0
1
2
2
5
0
0
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
 (
%
)
Value (denarii)
Figure A1 - Distribution of the frequency of sums for benefactions
Initial distribution Correction
  271 
Appendix 2 : mathematical appendix 
The derivative of our production function with respect to population is :  
 
 
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑃
=
(𝜃 ∙ 𝐴𝑎
𝑛 + 𝐿𝑎
𝑛) ∙ [ℎ ∙ 𝑛 ∙ 𝐴𝑎𝐿𝑎
𝑛−1 ∙ (
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝑃 ) + ℎ ∙ 𝐿𝑎
𝑛 ∙ (
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝑑𝑃 )]
(𝜃 ∙ 𝐴𝑎
𝑛 + 𝐿𝑎
𝑛)2
−
ℎ ∙ 𝐴𝑎𝐿𝑎
𝑛 ∙ [𝜃 ∙ 𝑛 ∙ 𝐴𝑎
𝑛−1 ∙ (
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝑑𝑃 ) + 𝑛 ∙ 𝐿𝑎
𝑛−1 (
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝑃 )]
(𝜃 ∙ 𝐴𝑎
𝑛 + 𝐿𝑎
𝑛)2
 
= ⋯ 
 
=
ℎ ∙ 𝜃 ∙ 𝐴𝑎
𝑛𝐿𝑎
𝑛 ∙ (𝑛 ∙
𝐴𝑎
𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝑃 +
(1 − 𝑛)
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝑑𝑃 ) + ℎ ∙ 𝐿𝑎
2𝑛 𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝑑𝑃
(𝜃 ∙ 𝐴𝑎
𝑛 + 𝐿𝑎
𝑛)2
 
 
Dividing the numerator and denominator by Aa2n yields : 
 
=
ℎ ∙
𝐿𝑎
𝑛
𝐴𝑎
𝑛 [𝜃 ∙ 𝑛 ∙
𝐴𝑎
𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝑃 − 𝜃 ∙
(𝑛 − 1)
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝑑𝑃 +
𝐿𝑎
𝑛
𝐴𝑎
𝑛
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝑑𝑃 ]
(𝜃 +
𝐿𝑎
𝑛
𝐴𝑎
𝑛)
2  
 
But just like for the short run situation, we now need to calculate the ratio of the 
relative change (i.e. : growth rates) of population and total output, that is, the elasticity 
(ζ). This operation is done by multiplying the derivative dQ/dP by P/Q, where Q 
stands for the initial production equation (for algebraic simplicity, we divide the 
numerator and denominator by 𝐴𝑎
𝑛):  
 
 
𝜁 =
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝑄
=
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑃 ∙
𝑄
𝑃
ℎ ∙
𝐿𝑎
𝑛
𝐴𝑎
𝑛 [𝜃 ∙ 𝑛 ∙
𝐴𝑎
𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝑃 + (
𝐿𝑎
𝑛
𝐴𝑎
𝑛 − 𝜃 ∙ (𝑛 − 1))
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝑑𝑃 ]
(𝜃 +
𝐿𝑎
𝑛
𝐴𝑎
𝑛)
2
1
ℎ
𝑃
𝐴𝑎𝐿𝑎
𝑛
𝐴𝑎
𝑛
(𝜃 +
𝐿𝑎
𝑛
𝐴𝑎
𝑛)
 
 
After simplification, we obtain the following expression : 
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𝜁 =
𝜃𝑛 ∙
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝐿𝑎
+ (𝛾𝑛 − 𝜃(𝑛 − 1)) ∙
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝐴𝑎
𝜃 + 𝛾𝑛
 
 
From here, we may convert the labor/land ratio into population density by using the 
transformation :  
 
𝛾 =
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎
 
 
𝜁 =
𝜃𝑛 ∙
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝐿𝑎
+ ((
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛
− 𝜃(𝑛 − 1) ∙
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝐴𝑎
𝜃 + (
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛  
 
We then divide the numerator and denominator by θ : 
 
𝜁 =
𝑛 ∙
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝐿𝑎
+ (
1
𝜃 (
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛
− (𝑛 − 1) ∙
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝐴𝑎
1 +
1
𝜃 (
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛  
 
Here, we need to remember that what we actually look for is an expression of the 
growth rate of per capita output. Since :  
 
𝜁 =
𝑔𝑄
𝑔𝑃
  and 𝑔𝑞 = 𝑔𝑄 − 𝑔𝑃 
 
It follows that :  
 
𝜁 =
𝑔𝑞 + 𝑔𝑃
𝑔𝑃
 
 
We might now replace 𝜁by this expression in the general differential equation :  
 
 
𝑔𝑞 + 𝑔𝑃
𝑔𝑃
=
𝑛 ∙
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝐿𝑎
+ (
1
𝜃 (
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛
− (𝑛 − 1)) ∙
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝐴𝑎
1 +
1
𝜃 (
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛  
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On the right side of the equation, we see that the variables appear under the form of 
growth rates :  
 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑔𝐴𝑎 =
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝐴𝑎
= 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑔𝐿𝑎 =
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝐿𝑎
= 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒
𝑔𝑃 =
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
= 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
 
 
From here, we easily observe that population growth rate can be put forward, and 
hence eliminated from the denominator on both sides of the equation :  
 
𝑔𝑞 + 𝑔𝑃
𝑔𝑃
=
1
𝑔𝑃
(
𝑛 ∙
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝐿𝑎
+ (
1
𝜃 (
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛
− (𝑛 − 1) ∙
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝐴𝑎
1 +
1
𝜃 (
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛 ) 
 
 
We are thus left with :  
 
𝑔𝑞 =
𝑛 ∙ 𝑔𝐿𝑎 + (
1
𝜃 (
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛
− (𝑛 − 1)) ∙ 𝑔𝐴𝑎
1 +
1
𝜃 (
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛 − 𝑔𝑃 
 
The growth rate of agricultural workforce and of agricultural surfaces are however 
problematic variables because they evolve on two dimensions : an extensive dimension 
(the increase in total population or total surface) and an intensive dimension (the 
increase of the share of agricultural labor force in total population, or of the share of 
land devoted to agricultural activities). If we express their growth rate from equations 
(2) and (3) above, we get (with k constant):  
 
𝑔𝐿𝑎 =
𝑑𝐿𝑎
𝐿𝑎
= 𝑘𝛼
𝑑𝑃
𝐿𝑎
+ 𝑘𝑃
𝑑𝛼
𝐿𝑎
= 𝑘𝛼
𝑑𝑃
𝛼𝑘𝑃
+ 𝑘𝑃
𝑑𝛼
𝛼𝑘𝑃
=
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
+
𝑑𝛼
𝛼
= 𝑔𝑃 + 𝑔𝛼 
 
𝑔𝐴𝑎 =
𝑑𝐴𝑎
𝐴𝑎
= 𝑎
𝑑𝐴
𝐴𝑎
+ 𝐴
𝑑𝑎
𝐴𝑎
=  𝑎
𝑑𝐴
𝑎𝐴
+ 𝐴
𝑑𝑎
𝑎𝐴
=
𝑑𝐴
𝐴
+
𝑑𝑎
𝑎
= 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝑠 
 
Injecting these expressions into the equation yields :  
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𝑔𝑞 =
𝑛 ∙ (𝑔𝑃 + 𝑔𝛼) + (
1
𝜃 (
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛
− (𝑛 − 1)) ∙ (𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝑠)
1 +
1
𝜃 (
𝛼𝑘𝜌
𝑎 )
𝑛 − 𝑔𝑃 
 
Two further simplifications can be operated : first, we may recall the parameter K 
introduced above (eq. 4) : 𝐾 =
𝜃
(𝑘∙𝛼)𝑛
  and consider its inverse ?̅? = 1/𝐾. Here, since the 
parameter α has been taken as a variable, its occurrence in the equation refers to the 
conditions prior to the differential calculus, that is, at the initial time; hence K should 
be re-labelled K0. Finally, we may once again express the agricultural population 
density (noted ω) as the ratio of population density to the share of agricultural land. 
We thus have :  
 
𝑔𝑞 =
𝑛 ∙ (𝑔𝑃 + 𝑔𝛼) + (𝐾0̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝜔
𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛) ∙ (𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝑠)
𝐾0̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝜔𝑛 + 1
− 𝑔𝑃 
 
𝑔𝑞 =
𝑛 ∙ (𝑔𝑃 + 𝑔𝛼) + (𝐾0̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝜔
𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛) ∙ (𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝑠) − (𝐾0̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝜔
𝑛 + 1)𝑔𝑃
𝐾0̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝜔𝑛 + 1
 
 
=
𝑔𝑃 + 𝑔𝛼 + (
𝐾0̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝜔
𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛
𝑛 ) ∙ (𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝑠) − (
𝐾0̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝜔
𝑛 + 1
𝑛 )𝑔𝑃
(
𝐾0̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝜔𝑛 + 1
𝑛 )
 
 
From here, we might do some re-labelling and re-arranging of the terms order to make 
this equations more easily readable. Let us write :  
 
𝐾0̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝜔
𝑛 = Ω  
Ω + 1 = 𝑍 
 
This re-labelling yields :  
 
𝑔𝑞 =
𝑔𝑃 + 𝑔𝛼 + (
𝑍 − 𝑛
𝑛 ) ∙ (𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝑠) − (
𝑍
𝑛)𝑔𝑃
(
𝑍
𝑛)
=
𝑔𝛼 + (
𝑍 − 𝑛
𝑛 ) ∙ (𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝑠) − (
𝑍
𝑛 − 1)𝑔𝑃
(
𝑍
𝑛)
 
 
If we label : 
𝑍
𝑛
= 𝐻 , the equation can be rewritten as :  
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𝑔𝑞 = (
𝑛
𝑍
)𝑔𝛼 + (
𝑍 − 𝑛
𝑍
) (𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝑠) + (
𝑛 − 𝑍
𝑍
)𝑔𝑃 
 
After elementary algebraic simplification, we obtain the final formula :  
 
 
 
𝑔𝑞 = 𝐻 ∙ 𝑔𝛼 + (1 − 𝐻)𝑔𝑠 + (1 − 𝐻)𝑔𝐴 + (𝐻 − 1)𝑔𝑃 
   
 
